Interaction between agriculture and industry : case studies of farm mechanisation and industrialisation in Sweden and in the United States 1830-1930 by Kuuse, Jan,
Det här verket har digitaliserats vid Göteborgs universitetsbibliotek. 
Alla tryckta texter är OCR-tolkade till maskinläsbar text. Det betyder att du kan söka och 
kopiera texten från dokumentet. Vissa äldre dokument med dåligt tryck kan vara svåra att 
OCR-tolka korrekt vilket medför att den OCR-tolkade texten kan innehålla fel och därför bör 
man visuellt jämföra med verkets bilder för att avgöra vad som är riktigt.
Th is work has been digitised at Gothenburg University Library.
All printed texts have been OCR-processed and converted to machine readable text. 
Th is means that you can search and copy text from the document. Some early printed books 
are hard to OCR-process correctly and the text may contain errors, so one should always 
visually compare it with the images to determine what is correct.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
C
M
PUBLICATIONS OF
THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY 
(Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet)
34
INTERACTION BETWEEN 
AGRICULTURE 
AND INDUSTRY
Case studies of farm mechanisation 
and industrialisation in Sweden and 
the United States 1830-1930
BY
JAN KUUSE
GÖTEBORG
1974

PUBLICATIONS OF
THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY 
(Meddelanden från Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet)
34
INTERACTION BETWEEN 
AGRICULTURE 
AND INDUSTRY
Case studies of farm mechanisation 
and industrialisation in Sweden and 
the United States 1830-1930
BY
JAN KUUSE
GÖTEBORG
1974
Studies in the Diffusion of Technology
ISBN-91-85196-07-X
Translated by Eva and Allan Green
Published with a grant from the Swedish Council 
for Social Science Research
Printed in Sweden by 
Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala 1974
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 5
I. THE RÔLE OF AGRICLTURE IN THE ECONOMY ................ 8
A. The market expansion ................................................................. 9
B. Theprocessofcommercialisation ...................................................13
C. Industriesconnectedwithagriculture...............................................15
1. Industriesbasedondeliveriesfromagriculture ........................16
2. Industries based on deliveries to agriculture ........................... 20
IL THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENTSAND AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY .... 25
A. Introduction........................................................................................ 25
B. Small companies with local markets .............................................. 32
1. Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad......................................................34
(a) Summary.................................................................................43
2. Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri & Mekaniska Verkstad
in Skurup........................................................................................ 44
(a) Summary.................................................................................52
C. Medium-sized companies with national markets........................... 54
1. Overums Bruk .............................................................................55
(a) Summary.................................................................................76
2. Munktells mekaniska verkstad, Eskilstuna ............................... 77
3. Summary.......................................................................................113
D. Large companies with international markets................................. 116
1. AB Separator, Stockholm ........................................................ 116
(a) The background to de Laval’s separator ..........................116
(b) Theintroductionoftheseparatorontothemarket . . .121
(c) The international spread of the separator against
the background of orders from agriculture..........................126
North America........................................................................140
Germany ............................................................................... 163
Russia ................................................................................... 167
(d) AB Separator and competition: the situation...................... 179
(e) The rôle of the separator industry in the
Swedish engineering industry .............................................188
(f ) The separator and the economic situation..........................192
(g) AB Separator’s production conditions ..............................193
(h) Conditions of financing and ownership ..............................198
(/) Summary...............................................................................207
2. McCormick — International Harvester Company, Chicago . 215
The McCormick Epoch ............................................................215
Introduction ...............................................................................215
(a) The background to McCormick’s harvester......................221
(b) The introduction of the harvester onto the market . . . 232
(c) The spread of the harvester before the Civil War
against the background of orders from agriculture . . . 240 
(id) The harvester and the American Civil War ..................... 259
(e) The spread of the harvester outside the USA
before 1900 268
(f) The spread of the harvester in the USA after the
Civil War up to about 1900 282
The International Harvester Epoch .........................................298
(g) Mergers: theirformationandproblems............................. 298
(h) International Harvester and the new agricultural
technology ........................................................................... 307
(;') International Harvester and the domestic market . . . 322 
(/') InternationalHarvesterandtheforeignmarket . . . .331 
(k) Summary .............................................................................351
III. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS........................................................ 357
REFERENCES.............................................................................................. 368
INTRODUCTION
Economists from Adam Smith to Keynes have seen the accumula­
tion of capital as the strategic factor in economic progress. Factors 
which have stimulated or impeded the accumulation of capital have 
therefore been very carefully analysed. The classical writers on 
economic science such as Adam Smith, Ricardo and Malthus have 
shown how economic growth has been halted by too small national 
assets and too large a population increase. Even if Ricardo, for 
example, did not rule out the possibility of technology modifying the 
rock-hard law of scarcity, he did not believe that the technological 
advances would be of sufficient importance to bring economic pro­
gress in the long run. In particular Ricardo studied how economic 
stagnation developed: because of the population increase more and 
more inferior soil had to be cultivated and with this the rents on the 
better land were increased. A static situation is reached when land 
rents become very high. Advances in agricultural engineering can 
change the static situation so that the highly inferior land does not 
have to be cultivated, and it is therefore possible to avoid very 
high land rents. However, according to Ricardo, this progress was 
only a way of maintaining artificial respiration without any real long­
term effects.
It is not surprising that economists like Ricardo and Malthus took 
a basically pessimistic view of the development. In 1800 the average 
European was a farmer with production engineering which was on 
the whole unchanged while at the same time the population increase 
was accelerating.1 Pessimistic views prevailed around the year 1800.
The successors of the classic economists laid much greater stress
1 Malthus was of the opinion that it was essentially the productivity of agriculture 
(i.e. the food supplies) which governed the growth of the population. In her work 
The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Economics of Agrarian Change under 
Population Pressure (London 1965) Ester Boserup takes the converse view: it is 
the population growth which basically determines the development of agriculture.
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on the role of technology in economic growth, but these successors 
were also active during the first half of the nineteenth century when 
technological development started to expand. The community began 
to look on the new technology as a transformer. The difference be­
tween the static feudal system and the constant process of trans­
formation within the capitalist society was noted. Scientists such 
as Sombart, Weber and Schumpeter have pointed out that capitalism 
cannot survive without a constant stream of technical and social 
changes, and that it can only continue in a climate which accepts 
and assimilates these changes fairly easily. On the whole the nine­
teenth century signified a more positive view of progress, when 
Auguste Comte's work Cours de Philosophie Positive, among 
others, contributed to new thinking about the rôle of technology 
and science in society.
Nowadays the importance of technology is not questioned, but the 
discussions as to how technology can best serve mankind are all 
the more vigorous. In particular interest is shown in the potential 
and the obstacles to progress in the underdeveloped countries. The 
industrialised world has not been unwilling to give advice about 
technical-economic development, but the advice has been mixed to 
say the least. On the one hand reference has been made to the 
benefits of growth through gradual industrialisation via agriculture 
and the consumer goods industry, which was roughly what happened 
in the developed countries a hundred years ago. On the other hand 
planned industrial development with a more direct emphasis on in­
dustry, especially heavy industry, has been recommended, roughly 
as happened in the Soviet Union after 1928. In the case of each 
of the alternatives there was the question of creating a surplus in 
the agricultural sector and channelling the surplus over into the 
industrial sector. The factors which distinguished the two alterna­
tives from each other were inter alia the gradient of the transition 
and who was to bear the cost of industrialisation. The various strate­
gies of industrialisation will not be discussed here, but the present 
work will deal, in the form of examples, with the interaction be­
tween agriculture and industry as it took place in the industrialised 
countries at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth centuries. Concrete examples have been taken from 
Sweden and the USA.
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The pattern of interaction between agriculture and industry is a 
complex one. Profound changes in agriculture influenced industry 
to a great extent during the initial stages of industrialisation. But 
the reshaping of industry had repercussions on agriculture. An ex­
ample of such repercussions across national borders is the great 
importance of American industry for the development of Soviet 
collective agriculture. Around 1930 94 per cent of the Soviet Union’s 
imports of tractors came from the USA and about 75 per cent of 
all the tractors in use in the Soviet Union, at this time were of 
American origin. Thus during the important initial stage of the first 
five-year-plan American agrarian technology contributed to the 
development of Soviet agriculture and thereby also to a more rapid 
industrialisation of the Soviet economy.2
In the introductory chapter the rôles in the national economy of 
agriculture and agrarian industry respectively and the development 
of the ways in which they came into contact with each other are 
described. Techniques of trade and distribution became of greater 
importance in meeting the increased need for contact. Chapter II 
is the nub of the account. In it there is discussion of certain selected 
companies manufacturing agricultural implements/machinery and of 
the importance of agriculture’s orders from industry. The mech­
anisation of farming was made possible by the engineering industry’s 
provision of agrarian technology. Thus the engineering industry 
made an important contribution to the economic development of the 
agrarian sector. For its part, because of its size, agriculture played 
an important rôle in the industrialisation process as a buyer of 
engineering products. In considering some engineering companies 
with an outlet orientated towards agriculture the particular market 
forces which developed through the interaction between agriculture 
and industry will be examined.
2 Dalrymple, D., ‘American Technology and Soviet Agricultural Development, 1924- 
1933’ (in Agricultural History, 1966, pp. 187 fF. >.
Probably even the USA benefited from the exports of agricultural machines to 
the Soviet Union during the depression years around 1930.
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L THE RÔLE OF AGRICULTURE 
IN THE ECONOMY
During the period which is usually called the age of industrial break­
through in Europe and North America, farming still constituted a 
dominant part of economic life. During the nineteenth century the 
proportion engaged in the agricultural sector was still great. Great 
Britain was an exception.
Table 1. The proportion engaged in farming in percentages
1870 1910
Great Britain 15 8
USA 51 32
Sweden 72 48
In spite of its relative decline, farming was an important sector 
in Sweden and the USA. Therefore in those countries and others 
like them changes within the farming sector had profound con­
sequences for the economy as a whole.
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A. The market expansion
The industrialisation which started in earnest in Europe and the 
USA around the middle of the nineteenth century can be readily 
gauged from the process of urbanisation. As a rule the urban popu­
lation increased much faster than the rural population, above all in 
North-Western Europe and the USA from 1850. In Britain this 
process had already begun before 1800. Between 1850 and 1913 the 
urban population in Germany increased from 10 million to 40 million 
and in France from 10 million to 20 million. In Britain the urbanisa­
tion continued, and in the USA metropolitan centres sprung up, 
with New York and Chicago in the forefront. Contemporaneously 
with the urbanisation the rural areas in the new industrial countries 
were being industrialised. Thus from about 1850 the non-agrarian 
population increased at a very rapid rate.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and up to the 
First World War average real wages rose continually in the new in­
dustrial countries. The improvement in real wages and the increase 
in the non-agrarian population would lead to a great consumer de­
mand for farming products. This demand constituted a basic factor 
in the nineteenth century economy.
Apart from some important exceptions the free trade principle was 
lasting to the outbreak of the First World War through Britain’s 
very act of removing the grain tariffs in 1846. As regards the in­
creased demand, agriculture reacted to the new conditions. Condi­
tions for production and outlets on a larger scale had been created.
As to the farmers’ response to the new market situation, some of 
them thought that renewed and improved methods of production 
were justified in principle. No homogeneous response from the farm­
ers was to be found in the new industrial world. The reaction 
showed great national variations, and within each nation such factors 
as the size of farms and the topography of the land among other 
things exerted an influence. But the main principle stands firm: an 
increasing number of farmers believed that they had the basis for 
farm production on a large scale, carried out in a more mechanised 
and specialised form and with increasing production for sale.
The free trade principle stimulated international division of labour,
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specialisation and increased foreign trade. However, the new situa­
tion also brought about new upheavals and new conditions of compe­
tition. Before the First World War, for example, Britain became both 
a large net importer of farm products and an important market for 
several industrialised countries. The USA became a significant net 
exporter, while Sweden, from having previously had a net export of 
farm products, after 1880 became a net importer of grain but a net 
exporter of butter.
As a result of the new production methods mass-production of 
farm products occurred. The mechanisation also led to overproduc­
tion and crises. It is possible to say that the response to the in­
creased demand became, at least in part, too vigorous. During the 
end of the nineteenth century the USA, for example, went through a 
crisis of overproduction in agriculture. In Europe during the 1880s 
farming was exposed to ever stiffer competition from Russian and 
American grain exports. It can be established that the period 1850— 
1914 signified growing markets for farm products, although with 
elements of partial overproduction. The overproduction before the 
First World War was, however, on a smaller scale and more transient 
in character than the overproduction which developed with failing 
markets during the period between the wars.
The farmers' response to the new situation occurred in several 
dimensions. Part of the response resulted in an increased disposition 
towards new and more mechanised forms of operation. The question 
of this increased disposition is however a complex one. For a long 
time the willingness to develop and the ability to benefit from the 
possibilities of an innovation have been considered more or less self- 
evident. With a closer look it has become clear that various kinds of 
obstacles have had repressive effects on the diffusion of innova­
tions. The tempo of progress in the industrialised countries has not 
been self-evident. Due to their large numbers the underdeveloped 
countries have made the industrialised countries of Europe and 
North America stand out as exceptions to the general rule. As 
regards their capacity to benefit from innovations there are interest­
ing differences between countries which are now industrialised and 
underdeveloped countries, whatever the causes of such differences 
may be.
A vital condition for the diffusion of something new is of course
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that the innovation shall become known. The spread of the field 
of information in space and time is of course dependent on how 
the transmitters and receivers of information function. Difficulties in 
communication can occur in both channels. For example a technical 
innovation could be marketed in an inadequate fashion by the inno­
vator or producer. Perhaps those who, it was assumed, would 
receive the information, were not capable of understanding and 
accepting the innovation or did not wish to do so. Marketing and the 
transmission of information about technical and social innovations 
were in general still very undeveloped during the nineteenth century 
and could therefore have hindered the acceptance of new techniques, 
but the decisive obstacle was to be found in the receiving channel.
Not all farmers by any means bothered to keep themselves in­
formed about the latest agrarian technology, apart from the fact 
that many had neither the time nor the ability (or believed that 
they had not). Some of those who kept up with technical develop­
ments could not afford the cost of the new technology. The analy­
sis of profitability was a key factor when it came to introducing 
new agrarian techniques of production. The economic base of the 
farmers played a decisive rôle in this analysis of profitability. If the 
economic base was wide—and this was determined by such factors 
as the size of the farm, the topography and fertility of the land, 
the livestock and the supply of ready money—and there were poten­
tial markets for farm produce, there would probably have been the 
incentive for new agrarian techniques. In an earlier study of Swedish 
agriculture the author has also established how rapidly and to how 
great an extent farmers with a bigger economic base reacted to 
agrarian innovations as compared with farmers with smaller scope. 
Most of the farmers in Sweden—about 80 per cent—had not mech­
anised their production to any great extent just before the First 
World War. This applied to smallholdings and smaller farms which 
in fact improved the standard of the quality and quantity of their 
equipment during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, but which had not been incor­
porated into commercial forms of operation.3 This tendency was
3 Kuuse, J., Från redskap till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersiali­
sering inom svenskt jordbruk 1860-1910.
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present in countries which were then at the same level of devel­
opment as Sweden. It is probable that the inclination to acquire 
farming machinery was held in check by the shortness of the period 
for which the machines could be used. Therefore profitability during 
the actual period of use must have been considered very important 
by those who extended their machine parks.
Thus the importance of the economic framework for the inclina­
tion to acquire the more highly qualified agrarian mechanics in 
particular is obvious. The tendency was further reinforced by the 
whole way of life—dictated by economic resources—which was to 
characterise “the gentry” during the nineteenth century. Landed 
proprietors, especially in Europe, strove to attain a social position 
in society which would correspond to their economic position. 
Through education they tried to attain the ideal of an educated 
landowning class who were accepted in higher circles. The pattern 
of education often included study abroad or general travelling or 
both, which gave the greater landowners opportunities of extending 
their contacts. More often than other farmers, the upper class in 
agriculture came into contact with innovations, for example at inter­
national agricultural exhibitions. Therefore this upper class would 
naturally develop some sort of curiosity about innovations. Thus the 
whole economic framework and environment produced a group 
which was basically less conservative, at least as far as technical 
innovations were concerned. There are also examples of landowners 
overreaching themselves in their technical ambitions, especially 
when their economic base shrunk, for example where the homestead 
was split up. Economic realities did not by any means invariably 
keep pace with social and technical ambitions.
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B. The process of 
commercialisation
The so-called transport revolution constituted one factor in the ex­
pansion of social contacts, above all for the upper class, during the 
nineteenth century. Transport by sea and land was gradually im­
proved. Steamships and steam engines replaced the older means of 
transport. The growing transport system provided for much faster, 
cheaper and more comfortable passenger transport, internationally 
as well as nationally. But although the consequences of the con­
stantly improving passenger traffic should not be underestimated, it 
was of course in the carriage of goods that the transport system was 
of great importance economically.
The faster and cheaper carriage of goods in the middle of the 
nineteenth century opened up completely new markets for agricul­
tural and industrial goods. Local and regional markets were strongly 
supplemented j by national and international ones. The trade route 
was extended. In addition the new transport system threw existing 
production completely out of gear. For large groups the process of 
adjustment and adaptation became difficult. Here reference need 
only be made to the situation as regards competition to which the 
European farmers were exposed, above all during the 1880s. Inex­
pensive Russian and American grain flowed onto the market as a 
result of increased production and cheaper and speedier transport.
Thus the transport revolution made a very concrete contribution 
to paving the way for mass-production and extended markets for 
industrial and agricultural goods. At the same time as mass-produc­
tion replaced older forms of production, deeper specialisation within 
agriculture and industry became necessary. As regards agriculture, 
this especially concerned the developing production in the food 
industry. During the period in question it would be misleading to 
describe the production of food as industrialised. It would be just 
as appropriate to regard the food manufacturing industry as a tech­
nical industry ancillary to agriculture, and for a long time the differ­
ence between the actual processed produce of agriculture and the
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food manufacturing industry was one of degree rather than kind. 
In any case agriculture through its deliveries of raw materials con­
stituted the basis for the food manufacturing industry. Gradually, 
however, production in the manufacture of food became more and 
more specialised and operated in industrialised forms. The centrali­
sation of operations, together with the formation of metropolitan 
areas which took place, accentuated the need for a better technique 
of distribution and a viable commercial system. Thus through the 
food manufacturing industry agriculture could process and distribute 
its goods in a manner which was more rational and better suited 
to the changes in the community.
Mention has already been made of the great importance for the 
whole economy of the technique of transporting goods. This applied 
especially to the carriage of heavy and bulky goods. To a great 
extent it was those types of goods which were to be increasingly 
transported to and from the farms. As regards transport to the farms, 
E. F. Heckscher stresses the special importance of the railways for 
the distribution of farm machinery and fertilizers. After the 1880s 
farming in several European countries was to produce foodstuffs 
from animals to a greater extent. Speed of transport is of the greatest 
importance for animal products. The railways and transoceanic 
shipping contributed to a high degree to the changed objective in 
production. In this context the refrigeration equipment with which 
ships and trains were fitted from the 1870s onwards played an im­
portant part. Thereafter frozen meat could be transported over 
distances which were practically unlimited. As regards Sweden, at 
the turn of the nineteenth century the average distance for transport 
on the state railways was 410 kilometres for meat, 540 kilometres 
for cheese and 330 kilometres for butter. The average distance for 
the transporting of grain was shorter, about 70 kilometres, but con­
siderably longer for flour, about 250 kilometres.4
4 Heckscher, E. F.. Till belysning af järnvägarnas betydelse för Sveriges ekono­
miska utveckling, pp. 109 f. and 118 ff.
Today the problems connected with the stock-keeping of agricultural products 
in many underdeveloped countries constitute a parallel with the problems of 
transport and storage which began to be solved through refrigeration in the 
transporting of food about 100 years ago. It is difficult to estimate the total loss 
of grain spoilt through faulty transport and methods of storage, but in any event
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C. Industries connected 
with agriculture
The contacts between agriculture and industry developed through 
the rôle of agriculture partly as seller and supplier to industry and 
partly as customer and buyer of industrial products. As the food 
manufacturing industry started to free itself from actual farming and 
to expand in consequence, contact was organised between farming 
and the food manufacturing industry, the branch of industry which 
mainly processed farm products. With mechanisation the demand 
for farming tools or machinery or both increased, as well as the 
demand for fertilizers. It was above all the engineering works and 
the fertilizer industry which were to meet the demands of agriculture 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Previously agricul­
ture's demand for tools had often been supplied by manufacture in 
the village blacksmith’s shop or in the farms themselves. It is prob­
able that for a long time the village blacksmith held a key position 
as far as the diffusion of agrarian technology locally was concerned. 
Many blacksmiths’ shops gradually developed into significant work­
shops with production concentrated on farming machinery. The 
orders for machinery from the food manufacturing industry, which 
very closely resembled that of farming in character, also played 
an important rôle as a customer of engineerings works.
Farming exerted a direct influence on the whole process of in­
dustrialisation through the consumer goods, engineering and fertili­
zer industries. In the text which follows there will be a discus­
sion, with examples, of the importance in the USA and Sweden 
of those particular branches of industry in comparison with industry 
as a whole.
this constitutes a significant deficit item in world economy. The problems of wastage 
have now begun to be tackled. However, this is taking place in many different 
ways (not including planned destruction), and it is probable that no short-term 
solution will be found. However, distribution and storage technology is faced here 
with a world economic problem.
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1. Industries based on deliveries from agriculture
There are various ways of assessing the industrial breakthrough 
which occurred in the USA and Sweden during the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, somewhat earlier in the USA than in Swe­
den. The change in the deployment of labour to farming and in­
dustry constitutes a rough gauge (see table 1), and the develop­
ment of the industry’s production in terms of value a further gauge. 
If industrial development is assessed on the basis of the industry’s 
production value, it is striking how large a proportion of the produc­
tion value came from the branches of industry which were com­
pletely dependent for their production on farm products. This 
applied at the beginning of the twentieth century too. At the start 
of the First World War the food manufacturing industry was the 
dominant branch of industry—in terms of the value of the end pro­
ducts—in Sweden as well as the USA. In all probability this was 
also the case in countries at the same level of development. The 
leather and textile industry could also be included among the 
branches of industry which were based on farm products, even if 
agriculture’s contacts with the food manufacturing industry were 
more direct and more extensive than with the leather and textile 
industry. In any case the deliveries of raw materials from farming 
constituted the basis for the leather and textile industry. The food 
manufacturing and the leather and textile industries are both re­
presentatives of light industry (consumer goods industry) which 
played a decisive rôle during the first phases of industrialisation in 
the countries which developed in a similar way to the USA and 
Sweden.5
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the level of development of various
5 The forestry industry has not been included among the industries based on 
supplies from agriculture. Forestry has often been closely connected with the 
original farming (forests owned by farmers) which could have warranted the inclu­
sion of the forestry industry. However, only the raw materials from the original 
farming have been related to the process of industrialisation here. The forestry 
industry is also different in character to the consumer goods industry. But it is 
apparent that agriculture in a wider sense, i.e. including forestry, has through its 
supplies influenced industrial development to an even greater degree than directly 
appears from the present section.
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Table 2. The value in millions of Swedish crowns of the production of in­
dustries in Sweden based on farm products'1
Branch 1896 1900 1910
Mills 53.3 83.6 106.4
Distilleries 45.6 61.1 64.7
Dairies 41.5 45.9 61.5
Sugar refineries 36.9 47.5 65.1
Breweries 21.7 33.6 39.0
Slaughterhouses 7.5 6.6 16.3
Bakeries 2.9 5.6 17.2
Margarine factories 1.8 10.2 18.9
A=the whole of the food manu-
facturing industry
B=the textile industry (spinning
211.2 294.1 389.1
mills+ weaving mills) 80.7 105.8 158.3
C=tanneries 7.7 11.1 28.9
D= the whole of industry 733.9 1 092.1 1 664.7
E=A as % of D 29% 27% 23%
F=B+C as % of D 12% 11% 11%
a Dairy production has been included in the table in spite of the fact that dairies are 
not considered as à branch of industry in Swedish statistics. On the other hand the 
value of the production of raw sugar has not been included.
Source Bidrag till Sveriges Officiella Statistik. D Fabriker och handtverk. Medde­
landen från Kungl. Lantbruksstyrelsen.
branches of industry within the consumer industries in Sweden and 
the USA after industrialisation had begun. In spite of the fact that 
the industrial statistics in Sweden were reorganised in 1896, and 
from then onwards show an improvement in several respects, the 
statistical material after that date cannot stand up to scrutiny in 
detail. This also applies to the American statistics. For example the 
statistics contain certain duplicated entries, but nevertheless these 
cannot affect the broad pattern in tables 2 and 3. The relative im­
portance of light industry in comparison with industry as a whole 
at the beginning of the twentieth century is established irrespective 
of the shortcomings of the statistics, and it then constituted around 
40 per cent of the total value of industrial production in both Sweden 
and the USA.
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Table 3. The value in millions of dollars of the production of industries in 
the USA based on farm products
Branch 1900 1905
Slaughterhouses + meat packing industries 783 (1.1) 913 (1.1)
Mills 501 (1.2) 713 (1.2)
Breweries+ distilleries 381 (4.9) 500 (4.3)
Sugar refineries 240(1.1) 277 (1.1)
Bakeries 175(1.8) 270(1.7)
Dairies 145 (1.2) 181 (1.2)
Others 475 492
A=the whole of the food manufacturing
industry 2 700 3 346
B=the textile industry 1 637 2 147
C=the leather industry 584 (1.3) 706 (1.3)
D= the whole of industry 11 406 (1.7) 14 743 (1.7)
E=A as % of D 24% 23%
F=B as % of D 14% 14%
G=C as % ofD 5% 5%
Note The figures in parentheses give the piocessing coefficient. The processing 
coefficient=the end value of the product divided by the value of the raw ma­
terials. The processing coefficient for the cotton industry was 1.9 and for the wool 
industry 1.6 in 1900. In 1905 the coefficient was 1.6 for both branches of industry.
Source Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1910 and 1912.
There is a striking similarity between Sweden and the USA 
as regards the relative importance of the branches of industry. As 
appears from tables 2 and 3, in Sweden in the year 1900 the food 
manufacturing sector accounted for 27 per cent and the leather and 
textile sector 11 per cent of the value of the production of the whole 
of industry. The corresponding figures for the USA were 24 per 
cent and 19 per cent respectively. However, certain national charac­
teristics can be distinguished. The fact that the textile industry 
played a somewhat greater part in the USA is not surprising, 
because of the extensive domestic growing of cotton. Sweden on 
the other hand has been completely dependent on imported cotton.
Another national difference was the relative importance of slaugh­
terhouses. Slaughterhouses have played a comparatively minor rôle
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in the Swedish food manufacturing industry, whereas the slaugh­
tering and meat packing industry expanded in a completely differ­
ent way in the United States. Tendencies towards the concentra­
tion of operations could be discerned in the American slaughtering 
and meat packing sector at an early stage. The consequences of 
centralised operations at a few large production units became appar­
ent, inter alia on the technological level. The meat packing sector 
was the first branch of industry to introduce the conveyor belt be­
fore 1850. The technique of refrigeration, to which reference has 
already been made, began to be used during the 1870s and it be­
came of great importance for the localisation and expansion of the 
meat packing industry. By means of new refrigeration devices on the 
railway wagons meat production on an industrial scale could be freed 
from the demand for proximity to a consumer centre in the Eastern 
USA. Frozen meat could tolerate long journeys and therefore the 
packing of meat could be located and concentrated in production 
centres, viz. the cattle districts round Chicago and in the Middle- 
West. Then a few large factories dominated the whole of the meat 
packing industry.
As far as the dairies were concerned a converse situation pre­
vailed. After the crises in European agriculture during the 1880s 
farming policy in several cases changed to greater livestock produc­
tion. In Sweden this led to a sharp increase in the production of 
dairy butter, which was mainly sold on the foreign market. The 
production of butter required a more intensive form of cattle-farm­
ing which was also practised in Sweden. Cattle-farming in the 
USA, ,however, was practised more extensively and concentrated 
on meat instead of milk and butter.
The value of production is an inadequate gauge of the contribu­
tion made by various branches of industry to industrial development. 
It includes not only the value of the industrial production process 
but also the value of the raw materials. Therefore the processing 
value gives a supplementary and fairer picture of the importance of 
the various industries. It is clear from table 3 that the processing 
value (processing coefficient) in the American consumer goods in­
dustries was usually considerably lower than in industry as a whole 
(cf. tables 3 and 5). With the exception of the beverage industry, 
raw materials in the consumer goods industry (farm goods) were
19
very high in value in comparison with the end products. However 
the textile industry and the bakeries tended to come near to the 
average for industry as a whole. By virtue of the fact that the 
processing level in the consumer goods industries had been lower 
from a general point of view than in several other industries, the 
significance of the consumer industry was reduced to a certain ex­
tent. Even if the processing value is used as a gauge, light industry 
took up the leading position among the industries. However, as 
regards processing value, the metal industry in the USA had over­
taken light industry before the First World War.6
The processing coefficients which appear in table 3 have been 
taken from the USA. With reservations for small differences in 
detail, they probably apply to countries with a corresponding in­
dustrial level. Similar tendencies to those in Sweden and the USA 
before the First World War would probably be apparent in the coun­
tries which were industrialised during the latter part of the nine­
teenth century. Thus the consumer goods industry played a dom­
inant rôle during the initial stages of industrialisation. However, a 
decline in the relative importance of this sector of industry can 
be traced before 1914, and other industries gradually take over 
the dominant industrial position. The factor above all which altered 
the old positions was the growth of the metal industry, including 
the engineering industry.
2. Industries based on deliveries to agriculture
The mechanisation in farming meant an increased demand for certain 
industrial products. Farming played an important part as a customer 
of industry as far as engineering works and the fertilizer industry 
were concerned. Indirectly the development of agriculture, condi­
tioned by market forces, became of great importance because of the 
expansion of the food manufacturing industry. Of course in its turn 
the food manufacturing industry required industrial products, mainly 
machinery from the engineering industry. The producers of agricul-
6 Statistical Abstract of the United States 1910, pp. 175 ff. ; 1912, pp. 199 ff.
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tural implements and machines also had to give orders to the tool 
industry for their own production. Thus a chain reaction occurred 
within the industry and a network of sub-suppliers grew up. As far 
as the engineering industry was concerned the various branches of 
industry were the biggest customers, and only a minor part of the 
value of the engineering works’ production came from engineering 
companies which had farming as a customer. But from the cus­
tomer’s point of view the importance of farming for industrialisation 
through the chain reaction which has been referred to was greater 
than is shown directly by the statistics. Apart from its direct orders 
to industry, farming also acted as one of the catalysts in industrial 
development.7
In value the production of the engineering works constituted 5-6 
per cent of the whole of industry both in Sweden and the USA 
during the beginning of the twentieth century. The corresponding 
proportion for the fertilizer industry was barely 1 per cent. In Swe­
den the production value of the agricultural implements/machinery 
amounted to 25-30 per cent of that of the engineering industry 
(table 4A). In the USA the corresponding figures were lower (11- 
24 per cent) which can be explained by the fact that dairy machinery 
which constituted a large entry in table 4A has not been included in 
table 5.
As with the consumer goods industries in relation to the engineer­
ing works and fertilizer industry, it is striking how similar in com­
parative importance the branches of industry were in Sweden and 
the USA. When assessing development from the point of view of the
7 Hans Modig in his work Järnvägarnas efterfrågan och den svenska industrin
1860-1914 approaches the problem of demand on the basis of the transport service 
as a customer of industry. He studies the spreading effect of railway construction 
on domestic industry and finds that this effect was fairly limited. The reason for 
this was that Swedish railway building was to a great extent made possible by im­
ports of railway materials. Thus the spreading effect was not to any great extent 
easy to gauge in Sweden.
The situation was different as regards the spreading effect of the orders placed 
by agriculture with the Swedish engineering industry. After the 1880s the exports 
of agricultural implements and machinery were greater than the imports and the 
difference gradually increased before 1914. Therefore the spreading effect of these 
orders was to remain within the country to a much higher degree, of which more 
in chapter 4.
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Table 4A. The production value of the engineering industry in Sweden in 
thousands of Swedish crowns
Tools/machinery 1896 1900 1906 1910
Locomobiles 394 705 1 168 1 188
Ploughs, harrows 590 796 1 510 1 655
Harvesters+ sowing machines 1 210 1 198 2 670 6 618
Threshing machines 634 993 1 469 2 353
Chaff cutters and others 146 171 284 309
Dairy machinery 4 675 8 020 10 337 11 404
Other agricultural implements 822 932 1 246 1 280
A=total tools+machinery 8 471 12 815 18 684 24 807
B=total of engineering industry 31 694 53 029 72 769 82 334
C=A as % ofB 26.7 24.2 25.7 30.:
Source Supplement to SOS D Fabriker och handtverk.
production value of the industry it is also clear that farming was of 
greater importance as a supplier to industry than as a customer for 
industrial products. But the dual rôles of farming in industrialisation 
appear better balanced when the degree of processing is taken into 
consideration. As appears from table 5 the processing coefficient 
was considerably higher in the engineering industry than in industry 
as a whole. The difference in the degree of processing is especially 
great when the engineering works are compared with the consumer 
goods industry. From a comparative viewpoint, therefore, the
Table 4B. The production value of the engineering works, the fertilizer in­
dustry and industry as a whole in Sweden in millions of Swedish crowns
Year
A=in­
dustry
B = the engi­
neering 
works
B as %
of A
C=the
fertilizer
industry
C as % 
of A
1896 692.4 31.7 4.6 4.4 0.6
1900 1 046.2 53.0 5.1 5.2 0.5
1910 1 003.2 82.3 5.1 11.5 0.7
Source Supplement to SOS D Fabriker och handtverk.
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Table 5. The production value in millions of dollars of industries in the 
USA based on deliveries to agriculture
Branch 1880 1890 1900 1905 1910
A=Agricultural impie-
ments 68 (2.1) 81(2.5) 101 (2.3) 112 (2.3) 146 (2.4)
B = Foundries+engi-
neering works 215 (2.1) 413 (2.4) 644 (2.3) 799 (2.5) 1 228 (2.3)
C=Fertilizer industry 24(1.5) 39(1.6) 45 (1.6) 57(1.5) 104(1.5)
D=Industry as a whole 11 406(1.7) 14 743 (1.7) 20 672 (1.7)
E=A as % of B + A 24 16 14 14 11
F = A-I-B as % of D 6.5 5.5 6.6
G=C as % of D 0.4 0.4 0.5
Note Dairy machinery is not included under the heading ‘Agricultural implements’. 
The figures in parentheses indicate the processing coefficient.
Source Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1910 and 1912.
industrial production phase was of far greater importance in the 
engineering industry than it was in light industry.
Farming occupied a central position during the initial stage of 
industrialisation before the First World War. About 50 per cent of the
Table 6. Number of companies and number of workers in thousands in in­
dustries in Sweden based on deliveries to agriculture
1896 1900 1910
Number of companies
A. Engineering works 296 315 459
B. Fertilizerindustrya 89 72 50
C. Industry as a whole 8 812 10 549 11 435
Number of workers (in thousands)
A. Engineering works 16 21 22
B. Fertilizer industry 1 1 1
C. Industryasawhole 202 265 302
“ A small number (4-6) of superphosphate factories dominated the production of 
fertilizers.
Source Supplement to SOS D Fabriker och handtverk.
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Table 7. Number of companies, number of workers in thousands and capi­
tal in millions of dollars in industries in the USA based on deliveries to 
agriculture
1880 1890 1900 1910
Number of companies
A. Production of agricultural
implements 1 943 910 715 640
B. Foundries+engineering works 4 984 6 500 9 316 13 253
C. Fertilizer industry 364 390 422 550
D. Industry as a whole 207 514 268 491
Number of workers 
(in thousands)
A. Production of agricultural
implements 40 39 46 51
B. Foundries+engineering works 145 231 350 531
C. Fertilizer industry 9 9 12 18
D. Industry as a whole 4 713 6 615
Capital (in millions 
of dollars)
A. Production of agricultural
implements 62 145 157 256
B. Foundries + engineering works 155 383 663 1 514
C. Fertilizer industry 18 41 61 122
D. Industry as a whole 8 975 18 428
Source Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1910 and 1912.
production value of industry as a whole came from industries which 
were in various ways directly connected with agriculture. This 
applied to countries like Sweden and the USA during the initial 
decades of industrialisation before 1914, and probably also to coun­
tries on a corresponding industrial level. Therefore the interaction 
between farming and industry stands out as a fundamental factor in 
the process of industrialisation. More than anything else, what hap­
pened in agriculture, with its wide base and its large area of contact 
with industry, was to have ramifications for the growth of industry 
as well as the economy as a whole.
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IL THE PRODUCTION AND 
MARKETING OF 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS 
AND AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY
A. Introduction
Whereas the development of agrarian technology has been studied 
from a producer’s point of view in the present work, in an earlier 
study agrarian technology was analysed mainly from a consumer’s 
point of view. In this earlier study particular attention was devoted 
to the question of how agrarian technical innovations were in­
troduced, accepted and adapted by the farmers in Sweden between 
1860 and 1910 (see note 3). The main question was which farmers 
reacted to the increased demand for agricultural products by in­
creasing mechanisation and which did not. Thus the spread of 
mechanisation in the various social and economic strata of agricul­
ture was considered fundamental. In earlier research into economic 
history insufficient attention has been paid to the processes of 
spreading in the development of agriculture and industry. In Amer­
ican research the problems connected with the diffusion of agrarian 
technology have in fact been dealt with comparatively extensively, 
but the process of diffusion has not yet been tackled in an integrated 
and more systematic way. The development of agriculture is one of 
those areas of research in which it is difficult to obtain hard facts. 
The large number of very small units of production have not left 
behind very many sources. As regards summaries of information, 
there are statistical accounts of agriculture on a national and regional 
level, but the individual units of agricultural production, as distinct 
from several industrial companies, have not provided any material 
which would make it possible to study each primary unit of produc­
tion individually. However there is one source which, in Sweden at
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any rate, can provide information about the possession of agricul­
tural implements and machinery, viz. the Estate Inventory Deeds.
Thus research into the diffusion of mechanisation in Swedish 
agriculture has been based on Inventory Deeds of people who at 
the time of their death were actively engaged in farming. Estate 
Inventory Deeds for three counties in South and Central Sweden 
were analysed in terms of the possession of some fifteen farming 
implements and machines such as ploughs, harrows, rollers, sowing 
machines, harvesters, threshing-machines, separators and milking 
machines, and the farms which were examined were divided into 
four groups according to size: smallholdings, smaller farms, larger 
farms and large holdings. The material in the Inventory Deeds has 
been regarded as a very useful source for estimating the diffusion 
of agrarian technology. In addition the Inventory Deeds provide a 
direct answer to the important question as to which farmers did not 
possess the agricultural implements and machines referred to.
There is another side to the problem of the spread of mechanisa­
tion in agriculture which concerns the marketing of the industry. 
The question of the extent to which farming by virtue of its size 
and buying power was an important customer of industry in general 
and the engineering industry in particular is an important one, and 
has been made the focal point of the present work. However it is 
easier to understand the development of the industries which manu­
factured agricultural implements according to farming’s require­
ments once it is known how the various farmers reacted to different 
forms of agricultural technology.
The mechanisation in farming meant an increase in the demand 
for industrially produced implements and machinery. Previously 
agriculture’s demand for implements had been satisfied by the pro­
duction of the village smithy itself. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century, of the engineering works which existed in Sweden only 
about twenty companies were above the handicraft level. In addition 
certain engineering products were manufactured at various iron 
works. Examples of larger engineering works of this time were 
Motala verkstad, Bolinders in Stockholm, Keillers in Gothenburg, 
Kockum in Malmö and Munktells in Eskilstuna.8
Gårdlund, T., Industrialismens samhälle, pp. 32 f.
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A rough outline of the development of the Swedish engineering 
industry during the latter part of the nineteenth century has already 
been given. Several companies were still assumed to produce a 
multiplicity of goods during the nineteenth century even though a 
tendency to specialise can be traced during the 1890s. Mention may 
be made of De Lavais separatorfabrik among those companies which 
formed the basis for the new specialised industries.9
Agriculture was of importance for industrialisation on account of 
its orders from the engineering industry. Therefore the interaction 
between agriculture and the engineering industry will be traced by 
studying six selected engineering companies with their markets 
directed towards agriculture. The selection of the engineering com­
panies has been governed by a wish to have companies of different 
sizes and with different levels of specialisation represented. The 
companies analysed may be said to exemplify different grades of 
company which were current at the outbreak of the First World War. 
Groupings into three such grades have been made, and two com­
panies are represented in each grade.
The first grade is made up of small engineering works with a 
mainly local market for their products. Two engineering works in 
Scania have been chosen as representing this type of company: 
AB Lilia Harrie Redskapsverkstad (10 kilometres north of Lund) and 
Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri & Mekaniska Verkstad in Skurup.10
The next two companies will represent the larger companies which 
had the whole of Sweden as a market and in addition exported on 
a fairly large scale. Of the two examples Överums Bruk (in the north 
of Kalmar län) is the oldest, founded in 1654. However the produc­
tion of agricultural implements only began in the middle of the nine­
teenth century. The other company, Munktells in Eskilstuna, 
originated early in the 19th century.
The two companies on the third and last level, AB Separator in 
Stockholm and the International Harvester Company in Chicago, 
represent companies which had already developed into multinational 
companies before the First World War. A very large part of their
9 Ibid., pp. 8Iff. Jörberg, L., Growth and Fluctuations of Swedish Industry 1869- 
1912.
10 The above-mentioned engineering works have expanded since 1914, and recently 
the local quality has diminished to a corresponding degree.
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Lilla Harrie Redskapsfabrik 
Bröderna Andersson, Skurup
överums Bruk 
Munktells, Eskilstuna
AB Separator, Stockholm
International Harvester Company, Chicago
local grade 
national grade 
international grade
Figure 1. The companies examined grouped by grades around 1914.
production was exported. However the large domestic market in 
the USA was of greater importance to International Harvester than 
the Swedish market was to AB Separator.
Figure 1 shows the grouping of the companies into the grades 
which have been described. Naturally figure 1 constitutes a simpli­
fication of the reality for the purpose of demonstration. In actual 
fact there are several transitional forms and grades between com­
panies in the local and the national grades and between companies 
in the national and the international grades. It should also be borne 
in mind that figure 1 only shows the situation at a certain given 
time (around 1914) and therefore what is shown is a static picture. 
During the period before 1914 Swedish industry was developing to 
a large extent in the rural areas in the form of many small company 
units. N. Wohlin has described the engineering industry (in 1912) in a 
somewhat colourful but accurate way as a highly diffuse small-scale 
industry from which a smaller number of companies of world renown 
rose up like giants among dwarfs.11 Neither the dynamics and inter­
nal development of the company nor the numerous types of company 
are reflected in figure 1. But in the following text the individual 
development of the various companies will be traced. In this context 
certain general characteristics of development will be discussed on 
the basis of the individual company. In fact the specific and unique 
characteristics of the development of the individual company are at 
least as important for a good understanding of the interaction be­
tween agriculture and industry.
Before the development of the individual companies is discussed. 
J. Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurs will be mentioned briefly, 
and his ideas will be of some assistance in the discussion which
11 Wohlin, NDriftskoncentrationer i svensk fabriksindustri, p. 53.
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Map I showing the location of the Swedish companies under examination 
which manufactured agricultural implements and machinery.
follows. The concept of the entrepreneur and the development of 
the company are closely connected. Joseph Schumpeter is the 
economist who has stressed most clearly the importance of the 
entrepreneur in economic development. He maintains that the 
entrepreneur’s innovations are the most important mechanism for 
changing the national economy. Progress involves great changes 
and there must be individuals capable of directing the process of 
fundamental economic transformation. In Schumpeter’s system this 
key rôle is filled by the entrepreneur. His task is to create or bring 
into operation new combinations of familiar individual processes. 
“The entrepreneur and his function are not difficult to concep­
tualize: the defining characteristic is simply the doing of new things 
or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way 
(innovation). It should be observed at once that the “new thing” 
need not be spectacular or of historic importance. It need not be 
Bessemer steel or the internal combustion engine. It can be the 
Deerfoot sausage. To see the phenomenon even at the humblest
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levels of the business world is quite essential though it may be 
difficult to find the humble entrepreneurs, historically.”12
Certain distinctions are of importance with regard to Schum­
peter’s concept of the entrepreneur. First, there has to be a distinc­
tion between an entrepreneur and management. It is one thing to 
build up a company and to realize a new idea and another thing 
to lead the administration of an established company, even if the 
two tasks often overlap. Furthermore, the function of the entre­
preneur is not identical with that of the capital owner, which con­
sists of providing money for investment. The essential thing in the 
business community is to put something new on the market. Thus 
the person whose importance for the development process is deci­
sive is the person who directs the use of the capital invested, not 
the person who provides it. The entrepreneur creates the capital 
and makes credit necessary at the same time. Finally, it is of 
particular importance to keep the entrepreneur separate from the 
inventor. Many inventors have become entrepreneurs but there is 
no absolute connection between the two functions. The inventor 
produces ideas, the entrepreneur puts them into practice, which 
can, but need not, mean anything new scientifically. An idea or a 
scientific principle is not in itself of economic significance. During 
classical antiquity Greek natural science probably had the collective 
knowledge necessary for the construction of a steam engine. But 
this did not help the Greeks or the Romans to build the steam 
engine.
As has been stated, the entrepreneur may also play other parts 
than that of entrepreneur. He may be an inventor, administrator, 
capita] owner and entrepreneur all in one, but there is no necessary 
connection between any of the four rôles. The fact that in reality 
it is seldom possible to encounter one rôle in its pure form is a 
different matter. What Schumpeter means is that the entrepreneur 
holds the key position in the control of the production processes. 
He has also pointed out that there is never a shortage of ideas 
for technical improvements. What may be in short supply is the 
manufacturer’s ability which is necessary to introduce these innova-
12 Schumpeter, J., ‘The Creative Response in Economic History’ (in the Journal of 
Economic History, no. 2 1947).
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tions to the public. It is often people of a unique type of personality 
who have sparked off the process of progress in a country.13 We 
therefore need to study more closely how these individuals have 
arisen and do arise in a society.
13 Ibid. According to Schumpeter capitalism is the most favourable environment for 
entrepreneurs and consequently also for changes in the national economy.
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B. Small companies with 
local markets
There was a rapid growth in the formation of companies connected 
with the industrialisation of Sweden during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. This also applied to a great extent to the 
engineering works. From the middle of the nineteenth century there 
was a noticeable trend towards an engineering industry independent 
of the iron works. For a long time this limited engineering industry 
had rather a special character. Production often took place to order. 
The marketing was usually local or regional. Although, thanks to 
the epoch-making milling machine, some larger companies in­
troduced specialised production in quantities before the end of the 
nineteenth century, the specialisation did not extend very far before 
the First World War. As E. Dahmén says: “Several great innova­
tions in production technique apart from the milling machine are 
to be found during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but 
they were not put into general circulation”.14
14 Dahmén, E., Svensk industriell företagarverksamhet. I, pp. 16f. Dahmén dates 
the quantitative breakthrough of Swedish production technique to the period after 
1895. Gårdlund. T., Industrialismens samhälle, pp. 90ff.
Without the milling machine it would have been impossible to produce gear 
wheels or worm wheels for the speeds needed in separators and steam turbines, 
for example.
Gårdlund draws a distinction between two different types of Swedish engineer­
ing works around the turn of the nineteenth century, and at the same time gives 
a descriptive account of the inner lives of the two types of engineering works. In 
the smaller and more versatile type of workshop the old-style master mechanic 
was king. He was the man who knew everything and he represented the old 
tradition. He wore a collar and had often been to technical evening classes and 
as far as knowledge was concerned he differed very little from the workers. He 
was often conservative and careful with money.
In the office of the workshop he negotiated with the customers. The work was 
usually done without precise measurement. Different parts of machinery and pieces 
to be machined were ground in with a file by each worker in a highly individual 
way. There was no machine or construction which was so demanding that it could 
not be made in a workshop of the smaller versatile type. There was an ambition 
not to refuse any orders, to show that the workshop could manufacture whatever
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The number of engineering works grew with special rapidity after 
1895.
Number of engineering works
Year Rural areas Towns Total
1885 130 94 224
1896 166 130 296
1910 244 215 459
It was above all the smaller companies which increased the most, 
especially in rural areas. In 1896 the number employed in rural 
engineering works was on average 37, while the corresponding 
figure for the town engineering works was 77. The average number 
of employees in rural engineering works was unchanged in 1910. 
The fact that the industrial statistics in this particular case are in­
complete must be taken into account. Several of the smaller newly 
formed engineering companies were so small that they were not 
taken into account in the industrial statistics. When this is taken into 
consideration there will be a reduction in the already low average 
number of employees in rural engineering works.15
There are various reasons for the increase in the number of 
small companies which were started. It was possible to start a 
smaller works without any great capital investment, often in rented 
premises. Moreover, the general mechanisation in society increased 
the need for sub-contractors and repair workshops. In spite of the 
increased specialisation of production, or perhaps because of it, 
there was a simultaneous growth of the need for workshops for 
customers who mainly required products which were technically 
less advanced. For such customers factors such as proximity and 
easy availability were of great importance.
the customer ordered. For many heavy implements and machines this technique 
fulfilled its purpose very well. But when it came to the mass-production of heavy 
machines at low prices or machines for precision work and with interchangeable 
spare parts, this system was inadequate. The other type of workshop geared to 
rational standard production and far-reaching specialisation is described in connec­
tion with the development of AB Separator (see note 115).
15 Ibid., pp. 87 f. Bi SOS D Fabriker och handtverk.
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The setting up of small companies will be regarded as a form of 
industry on which the skilled worker could support his family. This 
became of special importance during years of economic crises. 
Here too the increased level of mechanisation after 1890 may in 
the long run have created employment problems for skilled en­
gineering workers, which in turn may have prompted them to 
start their own workshops.16
1. LillaHarrieredskapsverkstad
Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad was founded in 1890 by blacksmith 
Nils Holmqvist. He was born in 1851 in Torrlösa near Svalöv. 
During his adolescence he worked with his father, who was also a 
master blacksmith. After some years of practical training in Malmö, 
Nils Holmqvist returned to Torrlösa, where in 1875 he rented a 
small blacksmith’s shop. Together with an assistant he kept up 
this country smithy until 1890. During those 15 years he manu­
factured simpler agricultural implements, work trucks and even 
some steam threshing-machines. Thus when Nils Holmqvist took 
over an old smithy in Lilia Harrie he had already had long ex­
perience in his trade.17
The village smithy was bought by Nils Holmqvist for 2 150 
Swedish crowns, which amounted approximately to his total assets 
at that time. At the start production was carried on as a handicraft, 
and the production programme resembled that of the smithy in 
Torrlösa. In the middle of the 1890s Holmqvist started to manu­
facture single-furrow ploughs of an American type. A couple of 
years after the turn of the century a new type of three-furrow skim 
plough was developed, and thereafter several thousands of these 
were produced. In fact the most important branch of production
ui Hammarström, I., Stockholm i svensk ekonomi 1850-1914, pp. 349f.
17 AB Lillu Harrie Redskapsverkstad. Minnesskrift, pp. 5 f.
It is dear from the memorial publication that Holmqvist's assistants who went 
to Lilia Harrie did not regard the move with any great enthusiasm. Therefore the 
driving force behind the move to Lilia Harrie was most probably Nils Holmqvist.
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Table 8. Ihe number of agricultural implements marketed by Lilia Harrie 
redskapsverkstad
Year
Harrows Ploughs Horse hoes
Lan
Total
Län
Total
Län
TotalM N L M N L M
1892 10 _ 10 _ 5 _ 5 _ 1 1
1893 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - - -
1894 7 - 7 - 38 - 38 - 2 2
1895 13 - 13 - 24 1 25 - 2 2
1896 11 - 11 - 19 - 19 - 9 9
1897 10 - 10 - 7 - 7 - 7 7
1898 30 - 30 1 7 - 8 - 10 10
1899 103 - 103 - 15 - 15 - 12 12
1900 8 4 12 - 10 - 10 - 9 9
1901 36 - 36 - 10 - 10 - 22 22
1902 25 - 25 - 14 - 14 2 46 48
1903 47 16 52
1904 161 42 60
1905 350
1906 800
1907 1 400
Source Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad’s records: 1892-1902, ledgers; 1903-1904, month­
ly journals, memorandum book; 1905-1907, Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad; 
Minnesskrift.
in the workshop was not to be the manufacture of ploughs but the 
production of harrows. Horse hoes were also manufactured to some 
extent. Tables 8 and 9 show the extent of production during the 
initial years of the company. During the first decade from 1892 
to 1902 there were also produced ten threshing-machines, salt­
petre spreaders, horse hay rakes, seed drilling machines and straw 
elevators, all with a market within Malmöhus län (county). The 
local character of the market appears clearly from tables 8 and 9. 
Up to and including the year 1902 the company’s products were 
sold almost entirely within Scania. During the company’s first ten 
years its local character is underlined by the fact that 90 per cent
35
Table 9. The number of agricultural implements marketed by Lilia Harrie 
redskapsverkstad 1903-1904
Harrows Ploughs Horse hoes
Län/Country 1903 1904 1903 1904 1903 1904
A 5 16 4
B - - -
C - - -
D - 1 -
E 1 - -
F - - -
G - - -
H - - - -
I 1 2 -
K - 2 1
L 10 1 3 1
M 44 117 15 20 49 52
N 2 - 1
O - - -
P - - - -
R 1 - -
S - - -
T 6 - -
U - - -
W - - -
X - - -
Y - - -
Z - - - -
AC - - -
BD - - - -
Denmark 21 1 -
Finland - - 1
Total 47 161 16 42 52 60
Source Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad's records: Monthly journals, memorandum
book.
of the products sold within the län of Malmöhus stayed within 
a radius of 10 kilometres from where they were sold.18
18 Ibid., pp. 6f. The records of Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad for the company’s 
first 10-15 years in operation are the best preserved of those for the early period. 
From 1904 until modem times it is not possible to trace the production and sales
36
Diagram 1. Number of harrows sold by Lilla Harrie redskapsverkstad in 
1892-1907
Number of 
harrows
1 250
1 000-
500-
95 96 97 98 99 1900 01 02 03 04 05 06 19071892 93 94
Source: See table 8.
The years 1902-1903 marked the beginning of the company’s 
growth. During the 1890s the labour force had never exceeded five 
men. But around the turn of the nineteenth century there was a 
development in production technique in that manual power was 
replaced by mechanical motor power, for example in turning lathes, 
drilling machines, shearing machines and bellows. At the same time 
a kerosene engine was acquired. The smithy was extended and a
with the aid of records. However. Minnesskriften AB Lilla Harrie Redskapsverkstad 
gives certain information in this connection.
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Table 10. Number of men employed in Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad 1900- 
1911
Number employed
Year Full-time Part-time Total
1900 5 _ 5
1903 5 4 9
1904 11 3 14
1905 17 - 17
1906 25 _ 25
1907 28 - 28
1908 29 - 29
1909 29 ~ 29
1910 31 - 31
1911 32 - 32
Source Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad’s records: Wages accounts. The number of 
men employed represents the situation at the end of the year.
smaller warehouse was built. These changes have to be considered 
in the light of the interest which Nils Holmqvist then developed 
in a new type of agricultural implement which began to be in­
troduced into Sweden, viz. the cultivator, a special form of harrow. 
The new cultivator, which was equipped with three small wheels, 
had sold very successfully abroad, and Holmqvist committed his 
company to this product. Since that time the production of cul­
tivators has formed the backbone of the workshop’s production. 
In spite of the mechanisation around 1900 the increase in produc­
tion demanded an extension of the labour force.
In connection with the start of the expansion in production the 
company opened a small department for sales, administration and 
accounting when Nils Holmqvisf s eldest son Carl joined the staff 
in 1903 as business manager of the company. Continuity in the 
management of the company was further reinforced in 1922 when 
the founder’s youngest son Gustav joined as managing director. 
Before that Nils Holmqvist himself had managed the division of 
labour on the shop floor until 1908 when this function was 
delegated to a foreman. The marketing organisation was extended
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under the management of Carl Holmqvist. During the first ten years 
the company was mainly in direct contact with its farming 
customers, but gradually distribution was arranged completely 
through wholesalers, dealers in machinery, ironmongers, village 
shopkeepers and blacksmiths. During the 1910s Söderberg & Haak 
AB in Stockholm became the company’s exclusive agent for 
Northern and Central Sweden.19
As shown in tables 8-10 and diagram 1, the first decade of the 
twentieth century was a decade of expansion for the company. 
After 1902 its products began to be marketed outside Malmöhus 
län and some were exported. The tendency towards a geographical 
expansion of the market is also underlined in table 11. The 
geographical spread of the products can be traced directly down to 
and including the year 1904. But the geographical spread of cus­
tomers can be established in general terms from the entries of 
outstanding debts in the stock book.20 Table 11 shows the inherent 
probability that the geographical area of the market expanded 
simultaneously with the sharp increase in production. However the 
market within Malmöhus län remained dominant in 1910. According 
to the company’s memorial publication in 1950, agricultural imple­
ments and machinery have spread all over the country and abroad 
since the Second World War, but the spread within Scania was still 
dominant in 1950.
A great factor in the expansion of the company during the first 
ten years of the twentieth century was the establishment of the
19 Ibid., pp. 7ff. Carl Holmqvist had had a background of commercial training and 
five years’ experience with the import firm of Paulsson & Co.'s Eslöv maskinaffär 
(mainly agricultural machinery) when he joined the staff of the company. His 
younger brother Gustav had a technological training behind him when he joined 
the company. After leaving technical college in Malmö he was employed as a 
constructor in Germany, at Landsverk in Landskrona and at SKF in Gothenburg.
Nils Holmqvist continued to manage the company until his death in 1932, when 
he was succeeded by his son Carl. Of late Gustav Holmqvist has been head of 
the company.
20 Cf. Dahl, S., ‘Travelling Pedlars in Nineteenth Century Sweden’ (in Scandinavian 
Economic History Review, 1959, pp. 167ff.)
S. Dahl has mapped out the field of operations of the travelling pedlars by 
examining bankruptcy documents to see where the travelling pedlars had had out­
standing claims.
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Table 11. Outstanding debts of over 50 Swedish crowns, classified accord­
ing to the geographical address of the customer, which were owing to Lilia 
Harrie redskapsverkstad in the years 1904-1910
Län/Country 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
A 2 1 1 1 3 1 2
B - - 1 1 - 2 2
C - 1 - - - 1
D - - - - - - 1
E - - 4 1 3 3 2
F - - - - - -
G - - - - - 1 -
H 1 - - 1 - - 2
1 - 3 2 1 1 2 1
K - - 1 - - 9 29
L 3 3 8 5 9 9 13
M 62 65 66 61 135 102 97
N 1 2 3 2 2 4 4
O - - - - 1 3 1
P - - 1 2 - 3 7
R - 1 - - 2 4 2
O
T 1 1 _ _ 1 2
U - - - 1 - i -
W - - - - - - 1
X
Y
- - - - — — 1
Z
AC
- - - - — — :
BD - - - - - - -
Denmark - - 1 - 1 i i
Finland 1 - - - 2 i -
Norway - - - - - i -
Russia - - - 1 1 i -
Total 71 77 87 77 161 150 169
Source Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad’s records: Stock books.
Kävlinge-Sjöbo railway, which was opened to traffic in 1906. 
Through the railway Lilia Harrie made contact with Örtofta (four 
kilometres from Lilia Harrie) on the main line from Stockholm to 
Malmö. The railway made a very real contribution to the extension 
of the workshop’s market areas. In conjunction with the establish-
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ment of the railway the first section of a machine workshop was 
built, to which the production was completely transferred. Repair 
work was to be discontinued and henceforth the company devoted 
itself exclusively to new production. In 1910 the production reached 
a capacity of 2540 articles, and the tools were worth 152000 
Swedish crowns. The production was then distributed along various 
production lines as follows:
Sw. kr. 
122 000 
17 000 
5 000 
8 000 
152 000
Cultivators, harrows 
Saltpetre spreaders 
Straw elevators 
Spare parts 
Total
Source Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primäruppgifter till industristatistiken.
The concentration on cultivators and harrows is clear. About 80 
per cent of the total production in 1910 could be ascribed to those 
implements. In less than twenty years the diversified smithy had 
been developed into a specialised workshop. In spite of the fact 
that in 1910 the workshop employed somewhat fewer (31) workers 
than the average number for rural workshops (37) the company’s 
share constituted about 7 per cent of the total Swedish market in 
ploughs and harrows. If harrows alone were counted, the share of 
the market would be twice as big. This shows two things. Even a 
small company could, through a high level of specialisation, attain 
a comparatively large share of the market for its special products. 
Furthermore, the share of the market could become comparatively 
large, in spite of the fact that the company had a typical local 
market for its special products. Naturally it is of importance in 
this context that the local market was to be found in the dense 
farming area in Malmöhus län.21
21 Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primäruppgifter till industristatistiken. AB 
Lilla Harrie redskapsverkstads minnesskrift passim. Svenska industrien, 1911-1912, 
pp. 370 f.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century the company has had most of the 
implements tested at the Statens Maskin- och Redskapsprovningsanstalt with con­
sistently favourable verdicts. Several awards “for outstanding agricultural imple­
ments” were given to the company, among other occasions at the Allmänna Svenska 
Lantbruksmötet 1906 in Norrköping.
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A change in organisation took place in 1911 when the company 
became a limited company. No capital worth mentioning was in­
troduced. The share capital amounted to 75 000 Sw.kr. and the 
shares were almost exactly the equivalent of the assets of the com­
pany. The ownership of the shares remained in the Holmqvist 
family (family company). There was less expansion in the 1910s 
than in the previous decade, although the First World War brought 
about a boom in Swedish agriculture, which resulted in increased 
demands for the company’s products. The total value of produc­
tion in 1918 amounted to 475 000 Sw.kr. (the equivalent of about 
200 000 Sw.kr. in 1914’s prices), and the number of men employed 
had risen to 50. At the same point in time the share capital was 
increased to 100 000 Sw.kr.22 Thus in comparison with the expan­
sion during the first decade of the twentieth century, the 1910s 
became a period of consolidation. Since the company’s “griinder” 
period up to 1910 stands out as the most interesting epoch in the 
development of the workshop, attention has been deliberately 
focused on this period.
It was throughout a principle of the company that expansion in 
the form of new plant or an extension of machinery must be self­
financing. Thus the rate of expansion was entirely determined by 
the money which was available within the company. In fact only 
seasonal and occasional borrowing took place, so that the stock 
could be maintained. However, the whole extent of self-financing 
contributed to the company’s lack of capacity to meet growing 
domestic and foreign demands. In management security clearly 
took precedence over growth. However the manufacture of 
agricultural implements and machinery was often a gamble with 
unknown factors. It was not like many other businesses in which 
one could wait for the orders and then buy the materials needed 
in order finally to start the manufacturing. Instead the size of the 
production series had to be decided years in advance and purchases 
made for it. Agreements for sales and deliveries did not come until 
much later. Therefore stock-keeping was a constant problem, 
especially as the products were bulky in relation to their price.
The viability of the business depended on the orders from the
22 Svensk Industrikalender 1918, p. 119.
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farms, placed either through direct contact or through dealers of 
some kind. It is possible to trace in general terms the social com­
position of the customers during the period of growth between 1890 
and 1910. Judging by the names, titles and farm addresses of the 
customers, the products of the company during this period seem to 
have gone almost exclusively to peasant farms. Only to the small 
extent of about 10 per cent were the products sold to so-called 
people of standing (squires, landed gentry, county councillors, etc.) 
with estates or large holdings. Thus the marketing was directed 
to a considerable extent towards the peasant farms of Scania.23
(a) Summary
Does the development of Lilia Harrie redskapsverkstad in its initial 
stage fit into Schumpeter’s entrepreneur framework? Was the com­
pany's founder, Nils Holmqvist, an innovator in the market for 
agricultural implements and machinery with consequences for 
economic development? Nils Holmqvist was certainly no revolu­
tionary innovator. But he contributed to the introduction of a new 
product (the cultivator on wheels) onto the Swedish market. The 
Scanian market, the orders from which provided work for his com­
pany, was the richest section of the Swedish market. Therefore the 
old village blacksmith’s shop could be developed into a workshop 
company. Schumpeter distinguished very carefully between the four 
rôles of inventor, entrepreneur, administrator and capital owner. 
In reality in the world of manufacturing two or more of the rôles 
often overlap, and a combination of all four rôles is most likely 
to produce the best results. The rôles played by Nils Holmqvist 
were those of innovator and manufacturer. There are various pieces 
of evidence about his experiments and inventions on a smaller 
scale.24 As a manufacturer he applied foreign innovations and in-
23 AB Lilia Harrie Redskapsverkstads minnesskrift, passim.
The social composition of the customers does not seem to have changed in any 
decisive way during modern times.
During the first decades when the sales organisation was modest the workshop 
apparently had the ambition to follow the products via the distributor all the way 
through to the customer. The ambition was realised in that it was recorded on 
whose behalf the distributor had placed the order.
24 Ibid., p. 5. During the Torrlösa period 1875-1890 Holmqvist partly co-produced 
with the carpenter in the area. The two constructors arranged for contact between
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troduced them onto the Swedish section of the market. Thus the 
product was not new, and in itself was hardly of revolutionary 
importance. Since according to Schumpeter the entrepreneur as 
creator of fresh markets plays the key rôle in economic develop­
ment, the company’s limited importance can be accounted for in 
this way. Nils Holmqvist did not play the rôles of administrator 
or capital owner, even though administrative expertise was 
gradually introduced into the company by the younger generation. 
Through Holmqvist’s careful financing policy the growth of the 
company, the development of the market and its significance for 
the national economy were also curbed. His company became one 
of many.
2. Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri &
Mekaniska Verkstad in Skurup
When Emil Andersson in partnership with his brother Olof founded 
Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri & Mekaniska Verkstad in Skurup in 
1903, he already had ten years work as joint manager behind him. 
As a matter of fact he had founded the firm of F. W. Haker and 
Company in Skurup with F. W. Haker in 1892. The teamwork con­
tinued until 1902 when it ceased because of internal friction be­
tween the managers. The production of the Haker firm consisted 
above all of agricultural implements and castings. In 1902 the value 
of the production amounted to about 35000 Sw.kr. and at that 
point in time the number of employees had risen to 20. Thus Emil 
Andersson stopped working with Haker and chose his brother Olof 
Andersson as his new partner. The production at the newly 
founded company, Bröderna Andersson, was on the whole con­
stituted in the same way as production at Hakers.25
the forge and the joinery workshop by means of a kind of “telephone connec­
tion” consisting of a wire and two mouthpieces.
25 Interview with J. Vifot, Managing Director of Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri, 
Skurup and son of Emil Andersson. Svensk industrikalendar 1895. Svenska in­
dustrien 1907.
Emil Andersson and F. W. Haker had each put up half the money in Haker's
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The brothers Emil and Olof Andersson were born and brought 
up in a farming family outside Skurup. Both were interested in 
technical things. Emil was trained at Malmö technical school and 
Olof became a chemical engineer. In the light of their background 
it was natural that their technical interest and knowledge should 
be applied to agrarian technology. Emil went to the USA where 
he gained practical knowledge by working in McCormick’s fac­
tories, and obtained valuable experience and inspiration for the 
future. Olof obtained employment at the laboratory of Jacob Lach- 
mann’s sugar refinery in Ystad. During the time when they were 
employed and during the Haker period the brothers were able to 
save a certain amount of capital with which the new firm was 
financed. However the financing also required a personal loan from 
their father. In 1904, one year after the foundation of the company, 
Bröderna Andersson were able to purchase the bankrupt estate of 
Löfberg's Smidesverkstad. This workshop had manufactured seed 
drilling machines in the years 1885-1904, and the purchase enabled 
the new company to expand more rapidly than would otherwise 
have been the case.26
The initial stage of the company's development was characterised 
by the variety of products and the local marketing of them. Thus 
in 1904 the tools and machines, about 70 in number, were sold only 
in the district round Skurup. Skurup is situated on the railway line 
between Malmö and Ystad which was completed in 1874. Thus
firm. When the partners separated in 1902 it was mainly due to a difference of 
opinion about the organisation of the distribution of work. So at the auction which 
they held among themselves in 1902 Haker bought Emil Andersson out of the 
firm of F. W. Haker and Co.
26 Interview with J. Vifot.
Emil Andersson was bom in 1866, and at the age of twenty he emigrated to 
the USA, where for four years he was mainly employed in McCormick's factories 
in Chicago. He worked as a fitter in the harvesting machine workshops. On his 
return to Sweden around 1890 he got a job at C. Holmbergs mekaniska verkstad 
in Lund, where the production consisted mainly of steam engines and dairy imple­
ments. Emil Andersson had become friendly with C. O. Holmberg in Lund dur­
ing their studies at the technical college in Malmö. His brother Olof was three 
years younger, and received his training as an engineer in Greifswald in Germany. 
In the partnership between the brothers from 1902 onwards Emil was responsible 
for the construction and production side and Olof for the business side.
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Table 12. Number of implements and machines produced at the Bröderna 
Andersson's works in 1904, 1914 and 1920
Implement and machines 1904 1914 1920
Rollers 24 951 981
Horse hoes 8 703 1 114
Potato diggers 300
Salt spreaders 113 59
Cultivators 8 57 239
Straw presses 45
Chaff cutters 5 20 113
Harvesters 23
Source Lund's Landsarkiv; Bröderna Andersson’s Gjuteri & Mekaniska verkstad's 
records: Memorandum book. Production journals.
any marketing problem of transport was solved from the start. 
The value of production in 1904 amounted to 25000 Sw. kr. but in 
1910 it had increased sixfold. Over the same period the labour force 
doubled from 22 in 1904 to 45 in 1910. At the latter point in time 
the production values of the various lines of production were made
up in Sw. kr. as follows:1 Sw. kr
Castings 50 000
Rollers, harrows 40 000
Sowing and harvesting machines 49 000
Other machinery 11 000
Total 150 000
Thus the agricultural implements and machines accounted for two- 
thirds of the total production value. Gradually the production was 
concentrated on rollers and horse hoes. During the First World War 
the demand from abroad for implements and machinery increased, 
and in the case of Bröderna Andersson this resulted in exports to 
the other Nordic countries and to Germany and Russia. However, 
with the end of the war the exports ceased. The production value 
in 1916 was ten times as great as that in 1904 (calculated on the 
basis of the prices in 1914), while the number of people employed 
trebled over the same period. The expansion during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century is shown in tables 12 and 13 and
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Table 13. Implements delivered by Bröderna Andersson's engineering 
works, Skurup, in the years 1914 and 1920
Län/Country
Horse hoes Rollers
1914 1920 1914 1920
A _ 49 17 13
B 2 20 3 14
C 1 10 5 3
D 4 21 9 24
E 76 112 22 60
F 1 16 3 36
G - 19 4 37
H 14 41 34 54
I 1 20 2 24
K 2 30 35 28
L 130 116 253 96
M 434 373 299 135
N 32 46 57 43
O 1 70 4 123
P 2 29 33 49
R 1 25 10 24
S _ 16 16
O
O
T 1 15 30 14
U - 10 6 8
W 1 20 29 21
X - 15 27 7
Y - 25 12 21
Z - 10 23 12
AC - 6 2 4
BD - 2 - 1
Norway - 45 - 85
Denmark - - 4 -
Total 703 1 161 939 974
Source Lund’s Landsarkiv. Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri & Mekaniska verkstad's 
records: Sales accounts.
in diagram 2. The local character, which had been very strong at 
the start, diminished as production increased. The following chart 
shows the percentage distribution of the various markets of the 
company.
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Diagram 2. Number of tools and machines manufactured at Bröderna 
Andersson's works, Skurup, in the years 1904, 1914 and 1920.
Number
Rollers1 100-
Horse hoes
Cultivators1 000-
Chaff cutters
900-
700-
600-
500-
400-
300-
100-
13 14 15 161904 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 17 1 19 1920
Source See table 12.
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Year
Horse hoes Rollers
Scania
The rest
of Sweden Total Scania
The rest
of Sweden Total
1904 100 0 100 100 0 100
1914 76 24 100 55 45 100
1920 43 57 100 25 75 100
From a comparative point of view the company's market in 
Scania in 1920 was still larger than the others, but compared with 
Lilia Harrie, Bröderna Andersson had a less restricted market area 
for its agricultural implements.27
If Bröderna Andersson is compared with Skurups Mekaniska 
Verkstad, as Haker’s firm was called after the split in 1902, the fact 
is that Bröderna Andersson expanded much more rapidly after 1903 
than Skurups Mekaniska Verkstad. In 1905 the two companies were 
approximately on the same level as regards both production value 
and the number of men employed. Three years later the production 
value at Bröderna Andersson’s works was three times higher than 
that at Skurups Mekaniska Verkstad, which was still at the level 
of 1905. The gap widened further and in 1916 Bröderna Andersson’s 
production had quadrupled in comparison with Skurups Mekaniska 
Verkstad, and the former company employed twice as many work­
ers as the latter. Apparently Emil Andersson was able through his 
break with Haker to give free rein to the forces of expansion at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. The local competition in 
which both manufacturers then engaged was to a large extent to 
Haker’s disadvantage.28
In 1910 Bröderna Andersson’s and Lilia Harrie’s workshops had 
reached approximately the same level of capacity. As Lilia Harrie 
was founded in 1890 and Bröderna Andersson not until 1903 this 
meant that the rate of growth during the initial stage was much 
more rapid at Bröderna Andersson. A factor contributing to this
27 Riksarkivet, kommerskollegii arkiv. Primary information for the industrial statis­
tics. Lund’s Landsarkiv, Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri & Mekaniska Verkstad’s arkiv. 
Memorial, production journals, sales ledgers.
28 Svenska Industrien 1907, 1911-1912 and 1918-1919.
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was that Lilia Harrie only obtained railway connections with the 
world in about 1906. In addition Bröderna Andersson had from the 
start the opportunity to purchase premises which were already 
functioning as a workshop. Furthermore the initial stage coincided 
with a decade when the demand for agricultural implements and 
machinery was exceptionally great. However during the 1910s the 
two companies grew at about the same rate. Specialisation was in 
operation for a longer time at Lilia Harrie than at Bröderna Anders­
son in Skurup. In 1910 Lilia Harrie had about 7 per cent of the 
Swedish market in implements through its concentration on har­
rows, while Bröderna Andersson only had 3 per cent of the same 
market at that time. In addition the Skurup company then had 1 
per cent of the sowing and harvesting machine market. During the 
1910s production was concentrated to a high degree on rollers and 
horse hoes.29
Bröderna Andersson’s company became a limited company in 
1918. The share capital amounted to 300000 Sw. kr. and all the 
shares remained in the Andersson family. The two brothers Emil 
and Olof Andersson were appointed managing directors of the com­
pany. From the older annual reports, which have only been pre­
served for the years 1918—1920, it appears that 65 per cent of the 
company's balance-sheet total of 550000 Sw. kr. came from its own 
capital and 20 per cent from short-term debts (credits from 
suppliers). Large parts of the assets were tied up in properties 
(16 per cent), machinery and tools (10 per cent) and stocks (65 per 
cent), while ready money only constituted 9 per cent. During these 
three years only small changes took place in the debit/credit 
balance. However the annual profit fluctuated considerably, reach­
ing 15 per cent of the share capital in 1918, 5 per cent in 1919 and 
7 per cent in 1920.30
The expansion brought about by the First World War was ter­
minated by the very fact that the war came to an end. The peace­
time depression which followed accounts for the stagnation in the
29 Riksarkivet, kommerskollegii arkiv. Primary information for the industrial 
statistics.
30 Annual reports of AB Bröderna Anderssons Gjuteri, Skurup for the years 1918- 
1920. Interview with J. Vifot.
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company’s development which began to occur in the years follow­
ing 1920. The decline lasted for the years 1920-1923 and thereafter 
business expanded again. The brothers Emil and Olof Andersson 
led the development of the company until Olofs death in 1947. 
Three years later Emil died, and a short time after that his son 
J. Vifot took over the management of the company. During the 
period of expansion production was to a comparatively great ex­
tent concerned with rollers and horse hoes. During the post-war 
period production had been orientated more towards stationary as 
well as mobile straw pressers.31
The selling side of the business has been studied through the 
sales records of the company which have been preserved from the 
year 1914 onwards. According to these, the agricultural implements 
and machinery were still mainly sold direct to the farmers or 
shopkeepers in 1914. From the time of the First World War Brö­
derna Andersson entered to a greater extent into contracts with 
wholesalers of implements and machines for the selling. The larger 
distributors were J. Slöör and A. Fischer in Stockholm, A. Pauls- 
son’s Maskinaffâr and A. Hollingworth’s branch in Eslöv, G, V. 
Rundström in Norrköping, Andersson & Mattson in Malmö and 
Nordiska Maskinkompaniet in Gothenburg. It is in fact possible, at 
least in the older sales records which have been preserved, to trace 
the orders back to the customers via the distributors. In essence 
the social composition of the customers seems to resemble that of 
Lilia Harrie. Thus the implements and machines were almost en­
tirely distributed to peasant farms and only to a smaller extent to 
the estates.32
In the same way as at Lilia Harrie growth at Bröderna Andersson 
took place at the rate which self-financing permitted. Thus the 
ploughed-back profits took care of new investments. The problems 
of stockkeeping probably helped to restrict growth. The stocks held 
accounted for a large part of the total value of the assets of the 
smaller implement workshops.
In the case of Bröderna Andersson, at the end of the 1910s the
31 Ibid. Between 1909 and 1952 about 25 000 horse hoes were sold.
32 Several of the trading firms mentioned here have appeared in the sales organisa­
tions of the other implement and machine manufacturers.
51
value of the stock constituted two-thirds of the total assets. The 
corresponding proportion at the works was barely one-sixth.
(a) Summary
The driving force at Bröderna Andersson appears to have been 
Emil Andersson. He was no revolutionary innovator in the imple­
ment market, but as a farmer’s son he was well acquainted with 
the market which became the base for his activities. Through his 
employment in the USA with the world’s leading producer of 
agricultural implements he acquired experience of advanced 
production technique and marketing. The comparatively rich field 
of experience probably in time threw Emil Andersson out of step 
with the more cautious and less travelled Haker. In spite of the 
fact that the complete break with Haker brought about a rapid ex­
pansion for Emil Andersson’s and his brother’s company, the growth 
took place within the framework of the smaller type of workshop. 
However the company started at what was an extremely favour­
able point in time as regards the great demand, but the main 
production during the first decades (rollers and horse hoes) did not 
bring about any new agrarian techniques or even any further 
development of existing ones. Also with the cautious financing 
which was in operation the target for the development of the com­
pany was probably a limited one. In this respect there are funda­
mental similarities between Bröderna Andersson and Lilia Harrie. 
Because of these they remained small company units. Looked at 
from a national perspective the many small workshops which 
supplied agriculture with implements and machinery had slight 
importance individually. Nor did the products which these work­
shops manufactured and marketed play an epoch-making rôle in 
the agricultural economy. However the many small and anonymous 
workshop companies together represented important values in the 
interaction between industry and agriculture. Due to their roots in 
local markets the small workshops were better able than the larger 
ones to know intuitively and meet local agrarian needs. They were 
not in the forefront, but in the national economy they performed 
the important function of spreading mechanisation down to the 
smaller farms. Conversely the market expansion also meant that
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peasant farming was partially and gradually orientated towards the 
production of agricultural wares to be offered for sale. Thus the 
increase in orders from peasant farms for implements and 
machines which resulted from this became an important factor in 
the development of smaller workshop industry.
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C. Medium-sized companies 
with national markets
The setting-up of smaller workshops was a comparatively late 
occurrence in Swedish industrialisation. Several small workshops 
were founded after 1890, and most of them were still quite small 
companies in 1914. As a rule the larger companies in existence be­
fore the First WorldWar had been started before 1890, and therefore 
had had time to expand. Of the larger and medium-sized workshops, 
which during the First World War had supplied agriculture’s need 
for implements and machinery, none had been founded after 1890. 
The following medium-sized workshops making agricultural imple­
ments and machinery, and having between 100 and 500 employees, 
were in operation at the start of the twentieth century: Överums 
Bruk for ploughs (founded in 1654, the manufacture of ploughs 
started in 1851), Munktells mekaniska verkstad, Eskilstuna, for 
steam threshing-machines and traction-engines (founded in 1832, 
the production of traction-engines started in 1853), Ystads gjuteri 
och mekaniska verkstad for various implements and machines 
(1853), Köping's mekaniska verkstad for threshing-machines (1856), 
Thermaenius mekaniska verkstad i Hallsberg for threshing- 
machines and cleaning machines (1868), Westerås mekaniska verk­
stad for harvesters and sowing machines (1874) with the works 
transferred to Morgongåva in 1898, Norrahammars gjuteri & 
mekaniska verkstad for implements (1877) and Arvika mekaniska 
verkstad for mowing machines and harvesters (1889).33 Överums 
Bruk and Munktells mekaniska verkstad have been chosen as 
representatives of the medium-sized companies. Above all the 
choice has been governed by the facts that Överum’s manufacture 
of ploughs is the oldest on an industrial scale in Sweden and that 
Munktells produced the really advanced and expensive farming 
machines such as steam threshing-machines and traction engines. 
Furthermore, the sources for these two workshops are the best 
preserved.
33 Svenska industrien 1907.
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1. Överums Bruk
Immigrant Walloons founded Överums järnbruk in 1654 and thereby 
continued the initiative which the Walloons De Geer and de Besehe 
had taken during the early parts of the seventeenth century, and 
which in Sweden had been directed mainly towards the production 
of cannon. When Henrik de Trij, the founder of Överums Bruk, 
moved to Sweden in the 1630s he was first employed by De Geer 
as foreman at the factory in Norrköping. In 1640 he married the 
daughter of Hubert de Besehe, which seems to indicate that he held 
a high social position among the immigrant Walloons. In 1654 with 
two partners (the de Besehe brothers-in-law) de Trij built a blast 
furnace in Överum and in the following year received letters patent 
from the Bergskollegium. The foundry had to regulate its production 
of iron so that the consumption of charcoal did not exhaust the 
forests. Cannon casting remained the foundry’s main work for more 
than 150 years in spite of changes in ownership and management.34 
When Johan Carl Adelsward bought Överums Bruk in 1816 the 
orders for cannon had already decreased to such an extent that 
cannon casting only constituted a minor part of a production which 
had become very greatly diversified. During Adelswärd’s ownership 
up to 1852 the programme of diversified production continued.35
In 1847 Baron Adelswärd employed Johan Bergwik as works 
manager. On Bergwik’s initiative the toolmaker Carl Petter Spång­
berg was offered employment as works foreman at Överum in 
1850, which he accepted. It was the aim of the management of 
the foundry that Spångberg would set up and manage a depart­
ment for agricultural implements. When Spångberg received the 
offer from Överums Bruk he was a toolmaker at Ultuna agricultural 
institute, which was opened in 1848. In 1850 he also received an 
offer from Ultuna to become works foreman of the institute, but 
Spångberg wanted a larger field of operations for tool production 
than he could get at Ultuna.38
34 Jansson, E. A., Överums Bruk Tre hundra år 1654-1954, pp. 9ff.
35 Ibid., p. 141. In addition to the hammered iron the works was mainly occupied 
during the first half of the nineteenth century in producing household goods: pots, 
kettles, pans, ovens, mortars, dampers and other similar articles.
36 Ibid., pp. 142ff. When Spångberg came to Överum in 1850 he was 28 years old. 
He was born in Södermanland and was the son of Erik Spångberg, a groom;
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Spàngberg's arrival at Överum marked the revival of the foundry. 
In 1851 the production of ploughs began, and in spite of changing 
economic trends this constituted the essential part of the company 
ever since. In the first year 94 ploughs were manufactured, of 
which 20 were sold during the same year, mainly to persons of 
social standing in the läns of Östergötland and Kalmar. The en­
gineering works grew in relation to the foundry because of the fact 
that the foundry went over from cannon to ploughs. Cannon casting 
gradually ceased during the first half of the nineteenth century and 
the diversity of production which had begun at that time also con­
tinued when the production of ploughs predominated. As a result 
of Spângberg’s contributions the workshop expanded during the 
1850s and new jobs were created. The number of employees in 
1862 was 184 of which 78 were in Spângberg’s workshop. The 
workshop production also meant that the company was able to 
process its earlier products—steel rods, castings and timber—to 
a greater degree. Thereby the profits from the processing could 
remain within the foundry which had a well integrated process of 
production. To a large extent the ore was taken from the com­
pany's own mines in Östergötland. At the foundry iron rods, pig- 
iron and castings were produced, while the foundry’s forest and 
saw-mill took care of the fuel and timber supply. The iron and 
timber were processed mainly into ploughs, the majority of which 
were sold, though some were used in farming by the company 
itself.37
Within a period of ten years there was an agricultural implement 
industry at Överums Bruk. In 1862 the annual production of ploughs 
had risen to 2 669. In addition the year’s production also included 
1819 plough parts, 1 345 ploughshares and 590 other implements 
and machines as well. Spângberg’s work of development was 
behind this expansion during the 1850s. The first ploughs were vir­
tually plagiarised copies of English and American models, while
he was educated in agrarian technology at Väderbrunns agricultural college (near 
Nyköping) during the years 1845-1848. The college was run by the famous agrono­
mist J. T. Nathorst and his son Hjalmar. In 1848 Spångberg came to Ultuna, and 
he worked at Överums Bruk for 37 years. He died in 1892.
37 Ibid., pp. 146ff. Överums Bruks arkiv: Capitalbok for the year 1851. Avraknings- 
bok för bruksarbetare for the year 1862. Reqvisitionsbok for the year 1851.
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plough no. 9 (the first specimen dating from 1854) was made in 
Sweden by Spångberg but was certainly an American model. 
Plough no. 9 became the prototype for the Swedish ploughs, which 
were marketed by Överum and achieved international recognition. 
Överums Bruk was the only Swedish exhibitor of agricultural imple­
ments to be awarded first prize at the world exhibitions in 1862 
(London), 1863 (Hamburg) and 1867 (Paris).38 During the latter part 
of the 1850s the sales department was reinforced by virtue of the 
fact that distributors in the larger towns were engaged in the selling 
of the company’s implements. At this time printed and illustrated 
price-lists of various implements and machines began to be distrib­
uted to advertise the company’s products widely. A price-list from
1861 shows the diversity of production:
Riksdaler
Allen’s harvesting machine 600
Barret's threshing-machine 600
Wood’s harvesting machine 400
Ransome’s tedder 250
Corne’s chaff cutter 200
Glover’s skim plough with Överum’s improvements 75
”Överum’s new chaff cutter” 50
Clover sowing machine 40
Plough no. 1 based on an English model 33
Plough no. 7 with wooden frame and iron ploughshare 1638
The selling side of the business can best be studied in the case 
of Överum through the ‘order books’ of the foundry, which have 
been preserved throughout in the records of the company. The 
order books contain information about the nature of the order, the 
quantities and date and the customer’s name and address as well. 
In the course of the mechanisation of Swedish economic life
38 Plough no. 9 was foremost among Överum’s ploughs. Of the 25 659 ploughs, 
of about 30 models, which were produced in 1861-1870, 36% were of the no. 9 
type.
39 Price-list from 1861. Reqvisitionsbocker from Överums Bruks arkiv. The sales 
of seed drilling machines first became of economic importance after 1890. The 
prices of seed drilling machines around the turn of the nineteenth century varied 
according to the number of shares on the machines. The most common types 
of machine had 12 or 16 shares and fetched prices of 165 Sw. kr. and 195 Sw.kr., 
respectively.
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wholesale firms were established, which dealt in tools and 
machinery among other lines. Trading companies of this kind are 
to be found in Överum’s order books, which show that sales were 
made through distributors to an increasing extent. Examples of 
larger trading companies which sold Överum’s products were 
J. Slöör, A. Fischer and J. Danielsson in Stockholm, G. Bolander 
in Gothenburg, G. V. Rundström in Norrköping, O. Harling and 
M. Hyden in Linköping and M. Alfort and A. HoIlingworth in 
Örebro. In some cases the distributor sold the tools and machines 
direct over the counter, and therefore in these cases there is no 
means of knowing where the tools and machines went. Probably 
they were sold to farmers who lived fairly near the outlet. Where 
a customer placed an order with a distributor it is possible to follow 
the orders in the order books as far as the customer. Apart from 
the larger distributors, around the year 1900 Överums bruk still 
sold about 50 per cent of its implements and machines direct to 
farmers and smaller ironmongers and village shopkeepers. The 
large number of implements and also the difficulty in ascertaining 
their final destination has made it impossible to group the com­
pany’s customers socially. On the other hand it has been possible to 
trace in a satisfactory way the geographical development of the 
foundry’s market for agricultural implements and machinery. In this 
connection it should be mentioned that each order was ticked off 
when it was delivered. Notes relating to cancelled orders, special 
conditions of delivery, date of delivery and means of delivery were 
consistently entered in the order books.40
The volume and distribution in time and place of the sales of 
tools and machines are shown in tables 14—20 and diagrams 3 and 4. 
Apart from the products dealt with in the tables, others connected 
with agrarian technology consisted of a smaller number of threshing 
machines and harvesting and other machines, but the large volume 
of the various implement and machine parts which were produced 
were of greater importance economically. During the greater part of 
the period 1851-1913 ploughs were predominant, but after 1895 they
40 The sales abroad were concentrated on Russia to a high degree, especially during 
the years immediately before and after 1880, and were organised mainly by the 
Rabotnik agencies in St. Petersburg and Moscow and also by Siebert, Wieprecht 
and Grahmann in Riga.
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were counterbalanced to a great extent in terms of value by the 
sowing machines. In 1870 the manufacture of ploughs constituted 
65 per cent of the foundry’s total production value, corresponding 
at that time to 395 000 riksdaler (rd).41
In terms of Swedish crowns, production in 1896 and 1910 was 
divided along the following lines:
Value of production in thousands of Swedish crowns
1896 % 1910 %
Castings 75 15 90 21
Ploughs etc. 204 41 80 18
Sowing and harvesting machines 162 33 120 28
Other farming machinery 27 6 31 7
Other products (mainly machine 
products) 24 5 114 26
Total 492 100 435 100
Source Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primary information for the industrial 
statistics.
There was concentration on ploughs from the start of the 1850s 
up to the 1890s when plough manufacturing’s proportionate share 
of the production of the foundry started to decrease. The figures 
65 per cent (1870), 41 per cent (1896) and 18 per cent (1910) speak 
for themselves. At the last two points in time sowing machines 
accounted for about one-third of the production, calculated in 
Swedish crowns. Between 1896 and 1910 an absolute decline in 
production took place, due entirely to a sharp comparative decline 
for agricultural implements and machines. In 1896 manufacturing 
connected with agriculture accounted for 80 per cent of the com­
pany’s total activity, but in 1910 it only accounted for half.
Överum was one of the larger manufacturers of agricultural 
implements in Sweden, and as far as ploughs were concerned in 
about 1860 the foundry was probably the leader on the Swedish 
market, a position which it maintained and consolidated for a 
couple of decades thereafter. During the 1860s Överum developed 
into a comparatively modern tool industry recognised interna-
41 Jansson, E. AOverums Bruk, pp. 190f.
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tionally, which had a good influence on its marketing. But competi­
tion came. In the Swedish general industry calendar of 1865, 32 
iron foundries and engineering works are reviewed as manu­
facturers of agricultural implements. Norrahammar’s Gjuteri & 
Mekaniska verkstad (9 kilometres from Jönköping) was founded in 
1870. A large part of Norrahammar’s production consisted of 
agricultural implements, especially ploughs, harrows and rollers. 
The management at Överum in the administration report for 1883 
emphasises that the cause of the recent decline in sales is the 
steadily growing competition within Sweden. Particular mention 
is made of Norrahammar’s policy of low prices through big dis­
counts. The difference in price for comparable models of plough 
was said to amount to 15 per cent, which helped to account for 
the fact' that Norrahammar diverted important markets from 
Överum, especially in the south-west of Sweden.43
During the latter part of the 1880s Överum was faced with sales 
difficulties partly because of the economic decline in farming, and 
partly because of the increasing competition from Norrahammar 
and other workshops. During the 1870s and several decades to 
follow Överums bruk came under the influence of English interests, 
which may also have contributed to the company’s difficulties in 
asserting itself on the Swedish market When the economic situation 
improved again during the 1890s Norrahammar was better able to 
respond to the increased demand for ploughs. A year or so after 
the turn of the century three times as many ploughs and thirty 
times as many harrows were produced at Norrahammar as at 
Överum. Around 1914 the manufacturing of implements (ploughs,
42 Unconcealed indignation appears in Överum’s administration report for 1883. 
“The result (of Norrahammar's discount policy) has already been seen in that 
Norrahammar has almost pushed Överum out of some areas such as Scania, Hal­
land, Bohuslän and Västergötland, where it is now hardly possible to sell an Överum 
plough except to those who look at the quality of the product rather than the 
price.”
In this connection a contributory factor was probably the engineer C. F. Hern- 
berg, who after ten years or so at OverunTs plough works moved to Norraham- 
mar in 1882 to take up the post of chief engineer for plough production. In Norra- 
hammar Hernberg retained the leading position in the company for more than three 
decades. He had probably taken with him some of Överum's production and sales 
techniques.
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harrows and rollers) was five times as great in terms of quantity at 
Norrahammar as at Överum.43 Information about the company's 
share of the Swedish market is also illuminating as regards the 
development at Överums bruk. In 1896 the market had been shaky 
for Överum for some time. Nevertheless the company had 35 per 
cent of the Swedish tool market at that time. In 1910 the cor­
responding share of the market was down to 5 per cent. The 
development shows two things: Överum’s relative stagnation and 
the arrival of a series of tool manufacturers of whom Norrahammar 
became the most important. In the 1890s Överum tried to break 
into the market for sowing machines, and in 1896 the company 
controlled 13 per cent of the Swedish market. In spite of the fact 
that Överum produced a greater number of sowing machines and 
more advanced ones at the beginning of the twentieth century, its 
share of the market fell to 2 per cent in 19IO.44 A number of work­
shop companies geared to the manufacture of farming machinery 
had been set up around 1890, and their production expanded 
sharply during the first decade of the twentieth century (see table 
4A).
At the middle of the nineteenth century Överum like other neigh­
bouring foundries was a company with a local or regional market. 
In his thesis “Relationer mellan bruk och omland i östra Småland 
1750-1900” O. Nordström deals inter alia with the market areas of 
the foundries around 1860. The foundries with which Nordström 
deals are situated in the län of Kronoberg and at that time they 
operated in a local/regional area, apart from their exports which 
went via Kalmar.45 The main part of the production around 1860 
was the manufacturing of rod-iron. The volume of production at 
Överum at that time was somewhat greater than at the foundries 
examined by Nordström, but the marketing conditions appear to
43 Svenska industrien 1907, 1911-1912 and 1918-1919.
44 Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primary information for the industrial statis­
tics. Bi SOS Fabriker och handtverk.
45 Nordström, D., Relationer mellan bruk och omland i östra Småland 1750-1900, 
pp. 200 ff.
The works examined by Nordström are Klafreström, Orrefors and Sävsjöström 
iron foundries. Around 1860 their domestic market area was confined to south­
eastern Småland, Blekinge and northern Scania.
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Table 14. Number of implement and machine units sold from Overums 
Bruk in 1851
Län/Country Ploughs Harrows Sowing machines
A 1 _ _
B - - -
C - - -
D - - -
E 12 2 -
F - - -
G - - -
H 6 - -
I 1 - 2
K - - -
L - - -
M - - -
N - - -
O - - -
P - - -
R - - -
S - - -
T - - -
U - - -
W - - -
X - - -
Y - - -
Z - - -
AC - - -
BD - - -
Total 20 2 2
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
have been similar. When in about 1850 Överum greatly expanded 
the workshop sector through tool manufacturing, there was a 
simultaneous expansion in the market area. The market for the 
most important product, the ploughs, became a national one.
The diffusion of the Överum ploughs within Sweden between 
1864 and 1913 has been illustrated in table 23. When Överum 
entered the tool market the sales of ploughs were concentrated in 
Sweden during the first twenty years. At the beginning the Scaniar 
farmers were the company's biggest customers, followed imme-
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Table 15. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1864
Lan / 
Country Ploughs
Plough
bodies FIarrows Rollers
Horse Chaff
hay-rakes cutters
Seed
drills
Sowing
machines
A 249 5 19 _ _ 15 _ 7
B 30 - 12 - - - - -
U
D 78 21 34 1 _ 1 _ 13
E 279 250 23 1 3 4 - 11
F 8 - 4 - 1 - - 6
G 24 - - - - - - -
H 315 1 54 1 - 6 - 8
I 10 5 1 - - - - -
K 53 - 7 - - 3 - 4
L 277 1 36 - 2 6 1 13
M 337 - 56 3 2 14 - 32
N 106 - 21 1 - 4 - 5
O 30 - - - - - - -
P 10 - 7 - - - - 5
R 192 3 66 1 6 8 1 7
S 59 - 21 - - - 1 6
T 215 28 21 1 - 3 - 4
U 68 - 29 2 1 1 - 13
W 7 16 1 - - 2 - 1
X
Y
11 - - - - - - 8
Z
AC
- - - - - - — -
BD - - - - - - - -
Norway 610 - 88 - 5 19 2 28
France 8 - 12 - 1 6 1 4
Total 2 976 330 512 11 21 92 6 175
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
diately by the farmers on the plains of east Götaland and round 
Lake Mälaren. Sparsely cultivated areas such as inner Småland and 
the north of Sweden, played a subordinate part in Överum’s sales 
of implements. In fact during the first year of sales 1851 the market 
area had a distinctly local character, but when the plough sales 
increased during the 1860s the domestic market expanded, and 
thereby attained a truly national character. The sales within
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Table 16. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1868
Län / Plough Horse Chaff Seed Sowing
Country Ploughs bodies Harrows Rollers hay-rakes cutters drills machines
A 298 11 50 4 3 16 _ 37
B 16 - 4 - - - 2 -
C 123 17 - - - - - -
D 27 33 - - - ' - - -
E 500 121 15 2 - 6 - 6
G 3 _ _ _ _ 1 _ _
H 79 - 8 - 1 2 - 7
I 21 5 - - - - - 2
K 21 - 3 - - - - -
L 71 140 5 - - 3 - 9
M
N
O
127 25 19 1 - - 23
13 8 2 _ _ 11 -
P 33 - 1 - - - 1 4
R 4 12 - - - 4 - -
S 82 - 6 - - - - 2
T 100 6 10 2 - - - -
U 163 12 3 1 - - - 3
W 8 - 1 - - 1 - -
X 11 - - - - - - 1
Y 18 - - - - - - -
AC _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
BD - - - - - - - -
Norway - - - - - - 1 -
Finland 1 - - - - 1 - -
Russia 200 - 2 - - 5 - -
Total 1 919 390 129 10 5 49 5 94
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
Överum’s own region (the coastal plain of Småland, Östergötland, 
Öland and Gotland) were not disproportionately large. Apparently 
factors other than geographical distance had a decisive effect on 
the company’s marketing. The difference in this respect between 
Lilia Harrie and Överum, for example, is very striking.
64
Table 17. The number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 
1873
Lan / Plough Horse Chaff Seed Sowing
Country Ploughs bodies Harrows Rollers hay-rakes cutters drills machines
A
B
C
854 26 36 3 11 26 1 58
89 5 _ _ _ 1 _
D 119 1 - - - - - 2
E 427 90 - 2 5 4 - 9
F 28 30 - - - - -
H
I
K
324 48 6 1 - 2 - 2
32 6 — _ _
1
1 Z
4
L 150 - 20 10 - - - 6
M
N
O
54 4 - 2 - 3
200 10 36 - - 36 26
R 105 23 _ _ _ 2 _ 4
S 128 1 9 - 8 10 - 14
T 168 24 6 - - 4 - 1
U
W
X
264 1 - - 1 5 - -
36 _ _ _ _ 1 _ _
Y 114 - - - - - - -
TLi
AC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
BD - - - - - - - -
Norway 6 1 - - - - - -
Finland 1 - - - - - - -
Russia 954 2 550 79 - 6 61 1 12
Austria 1 - - - - - - -
Hungary - - - - - ’ 1 - -
Germany - - 1 - - 2 - 2
Total 4 065 2 816 197 16 33 157 3 143
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
The farmers’ purchases of agricultural implements and machines 
depended on the economy. Diagram 3 underlines this situation. 
The agricultural economy was hard hit by the difficult famine 
years of 1868-1869, and as a result the demand for implements
5- 742579 Kuuse 65
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6
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3. Number of ploughs sold by Överums Bruk 1851-1913.
of
Total
Exports
""X /
64 68 73 1903
records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
Diagram 4. Number of sowing machines sold by Överums Bruk in 1851- 
1913.
Number of
sowing -------------  Total
machines
Exports2 000-,
1 750
1 500-
1 250
1 000-
500-
64 68 73
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
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Table 18. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1882
Lan / Plough Horse Chaff Seed Sowing
Country Ploughs bodies Harrows Rollers hay-rakes cutters drills machines
A
B
2 335 530 125 17 283 218 11 128
C
D 20 26
-
2
- -
5 3
E 481 441 10 6 37 17 9 17
F 15 76 4 - 4 2 1 1
G 35 121 4 - 3 3 - 11
H 180 152 10 1 8 3 6 4
K 33 41 3 _ 2 2 _ 1
L 64 162 Il 1 2 3 - 3
M 39 69 12 - 1 9 - 7
N 2 18 - - 10 - 1 -
O 249 64 41 6 - 3 2 26
P 1 - 4 - 3 1 1 -
R 39 24 15 - 10 5 2 5
S 29 15 3 - 4 1 - 5
T 30 4 4 - 3 1 1 2
U - - - - - 2 - -
W
X
6
1
- - - 1 1 - —
Y
Z
1
3
- - - - - -
2
AC - - - - - - - -
BD - - - - - - - -
Finland 259 8 57 - 10 54 - 17
Denmark 2 - 2 - - - - -
Russia 4 515 1 000 67 3 - 98 5 54
Turkey 4 - 1 - - - - -
France 2 - - - - - - 1
Spain 14 - 3 - 1 - - -
India 265 - - - - - - -
Total 8 624 2 751 376 36 382 423 44 287
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
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Table 19. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1888
Län / Plough Horse Chaff Seed Sowing
Country Ploughs bodies Harrows Rollers hay-rakes cutters drills machines
A
B
1 182 618 50 15 381 249 1 177
C
D 16 3
“ - - - - -
E 143 389 8 - 32 6 - 34
F 28 42 2 - 3 1 - 11
G 12 44 2 - 2 - - 2
H 182 129 3 1 14 13 4 2
I 18 7 - - - 22 - 3
K 5 22 1 - 3 1 - -
L 10 90 - - 9 1 - 4
M 23 59 - 1 _ - - 4
N - - 5 - - - _ 8
O 85 45 4 1 2 - _ 7
P 24 15 3 - 1 - - 4
R 18 10 2 - 2 - - _
S 1 2 _ _ _ __ _ _
T 60 52 - - - 2 _ 1
U 1 - - - _ 1 _ _
W
X
Y
1 2 - - 2 - -
16 - - - - -
AC 8 _ _ _ :
BD 2 - - - - 25 - —
Norway 13 7 3 - - 5 - 2
Finland 3 1 - - - _ _ _
Denmark - - - _ _ 1 _ _
Russia 415 - - - 24 56 _ _
UK 50 - - - - _ _ _
Spain 1 - - - 1 - 2 -
Argentina 60 - 6 - 5 - - 1
Total 2 377 1 536 91 18 479 385 7 261
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
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Table 20. Number of implement and machine units sold from Overums Bruk in 1895
Lan / Plough Horse Chaff Seed Sowing
Country Ploughs bodies Harrows Rollers hay-rakes cutters drills machines
A 1 217 667 63 14 742 25 41 664
B 3 - - 1 3 2 1 1
C 5 - 5 2 - - 2 3
D 23 16 13 - - - 59 62
E 191 488 59 5 42 2 489 75
F 56 47 7 3 3 - 5 6
G 27 36 3 - 3 - - 3
H 235 260 73 6 27 35 13 20
I 358 42 19 - 21 61 10 12
K 23 70 9 - 2 - - -
L 35 132 7 - 18 - 1 10
M 94 142 12 - 5 1 - 2
N 27 8 2 - 9 - - 10
O 310 102 72 2 104 6 2 38
P 17 22 14 - 1 - - 9
R 36 53 - - - 1 1 38
S 5 - - - - - - -
T 25 10 1 1 2 - 5 2
U 2 14 - - - - 7 -
W 47 - - - - - -
X 12 - 5 - - - - -
Y 151 - 2 - - 5 - -
AC 4 1 _ _ _ _ _ _
BD - - - - - 1 - -
Norway 49 5 - - 1 5 - -
Finland - - - - - - - 5
Russia 787 - - - - 73 - 5
UK 3 - - - - - - -
Spain 2 - - - - - 4 -
India 191 - - - - - - -
Argentina 5 - - - - - - 5
Total 3 948 2 115 366 34 983 217 640 970
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
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Table 21. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1903
Lan / 
Country Ploughs
Plough
bodies Harrows Rollers
Horse
hay-rakes
Chaff
cutters
Seed
drills
Sowing
machines
A 578 297 19 1 _ 16 1 146
B 97 19 4 1 - 1 7 7
C 72 64 17 2 28 5 2 17
D 19 39 8 5 9 1 50 16
E 143 327 2 6 95 22 199 82
F 72 61 8 - 37 2 28 23
G 128 100 3 1 12 2 2 6
H 293 279 29 11 57 55 38 51
I 56 - 2 12 24 29 28 8
K 49 27 6 2 7 5 2 7
L 64 105 2 4 20 1 3 26
M 13 7 6 4 22 5 6 11
N 15 18 - 5 9 2 6 28
O 127 34 14 3 9 1 11 15
P 72 30 - 4 12 10 15 13
R 176 77 - 3 7 18 51 31
S 42 2 8 2 11 1 19 2
T 52 60 6 2 13 11 35 30
U 44 11 1 3 6 - 8 20
W 140 8 1 - - 8 16 8
X 43 6 - - 1 - 4 5
Y 80 - 2 - 3 1 10 7
Z 35 7 11 - - 2 - 5
AC 14 - 1 - - 1 1 9
BD 20 - - - - - - 1
Norway 296 - 5 - - 88 5 25
Finland 3 - 2 1 - 1 - 96
Russia 315 - - - - 31 - -
Argentina 15 - - - - - -
Total 3 073 1 578 157 72 382 319 547 695
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
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Table 22. Number of implement and machine units sold from Överums Bruk in 1913
Län / 
Country Ploughs
Plough
bodies Harrows Rollers
Horse Chaff
hay-rakes cutters
Seed
drills
Sowing
machines
A 292 88 _ _ 18 3 1 40
B 109 19 6 1 9 2 17 19
C 198 66 - - - 2 14 13
D 104 15 19 13 16 6 87 19
E 622 159 60 47 69 25 138 105
F 239 156 - 3 21 4 69 15
G 203 111 2 - - 9 4 2
H 248 259 28 ■ 23 30 22 168 24
T 16 - 18 - 4 6 18 11
K 43 26 1 - 6 2 7 4
L 92 30 5 - 10 3 21 21
M 31 2 4 - 8 2 10 4
N 33 3 - - 1 25 37 13
O 83 10 2 - 3 8 10 12
P 117 9 9 - 30 16 36 15
R 193 72 5 - 7 24 91 19
S 102 2 - - 2 9 30 3
T 89 20 1 - 2 10 55 10
U 78 13 7 - - - 28 9
W 209 3 - - - 13 52 4
X 127 7 1 - - - 30 2
Y 84 3 11 - - 2 25 9
Z 113 3 5 - - 2 9 17
AC 109 - 6 - - - 13 7
BD 81 - 19 - - 5 8 2
Norway 86 4 - - - 22 393 54
Finland 67 - - - - - 65 84
Denmark - - - - - - 2
Russia 153 - - - - 3 -
India 100 - - - - - - -
Total 4 021 1 080 209 87 236 225 1 438 537
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
and machines declined. Överum’s stocks of implements piled up. 
Because of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 the economic 
situation improved, sales increased, and Överum’s stocks were 
depleted. Because of the bulky nature of the products, stock-keep­
ing became a great problem and it functioned like a concertina be-
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Table 23. Överum’s distribution of ploughs divided into various regions in 
Sweden (percentage figures)
Region 1864 1868 1873 1882 1888 1895 1903 1913
A+B+C+D+U
The Mälar province 18 37 43 66 64 43 32 22
E+H + I
Plain of Eastern Götaland 25 35 25 19 19 27 19 25
F+G
Inner Småland 1 0 1 1 2 3 8 12
L+M+N
Scania and HalIand 30 12 7 3 2 5 3 4
W+X+Y+Z+AC+BD
Dalarna and Norrland 1 2 5 0 2 8 13 21
The rest of Sweden 25
J
14 19 11 11 14 25 16
Swedish total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source The records of Överums Bruk: Order books.
tween boom and slump periods. In the sales resistance of the years 
of famine Överum lost a large part of the Scanian market. When 
the economic situation improved again during the 1870s Överum 
were unable to regain it. Competition from Norrahammar began 
to tell in 1870, above all in the South-West of Sweden. The assess­
ment in the administration report of 1883 which was mentioned 
above certainly was not without foundation (see note 42). Instead 
the Mälar province became the most important market area, but 
its comparative importance declined at the start of the twentieth 
century. To the same degree as the share of the Mälar area 
decreased, there was an increase in the share of the sparsely cul­
tivated areas in inner Småland and North Sweden. The farmers in 
these districts started to buy Överum’s ploughs at a late stage, but 
in 1913 they accounted for one-third of all the Swedish orders. The 
first year of the 1880s brought sharply expanding markets for 
Överum, both domestic and foreign. The economic decline which 
followed was a general depression in European agriculture caused 
by Russian and American competition, and it became noticeable
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even at Överum. When the economic situation improved again dur­
ing the 1890s, as far as Överum was concerned it was impossible 
for various reasons to meet the increase in demand. The years 
1895-1913 meant stagnation in the history of the foundry, in com­
plete contrast to the general development of the workshop com­
panies connected with agricultural technology.
In all, the domestic market meant more to Överum than the 
foreign one. Apart from at the start of the 1860s, the exports on 
the whole went eastwards. Russia was clearly the largest importing 
country, but Finland and India also ordered quantities of imple­
ments at times. The advent of the railway line between Norsholm 
and Västervik in 1879 helped to extend the trade in Överum’s 
products. Through the railway Överum got faster and cheaper 
direct transport to the seaport of Västervik and with the main line 
in the South at Norsholm (between Norrköping and Linköping). 
The importance of the railway to the foundry was immediately 
apparent when the export of ploughs from Västervik to Russia in­
creased sharply during the years immediately after 1879. The value 
of the ploughs exported to Russia rose by more than 600 per cent 
between 1879 and 1883. During 1882, the year under investigation, 
more than 50 per cent of Överum’s ploughs were sold on the Rus­
sian market.
At the same time as Överums bruk was extending its engineering 
works, important changes took place in production technique. 
Production was organised into different departments, among which 
the workshop and casting shop were prominent. Above all the 
foundry’s own metalware and tool forges met the demands of the 
engineering works in manufacturing tools. The works was divided 
into various subdivisions, with equipment and machinery for lathe 
operators, milling machine operators, filers, grinders, sheet metal 
workers and joiners. As far as metal production was concerned the 
company’s labour force was comparatively constant during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and amounted to almost 200 
men. In 1910 only 130 workers were recorded, which is connected 
with a comparative decline in production at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.46
See note 44. Svenska Industrien 1907.
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For more than two hundred years the head of the foundry, at 
least nominally, was the proprietor of the foundry. After the death 
of Adelsward in 1852 the foundry was carried on by his widow un­
til 1861 when her son-in-law Count A. Stackelberg became the 
manager until 1871. But such worldly things as the manufacturing 
of ploughs did not interest the deeply religious Stackelberg. Fore­
man Spångberg managed the department instead. On the death of 
Stackelberg in 1871 the executors tried to convert Överums Bruk 
into a limited company. The company was thought to be in need 
of increased working capital, and so the formation of a limited 
company with a share capital of 2.2 million Swedish crowns was 
proposed.47 However, the formation of the limited company did not 
take place, and in 1872 the foundry estate was sold to an English 
company. Six years later the English company transferred the 
foundry to another English company, a holding company (The 
Överum Estate Company) with important interests in English tool 
manufacturing. In 1882 the company was converted into a limited 
company (Aktiebolaget Överums Bruk) with a share capital of 1 mil­
lion Swedish crowns. The newly formed limited company formally 
purchased the foundry estate from the English consortium, but in 
reality the English controlled AB Överums Bruk by virtue of the fact 
that the Överum Estate Company bought almost all of the capital 
stock. The English period in the history of Överum lasted until 
1918.
A decline in production and business afflicted with losses are 
noticeable, especially under the manager H. Hasluck from 1894 
to 1915. The finances seem to have been particularly badly 
managed around the turn of the nineteenth century, with a total 
loss on the balance sheet of over 300 000 Swedish crowns, and to
47 Inbjudning till bildande af Öfverums Aktie Bolag (printed in Linköping in 1871). 
In the invitation to subscribe the company's agricultural implements were specially 
advertised. Rich foreign markets were also put forward as a bait: “As it is now 
recognised that Öfverum’s agricultural implements are at least as good as the Eng­
lish ones, which cost considerably more, and since the costs of freight are lower 
in competition with manufacturers in England, Öfverum must be able to drive these 
away from the Russian market.” There was the desire to underline the importance 
of the Russian market further by giving information of the fact that in 1869 Eng­
land had sold 15.5 million riksdalers worth of agricultural implements to Russia.
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cap it all part of the company’s own shares had been entered as an 
asset of 200000 Swedish crowns.48
Aktiebolaget Överums bruk was sold in 1918 by the English to 
the Svenska Tändsticks AB, which was managed by Ivar Kreuger. 
Kreuger’s motive in buying Överum was to secure the vast forest 
estate. On the other hand he had no interest in the workshop pro­
duction. Carl Sundberg was employed as foundry manager in 1920. 
He took over a company on its last legs.49 Under Sundberg’s 
management the business was reorganised, and the sales figures 
trebled during the first five years of the 1920s. An innovation was 
introduced onto the Swedish market in 1926 when Överum released 
the first tractor plough, which arrived at the right time for the 
breakthrough in the use of tractors. In addition, in 1929 Överum 
was able to regain its leading rôle on the plough market when 
Norrahammar’s plough manufacturing was bought by-Överum with 
financial assistance from Tändsticksbolaget. In doing this the com­
pany eliminated its fiercest competitor.
{a) Summary
The real innovator in Överum was the works foreman, Spångberg, 
who took models of ploughs with a foreign design and adapted 
them to suit northern conditions. Thus in actual fact Spångberg 
was more of a developer than an innovator. But his contributions 
achieved great importance and within a short time Överum’s 
ploughs attained international recognition. In Sweden Överum 
quickly took over the leading position in the plough market. In 
spite of Spàngberg’s contributions his authority and sphere of
48 Jansson, E. A., Överums Bruk, pp. 187ff.
49 Ibid., p. 242. The works manager, Sundberg, expressed the following view inter 
alia when he inspected the works: “The machines which were to be found in the 
workshop were extremely old and worn out. The forging presses which were funda­
mental for plough manufacturing were not to be found at all, no, there was actually 
one, but it was placed along a wall and had never been used, because nobody 
had solved the problem of how to make the necessary tools. Types of plough 
and other articles which were manufactured then were just as ancient and were 
to a great extent obsolete, all of which resulted in a decline in production to almost 
nothing.” In a later report he writes: “During my first years at Överum it was not 
possible to record a turnover of 200 000 Sw. kr., which was almost equivalent to 
what a large village smithy could achieve at that time.”
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activity were limited, and he did not have the supreme power of 
directing how Överum’s capital should be invested. The combina­
tion of a Spångberg with supreme authority and increased capital 
might have brought about a real breakthrough for Överum. But 
such a figure failed to materialise. Probably the English tool manu­
facturers were uneasy because after the death of the unworldly 
Stackelberg in 1871 Överum tried to raise further capital through 
subscription for shares. The English feared competition on the 
Russian market above all, and Överum’s favourable position in rela­
tion to the economics of transport, and its ploughs which were 
well-known and fairly cheap and which were adapted to the condi­
tions of Northern Europe, were regarded as constituting a real 
threat. The threat was eliminated because Överum was bought up. 
After ten years or so the English-owned company stagnated and 
new competitors appeared on the Swedish market, above all Norra- 
hammar. The English epoch in the history of Överum ceased in the 
year after the Russian revolution of 1917. Under more energetic 
management combined with I. Kreuger’s contribution of capital 
Överum was able to regain its leading position after 1920. The 
tractor plough was launched onto the market at the right time and 
it fulfilled agriculture’s new needs in the use of tractors. But they 
had also learnt something from the English. In 1928 Överum bought 
up the plough manufacturing side of its fiercest competitor, Norra- 
hammar. After a long period of stagnation and decline dating back 
to the 1880s Överums bruk was able to become the leader of the 
Swedish plough market again in the 1920s by meeting the demand 
for new agricultural technology. In so doing Överum regained the 
position in plough manufacturing which it had once held in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.
2. Munktells mekaniska verkstad,
Eskilstuna
Theofron Munkteil, the founder of Munktells verkstad in Eskils­
tuna, was born in 1805 at a parsonage in Kärrbo in Västmanland. 
He does not appear to have received any protracted academic
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education in general, but as a youth he was employed by an 
instrument maker in Västerås. Through his father's contacts and 
kinship with mining people in Falun, Munktell was apprenticed at 
the age of seventeen to one of the best-known engineers and 
metallurgists of his day in Sweden, Gustaf Broling of Stockholm. 
After one year’s practical training as a filer and lathe operator 
Theofron Munktell got a higher post at the cast steel works which 
Broling had recently started, and he there became the driving force 
for some years. Simultaneously with this work Munktell was 
employed in the Royal Mint, and in 1826 he became works fore­
man there. While he was employed at the Royal Mint Munktell 
constructed a number of new implements and machines for stamp­
ing coins.50
The English-born industrialist Samuel Owen had started a work­
shop and casting shop on Kungsholmen next to the Royal Mint. 
During his time in Stockholm Munktell had become a close friend 
of Owen, whose workshop he visited very often. Through his 
business on Kungsholmen Owen played a central part in the be­
ginning of Swedish industrialisation. FIe was of great importance 
as a producer of factory equipment and farming machinery but 
his greatest achievement was in his rôle as an industrial pioneer 
and teacher. At the beginning of the nineteenth century he alone 
was able to exploit the technical innovations which had been made 
in English industry. In Sweden Munktell could not have had better 
teachers than Broling and Owen.51
His activity in Broling’s steel works was gradually diminishing 
and in 1832 Munktell’s work at the Royal Mint ceased. In the
50 Hellberg, K .,Järnets och smedernas Eskilstuna. Andra delen, pp. 115 ff.
T. Munktell gave early proof, in several different independent constructions, of 
technical knowledge and imagination which were prerequisites for employment with 
Broling. He himself in 1797-1799 had studied the most prominent iron foundries 
and engineering works of that time in England, and he thereafter became a pioneer 
in the Swedish iron industry and machine construction. Of the technological con­
structions carried out by Munktell during the Stockholm period mention may be 
made of a slide rule (1823) which won general esteem, and which was ordered 
by all the members of the Jernkontor. In addition, he designed the printing presses 
for Lars Johan Hierta's Aftonblad during the paper's first year.
51 Ibid., pp. 119f. Svenska män och kvinnor. In his operations up to 1843 Owen 
produced more than 1 OOO threshing machines, among other items.
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same year he moved to Eskilstuna and founded the Eskilstuna 
mekaniska verkstad. The work in the beginning consisted mainly 
of repairs for the foundries and textile industry in Södermanland. 
Because of his penchant for experiment and his earlier contact with 
skilled engineers Munktell had good prospects of success in his 
new work as an independent industrialist. But he wanted to learn 
more, and in 1835, only a few years after his arrival in Eskilstuna, 
Munktell travelled to England to study the British iron industry for 
himself.52
The business in Eskilstuna started on a small scale, but after his 
return from England Munktell expanded the workshop into an 
engineering factory. During the 1840s activities at MunktelTs com­
pany were geared to a great extent to the State arms factory, which 
ordered a number of new machines. At the same time Munktell 
introduced standardised production of tool machines. This was later 
to become of great importance in the production programme.
In the next decade, the 1850s, the business was characterised by 
the production of big machines. In fact at that time Munktell 
delivered Sweden’s first locomotive and traction engines. There 
was never any large scale production of locomotives, but the first 
traction engine in 1853 marked the start of a new trend in the 
workshop. The production thereafter was to be mainly connected 
with agriculture, as was further emphasised in 1859 by the start of 
threshing-machine production. The traction engine, which was the 
source of power for the steam threshing-machine, was the only 
inanimate source of energy used in Sweden before the First World 
War. Traction engines as well as steam threshing-machines were 
manufactured in series on a gradually increasing scale and con­
stituted the basis of the business in the workshop up to the First 
World War. Apart from this production, mechanical threshing- 
machines, steam mills, steam pumping plants, water elevator
52 Hellberg, K., Järnets och smedernas Eskilstuna, Andra delen, pp. 121 ff.
The study visit to England was made with a government grant. On his return 
from England Munktell extended his business and in 1837 he bought building sites 
on the Eskilstuna River on which to set up factories. In that connection he also 
acquired the right to the river’s water-power. Five years after the foundation of the 
company in 1837 about 25 workers were employed at Eskilstuna mekaniska verk­
stad.
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frames for mines, steam dredgers, steam boilers and steam engines 
were manufactured during the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury.53
In connection with the changeover to production of larger 
agricultural machines Munktell extended the capacity of the work­
shop. The number of people employed had more than quadrupled 
between 1837 and 1860 and at the latter date amounted to 112. 
As a result of the development in production techniques during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century the need for lathe operators, 
filers and other engineers increased the most, while more craft 
groups of workers such as blacksmiths, sheet metal workers and 
joiners were required in a lesser capacity. However the number of 
threshing-machine joiners increased rapidly from the end of the 
1890s. In 1910 threshing-machine joiners constituted around 20 per 
cent of the labour force at Munktell and filers, lathe operators and 
other engineers constituted about 50 per cent.54
During the nineteenth century a large part of the Swedish iron 
and metal industry was located in Eskilstuna, “the Sheffield of 
Sweden”. In this industrial environment the Munktell workshop ex­
panded more rapidly than any of the town’s other factories, and in 
the middle of the 1870s Munktell employed three times as many 
workers as the next largest company, Eskilstuna Jernmanufaktur
53 Ibid., pp. 123 ff. From 1853 up to the First World War about 7 000 traction en­
gines were produced, with a total horse-power of about 50000. Jobs were created 
for Munktell’s dredger and pumping stations through the lowering of the Hjälmaren 
and the two Kvismare lakes in Närke. The lake conservancy company was one of 
the largest in the world, and was founded as a result of the devastating effects 
of the spring spate on farming around the lakes in question. The work went on 
for eleven years (1877-1888) at a total cost of around 4 million Sw. kr. The result 
was that almost 19000 hectares were reclaimed for cultivation.
54 Ibid., pp. 126ff. The factory expansion in 1859-1860 brought about the construc­
tion of a new foundry and the broadening of the management of the firm when the 
son of the founder Theofron Munktell became a partner in the firm in 1859. In 
1857-1859 he studied at Falun bergsskola and thereafter remained in his father’s 
firm until 1889. After the formation of the limited company in 1879 he succeeded 
his father as works manager and managing director, a position he held until 1889. 
Theofron Munktell Jr. also occupied a central position in the development of 
Eskilstuna, since he was chairman of the town council for 30 years from 1865. 
The management of the company became even broader when the founder’s nephew, 
Theofron Boberg, an engineer, joined the firm as a partner in 1863.
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Table 24. Production values for Munktell's engineering works and other 
industries in Eskilstuna. The amounts are given in thousands of Swedish 
crowns
Year
Munk-
tell
Söder­
bloms
mek.
verkst.
Bero-
nius
mek.
verkst.
Eskils­
tuna
Jemmanu-
faktur AB
Eskils­
tuna
Stålpress­
nings AB
Carl
Gustafs
Gevärs­
faktori
1875 544
1885 575 165
1890 787 170
1895 813 200 150 450 200
1896 1 016 522
1900 2 617 420 330 1 140 700 1 296
1910 4 425 600 450 2 000 1 380
1916 12 000 1 100 1 000 2 080 6 000
Note In 1885 the production value at the 66 forging works in Eskilstuna amounted
to a total of 1.2 million Sw. kr., while the corresponding value for the 72 forging
works in 1890 had risen to 1.8 million Sw. kr.
Production value
Number of factories in 1000 Sw. kr.
1896 1900 1910 1896 1900 1910
Industry as a whole in
Eskilstuna 148 132 151 5 646 9 018 20 143
Engineering works in
Eskilstuna 9 8 11 1 312 2 277 5 606
Munktell 1 1 1 1 016 2 617 4 425
Source Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik:: D, Fabriker och handtverk; Svenska
industrien 1911-1912 and 1918-1919; Hellberg, K., Järnets och smedernas
Eskilstuna. Part II.
AB. From table 24 it is possible to see Munktell’s comparative 
importance in the economic life of Eskilstuna. In 1900 Munktell 
alone accounted for 29 per cent of the total industry of the town 
and for 35 per cent of the iron and metal industry, which in turn 
accounted for 80 per cent of the production value of the whole 
industry. Munktell even became the town’s pioneer in production 
techniques, and he introduced steam and electric power in Eskils­
tuna in the 1860s and 1880s respectively.
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It was the arms factories which pioneered the use of the new 
milling machines in workshop production in Sweden and Munk- 
tell’s contacts with the arms manufacturers in Eskilstuna proved 
valuable, not least in the context of production technology. Modern 
workshop techniques were brought over to Sweden from America. 
When the Carl Gustav gevärsfactori in Eskilstuna received a large 
government order for modern rifles in 1867 the manager of the 
factory Major C. Fries and the engineer at Munktell’s workshop, 
Theofron Broberg (the nephew of Munktell senior) went to the 
USA, and there for six months they studied the production at 
Remington’s arms factory. When they returned to Eskilstuna they 
brought with them American milling and drilling machines and 
templates for mass-production. In order to supply the factory in 
Eskilstuna with new machines Munktell started to produce 
machines using the ones brought from America as patterns. From 
Eskilstuna the new techniques spread to Swedish industry, but 
often with a time-lag of ten or twenty years.55
In spite of the fact that Munktell, partly as a result of the 
fruitful contacts with the arms industry, introduced an advanced 
technique for mass-production at an early stage, Torsten Gårdlund 
still described Munktell as a many-sided company immediately after 
the First World War. The production was then spread among 98 
different kinds of engine. 40 different kinds of traction engine and 
100 different kinds of machine tool. It was the aim of the older 
workshop directors not to turn away any orders and to show that 
the workshop could produce whatever the customers ordered. 
However, it is right to bear in mind that some of the companies 
with a mixed production were so large that they had specialised 
departments which attained a greater production than companies 
which were specialised in the usual sense. Machine tools con­
stituted a small part of Munktell’s total production, while at the 
same time the company was the largest producer of machine tools 
in the country.56 The same was true to a still greater degree of 
the heavy agricultural machines, the steam threshing-machines and 
traction engines.
55 Gårdlund. T., Industrialismens samhälle, pp. 244 f.
56 Ibid., pp. 84ff.
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Production value in thousands of Sw. kr. at Munktell
1896 (%) 1910 (%)
Castings 163 16 555 13
Steam boilers 78 8 315 7
Traction engines 304 30 1 159 26
Other steam engines 77 7 319 7
Machine tools, engines 111 11 645 15
Threshing machines 134 13 1 008 23
Others 149 15 424 9
Total 1 016 100 4 425 100
Source Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primärmaterial till industristatistiken.
Thus in the years before and after the turn of the nineteenth 
century traction engines and steam threshers accounted for almost 
half of the production value (43 per cent in 1896 and 49 per cent 
in 1910). Munkteirs share of the Swedish market in traction engines 
increased from 77 per cent in 1896 to around 98 per cent in 1910, 
while the company’s share of the threshing-machine market was 
21 per cent in 1896 and 43 per cent in 1910. If steam threshing- 
machines alone are included Munktell’s share of the market would 
be considerably larger. In practice Munktell controlled the Swedish 
market in traction engines and steam threshers at the outbreak of 
the First World War. The traction engines were special agricultural 
machines in the sense that it was necessary to have the assistance 
of special joiners to assemble them. Therefore the manufacturers 
of traction engines would have to keep a fairly large service person­
nel in the field. This probably proved an obstacle to the attempts 
at expansion made by smaller manufacturers, and militated towards 
a monopoly in this field.
During the twenty years which preceded the First World War 
there was a decisive increase in the domestic demand for machines 
and tools, particularly because of the mechanisation of industry 
and agriculture. The engineering industry was also able to an in­
creasing extent to cope with domestic demands. Among the most 
important groups of machines—where the domestic production in 
1913 covered at least 75 per cent of the consumption—were steam
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engines and motors, woodwork machines, machines for hoisting 
and pressing and for use in the mineral industry, armaments and 
agricultural machines and implements. The acceleration in the 
establishment of new engineering companies from the 1890s on­
wards must be regarded as a response to the increase in demand. 
With this, competition was intensified. One factor which contrib­
uted to keener competition was the accounting and cost account­
ing system which had long been underdeveloped. The lack of 
proper cost analysis often led to the fixing of prices at random or 
on the basis of a competitor’s (perhaps unrealistic) price. However 
some of the larger companies such as Separator and Munktell 
introduced rational planning of production and cost accounting 
before the First World War. In 1912 Munktell set up an operating 
cost office,'which employed 34 people in 1917.57
The sale of MunktelFs products was affected by the trends in 
economic activity. This was true of sales in general and especially 
of the sales of farming machinery. The period from 1860 to 1914 
can be roughly sub-divided into two shorter periods, from 1860 
to 1890 and from 1890 to 1914. The first period was relatively 
speaking a static one, though it had clear economic declines and 
booms, and the second period one of expansion caused by inter­
mittent booms due to the economic trend. The years 1895-1900 
and 1905-1910 were particularly years of expansion. Diagram 8 
shows clearly the restrictive effect which the years of bad crops 
1867-1869 had on the economy, and the subsequent boom at 
the start of the 1870s. The end of the 1870s saw a new decline 
followed by a short but striking boom at the start of the 1880s. 
The depression which struck European agriculture in the 1880s 
affected Munktell most in the years 1886-1887. On the other hand 
the expanding sales of heavy farming machines at Munktell after 
1890 are a clear indication of an upward economic trend in agricul­
ture at that time.
Thus the trends in agrarian economy were to a high degree 
decisive for MunktelFs sales figures. In turn the sales figures dic­
tated the limits of the company’s capacity, and thus the company’s 
fixing of wage levels and wage-paying capacity were directly
57 Ibid., pp. 88f.
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Table 25. Wages paid to different groups of workers at Munktells mekaniska verkstad 
in the years 1877-1910. Amounts are given in thousands of Sw. kr.
Year
Pattern­
makers
Thresher-
makers
Filers
turners
fitters Forgers Platers Others
Amount 
of wages
Number of
workers
1877 4 4 52 10 8 19 97 224
1878 5 6 66 11 8 16 112
1879 5 6 60 9 8 4 92
1880 5 8 73 11 10 5 112
1881 5 13 77 12 15 5 127
1882 6 15 88 13 17 5 144
1883 7 17 107 16 18 15 180 244
1884 10 20 106 17 20 21 194 252
1885 7 18 92 15 15 11 158
1886 6 14 76 11 12 6 125 213
1887 7 15 77 11 12 5 127
1888 8 16 93 14 16 9 156
1889 8 18 136 20 33 12 227 251
1890 11 18 147 21 42 13 252
1891 12 21 148 24 41 15 261
1896 14 31 164 22 32 14 277
1897 16 31 223 28 45 16 359 438
1898 18 40 258 34 44 29 423
1899 22 62 319 46 54 42 545
1900 22 80 315 56 69 56 598
1901 17 68 266 46 53 43 493
1902 18 68 215 42 44 36 423
1903 20 78 245 48 56 38 485
1906 22 89 306 57 63 47 584
1907 23 101 358 68 81 65 696
1908 30 118 426 76 95 66 811
1909 26 150 354 62 58 66 716
1910 35 191 455 76 67 78 902 839
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Wage-books
dependent on the sales figures. Diagram 7 shows that on the whole 
the wages paid at Munktell varied according to the sales. In fact 
the wages ratio dropped from 30-35 per cent at the end of the 
nineteenth century to 20-25 per cent at the beginning of the twen­
tieth century. However the profit ratio decreased at the same time,
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Table 26. Sales, wages paid and profits before deductions at Munktell 
1877-1910 in thousands of Svr. kr.
Year Sales
Payments
of wages Profits
1877 444 97 94
1878 528 112 114
1879 361 92 55
1880 380 112 56
1881 444 127 100
1882 644 144 160
1883 578 180 143
1884 612 194 142
1885 436 158 63
1886 444 125 17
1887 387 127 19
1888 539 156 40
1889 757 227 75
1890 788 252 87
1891 832 261 70
1896 1 075 277 58
1897 1 488 359 186
1898 1 629 423 188
1899 1 774 545 101
1900 2 226 598 100
1901 1 917 493 48
1902 1 991 423 85
1903 2 242 485 126
1906 2 979 584 127
1907 3 937 696 193
1908 4 264 811 301
1909 4 022 716 220
1910 4 031 902 68
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Wage books. Gårdlund T., 
Svensk industrifinansiering under genombrottsskedet 1830-1913, pp. 116*ff.
usually very much faster than the wages ratio. To put it another 
way, other items of expenditure such as the cost of raw materials, 
operating costs and the costs of interest and investment played a 
greater part during MunktelTs breakthrough phase. Simultaneously 
with these tendencies the trend in wages has meant that the amount
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Table 27. The relationship between sales, wages paid, and profits before 
deductions at Munktell 1880-1910 (sales=100)
Year Sales
Payments 
of wages Profits
1880 100 30 15
1885 100 36 14
1890 100 32 11
1896 100 26 5
1900 100 27 4
1906 100 20 4
1910 100 22 2
of the individual worker’s wage had increased accordingly between
1877 and 1910.
Year Wage per worker, Sw. kr.
1877 435
1883 740
1886 585
1897 820
1910 1 075
The economic situation affected different groups of workers in 
various high degrees. The ‘other workers’ group was the most sensi­
tive to the development of the economic situation, and as regards 
employment functioned like a concertina according to the economic 
trend. The employment situation was considerably more stable for 
forgers, toolmakers and platers of the craftsmen groups.
Munktell’s concentration on agricultural machinery was followed 
up by various kinds of marketing measures. The agricultural ex­
hibitions which recurred on regional, national and international 
levels during the latter part of the nineteenth century afforded 
manufacturers great opportunities to advertise their products. World 
fairs attracted special interest and Munktell was represented at 
several of them in Paris, London, Vienna, Moscow, Riga, Brussels, 
Madrid, Copenhagen, Christiania and also Bogota in South
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Table 28. The relationship between sales, wages paid, and profits before 
deductions at Munktell 1880-1910 (wages paid=100)
Year Sales
Payments 
of wages Profits
1880 340 100 50
1885 276 100 40
1890 313 100 35
1896 388 100 21
1900 375 100 17
1906 510 100 22
1910 446 100 8
Source See table 26.
America. However Munktell did not achieve any exports of agricul­
tural machines worth mentioning before 1895. After that sales 
increased much more rapidly, at home as well as abroad, and in 
the years 1910-1914 about half of the steam threshers and traction 
engines which Munktell delivered went to the foreign market. 80 
per cent of the exports in the years 1900-1914 went eastwards 
(to Russia and Finland) and Russia alone accounted for 70 per cent 
of all exports.58
In the period before the First World War traction engines were 
the most costly machine investment for agriculture. The prices in 
Swedish crowns varied according to the size of the machine, as 
follows:
Traction engines
Year 4 h.p. 6 h.p. 8 h.p. 10 h.p. 12 h.p. 18 h.p. 20 h.p.
1887 2 600 3 200 3 750 4 350 5 000 7 600 8 300
1907 3 350 4 000 4 700 5 500 7 600 8 200
1913 3 350 4 000 4 700 5 500 7 600 8 200
58 Hellberg, K., Järnets och smedernas Eskilstuna. Andra delen, p. 126. MunktelPs 
largest foreign agents were E. Hamrin in Moscow, Silfverhjelm & Ullgren in Riga, 
P. Sidorow and AB Agros in Helsingfors and A. Malmkvist in Copenhagen.
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Steam threshers
Year 31 feet 4 feet 41 feet
1887 2 200 2 400 2 500
1907 2 850 3 050 3 250
1913 3 100 3 350 3 600
The most common types of traction engine were of 6-8 h.p. and 
steam threshers with a working width of 4 feet predominated. Thus 
in 1907 an ordinary steam thresher with a traction engine cost 
about 7000 Sw.kr. Therefore an ordinary steam thresher with a 
traction engine cost at least ten times as much as the next most 
expensive farming machine, the reaper. In addition, at the beginning 
of the twentieth century more and more steam threshers were beirtg 
equipped with straw balers; in 1913 the self-binding type cost 3 000 
Sw.Kr. while a smaller straw baler cost 1700 Sw.kr.59
The high cost of buying a steam thresher with a traction engine 
together with their limited period of use account for the fact that 
Swedish farmers only bought these machines to a small extent. 
But the comparatively limited number of steam threshers with trac­
tion engines (about 7000) has made it possible to study their 
distribution in Sweden from a social as well as a geographical 
viewpoint. The deliveries of traction engines and threshing 
machines can be traced in Munktell’s order books, one of which 
was kept specially for traction engines and another for threshing 
machines. If the people who ordered farming machines are simply 
grouped socially according to whether or not their surnames end 
in ‘-son’ a significant difference becomes apparent. The early 
orders came to a great extent from farmers with non-sonnames. 
This group consists almost exclusively of estate owners and people 
of social standing, and with the aid of information about titles or 
farm addresses or both it has been possible to verify the group 
identification to a great extent. Thus 93 per cent of the orders 
before 1880 came from people with non-sonnames, and only 7 per 
cent from farmers with son-names. The number of people with
59 Price-lists from Munktell.
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Diagram 5. Amounts of wages for thresher-makers and also filers, turners 
and fitters in relation to the total wage bill at MunktelVs mekaniska verkstad 
in Eskilstuna 1877-1910.
Thousands of 
Sw. crs
Total wage bill900-,
Filers, turners and fitters
Thresher-makers800-
700-
600-
80 82 '84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 1900 02 08 1910
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Wage books.
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Diagram 6. The development of wages and profits at Munktell 1877-1910.
Thousands of 
Sw. crs
------ Wages paid
800-
----Profits before deductions
600-
500-
400-
300-
200-
r-----
100-,
80 82 84 86 98 1900 02 04 06 08 1910
Source See table 26.
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Diagram 7. Sales and wages paid at Munktells mekaniska verkstad, Eskils­
tuna 1877-1910.
Thousands of 
Sw. crs
4 500-,
Sales
Wages
4 000-
3 500-
3 000-
2 500-
2 000-
1 500-
1 000-
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 1900 02 04 06 08 1910
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Wage books. Gårdlund, T., 
Svensk industrifinansiering under genombrottsskedet 1830-1913, pp. 116*f.
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Table 29. Number of threshing-machines delivered
Year Sweden Abroad Total Year Sweden Abroad Total
1860 _ 1 1 1880 26 1 27
1861 3 - 3 1881 23 3 26
1862 9 - 9 1882 45 1 46
1863 15 - 15 1883 48 1 49
1864 10 - 10 1884 42 3 45
1865 7 - 7 1885 41 3 44
1866 6 - 6 1886 22 5 27
1867 6 - 6 1887 16 7 23
1868 6 - 6 1888 36 1 37
1869 9 - 9 1889 17 6 23
1870 11 - 11 1890 50 1 51
1871 13 1 14 1891 33 4 37
1872 16 - 16 1892 66 - 66
1873 17 - 17 1893 43 - 43
1874 16 2 18 1894 74 10 84
1875 17 1 18 1895 71 5 76
1876 21 - 21 1896 52 10 62
1877 11 - 11 1897 87 5 92
1878 23 - 23 1898 96 5 101
1879 18 - 18 1899 118 10 128
1900 106 19 125
Year Sweden Denmark Finland Russia Others Total
1901 100 7 3 <6 116
1902 128 10 1 5 - 144
1903 136 8 1 15 - 160
1904 113 9 3 22 1 148
1905 94 8 - 13 - 115
1906 151 7 3 21 - 182
1907 185 4 1 28 - 218
1908 202 17 1 33 1 254
1909 196 15 5 55 1 272
1910 181 2 2 135 9 329
1911 167 10 1 126 27 331
1912 203 20 4 82 14 323
1913 190 15 4 142 14 365
1914 128 15 1 115 10 269
1915 126 12 1 - 139
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Order books.
Table 30. Number of traction-engines delivered
Year Sweden Abroad Total Year Sweden Abroad Total
1853 1 _ 1 1877 24 2 26
1854 1 - 1 1878 34 - 34
1855 4 - 4 1879 30 - 30
1856 5 - 5 1880 34 2 36
1857 5 - 5 1881 38 3 41
1858 11 - 11 1882 66 _ 66
1859 10 - 10 1883 70 2 72
1860 13 1 14 1884 49 8 57
1861 8 _ 8 1885 41 4 45
1862 22 1 23 1886 32 7 39
1863 27 _ 27 1887 21 5 26
1864 17 17 1888 40 3 43
1865 16 - 16 1889 29 4 33
1866 14 - 14 1890 42 3 45
1867 11 - 11 1891 40 3 43
1868 12 - 12 1892 69 - 69
1869 14 - 14 1893 51 - 51
1870 11 11 1894 80 13 93
1871 15 1 16 1895 67 9 76
1872 34 _ 34 1896 91 11 102
1873 26 _ 26 1897 127 9 136
1874 38 1 39 1898 142 9 151
1875 44 1 45 1899 176 15 191
1876 45 - 45 1900 165 28 193
Year Sweden Denmark Finland Russia Others Total
1901 162 1 4 7 3 117
1902 195 8 7 9 1 220
1903 219 6 5 21 3 254
1904 179 9 18 22 - 228
1905 138 6 20 15 1 180
1906 183 4 44 21 2 254
1907 214 9 21 23 3 270
1908 191 30 38 38 5 302
1909 150 20 20 52 3 245
1910 154 3 20 124 7 308
1911 88 5 10 123 22 248
1912 126 10 5 70 17 228
1913 117 6 14 110 1 248
1914 61 2 4 116 2 185
1915 87 4 8 6 1 106
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Order books.
Table 31. Number of kerosene engines delivered
Year Sweden Denmark Finland Russia Others Total
1907 6 _ _ 6
1908 78 - - - - 78
1909 48 2 - 42 6 98
1910 40 - - 116 25 181
1911 43 3 - 91 53 190
1912 54 5 - 55 30 144
1913 65 2 - 103 19 189
1914 57 8 4 37 18 124
1915 3 2 3 5 8 21
Table 32. Number of straw presses delivered
Year Sweden Denmark Finland Russia Others Total
1904 2 _ 2
1905 8 1 - _ — 9
1906 22 - - _ _ 22
1907 51 - - - - 51
1908 87 15 - - _ 102
1909 100 11 1 - - 112
1910 85 4 — _ _ 89
1911 77 2 - - 2 81
1912 85 5 - - — 90
1913 69 4 - - - 73
1914 35 5 1 31 - 72
1915 2 2 - - - 4
1916 67 15 - 2 _ 84
1917 24 8 - - _ 32
1918 37 1 - - _ 38
1919 36 5 - - - 41
1920 4 - - - - 4
Source The records of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Order books.
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dumber of traction engines and threshing-machines delivered. 
ds of Bolinder Munktell, Eskilstuna: Order books.
son-names who placed orders certainly increased during the 
1880s but up to 1890 it still only constituted 15 per cent of the 
total number of buyers. During the decade after 1890 the orders 
were ‘democratised’ to such an extent that customers with son- 
names almost counterbalanced the customers with non-sonnames, 
but up until 1900 69 per cent of all the orders came from farm­
ers with non-sonnames. Thus two out of every three deliveries be­
fore 1900 went to the estates, and above all to the Mälar area and 
Östergötland in which there were many estates, (see table 33, coun­
ties B, C, D, U and E, and maps 2-7). On the other hand from 
the beginning of the twentieth century farmers with non-son-names 
—a substantial number of whom resided in Scania—were predomi­
nant. A new and larger marketing group, consisting mainly of lar­
ger Scanian peasant farms, then succeeded the central Swedish 
estates as the most important buyers of Munktell’s steam threshing 
machines and later of straw presses too. In fact for 30-40 years 
heavy farming machines from Munktell had only been distributed 
outside the estate-owning class to a small extent. It took a long 
time before the steam threshers were in circulation on the next 
agrarian level, viz. the larger peasant farms on the country’s best 
land. The trend of development mentioned above strongly confirms 
the results of earlier research into the diffusion of mechanisation 
within agriculture. In research into the diffusion of mechanisation 
in Swedish agriculture between 1860 and 1910 based on material 
from estate inventories it appeared that in the year 1890 rather 
more than 40 per cent of the large holdings under examination were 
in possession of steam threshers, as compared with only a few of 
the larger peasant farms under investigation. Twenty years later 
there were steam threshers on 60-70 per cent of the large holdings, 
while the corresponding figure for the larger peasant farms was 
15-20 per cent.60
60 Munktell’s order books for traction engines and threshers contain information 
about delivery dates, machine sizes, customers, possible middlemen, machine 
joiners and customers’ addresses. On the whole the non-son-names bore the imprint 
of remarkably “high social standing” typified by Adlercreutz, Brannerhjelm, Cassel, 
Celsing, Coyet, Fries, Hamilton, Lagerheim, Lybecker, Piper, Posse, Rappe, Rosin, 
Rålamb, Stjemstedt, Tersmeden et cetera. It has been possible to trace farm
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The introduction of steam power into agriculture around 1850 
marked the start of a new phase in the development of agricultural 
techniques. The first wave of mechanisation in farming during the 
first half of the nineteenth century was based on and dependent 
on an increase in the number of beasts of draught as a source 
of power. Examples of such agricultural techniques were the horse- 
drawn mowing and sowing machines and the thresher with the 
horse walking. During the second half of the nineteenth century 
several attempts were made to convert steam into a source of 
power in farming. This would enable a reduction to be made in the 
stock of beasts of draught. However most attempts to adapt steam 
power to the special needs of agriculture failed. As far as farming 
was concerned the steam engine was too heavy in relation to the 
power it produced, and therefore the steam ploughing system, for 
example, was only used to a very small extent. Steam power could 
only be used successfully in farming when the steam engine in 
operation could remain stationary on a firm surface, as when steam 
threshing. Undoubtedly the steam-powered thresher constituted the 
most expensive technical investment in agriculture before the First 
World War. The steam thresher with its accessories cost more than 
ten times as much as the next most expensive farming machine, 
the mowing machine or the separator. Therefore the very limited 
number of steam threshers in circulation outside the large holdings 
was not just a Swedish phenomenon but one which appeared gener­
ally wherever advanced farming was practised. Through J. M. G. 
van der Poel’s company history of Boeke & Huidkoper, Groningen, 
a firm which exported farming machines, in which the whole of the
addresses of people with non-son-names to well-known estates and farms, or, 
through maps, to specific manor houses or larger farms.
Percentage distribution of orders for machines according to the customer's surname
Period Non-son-names Son-names Total
1860-69 98 2 100
1860-79 93 7 100
1860-89 85 15 100
1860-99 69 31 100
Kuuse, J., Från redskap till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersialise­
ring inom svenskt jordbruk 1860-1890, pp. 47 ff.
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Map 2. Buyers of Munktells steam threshers.
1890-18991860-1869.
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Map 3. Buyers of MunktelVs steam threshers.
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Map 4. Buyers of MunktelVs steam threshers 1870-1879.
Buyers with 
non-son-names
Buyers with 
son-names
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Map 5. Buyers of MunktelVs steam threshers 1880-1889.
Buyers with 
non-son-names Buyers with son-names
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Map 6. Buyers of MunktelVs steam threshers 1890-1899.
Buyers with 
non-son-names
Buyers with 
son-names
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Map 7. Buyers of MunkteWs steam threshers 1907.
BuyerS with 
son-namesBuyers with non-son-names
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technical development of Dutch agriculture is also dealt with to a 
certain extent, it is possible to follow the spread of the steam 
thresher in the Netherlands after 1870. The slow diffusion of the 
steam thresher in Sweden was matched by an even slower rate of 
diffusion in the Netherlands. In 1870 there were 30 and in 1900 
barely 300, whereas Sweden had about 70 in 1870 and about 1500 
around the year 1900. The reason for the slow development of the 
curve of the spread in the Netherlands was that the farming com­
munity in relation to the acreage of arable land was larger in the 
Netherlands than it was in Sweden. Thus the potential buyers of 
steam threshers, the large holdings, were more numerous in 
Sweden than in the Netherlands. In addition the domestic produc­
tion of steam threshers in Sweden may have contributed to the fact 
that they spread quicker in Sweden than in the Netherlands where 
steam threshers had to be imported. In 1 900 almost 85 per cent 
of the Dutch steam threshers were to be found in the three northern 
regions of Groningen, Friesland and Noordholland where most of 
the large farms were situated. Furthermore, in 1885 83 per cent of 
all the soil drainage in the Netherlands had been carried out in 
these three regions in spite of the fact that together they only 
accounted for a quarter of the country’s area and population. 
Apparently the steam thresher was as densely distributed amongst 
the large holdings in Holland as it was in Sweden. Over a long 
period steam power in European agriculture was only utilised by 
established large holdings, and it was not until towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, when farmers started to form so-called 
steam thresher associations to share the investment costs, that 
steam power also reached the peasant farms. Another farming 
machine which also spread selectively to the larger farms was the 
fertilizer distributor, and around 1900 four out of five Dutch fer­
tilizer distributors were in use in the three most northern regions 
of the country.61
61 Ibid., pp. 103 ff. van der Poel, J. M. G., Honderd Jaar Landbouwmechanisatie 
in Nederland, pp. 151, 194, 21 Iff. The firm of Boeke & Huidekoper was AB 
Separator's general agent in Holland. During the First World War the demand for 
agricultural machines was especially great in Europe, and at that time journeys 
were made from Boeke & Huidekoper inter alia to Sweden in order to ensure 
deliveries of agricultural machines from AB Separator's factories in Stockholm and 
International Harvester’s factories in Norrköping.
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Well-developed communications were a necessary condition for a 
more extensive distribution of farming machinery. The opening of 
the railway line between Eskilstuna and Oxelösund in 1877 gave 
Munktell the opportunity of transporting its heavy machines in a 
more rational way. However it was to take fifteen to twenty years 
before the railway’s capacity in this respect was used to a greater 
extent. Munktells mekaniska verkstad’s branch in Åstorp in Scania 
became of more immediate importance for the spread of the 
machines. From the start of the twentieth century the branch 
served the growing Scanian market with sales and repair work. 
During the period before the First World War apart from the branch 
in Åstorp Munktell set up local offices for sales operations in 
Stockholm, Örebro, Linköping, Kristinehamn, Falun, Skövde, 
Växjö, Copenhagen, Moscow and Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar, 
to the north-east of the Black Sea in the Russian black earth 
belt).62 The decline in the deliveries of traction engines after 1914 
was due partly to the outbreak of war but mainly to the fact that 
the driving power was modernised. The steam-driven traction 
engines were replaced by kerosene-driven engines at the time when 
the steam thresher was replaced by the motor thresher.
In Sweden during the earlier phase of industrialisation the accu­
mulation of capital seems to have been brought about by the com­
panies ploughing back their own profits. This applied especially 
to the engineering works, which were usually founded as quite 
small companies. An industrious technician could borrow a few 
thousand Swedish crowns and equip a small workshop with a few 
filing benches and metalwork machines. Then a gradual expansion 
could take place towards a production which was worth millions. 
Although there are instances of companies which were founded 
from the start as large workshops—by merchants—it normally hap­
pened that the workshops were started on a small scale by young 
technicians and then expanded with the aid of ploughed-back 
profits. The conversion into a limited company then took place, in 
order to limit liability and not in order to facilitate the raising of 
capital. The foregoing description applies in its entirety to the 
financial development of Munktell. From the founding of the com-
62 Svenska industrien 1907 and 1918-1919.
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Diagram 9. Profits realised before allowance for depreciation and Munk- 
tell’s private withdrawals before the formation of the limited company in 
1857-1878.
Thousand 
Sw crs.
Profits
250-
Private withdrawals
200-
100-
74 76 187860 62 64 66 68 70 72
Source Gårdlund, T., Svensk industrifinansiering under genombrottsskedet 1830- 
1913, pp. 118*f.
pany in 1832 to the end of the 1850s when an expansion connected 
with the transition to farming machines took place, Munktell had 
expanded gradually after a modest start. Theofron Munktell had 
not inherited any starting capital from his family. By the end of the 
1850s the company had grown and Munktell’s personal withdrawals 
from this time onwards indicate a high standard of living. During 
the twenty years which preceded the formation of the limited com­
pany in 1879, Munktell’s personal withdrawals constituted on 
average 40 per cent of the profits. Thus the greater part remained 
in the company. In spite of this it was possible for Munktell to 
withdraw on average 25000 Swedish crowns during the 1860s and
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1870s for his personal use. This put his level of expenditure above 
the salaries of the top civil servants.63
After its incorporation in 1879 Munktell remained a family com­
pany, and in 1895 the ten largest shareholders held 94 per cent of 
the total share capital of 850000 Swedish crowns. During the period 
from 1879 to 1913 no new shares were issued. Instead the expan­
sion of Munktell from the 1890s up to the First World War was 
brought about to a great extent with the aid of outside capital. As 
the following compilation shows, long-term borrowing increased 
especially during the latter part of the period.
Principal categories of debt as percentages of the balance sheet total
Year
Short-term
debts
Long-term
debts
Own
capital Total
1860 11 13 76 100
1870 1 13 86 100
1880 1 12 87 100
1885 7 13 80 100
1890 6 23 71 100
1895 7 16 77 100
1900 14 40 46 100
1905 6 54 40 100
1910 15 57 28 100
1913 13 56 31 100
During the latter part of the period the long-term credits were 
arranged mainly through mortgage loans from the commercial 
banks and a supplementary bond loan. On the assets side the 
development was distinguished by the decreasing share of the fixed 
assets from 65 per cent in 1860 to 22 per cent in 1913, while over
83 Gärdlund, T., Svensk industrifinansiering under genombrottsskedet 1830-1913, 
pp. 43 ff. For the purposes of comparison annual salaries in Sw. kr. of certain high 
officials are given:
Office 1850 1860 1870 1880
Secretary of State 10500 15000 17000 17000
Chief Justice of Appeal 7500 9000 9000 10000
Regimental commander 5400 6000 6740 7 500
Justice of Appeal 3 900 5 000 5000 6400
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the same period the stock assets grew from 12 per cent to 36 
per cent. In the expansion from the middle of the 1890s to 1913 
the liquid assets were multiplied twenty times over (almost entirely 
trade debts). Thus in 1913 trade debts constituted 42 per cent of the 
total assets and were therefore the largest item in the assets.64
Continuity in the management of the company was also main­
tained after 1889 when Theofron Munktell Jr. retired as a director 
of the company. He was then succeeded by the engineer at Munk- 
tell, C. G. Thunberg, who remained a director until his death in 
1907. Under Thunberg’s management significant new building con­
struction and expansion took place in the years 1895-1898, and the 
turnover almost trebled between 1895 and 1900.
During the boom perjod of the First World War Munktell ex­
panded the business by purchasing Beronius mekaniska verkstad in 
Eskilstuna in 1918: this had previously been an independent com­
pany specialising in woodwork machines. After the First World 
War Munktell in common with the whole of the export industry 
was hit by a gnawing depression during 1921-1923, with decreasing 
markets and limited orders as a result. The company entered into 
a serious decline and went into liquidation in 1922. According to 
contracts of sale a large part of the production and sales at 
MunktelFs factories in 1920-1925 were handled by Nydqvist & 
Holm in Trollhättan, who had large orders from Russia during 
these years. In 1926 the Handelsbank took over financial respon­
sibility for Munktell which was extended as the economic trend 
improved during the latter part of the 1920s, through mergers, 
on the one hand in 1929 with AB Avancemotor, with tractors as 
the principal product, and on the other hand in 1932 with J. & 
C. G. Bolinders Mekaniska Verkstad in Stockholm. The merger be­
tween AB Bolinder and Munktell in 1932 signified a fundamental 
change and widening of the production programme. Bolinder, which 
produced mainly marine and stationary oil engines, transferred its 
machine and engine production to Munktell in Eskilstuna, and this 
became an important branch of the production of the merged com­
panies. The former production of traction engines and steam 
engines at Munktell had ceased after the First World War. However
64 Ibid., pp. 36ff., p. 112.
112
in the future farming machinery, together with roadbuilding 
machinery, was also to play a significant part in the production of 
the company, but with new products such as motor threshers, com­
bine harvesters and tractors.
After the merger in 1932 Bolinder-Munktell developed into a 
multinational company with seven foreign subsidiary companies in 
Helsingfors, Oslo, London, Paris, Rotterdam, Milan and New 
York, and a worldwide agency business was organised for the sell­
ing. When the sale of Bolinder-Munktell was mooted after the 
Second World War, negotiations for its acquisition took place in 
1949 with International Harvester among others. However in the 
following year the company was purchased by Volvo, who had 
begun to make tractors during the 1940s and had had an agreement 
with Bolinder-Munktell for cooperation on the construction side 
since 1943. Thus in 1950 Bolinder-Munktell was linked to the motor 
car industry and became part of the Volvo group of companies as 
the subsidiary BM-Volvo.65
3. Summary
When Munktell and Överum began to supply engineering products 
to agriculture in the 1850s, the companies resembled one another 
in some respects. In the middle of the nineteenth century both 
could be regarded as companies on an intermediate level with a 
largely regional field of operations, and both had had connections 
with the armaments industry before the transition to agricultural 
implements and machinery. Furthermore, following the concentra­
tion on agricultural implements and machinery, the markets of the 
two companies developed rapidly in their penetration of the national 
market. But there on the whole the similarities ended. Överum’s 
phase of expansion occurred comparatively early in 1860-1885, 
when the foundry’s ploughs quickly won international recognition
65 Attman, A., Göteborg 1863-1962. 1:2, pp. 62 ff. Hildebrand, K. G., I omvand­
lingens tjänst. Svenska Handelsbanken 1871-1955, pp. 300 ff.
Hellberg, K., Järnets och smedernas Eskilstuna, II, pp. 329ff. A new foundry 
for machinery was set up in 1918 to supply Munktell s various machine works 
with materials and semi-manufactured products. During the period between the wars 
the foundry was the largest for heavy machinery in the Nordic countries.
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and dominance on the national market. From then until 1920 
Överum can be described as a company which slowed down, while 
Munktell grew comparatively slowly until 1890, to expand rapidly 
thereafter.
Munktell introduced traction engines into Sweden in 1853. In 
Britain the first threshing machine with a traction engine had been 
shown in Liverpool in 1841. Ten years later the number of steam 
threshers in Britain was estimated at 8 OOO.66 In Sweden the diffu­
sion of the steam thresher was not so rapid, and Munktell, which 
dominated the Swedish market, only delivered about 7 000 machines 
in over 60 years. Of these only a small proportion were delivered 
during the first 40 years. The difference in the rate of diffusion 
is due to the difference in market conditions. There were compara­
tively many estates in Britain and therefore the demand grew fast, 
while the comparatively few estates in Sweden, which for a long 
time had been the sole buyers of steam threshers, constituted a 
small market for the producers. The breakthrough in steam thresher 
deliveries at Munktell only occurred when around the turn of the 
nineteenth century the larger peasant farms started to acquire steam 
threshers in large quantities. From this perspective it is possible to 
establish that Munktell with its heavy farming machinery arrived 
too early on the Swedish market.
Traction engines and steam threshers, which Munktell introduced 
onto the Swedish market, were no new products. At the beginning 
of the 1850s these farming machines were in use on many British 
estates. For various reasons the traction engine industry developed 
a tendency to favour the producers on the home market.67 In addi­
tion problems connected with the servicing of the machines 
hindered the expansion of the smaller domestic producers. In this 
situation Munktell was able to gain a firmer hold on the Swedish 
part of the market. Munktell completely dominated the production 
of traction engines in Sweden, and up to the First World War 
it was able to conquer an ever increasing proportion of the
66 Fussel, G. E., The Farmer's Tools. The History of British Farm Implements, 
Tools and Machinery before the Tractor came 1500-1900, pp. 218 ff.
67 The tariff walls which the Swedish industrial protectionists forced into existence 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century were a contributory factor in this 
connection.
114
country’s sales of steam threshers. After 1895 Munktell was able 
to start exporting on a large scale, and around 1910 the foreign 
market accounted for about half of the company’s total sales. 
Eighty per cent of the exports went eastwards and Russia, who 
had a growing but inadequate domestic agricultural machine 
industry, accounted for the majority of these exports. Russian 
agriculture, which was expanding but lacked agricultural tech­
niques, required Munktell’s steam thresher on an ever increasing 
scale at the start of the twentieth century.
Eskilstuna’s foremost personality in the industrial development 
of the nineteenth century was Theofron Munktell, who combined 
technical imagination with enterprise. He was both an inventor and 
an entrepreneur. The metal industry in Eskilstuna soon took the 
lead in the country through its prompt application of British and 
American technology during the nineteenth century. The industrial 
scene there acted as a spearhead for the rest of the country. The 
development of Munktell can be explained at least in part by the 
industrial hot-house climate in which the company functioned. 
Munktell became an advanced company from the point of view of 
production technique, but progress was retarded for reasons relat­
ing to the market. From a global point of view Th. Munktell 
created no fresh markets. He opened up the Swedish part of the 
market. The important concentration on heavy agricultural 
machines only had economic consequences inside Sweden. Cer­
tainly a large number of heavy agricultural machines from Munk- 
tell were in due course exported to Russia, but from a Russian 
point of view these exports were only a drop in the ocean. Even 
if Munktell exerted a great influence on the economy of the large 
farms in Sweden, the Swedish part of the market, consisting of the 
top stratum of agriculture, was too small for Munktell to make a 
real breakthrough as did another Swedish company dealing in 
agricultural machines, viz. AB Separator. It was possible for Munk- 
tell to develop into a large-scale company in the period between the 
wars through the merger of companies with different types of 
production, and at that time the production of agricultural 
machines only constituted a less important part of the whole business.
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D. Large companies with 
international markets
Before 1914 the manufacturing of agricultural machines on a large 
scale developed primarily in the USA and Canada. This was quite 
natural when one bears in mind the many large farm units on the 
prairies and the existing shortage of labour. Outside North America 
before the First World War there were no real manufacturers of 
agricultural machines apart from a few small ones (by American 
standards) in Britain, Germany, Sweden and France. From an inter­
national point of view there were ten really large producers of 
agricultural machines at the turn of the century, and most of these 
were in North America. It is therefore reasonable to choose one of 
the large American producers of agricultural machines to represent 
the large-scale companies in this research. In addition it has been 
thought desirable to examine also a large-scale company which 
produced agricultural technology for a sector of agriculture other 
than arable farming, viz. cattle farming. On this basis International 
Harvester Company, Chicago and AB Separator, Stockholm have 
been chosen as subjects for research on the level of the large- 
scale company. AB Separator became one of the few large Euro­
pean producers of agricultural machines, and it developed into one 
of Sweden’s largest companies at the start of the twentieth century. 
The company quickly became the foremost in the world in the 
field of cattle-farming machines. During the twentieth century the 
International Harvester Company has been the world’s largest 
producer of agricultural implements and machines, and the 
equivalent position during the nineteenth century was held by the 
company’s best-known predecessor, the McCormick Machine Har­
vesting Company, which specialised in harvesting machines.
1. AB Separator, Stockholm
(a) The background to de Laval’s separator
Several foreign visitors came to Sweden during the seventeenth 
century because of her position as a Great Power. The technical
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prowess of the Walloons has already been mentioned in connection 
with the development of Överams Bruk. During the Thirty Years 
War several families of European soldiers who had joined the 
Swedish army in Germany followed the Swedish troops home to 
Sweden. The French Huguenot Claude de Laval also joined the 
foreign soldiers who emigrated to Sweden. He came to Sweden in 
1622 and after serving as an officer he became governor of Vad­
stena castle in 1640 and was ennobled in 1646. Members of the 
Swedish branch of the de Laval family generally became officers. 
One of these officers was Jacques de Laval and in 1844 he was 
appointed a captain and director of the Orsa Kompani in Dalarna. 
In the following year (1845) his son Gustaf was born. On his 
mother’s side Gustaf de Laval was a descendant of the Walloon 
family Martin, who had emigrated to Sweden around 1680. Apart 
from being an officer, Captain Jacques de Laval was also a land 
surveyor and a farmer.68
Thus Gustaf de Laval who ‘invented’ the separator in 1878 came 
partly from a farming background. His personal development after 
he went to high school in Falun has been thoroughly described by 
T. Althin. The diary which Gustaf de Laval already began to keep 
as a youth has helped to make the picture of him unusually 
detailed. After the student examination in 1863 Gustaf de Laval 
was enrolled at Uppsala University but instead he began to study 
at the Technical Institute in Stockholm, from which he graduated 
as an engineer in 1866.69
The difficulties in finding appropriate work drove Gustaf de 
Laval back to studying at Uppsala University in 1868. He studied 
chemistry and mineralogy mainly, and in 1872 he defended his 
thesis 'On Wolfram and its chloride compounds’. However Gustaf
68 Althin, T., Gustaf de Laval 1845-1913. De höga hastigheternas man. pp. 308 ff. 
Aktiebolaget Separator, Stockholm. (Memorial publication by C. Kullberg) p. 8. 
In 1850 the de Laval family moved to Leksand and in 1859 to Falun, where Gustaf 
began his studies at the high school.
89 Althin, T., op.cit.. pp. 31 f. Gustaf de Laval had difficulty in finding employ­
ment as an engineer at the end of the 1860s. The demand for engineers was small 
since Swedish industry was at that time passing through a period of depression, 
and so he was first employed as materials book-keeper at Stora Kopparbergs Bergs­
lag.
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de Laval had already decided at an early stage to study and carry 
out research mainly in order to make practical use of his knowl­
edge in fields of economic importance. In the diaries for 1868— 
1870 manifestos for future businesses often appear. “Surely you 
are not going to be a scientist in the strict sense. You are only 
to acquire it insofar as it is necessary for your practical work in 
the future and useful in independent research and invention! Thus 
you shall become a scientist in knowledge, that is to say you shall 
try to reach the top in technology and the technical branch of 
science; to be a true scientist will never be your goal.” (12/2 1 870.) 
The above manifesto was often coupled with patriotism, as in the 
phrase “Sweden’s natural resources for the Swedes!”. He predic­
ted that “Sweden could come first in industry as well as in general 
wellbeing if only the right inventions could be made”. Finally he 
plotted his own course: “My actual field of work looks like being 
the practical one, mining and metallurgy, agronomy and business 
involving products connected with these.” (10/10 1868.)70
In 1874 after his academic studies Gustaf de Laval started his 
own industrial company manufacturing glass bottles in Falun. The 
method of production was based on one of de Laval’s inventions, 
in which the bottles were shaped by rapid rotation of the molten 
glass and centrifugal force. Thus there was no glass-blowing. The 
company was financed by de Laval’s partner Oskar Karlsson, 
director of Stora Kopparbergs Läns Sparbank. From a financial 
point of view the business was a failure, mainly because of the fall 
in the price of bottles in 1874 (the collapse of glass). Production 
had to be terminated in 1875, but from a technical point of view 
the enterprise was a success. The centrifugal force principle had 
proved workable, but de Laval was to use this in a context other 
than the manufacture of glass.71
The first person to show how in theory centrifugal force was 
able to separate cream from milk is supposed to have been Pro­
fessor C. J. Fuchs in Karlsruhe, who constructed a small centri­
fuge for testing cream in 1858. In 1864 in Munich the brewer A. 
Prandtl constructed a centrifugal machine which skimmed milk on
70 Althin, T., op. cit.. pp. 42 ft". Diaries.
71 Althin, T.. op. cit., pp. 52f. Althin estimates that the loss of the bottle production 
amounted to about 40000 Sw. kr.
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a large scale. However he abandoned the experiment when he 
found that he could not solve the problems of power consumption. 
In the middle of the 1870s the engineer W. Lefeld, who also came 
from Germany, started new experiments into the skimming of milk 
centrifugally. The skimming capacity was 100 kilos of milk an hour, 
but the skimming efficiency was negligibly higher than when the 
skimming was done by hand. In spite of the fact that Lefeld im­
proved his machine in 1877, problems of skimming and the 
disproportionate power required still remained. Lefeld’s experi­
ments may therefore be regarded as interesting scientifically but not 
as providing a practical solution to the problems of skimming milk 
by the use of centrifugal force.72
Gustaf de Laval happened by chance, after the failure of his 
glass bottle business, to read an article about Lefeld’s experiments 
with centrifugal force. As de Laval himself had used the same 
principle in the production of bottles he had the qualifications for 
getting down quickly to the practical side of solving the problems. 
A machine which revolutionised the milk economy would be tailor- 
made above all for European agriculture’s change-over to the pro­
duction of livestock under pressure of competition in grain from 
across the ocean from the 1870s onwards. But the concentration on 
livestock was not merely a necessary condition for the introduction 
of mechanised milk production and dairy management, but by and 
by it also became to a high degree a consequence of this mechani­
sation.73
72 The ability to separate two substances of different densities by centrifugal force 
has been known for several thousands of years. In the older civilisations of China 
it was possible to let a sling rotate and through the force of the arm separate 
various fruit juices and oils. Attempts to separate the cream from the rest of the 
milk centrifugally did not take place until around 1860. Before that simpler sugar 
and honey centrifuges had been used in Europe. For a more detailed study of the 
earlier technological history of the milk separator, see Martiny, B., Geschichte der 
Rahmgewinnung. Zweiter Teil: Die Schleuderentrahmung. I. Band pp. 7 ff.
73 The experimental interest which did not begin to be directed towards milk separa­
tion until 1860 shows that at that time the market forces in livestock production 
started to become a force to be reckoned with in the agricultural sector. The 
expansion of the market forces stimulated a re-thinking about the techniques of 
milk production. It is probably no accident that the first milking machine was 
exhibited in 1862 (Fussel, G. E., The Farmer's Tools 1500-1900, p. 194). E. Boserup
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Table 36. Production techniques used in Swedish dairies in 1895. Compara­
tive figures
Farm dairies Other dairies
Ice Sepa- Ice Sepa-
Area method rator Total method rator Total
Eastern Sweden 
(ABCDEU) 
South-Eastern Swe-
23 77 100 21 79 100
den (FGHIK) 
Southern Sweden
24 76 100 12 88 100
(LMN)
Western Sweden
7 93 100 4 96 100
(OPRST) 23 77 100 6 94 100
Dalarna+ Norrland 30 70 100 26 74 100
Total 20 80 100 12 88 100
N=533 N=315
Note N means the number of dairies supplying information about their production 
technique.
Source Key-Aberg, K., Sveriges industrikalender 1895, p. 574ff.
Lefeld’s milk-skimming machine, which gave de Laval the in­
centive to develop it further, suffered from the fundamental defect 
that it could not work continuously. Frequent stoppages had to be 
made during the skimming which cost time and money. Gustaf de 
Laval's first milk skimmer was not continuous either, but in 1878
puts forward similar views in trying to explain changes in agrarian techniques. 
Many of the production methods which began to be used during the agricultural 
revolution in Europe had been known earlier and were latent until the population 
increase in Europe increased the demand for agricultural products. The plough had 
been known in Asia and Europe for many thousands of years. However, less in­
tensive methods of cultivation such as bum-beating have co-existed with plough 
cultures as late as the 20th century in certain places where outside conditions (the 
population pressure, according to Boserup) have been lacking for the transition to 
more intensive farming. In this respect E. Boserup's view of man’s development 
is an optimistic one, since according to her he is able to adapt himself to new 
conditions. Boserup, E., The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Economics of 
Agrarian Change under Population Pressure, pp. 37 f. and pp. 56 f.
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he had discovered the principle of the skimming centrifuge which 
could work continuously. Only when this separator was devised 
was it possible to say that the problem of skimming by machine 
had been solved, and only then was it possible for centrifugal 
skimming to become of great practical importance.74
During the 1860s the dairy industry had developed rapidly in 
Sweden. In order to increase the turnover the dairies began to 
organise branches known as skimming stations. From these the 
cream was transported to the main dairy where the making of 
butter took place. Through this the dairy industry was also able 
to reach the smaller and more remote farms. The main reason for 
the boom in dairying during the 1860s was the new method of 
cream setting introduced at that time, known as the ice method. 
This involved the cooling down of the milk with ice immediately 
after milking to a temperature of nearly zero degrees Celsius. 
After a day or so of cream setting the cream was skimmed by 
hand and through the chilling of the milk, more cream was ex­
tracted. It also became possible for dairies to extend their recep­
tion areas so that remotely situated farmers were also able to 
deliver fresh cream to the dairies. The ice method spread generally 
and during the 1870s it was the only method used in Sweden. 
From there it spread to the rest of the Nordic countries and 
through their good supplies of ice these gained an advantage over 
competitors in Germany, Holland and Britain. When de Laval’s 
separator first came onto the Swedish market at the end of the 
1870s it therefore faced keen competition from the well-established 
ice method.75 It is interesting to note that the ice method survived
74 Martiny, B., op. cit., p. 23. AB Separator, pp. 6f.
Gustaf de Laval, who acquired a patent on his continuously working separator 
in Sweden, Germany and Britain in 1878 and in most other countries in the follow­
ing year, was not the first to take out a patent on such a machine. In France 
in 1874 La Compagnie de Fives Lille had already acquired a patent on a continuous 
centrifuge. Even though there had been a greater interest in wine rather than in 
milk separation in France, the patented machine could also be fully used for milk 
skimming. However, the centrifuge exploded on its first trial run and killed the 
inventor, and the invention only became known in France to a limited extent. An 
American patent on a continuous milk centrifuge which was taken out a year or 
so later by Houston & Thomson also had no practical influence whatever.
75 The organised operation of dairying was initiated by the Academy of Agricul-
121
in Sweden for a long time in spite of the fact that Sweden became 
the world’s leading country in the production of separators. Long 
after the Alpha separator had been introduced, the ice method was 
in sole use in the newly established co-operative dairies and above 
all in several of the farm dairies on the estates and model farms. 
In fact by 1895 the separator had come to most of the Swedish 
dairies, but a surprisingly large number kept to the old technique 
of production in spite of the fact that the newer method had been 
in use for more than fifteen years. It was expected that the farm 
dairies and other dairies, especially in Sweden, would have ac­
cepted the new technique represented by machine separating more 
quickly than they did.
(b) The introduction of the separator onto the market
In order to develop his invention commercially, de Laval needed 
help from assistants with great business experience. Only two of 
the 92 objects which he patented, the separator and the steam tur­
bine, were to have any practical value. It may be mentioned in 
passing that the steam turbine became of great importance for the 
working of the separator. The turbine engine, with its minimal 
demands for space, in fact replaced other sources of power which 
required space, and thus considerably reduced the costs of install­
ing separators. As an inventor de Laval was a firebrand with vivid 
imagination and enterprise. His boldness in attacking technical 
problems is reminiscent of Christopher Polhem and Alfred Nobel. 
In his comprehensive but unpublished history of AB Separator 
Birger Steckzén describes Gustaf de Laval as the most prominent 
of the many technicians and ‘gründer'-types working in Sweden 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century. During this period 
there was a great spate of technical inventions both in the USA 
and Europe which created a belief in rapid and revolutionary 
success. This optimism also fired Gustaf de Laval to a high degree 
and brought ideas to him in a flash of inspiration, but as an 
inventor and the founder of a company he lacked patience and
ture, various farming institutes and agricultural societies which carried out research 
and supplied information for agriculture.
The ice method was introduced at the beginning of the 1860s by the estate 
owner J. G. Swartz at Hofgârden in Östergötland.
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showed little interest in methodical work on matters of detail. 
Without doubt the marketing of the separator would have been 
longer delayed and would have been more difficult if de Laval had 
not come into contact with Oscar Lamm Jr. He in fact was to 
play a prominent part in the continuing development of the 
separator, after de Laval and Lamm had entered into a business 
agreement for the production of separators under the company 
name of Oscar Lamm Jr. Lamm came to the fore and patents 
on the separator were taken out in his name. On the whole the 
association between the inventor de Laval and the businessman 
Oscar Lamm proved a fruitful one. They counterbalanced each 
other since de Laval concentrated mainly on the work of technical 
development while Lamm took care of the financial and commer­
cial side. But the partners were so different that they had difficulty 
in understanding each other, and there was often the risk of a 
schism between the two. During the nine years for which Oscar 
Lamm ran the management side of de Laval’s separator business 
he organised the company’s finances and sales in Sweden and 
abroad. The early years were difficult in many respects and without 
Oscar Lamm’s assistance de Laval’s separators would not have 
reached the market level which they did.76
Oscar Lamm was born in 1848 and so he was three years 
younger than de Laval. After technical studies in Uppsala and 
Stockholm he became manager of the cannon foundry in Finspång 
in 1874. We see in Oscar Lamm a further representative of the 
Swedish industrialists and businessmen who in the nineteenth cen­
tury entered the field of agricultural machines via the armaments 
industry. Through a scholarship from the Board of Commerce
76 Althin, T., op.cit., pp. 71 ff. AB Separator, pp. 13ff. Steckzén, B., AB Separa­
tors historia, manuscript.
The effect of the business agreement was that de Laval was to provide machines 
and Lamm money, or as Oscar Lamm stated after the formation of the firm: “Well, 
my dear Gustaf, it is now I who give the orders in the business and you who 
get the machines ready.” Lamm worked in an unobtrusive but methodical way, 
and de Laval’s risky plans and rash views on the raising of capital were com­
pletely alien to him. In fact Gustaf de Laval was very eager that his separators 
should spread and become of practical importance, but he thought that the spread­
ing would be achieved if only he solved the technical problems. Everything else 
was of peripheral importance to him.
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Lamm was able in 1876-1877 to make a long trip to Germany, 
Austria, France and Britain in order to study industrial technology 
and market conditions. When he met de Laval through a mutual 
friend Oscar Lamm did not have much capital but he counted on 
financial help from his father, Ludvig Lamm, a wholesaler. Produc­
tion of the first series of separators began in 1878 when Lamm and 
de Laval made twelve separators at Ludvigsbergs mekaniska verk­
stad in Stockholm, which belonged to Ludvig Lamm. The buyers 
of the first separators were estate owners, dairies and a few 
foreign industrial companies. To break down the resistance of 
domestic buyers Lamm had to obtain a statement from the agri­
cultural experts as to the superiority of the separator over the ice 
method. Lamm and de Laval counted on more rapid sales success 
abroad. The possibility of this lay in the fact that a new product 
was being sold and in a new market area in which competition 
was weak to start with.77
The tests comparing the separator and the ice method which 
were carried out at Säbyholms gård in Scania in 1879 showed that 
10 per cent more butter was extracted with the separator than with 
the ice method. In that same year the number of separators sold 
increased to 54, of which half were exported to Germany, Britain. 
Holland and Russia. The largest buyer was Bergedorfer Eisenwerk 
in Hamburg who purchased twelve separators. The development at 
the beginning of the 1880s was characterised by an increase in 
sales, above all abroad. In 1880 116 separators were sold and in 
the years 1881-1882 a total of 800, 75 per cent of which were 
sold to places outside Sweden. The reason for the increase in sales 
was the establishment of a network of selling agents within Sweden 
and abroad. Another contributing factor was the favourable out­
come for the firm of Oscar Lamm Jr. of certain patenting disputes 
in Germany in 1880. Competing with the firm’s keenest rivals on 
the separator market, the German firm of Lefeld and the Danes 
Nielsen & Petersen, who later assigned their patent to Burmeister & 
Wain, Copenhagen, de Laval’s separators emerged victorious from
77 The firm of Oscar Lamm Jr. first received a loan of 4 000 Sw. kr. from Ludvig 
Lamm. Later on, Ludvig Lamm acted as intermediary between his bank and the 
firm in procuring further loans.
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the conflict at a large number of exhibitions the world over, and 
this naturally stimulated further sales. In turn the increase in 
demand led to changes on the production side. In 1880 the firm 
established its own workshops in rented premises and employed 
fifteen workers there, and two years later the firm built its own 
workshop premises on the Kungsholmen in Stockholm where 42 
workers were employed. The expansion in business led to the con­
version of the trading company into a limited company (AB 
Separator) in 1883. Gustaf de Laval was elected chairman of the 
board of directors and Oscar Lamm managing director. These two 
held over 95 per cent of the share capital of 400000 Swedish 
crowns, and all the shareholders were also members of the board. 
Thus the management remained in the same hands as before and 
the change was one of form only.78
78 AB Separator, pp. 13 ff. All the documents concerning AB Separator up to 1886 
have probably been systematically destroyed. C. Kullberg in his work AB Sepa­
rator has had access to some of Oscar Lamm’s copy books which are now missing. 
In his unpublished historical account of the Separator limited company B. Steckzén 
has used the private records of Oscar Lamm which have been preserved, but these 
however contain significant gaps.
From trials which were made at Ultuna and Alnarp's agricultural institutes in 
1881 it was confirmed that the separator was superior to the ice method in the 
manufacture of butter. During the period from 1878 to 1883 de Laval's separator 
had received 45 highest awards at the same number of shows in 12 different 
countries.
As sales in Sweden had been arranged through three agents—Carl Jacobsen & 
Co for central and northern Sweden, C. Holmberg in Lund and G. Bolander & Co. 
in Gothenburg for the rest of Sweden—Lamm was better able to concentrate on 
the export business. The first paragraph of the company’s articles underlines the 
company’s special concentration on dairying machines and separators: “This com­
pany (Aktiebolaget Separator) has as its object, after the purchases of patents and 
the business of the production and sales of centrifugal separators which was carried 
out by the firm of Oscar Lamm Jr. in Stockholm, to manufacture and sell centrifugal 
separators principally in accordance with the patents which Gustaf de Laval has 
acquired at home or abroad or will be able to acquire in the future for a centrifugal 
separator invented by him, as well as after acquiring the rights to manufacture 
and sell a so-called motor, invented by de Laval, in combination with a separator 
(turbine separator) principally according to the patents mentioned above, and also 
to manufacture, sell and instal other machines and implements appertaining to dairy­
ing."
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(c) The international spread of the separator 
against the background of orders from agriculture
After the company was incorporated de Laval dropped out of it 
to a great extent apart from the work of technical development 
and he left the business to Lamm to an even greater degree. The 
international market in separators attracted Lamm and he tried 
by various means to acquire an increasing clientèle. He paid special 
attention to North America whose high tariffs made exports there 
more difficult. To avoid the tariff charges on Lamm’s initiative 
in 1883 a subsidiary was formed inside the American tariff wall 
(the De Laval Cream Separator Co. with registered offices in New 
York and Montreal). The subsidiary took over the production of 
separators in North America with the exception of the separator 
bowls which were shipped from Sweden. Due to a shortage of 
capital the American company became indebted to AB Separator 
in Stockholm. Therefore an alteration in the American company 
was made in 1885 and it was converted into a new limited com­
pany, the De Laval Separator Co. (Lavalco). In the same year AB 
Separator organised sales in New Zealand, Australia and South 
Africa. The separator production was the first branch of production 
in Sweden which was consciously aimed at an international export 
market from the very start.79
Simultaneously with Lamm’s efforts on the business side de Laval 
continued to develop new models of the separator. Incomparably 
the most important model from the economic point of view was 
his hand cream separator, which was ready for the market in 1886. 
In contrast to other hand cream separators de Laval’s machine was 
small and simple to use. For a long time the hand separator was 
to be the basic product in AB Separator’s business. The hand 
separator acquired enormous importance in the economy of 
agriculture since it spread to a great extent to the many small and 
medium-sized farms. In relation to the size of the population the 
hand separator had the biggest sales in Sweden, but it also became
79 AB Separator, pp. 35 ff. To start with AB Separator had only held the majority 
shareholding in the American engineering works, but in 1890 it acquired all the 
shares in the American company.
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very common abroad in areas which concentrated on livestock 
production.80
Reference has already been made to the differences in character 
between Gustaf de Laval and Oscar Lamm. Lamm used to curb de 
Laval’s bold plans as best he could. When de Laval tried to per­
suade Lamm and AB Separator to take over one of the lactometers 
which de Laval had invented, the laktokrit, Lamm refused on 
economic grounds. The affair led to a split, and Lamm resigned in 
1886 as a member of the board and as a director of AB Separator. 
In the following year Oscar Lamm accepted K. A. Wallenberg’s 
offer of the managing directorship of AB Atlas, and he remained 
there until 1909.81
In 1887 de Laval managed to get John Bernström to replace 
Lamm: like Lamm he was born in 1848. J. Bernström was a son 
of Peter Fredrik Bernström who became a farmer after being a 
master cooper in Helsingborg. After leaving school John Bernström 
had planned to join the army, but he changed his mind when he 
took a temporary job with the firm Graham Brothers mekaniska 
verkstad in Tingstäde on Gotland and he chose a technical-commer­
cial career instead. During the years 1871-1873 he received a 
technical and commercial education in various employments in 
Sweden and England. In England he worked as an engineer at a 
shipyard in Newcastle. On his return to Sweden he was employed 
by Graham Brothers who had moved to Stockholm, but in 1877 
he founded his own company, the machine business of John Bern­
ström & Co. in Stockholm. As AB Separator became one of Bem- 
ström’s customers he came into contact with de Laväl.82 They
80 Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia, Moderbolaget 1895-1903. The following 
statement emanated from Norwegian farming circles in the middle of the 1890s 
about the importance of the separator for agriculture: “There is no agricultural 
machine in our country which has been as wide-spread as the hand separator (mainly 
from AB Separator). There is no machine which has given agriculture such a 
boost, and there is no machine which has to the same extent understood, simplified 
and developed the main route for our sector of agriculture—cattle-farming.” From 
corresponding quarters in Germany it was said: “Next to the plough the hand 
separator is the most essential implement for the German farmer.”
81 Althin, T., op.cit., pp. 198flf. Gasslander, O., Bank och industriellt genombrott. 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank kring sekelskiftet 1900. I, pp. 129f.
82 Svenska Män och Kvinnor.
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collaborated more closely in 1884 when they had a common interest 
in Olofströms bruk. The foundry was the oldest steel pressing 
factory in Scandinavia and de Laval had noted its technical possi­
bilities for manufacturing separators. However the economic situa­
tion at the foundry had for long been a difficult one and in 1884 
the owners disposed of the whole foundry. Through Bernström, de 
Laval and many others Olofströms bruk was bought up and the 
capital required for the formation of a company (AB Olofströms 
bruk) was arranged. The business was reorganised. New steel 
pressing techniques were introduced which were completely suited 
to the requirements of the separator, and the orders increased 
rapidly. In 1887 this justified an increase in the share capital and a 
fundamental reconstruction into Svenska Stålpressnings AB Olof- 
ström. At Olofström de Laval was to appreciate in practice what he 
had learned about steel pressing during his visit to Germany in 
1876. It was of great importance for AB Separator that its sheet 
metal components for the separators should be of a high quality. 
It is against this background that AB Separator’s involvement in 
the art of processing steel plate must be looked at. Of course 
it was also important for the company in Olofström to achieve the 
large-scale production which AB Separator’s orders at Olofström 
made possible.83 AB Separator became one of Olofström’s biggest 
and most important customers and the boom which AB Separator 
enjoyed in the 1890s was reflected in increased orders at Olofström. 
In 1893 Olofström acquired a competitor in the field of steel press­
ing when Eskilstuna Stålpressnings AB was formed. The driving 
force behind the formation of the company and the leading figure 
in the newly founded company was Viktor Larsson, son of the 
former owner of Olofströms bruk. Under his management the 
Eskilstuna company developed into a modern factory. In 1906 AB 
Separator bought the majority shareholding in Eskilstuna Stålpress-
83 Söderberg. T., Olofströms bruk 1735-1935. Althin, T., op. cit., pp. 201 ff.
Due to Olofström's large debts and the creditors' request to be released from their 
commitments de Laval was able with a partner to take over one part of the foundry. 
When the owners advertised the sale of the foundry in the daily newspapers in 
1884, the machine firm of John Bernström & Co. in Stockholm replied to the 
advertisement. The Olofström transaction helped to bring John Bernström closer to 
de Laval’s industrial company.
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nings AB and on AB Separator’s initiative the company in Eskils­
tuna in turn bought the majority shareholding in Svenska Stålpress­
nings AB Olofström. By virtue of the very fact that in 1906 the 
Olofstrom company was transformed into a subsidiary of the Stål­
pressning .company in Eskilstuna, Viktor Larsson also became 
managing director of Olofström. In this way AB Separator obtained 
control over both the Olofström and the Eskilstuna companies. 
The course of events showed the importance which AB Separator 
attached to guaranteed deliveries of pressed steel and tinplate 
products which in the year 1906 amounted to about half a million 
Swedish crowns in value.84
During the 28 years in which John Bernström was managing 
director of AB Separator, from 1887 to 1916, he succeeded in 
bringing AB Separator into the limelight internationally. It can be 
said with complete justification that his contributions in the 
separator company showed the Swedish export industry the way 
to success on the world market. His greatest coup occurred after 
only two years when in 1889 he carried through the acquisition of 
the Alfa patent in the face of all the opposition from other members 
of the company’s board. The inventor of the Alfa inset was the 
Austrian baron Clemens von Bechtolsheim. By accident he discovered 
experimentally that there was a considerable improvement in the 
skimming if the separator bowl, which constituted the rotor in the 
centrifugal separator, was split into a lot of cone-shaped discs. The 
actual separation of the milk took place in the bowl, and the Alfa 
inset which was fixed inside the bowl consisted mainly of these 
discs of sheet-metal. The skimming speed was also increased when 
von Bechtolsheim’s Alfa inset was used. In spite of this fact he had 
difficulties in selling his patented invention to begin with. Negotia­
tions with Burmeister & Wain in Copenhagen and also with German 
and English firms proved abortive. However at an exhibition in 
Breslau in 1889 von Bechtolsheim’s Alfa separator was noticed by 
an agent of the firm'Bergedorfer Eisenwerk, and he reported the 
invention to the firm. Bergedorfer Eisenwerk, who were AB Sepa­
rator’s principal agents and were responsible for sales in Germany, 
considered that it was worth forwarding the invention to John
84 Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Moderbolaget.
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Bernström in Stockholm. Bernström acted quickly: he immediately 
invited the inventor to Stockholm and reached an agreement with 
him for AB Separator to take over the patent rights. Thanks to his 
technical instinct Bernström at once appreciated the-importance of 
the Alfa patent, and he quickly and high-handedly concluded a 
settlement with the owner of the patent. With the epoch-making in­
vention of the Alfa inset which multipled the capacity of the 
separators, AB Separator was able at one bound to outstrip its 
competitors in that field. The striking difference in quality be­
tween Alfa-Laval separators and other separators appeared very 
clearly at all the exhibitions. The Alfa inset was to be used above 
all for hand separators which, with von Bechtolsheim’s invention, 
spread generally throughout agriculture where advanced cattle­
farming took place. Thus the Alfa patent became of greater im­
portance to agriculture than to the dairy sector. Between 1890 and 
1895 AB Separator's sales increased by 150 per cent and this 
occurred during a so-called economic slump. Through his agrarian 
background Bernström had a good understanding of the psychology 
of agricultural economy, and at his suggestion AB Separator bought 
Hamra farm in Tumba where a model farm for cattle-farming and 
dairying was built. In trying to convince farmers, who were techni­
cally conservative, it was necessary to be able to point to hard 
facts. It was also of great importance that the American subsidiary 
the De Laval Separator Co., which was reorganised financially in 
1890 through Bernström's intervention, was able to use the parent 
company’s Alfa patent. Thanks to this technological loan it was 
possible for the De Laval Separator Co. within the course of a few 
years to monopolise a large part of the American separator mar­
ket.85
85 AB Separator, passim. Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Moderbolaget.
After the transaction with von Bechtolsheim Bernström was accused by other 
members of the board of acting without authority. The patent rights cost AB 
Separator 46 000 Sw. kr. together with a yearly royalty during the currency of the 
patent (14 years). During this period von Bechtolsheim received a total of 3.1 million 
marks in royalties, but the party which gained most from the transaction was 
undoubtedly AB Separator.
At all the competitions or fairs in which Laval and Alfa-Laval separators had 
taken part, they had won the top prizes. During the years 1879-1907 these separators 
received 780 first prizes in competitions or fairs in 42 countries.
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Table 37. Number of dairy separators of the de Laval type sold in 1886-1895
Area 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895
Sweden 157 138 176 100 115 14 2 _ — _
Norway 7 7 8 7 3 2 1 - - -
Denmark 24 143 237 119 32 4 - - - -
Finland 11 33 16 7 4 1 1 3 1 -
Russia 3 13 23 10 5 1 - _ - -
U.K. 61 103 101 78 75 2 1 2 1 1
Germany 288 395 451 315 278 66 - 1 5 1
Holland 3 11 15 22 6 - - - - -
Belgium - 2 - 2 2 5 - - - -
France - - 2 2 28 28 21 32 27 15
Spain 1 - - - - - - - -
USA - - - 10 - - - - - -
Canada -
South America 7 1 - 8 3 - - - - -
South Africa 2 - 2 - 1 - - - - -
Australia 77 130 198 166 186 162 79 48 15 9
Total 641 976 1 239 846 739 285 105 67 49 26
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
Thus the separator had undergone a rapid technical development 
during the 1880s at the same time as European agriculture was 
faced with a difficult crisis of adjustment. The adjustment involved 
a transition to increased livestock production. In fact this very 
adjustment was one of the conditions for the rise of the separator, 
while the separator made it possible for the process of adjustment 
in agriculture to take place more rapidly. This explains why during 
the 1880s and the start of the 1890s AB Separator’s development 
was more favourable than that of other engineering companies dur­
ing the economic slump. The purchase of the Alfa patent in 1889 
opened up large markets for AB Separator in a decisive way. Tables 
37—41 and diagram 11 illustrate clearly that it was the Alfa patent 
which became the spring-board for the sales of the agricultural 
separators. The agricultural separator had rapidly developed into a 
productive machine which appealed to a very large clientèle. When 
the general economic situation improved considerably in 1895, in­
ternational purchasing power increased and the spread of the
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Table 38. Number of turbine-powered dairy separators of the de Laval type sold 
in 1886-1895
Area 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895
Sweden 14 31 62 29 22 3 - 5 3 -
Norway - 3 3 1 7 - - - - -
Denmark 1 11 20 25 1 - - - - -
Finland 2 27 7 3 1 - - 1 -
Russia 1 2 14 13 2 1 1 - - -
U.K. 6 17 15 4 2 - - - - -
Germany 2 16 39 43 42 6 1 1 6 9
Holland - 1 3 3 7 - - - -
Belgium - 1 1 - 1 - - - - -
France 1 1 9 5 10 4 - - - -
Spain 1 - - - - - - - - -
USA 7 40 90 146 - - - - - -
Canada - 1 - - - - - - - -
South America - - 11 - 1 - - - - -
South Africa - -
Australia - 3 34 15 - 5 63 11 19 5
Total 35 154 309 287 96 19 65 17 29 14
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
separator machines accelerated. The Separator group of companies 
expanded, especially in countries with advanced agriculture where 
they consciously aimed at and achieved large shares of the market. 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century the Separator group of 
companies had for example supplied 98 per cent of Denmark’s 
dairy separators, 90 per cent of the dairy machines in the larger 
dairies in the Argentine, about 90 per cent of the dairy separators 
in Siberia and New Zealand and also 80 per cent of those in Swe­
den (where domestic competition had begun), 75 per cent of the 
Swiss market and 50 per cent of the important North American 
separator market. On the other hand the share of the market was 
considerably lower in countries with a small total demand for 
separators, for example Spain, Portugal, the Balkan states, Turkey, 
Persia, India, China, Brazil and Africa, apart from South Africa.86
AB Separator, pp. 85ff. Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia.
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Table 41. Number of hand separators with Alfa inset sold in 1890-1906
Area 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1906
Sweden _ 58 101 270 1 256 1 628 2 736 3 773 7 010 4 912
Norway 1 55 123 421 344 1 355 1 421 1 282 1 405 1 265
Denmark 1 12 11 23 61 59 92 183 151 51
Finland - 39 195 359 547 1 734 1 677 2 067 2 316 1 454
Russia 1 34 114 101 69 370 393 503 1 235 5 358
U.K. 2 96 130 226 692 1 345 1 852 1 309 1 532 1 549
Germany 100 712 1 588 2 421 3 451 4 057 3 539 2 975 2 828 14 358
Holland - 5 7 41 56 74 122 144 89 304
Belgium 1 49 59 94 143 170 386 381 420 711
France - 7 31 18 39 372 475 743 585 2 836
Austria - - - - - - - 347 662 3 536
Hungary - - - - - - _ - - 150
Switzerland - - - - - - - - - 150
Italy - - - - - - - - - 122
Spain - - - - - - - 5 - 1
Portugal - - - - - - - - 5 30
North America 100 22 - 1 3 5 - 2 1 2
South America - 5 8 3 3 37 46 33 57 414
Africa - 8 16 9 - 238 146 127 118 51
Australia 2 38 223 425 802 1 224 1 132 1 245 2 231 4 180
Total 208 1 140 2 606 4 412 8 520 12 668 14 017 15 364 20 741 41 434
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
Since a very large part—about 90 per cent (see table 49)—of 
AB Separator’s production was sold on the export market right 
from the start, it is only right to pause and deal at some length 
with the construction of the sales organisation. With the exception 
of North America, where AB Separator had its own factory and its 
own sales organisation (the De Laval Separator Co.) since 1883, 
the firm’s sales abroad had been handled by the system which 
was then current of using general sales agents in different coun­
tries. The company operated what was known as indirect export­
ing. AB Separator entered into agreements with several large firms 
who for a discount sold the Alfa separators. Each general sales 
agent in his turn had local agents, who were often ironmongers. 
The local agents were in close contact with the customers and 
sometimes solicited custom from them with special travellers. In
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Diagram 10. Number of dairy separators from AB Separator sold in 1886- 
1903.
Number of
separators
------de Laval type
Alfa type1 500-
1 000-
1900 1903
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
addition the general sales agents had a number of travelling in­
spectors who each within his district would give the local agents 
information on technical matters and marketing, and who at the 
same time would supervise them and prod them into activity in 
making sales. The system of general sales agents had both ad­
vantages and disadvantages for the producer/exporter. The 
producer did not have to have any capital tied up in a branch 
office or risk his credit, but he had no guarantee that the general
136
Diagram 11. Number of hand separators sold in 1886-1906.
Thousands of
hand separators
de Laval type
With Alfa inset
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
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sales agents, who usually represented several different export firms, 
would work the market area in the best interests of the individual 
producer/exporter. Often the general sales agent would sell at too 
high a price for the sake of his own profit, and thus would hinder 
the spread of the product among the clientèle. So the producer’s 
opportunities of guiding developments in accordance with his own 
particular interests were limited. To remedy this the large com­
panies in the leading industrial countries started at the end of the 
nineteenth century to change to a system of direct exports. In 
Sweden AB Separator paved the way for the new export system 
when at the end of the 1890s it organised the sales in certain 
countries with its own administration. But there were problems 
in the gradual and tactful elimination of an international network 
consisting of 35000 agents. It involved the risk that the general 
sales agents might be provoked into becoming agents for a com­
petitor. Therefore the more important general sales agents were 
allowed to remain. The system of direct exports was first tried out 
by AB Separator in the virgin territories of South-Eastern Europe. 
In 1897 a branch was established in Vienna to direct the sales in 
Austria/Hungary and in the Balkans.87 The agrarian economy of the 
Balkans was only orientated to a very small degree towards cattle­
farming and dairying. Instead sheep farming dominated the more 
primitive and less differentiated agriculture. Therefore the first 
attempt at direct export sales was less successful. John Bernström 
realised that he had begun at the wrong end when he started the 
first sales company in a field which was as difficult to work as 
South-Eastern Europe. There had to be greater possibilities where 
farming and cattle-breeding were practised in more advanced forms 
as they were in Denmark and Germany. In 1900 AB Separator 
opened a sales branch (with a repair workshop) in Copenhagen and 
in the following year a similar branch was opened in Berlin. 
Something which further contributed to the company’s concentra­
tion on direct exports to Denmark and Germany was the fact that 
domestic competitors there began to assert themselves again. From 
AB Separator’s point of view it was desirable to meet the keener
87 AB Separator. Steckzen, B.. AB Separators historia. As the national mood of Austria- 
Hungary varied, the Vienna company established branches in Budapest for Hungary, 
in Prague for Bohemia, and in Cracow for Galicia.
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competition which was expected by more effective use of the 
superior steering power which direct exporting offered, especially 
after the expiry of the Alfa patent in 1903. The new sales methods 
which AB Separator adopted, with direct channels of information 
in New York, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest and Copenhagen, resulted 
in its having better contact with international market conditions 
around the turn of the nineteenth century than other Swedish en­
gineering companies. In 1903 AB Separator’s sales abroad were 
organised as follows:
Europe
Norway AB A. Hollingworth & Co., Christiania 
Denmark AB Separators Depot. Alfa-Laval, Copenhagen 
Finland P. Sidorow, Suom. K. O., Helsingfors 
Russia L. Nobel, St. Petersburg
Great Britain and Ireland Dairy Supply Co. Ltd., London W.C.
Germany Alfa-Laval Separator, A.G.m.b.H, Berlin 
Holland Boeke & Huidekoper, Groningen 
Belgium P. Gillain, Antwerp 
Luxemburg E. Flammant, Luxemburg 
France Th. Pilter, Paris
Austria and the Balkan States A.G. Alfa-Separator, Vienna 
Hungary A.G. Alfa-Separator, Budapest 
Switzerland Baumgartner & Baechler, Zurich 
Italy M. Sordi, Lodi
Spain G. Hermanos, Yermo y C:ia, Bilbao 
Portugal H. von Hafe, Oporto
Asia
Siberia L. Nobel, St. Petersburg 
Persia W. Gilchrist & Co., Glasgow
British India, China and Japan Dairy Supply Co. Ltd., London W.C.
Africa
South Africa H. Farrar, Robinson & Co., Port Elizabeth and East London 
Agents in Europe: F. A. Robinson & Co.. London W.C.
Algeria Th. Pilter, Paris
Egypt Dairy Supply Co. Ltd., London W.C.
America
Canada The De Laval Separator Co., Montreal and the Canadian Dairy 
Supply Co., Montreal
The USA and Mexico The De Laval Separator Co. (Lavalco), New York
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Brazil Ch. Causer & Hopkins, Birmingham, England 
Rio Grande do Sul E. Berta & Co., Porto Alegre 
Peru W. Walker, Wolverhampton, England 
Uruguay E. Barth & Co., Montevideo 
Argentina W. Goldkuhl & G. Broström, Buenos Aires
Australia and New Zealand
New South Wales Waugh & Josephson, Sydney 
Victoria J. Bartram & Son, Melbourne 
South Australia A. W. Sandford & Co., Adelaide 
West Australia J. Bartram & Son, Melbourne 
New Zealand Mason, Struthers & Co., Christchurch.
In terms of the parent company’s sales, Russia, Germany and 
Australia were the biggest customers. On the other hand the total 
sales of the Separator group of companies went mainly to the USA, 
Germany and Russia, which is accounted for by the sales of the 
group’s subsidiary in the USA and later in Germany (see diagrams 
14 and 15 and also tables 43 and 45). Next came a group of medium­
sized buying-countries consisting of Scandinavia, Australia, France 
and Austria. Sweden in fact bought the most separators in relation 
to the size of her farming population, and from an international point 
of view she had the widest distribution of separators at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. A comparatively large domestic market has 
been a fundamental factor in the development of a prominent export 
industry.
Thus the really large separator market was developed in North 
America, Germany and Russia, which together accounted for about 
70 per cent of the sales of the Separator group of companies. The 
marketing of the company in these countries therefore merits a 
somewhat closer examination.
North America
When John Bernstromjoined AB Separator as managing director one 
of his first tasks at the end of the 1880s was to reorganise the 
subsidiary, the De Laval Separator Company in New York 
(Lavalco). New modern workshops were built in 1892 in Pough­
keepsie outside New York. The head office was in New York with 
branches in Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Los Angeles,
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Table 42. Number of separator bowls sold, 1886-1907
Area 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895
Sweden _ 4 5 4 8 224 186 175 171 114
Norway - - - - 2 11 16 24 21 16
Denmark - - 2 5 11 121 105 169 178 129
Finland - 1 1 - - 14 19 8 16 25
Russia - - - 1 - - 48 126 151 64 81
U.K. - - 5 17 6 40 27 17 46 52
Germany 6 - 56 37 12 540 518 408 348 290
Holland - - 2 5 - 20 9 9 7 3
Belgium - - - 2 - 11 6 12 9 4
France 49 109 30 92 22 11 3 10 12 5
Austria - - - - - - - - -
Hungary - - - - - - - - -
Switzerland - - - - - - - - -
Italy - - - - - - - - -
Spain - - - - - - - - -
Portugal - - - - - - - - -
North America 197 145 300 491 1 350 1 545 1 975 5 650 2 057 2 652
South America - - - - - 2 9 10 7 13
Africa - - - - - 16 2 1 2
Australia - - 5 3 23 129 198 155 174 202
Total 252 259 406 657 1 434 2 732 3 199 6 800 3 110 3 588
1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907
89 62 52 42 44 29 26! 17 15 8 12 10
22 15 10 15 17 8 f) 2 3 1 1 1
115 47 55 59 87 142 76 65 64 281 185 360
24 22 17 16 44 14 A1 4 1 3 1 4
171 130 33 5 7 30 14 10 - - 203 121
65 51 24 76 129 114 231 9 30 15 32 19
298 354 141 107 221 215 71 106 78 1 015 499 261
6 15 13 11 18 20 131 27 31 14 15 9
11 6 22 11 6 8 ! 9 3 2 2
21 7 5 9 35 55 19 20 8 9 4 33
- 14 13 1 37 3 11' 6 35 12 145 7
- - _ _ _ _ 3 _ 2 1
- - - - - - 1 2 8 1
- _ _ _ _ 4 1 2 1 1
3 752 4 125 6 477 10 321 15 069 20 875 34 540 53 680 24 275 16 410 22 070 1 993
10 2 1 1 14 - 8 16 36 24 15 6
- 2 4 6 6 39 < 13 5 18 4
105 86 59 43 440 193 101 242 270 183 242 53
4 689 4 831 6 927 10 719 16 174 21 749 34 988 54 215 24 866 17 994 23 346 2 892
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
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Table 45. Number of hand separators sold within the Separator group of 
companies
Berge-
Year
AB
Sepa­
rator
AB
Cen tri­
fug
Lavalco
New
York
dorf
Eisen­
werk
AB
Pump-
Sep.
AB“
Baltic Total
1886 230 _ _ 230
1887 1 211 - - _ - - 1 211
1888 2 291 - - - - - 2 291
1889 2 621 - - - - - 2 621
1890 2 744 - - - - 2 744
1891 3 001 - — — _ _ 3 001
1892 4 260 - 339 - - - 4 599
1893 6 322 - 4 496 - - - 10 818
1894 9 245 - 2 259 - - - 11 504
1895 13 304 - 4 472 - - - 17 776
1896 14 397 - 2 313 - - - 16 710
1897 15 290 - 2 367 - - - 17 657
1898 20 538 3 300 5 681 - - - 26 219
1899 22 808 9 600 7 001 - - - 29 809
1900 25 664 11 400 8 113 - - - 33 777
1901 24 129 16 000 12 436 - - - 36 565
1902 24 418 16 128 27 565 - - - 51 983
1903 28 614 14 900 39 234 - 900 - 67 848
1904 27 308 9 026 36 619 - 1 200 15 000 63 927
1905 28 948 8 246 16 213 - 3 700 15 000 45 161
1906 41 315 14 587 22 740 - 4 600 15 000 78 642
1907 44 863 14 022 35 615 ________- 4 000 15 000 94 500
1908 36 444 15 496 46 000 _ 4 700 15 000 97 940
1909 43 786 16 002 57 715 4 168 14 800 15 000 121 671
1910 38 302 17 228 68 497 10 824 21 100 15 000 134 851
1911 45 047 13 982 65 243 11 750 30 000 15 000 136 022
1912 39 588 33 604 67 785 14 791 23 000 15 000 155 768
1913 51 889 34 826 74 561 15 050 42 200 38 109 176 326
1914 41 896 38 763 70 937 14 921 63 000 38 109 166 517
1915 34 743 44 677 74 948 21 365 67 300 38 109 175 733
1916 67 210 84 905 67 835 29 253 98 600 38 109 249 203
1917 57 754 56 826 70 461 26 279 123 000 38 109 211 320
1918 64 415 23 843 63 113 15 805 96 500 38 109 167 176
1919 51 559 35 019 78 806 20 319 104 600 38 109 185 703
1920 30 671 13 202 59 201 21 517 102 000 38 109 124 591
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Table 45 cont.
Year
AB
Sepa­
rator
AB
Centri­
fug
Lavalco
New
York
Berge­
dorfer
Eisen­
werk
AB
Pump-
Sep.
AB“
Baltic Total
1921 18 398 7 022 31 960 18 829 36 200 38 109 76 209
1922 19 091 16 234 49 383 9 414 30 000 38 109 94 122
1923 31 768 22 947 41 969 8 263 39 000 55 000 104 947
1924 62 431 27 301 38 874 17 331 68 192 55 000 145 937
1925 94 847 52 939 48 093 37 736 87 071 55 000 233 615
1926 108 561 62 996 47 655 42 140 99 072 55 000 261 352
1927 89 106 70 285 51 313 21 992 96 114 55 000 232 696
1928 81 839 68 640 43 256 10 940 85 287 55 000 204 675
1929 62 065 45 752 33 620 8 990 79 027 55 000 229 454
1930 59 062 44 160 20 700 7 360 63 935 55 000 195 217
1931 40 071 36 679 12 049 - 37 820 126 619
° From 1931 included in Pump-Sep.
In the total column only the sales of AB Centrifug, AB Pump-Separator and AB 
Baltic have been included below the line. The line marks the point when the above- 
mentioned companies merged into the Separator group of companies.
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik, Avd. L. 15.4.1959.
and a large staff of local agents formed part of the sales organisa­
tion. The greater part of the sales went through the office in 
Chicago, as it was situated in the middle of the butter producing 
area of the USA. During the 1890s the De Laval Separator Co.’s 
sales increased significantly, and at the start of the twentieth cen­
tury the De Laval Separator Co. was able to overtake the parent 
company in Stockholm. These successes were due to a series of 
favourable factors. First of all the De Laval Separator Co. had 
access to a large and continually growing home market. In contrast 
to the parent company, the De Laval Separator Co. could devote 
all its attention to domestic sales and did not need to incur costs 
in order to organise export trade. Even though cattle-farming in 
the USA centred round meat production more than it did in 
Europe, dairying started to develop rapidly during the 1890s. The 
farms were large and spread wide at great distances from the 
dairies, especially on the prairies in the Middle West. Therefore
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Diagram 12. Number of agricultural separators within the Separator group 
sold in 1886-1931.
Thousands of 
separators
250-
200-
100-
1886 90 1900
Source Alfa Lavais arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik, Avd. L 15.4.1959.
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Diagram 14. AB Separator s sales distribution in terms of value in per­
centages according to geographical localities for the period 1887-1921.
O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112131415%
.l.I!I,I 1 I I I 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 I I I.I 1 I 1 1 1
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Russia 
XXXXXXXXXXXXX\X\\\\\\\\X\\XXX\X\\\XX\XXX\XXXXX Germany 
XXXXXVXXXXX\X\X\\X\X\\\\X\X\XXX>XXXXXXXXX Australia
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXWXXXXXXXXX Sweden
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX France 
X\\\\\\\\\\\XX\\X\X\XX Austria
\\\\\\\\\\\\^ England
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXl North America 
XXXXXXXXXXl South America
SXXSxSSl Finland
XXXXXXXX Denmark 
XXXXXX Norway 
XXXsX Belgium 
XXsX Holland 
XXX Africa 
XXI Southern Europe 
XX PoIandandtheBaItic 
Xi Switzerland 
S Hungary 
] Asia
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
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Diagram 15. The distribution in percentages of separator sales localitiesfor 
the Separator group of companies (excl. AB Centrifug) for the period 1886- 
1921.
44.9 NorthAmenca
15.5 WWWWW^ Germany
8.3 Russia (including Poland)
France
Australi
Austria
^ Norway
2 South America
3 Belg ium 
^ Africa
] Denmark
Holland
Hungary
Switzerland
Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain, The Balkans)
The total number of separators sold (excl. AB Centrifug) in the period 1886-1921 was 
about 2.5 million. If AB Centrifug is included the number of separators sold was 
about 3 million.
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
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Map 8 showing the more important sales areas of the Separator group 
of companies (excl. AB Centrifug).
The north 
temperate 
zone____
The south temperate 
zone
= Underdeveloped countries around 1950 
according to Bhagwati, J., U-Iandernas 
ekonomi
I = North America 45%; 2=Central Europe 27%; 3=Scandinavia 11%; 4=Russia 
with Siberia 8%; 5=Australia and New Zeeland 5%; 6=Great Britain 2%; 7= 
South America 1 %; 8=South Africa 0.7 %; 9=Others 0.3%.
the dairying had to be developed to a great extent within the 
individual farm. Here the farmer’s need of a hand separator was 
greater than in other places. It was also the hand separator which 
dominated the American sales. In Europe, where the size of the 
average farm was smaller than in the USA the smaller hand 
separators (100-200 litres) usually supplied the needs of the farms, 
while the American farmer as a rule bought separators in the 300- 
400 litre range. In the battle for the American market the De 
Laval Separator Company had the great advantage of access to the 
Alfa patent and to the parent company’s know-how, which was 
constantly given prominence in the advertising. For example the 
manufacture of the separator bowls took place in Sweden for a long
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time, whence they were exported for final assembly at the De 
Laval Separator Co.’s factory. On the other hand AB Separator 
took valuable soundings from the De Laval Separator Company 
about American implement machines and work methods for mass- 
production.
A year or so after the turn of the nineteenth century there was 
a noticeable boom in the sales of separators at the De Laval 
Separator Co. In farming circles there was rapidly increasing 
enthusiasm for dairying and farm separation. The optimism was 
due to the increase in butter prices in 1902, after the Congress 
in the USA had decided to restrict the trade in margarine. The 
pressure of demand gave rise to expansions in the De Laval 
Separator Co.’s production, and after some resistance from the 
parent company the De Laval Separator Co. got permission in 1903 
to press its separator bowls itself. The decrease in the parent 
company’s exports after 1903 which resulted from this is clearly 
shown in tables 42 and 43.88
At this time (1902) there were in the USA apart from the De 
Laval Separator Co.—which alone had about 50 per cent of the 
separator market—eight or nine separator manufacturers of which 
the most prominent were the Sharpies Separator Company, the 
Empire Cream Separator Company and the Vermont Farm Machine 
Company. The Sharpies and Empire companies in fact based their 
production on models of Swedish origin or which had been in-
88 The information about the De Laval Separator Co. is mainly based on business 
correspondence between the De Laval Separator Co. and AB Separator, which has 
been subsequently collated by B. Steckzén. John Bernström acted as chairman of 
the board of the De Laval Separator Co. After 1893 the managing director Francis 
Arend was responsible for continuing the work. In 1901 John Bernström’s son 
Richard was appointed as liaison man between AB Separator and the De Laval 
Separator Co. and thereafter he visited the USA every year. In particular there was 
extensive correspondence between Francis Arend and Richard Bernström.
In a letter from Richard to John Bernström on 29 April 1904 the son tries to 
persuade his father that it was sensible for the De Laval Separator Co. to start 
its own production of separator bowls. "The production capacity of the De Laval 
Separator Co. must be increased so that it can cope with the fierce rush to buy. 
The new law against margarine and the ensuing high butter prices have brought 
about an actual revolution in the separator market. Our Chicago office has requested 
by telephone at least seven wagon loads a week—we can produce four.”
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vented by Swedes. Sharpies had been founded in 1890 by Philip 
Sharpies who had manufactured separators for the De Laval 
Separator Co. during the 1880s and had thereby acquired a good 
understanding of the Alfa-separator’s characteristics. When he 
started his own production he copied the Swedish separator to a 
large extent. Empire at the turn of the century had close technical 
and financial contacts with Svenska Centrifug AB, which was 
established in 1896 on the initiative of Gustaf Wallenberg. Since 
1898 the Centrifug company and Empire had the same type of 
separator on the market (the Kronseparator), which had been con­
structed by the Swede Olof Ohlsson. In 1902 Gustaf Wallenberg 
sold his interest in the Centrifug company and bought the majority 
shareholding in Empire. Some years later Svenska Centrifug AB 
was bought by AB Separator.
The Alfa patent expired in 1903 and this triggered off an 
enormous amount of activity, above all among the De Laval 
Separator Co.’s competitors. The competitors who were established 
feared new rivals in the industry, and in 1903 they made several 
attempts to organise some form of merger in which the De Laval 
Separator Co., Sharpies, Vermont, Empire and a few other 
separator companies could join. As for AB Separator and the De 
Laval Separator Co., they pursued a wait-and-see policy and they 
did not want to participate in a trust which amassed a large share 
capital by capitalisation of the assets which could later be sold olf 
by the interested parties at their own discretion.89
In the years immediately after 1903 the separator market in the 
USA was characterised by keener competition and a decrease in 
the total demand. Even the De Laval Separator Co. was hit by 
this, but its older competitors were affected to an even greater 
degree. In fact the latter with their cheap separators had con­
centrated above all on the smaller farmer who had between 2 and 
10 cows. The new competitive companies which were started after 
1903 mainly solicited the same type of customer with cheaper and 
simpler machines, while the De Laval Separator Co.’s approach 
was mainly to the larger farmer with bigger and more expensive
89 The attempts at a merger in 1903 were mainly provoked by a desire to make 
the market more difficult for the newcomers to the separator industry who were 
expected after the expiry of the Alfa patent.
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machines. The mail order firms were a new feature of the competi­
tion, operating on small profit margins and selling everything 
“from pins to locomotives”. The most important of these mail 
order firms was Sears, Roebuck and Co., which started its own 
separator production in 1905. The most disconcerting thing for 
the De Laval Separator Co. was the fact that in 1904 the world’s 
largest manufacturer of agricultural machines, the International 
Harvester Company, seriously considered involving itself in the 
separator industry. With its efficient sales organisation of 57000 
agents and an advanced credit granting system International Har­
vester had a firmer hold on the ironmongers. It was convenient to 
combine agricultural machines and separators when International 
Harvester tried to develop the so-called full line principle, which 
meant that the company would sell all kinds of implements and 
machines which a farmer might need. However the company policy 
of International Harvester was diametrically opposed to that of the 
Separator group of companies which concentrated exclusively on 
one special product. Francis Arend of the De Laval Separator Co. 
launched a counter-attack in a memorandum to International Har­
vester in which he gave an account of the leading position of 
AB Separator and the De Laval Separator Co. in the separator 
industry. If International Harvester began in earnest to manufacture 
and sell separators through its dealers in agricultural machines, the 
De Laval Separator Co. would probably feel obliged to take certain 
counter-measures and fight International Harvester by starting to 
sell agricultural machines. But Arend finally suggested that it would 
be appropriate for the two companies to co-operate in order to be 
able to outdo other competitors. However no such co-operation 
ever took place.90
Because of the many newly established separator workshops (35 
factories in the spring of 1906) and the increasing resistance of the 
customers the De Laval Separator Co. was to see its separator 
sales sharply reduced in 1905. In spite of this throughout the year 
reports came in to the effect that the De Laval Separator Co.
90 In the correspondence between Francis Arend and Richard Bernström during the 
autumn of 1904 the topic of International Harvester’s activities was frequently dis­
cussed. They agreed that International Harvester was able to extend its sales 
programme at a comparatively low cost.
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still held a share of about half the market in the Middle West as 
well as in the USA as a whole. After three lean years from 1904 
to 1906, 1907 brought a new boom for the De Laval Separator 
Co. with new models from AB Separator. The critical years hit the 
rival company Empire especially hard. The development caused 
problems for Gustaf Wallenberg, and he tried to interest AB 
Separator in purchasing the majority shareholding in Empire. But 
Empire was no longer looked on as a threat to the De Laval 
Separator Co. and the offer was declined. In Stockholm there was 
greater uneasiness about the doings of International Harvester. In 
1908 Richard Bernström was not unfamiliar with measures which 
would facilitate the sale of the De Laval Separator Co. to Inter­
nationa] Harvester, through which in his view a large capital gain 
would accrue to AB Separator. But his ideas failed to win any 
response either in New York or in Stockholm. Francis Arend 
replies to Richard Bernström’s argument and at the same time 
corrects the latter’s sanguine view of the extent of the American 
separator market. Since Arend’s letter analyses the state of the 
market in a nutshell it is quoted extensively here: “I don’t quite 
know where you (Richard Bernström) got your idea about the 
possibilities of selling separators in this country, and I wish we 
could absorb a little of your tremendous enthusiasm about it. I am 
now thinking in particular about you saying that you believe the 
day will come when the sales of separators in the USA will easily 
reach 700000 a year. According to my estimate there are two 
million farms in the USA and Canada which have three or more 
cows, where separators could be used within the next ten years. 
There are probably 800000 separators in use today on those farms, 
of which 300000, or to be more precise, 40 per cent are Alfa 
machines. In 1908 probably 165000 separators were sold, of which 
10 per cent replaced old machines; of that total about 35 per cent 
came from Lavalco. The selling becomes more difficult because of 
the fact that the bigger and more enterprising farmers already have 
separators. On the other hand the number of machines which are 
replaced must increase, and it is not impossible that total sales can 
reach 200 000 a year, but I think it is unlikely that they will exceed 
this maximum.
“Our share of the sales is of course another question. The ques-
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tion is whether we wouldn’t be in a very good position with one- 
third, and whether it won’t be hard for us to keep our position, 
let alone improve it, if we aim at half. However the conditions 
about sales can be changed. Twenty years ago we had to give one 
agent a district with a radius of 25-100 miles in order to get him 
to start selling separators. Since then we have reduced the extent 
of the agents’ districts from year to year so that they now have a 
radius of 5 miles on average. The tendency still continues towards 
smaller districts and the time may come when we can try to sell 
to all the agents in a district instead of to only one out of about 
ten agents. We extend ourselves as far as we can and with as 
much speed as is possible at present, but we are handicapped in 
the choice of agents. We can offer what most people consider to 
be the best separator, but the best salesmen probably represent 
International Harvester. The dealers can’t afford to forgo this 
gigantic complete range of implements and machines, which gives 
them material to work all year round, in order to sell a separator 
however excellent it is. International Harvester is now increasing 
the pressure on its agents to carry its separators. That this has not 
been done to a greater extent is due to the difficulties they have 
had with their machine. Difficulties which we assume International 
Harvester will overcome. Naturally we sometimes ask ourselves the 
question whether we ought not to tackle the agricultural implement 
industry on a wider basis and carry trailers, ploughs, harvesters, 
mowing-machines and so on. It is true that we don’t wish to do 
so and ought not to do so if it can be avoided, but with the 
direction in which conditions seem to be taking the business per­
haps we will be forced to do so in order to safeguard our own 
legitimate business.”91
During the autumn of 1909 the financiers made fresh attempts 
to sell Empire to International Harvester or AB Separator. The 
Swedish financier William Olsson then came onto the scene as 
representative for Gustaf Wallenberg and in close accord with banks
91 Francis Arend’s letter to Richard Bernström 28/1 1909. In a subsequent letter to 
Richard Bemstrom on 7/10 1909 Arend reports that the John Deere Plow Co., the 
biggest firm in agricultural machinery next to International Harvester, had shown 
an eagerness to sell the De Laval Separator Co.’s separators. However, Arend felt 
obliged to refuse the offer on account of the agent organisation.
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in London, New York and Stockholm which had interests in the 
Empire deal. True to type, William Olsson acted very independently 
and made much ado about the deal. He thought of resolving the 
Empire deal by linking it with risky transactions in which Inter­
national Harvester and AB Separator would be played off one 
against the other. First William Olsson got in touch with Inter­
national Harvester in Chicago and suggested that the company 
should acquire the greater part of the American separator industry 
by purchasing Empire and the De Laval Separator Co. But William 
Olsson went one step further and presented a grander alternative, 
viz. that International Harvester should also purchase AB Separator 
in Stockholm with its world-wide assets. Thereby International 
Harvester would also be the leader on the international separator 
market which would accord well with the company’s “full-line” 
principle. Then William Olsson contacted the De Laval Separator 
Co. with the reverse offer: the De Laval Separator Co. should 
purchase Empire to reinforce its ability to compete with Inter­
national Harvester. But there was little interest from either of the 
big groups of companies in William Olsson’s plans in spite of the 
fact that he came back on several occasions with various 
suggestions for a solution. Among other things in 1910 he tried 
again to get the large separator companies to purchase Empire 
after the company had introduced a centrifugal machine for rubber, 
which according to William Olsson provided a rational solution to 
the problem of the coagulation of the rubber juice (latex).92 The 
deal exemplifies the characteristics of the early 1900s in the USA, 
with company mergers the better to acquire new techniques and 
secure present and prospective markets.
In Europe interest increased by and by in the smaller and 
cheaper hand separators which best met the needs of the many 
small farmers. In order to meet competition on the European 
market AB Separator felt obliged to sell small and cheap hand
92 William Olsson’s letter to John Bernström 19/4 1910. Bearing in mind the increased 
demand for rubber from industry and motoring the rubber separator might be of 
great value in the future like the Alfa patent, and so John Bemstrom did not reject 
William Olsson’s suggestion out of hand from the start. But after some time it 
turned out that Empire’s rubber separator did not work in practice and William 
Olsson’s labours were definitely in ruins.
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separators there. At the beginning of the 1910s the parent company 
also wanted to introduce the smaller, cheaper separators into the 
USA, but met with powerful opposition from Arend in the De 
Laval Separator Co. According to him market conditions in the 
USA and Europe were fundamentally different. The need for larger 
separators was proportionately far stronger in the USA than it was 
in Europe, and competitive low-priced machines did not create any 
great obstacle for the De Laval Separator Co. No change was 
made in the production programme.
In 1913, the last year of peace, the De Laval Separator Co. 
reached a sales peak of 75000 separators. In a detailed market 
report to AB Separator Richard Bemstrom also gives the De Laval 
Separator Co. much praise for its activities in the USA and Canada. 
He found that the workshops in Poughkeepsie had an annual 
production capacity of 80-90000 separators, which considerable 
investments had made possible. The majority of the De Laval 
Separator Co.’s sales went through the office in Chicago which 
supplied the large farming districts in the Middle West. Richard 
Bernström also dealt with the situation as regards competition on 
the international market, and he found that The De Laval Separator 
Co. was able to keep its position even after International Har­
vester, with its superior network of agents, had begun to sell 
separators. In the report the total number of separators sold annu­
ally in the USA was estimated at 210000. The De Laval Separator 
Co. sold about 75000 of these, while the yearly sales figures of the 
other competitors was estimated as follows (page 162).
Another matter canvassed in the report was the question of the 
consequences of the reduction in the duty on separators which 
Congress had resolved in 1913. The earlier tariff rate of 45 per cent 
was abolished completely as far as cheaper separators were con­
cerned (under $75) and was reduced to 25 per cent for the others. 
But since the American demand was mainly for the larger machines 
and European production was devoted to the smaller ones the 
decision was not regarded as a real threat.93 The reduction in the
93 Report from Richard Bemstrom to AB Separator 3/12 1913 after a tour of inspec­
tion lasting two months in the USA and Canada. On the subject of separator 
competition R. Bernström wrote: “In America International Harvester has led the 
way in pursuing a sales policy which has enabled local agricultural machine agents
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tariff on butter in 1914 posed a much greater problem. The price 
of butter in the USA fell by 30 per cent mainly under pressure 
from Australian and European butter exports, which led to a 
decrease in the purchasing power of the American farmers and a 
reduction in the demand for separators.94
Thousands of
separators
In per cent 
of total
The De Laval Separator Co. 75 36
International Harvester" 30 (at the most) 14
Sears, Roebuck & Co. (mail order firm) 25 12
Sharpies 25 12
Empire 15 7
United States 15 7
Marsh (Waterloo, Iowa) 5 2
Others 20 10
Total 210 100
“ The De Laval Separator Co.’s estimate of International Harvester’s yearly sales 
corresponds well with the reality. The sales in fact amounted to 25 thousand accord­
ing to International Harvester’s own book-keeping.
Source McCormick Collection. International Harvester Co.: Annual Settlement 
Records, 1912.
to buy from the company about 75 % of all the various implements which they 
need for their business. Through this the seller gains still further great influence 
over the agent which the seller exploits in order to force upon the agent the agency 
for the new products which the seller has decided to produce. This situation has 
left its mark on the operations of the De Laval Separator Co. in the latter years. 
In certain districts in America about 50% of International Harvester’s local agents 
also work for the De Laval Separator Co., and therefore the De Laval Separator 
Co. has lost quite a lot of good agents since the International Harvester Co. started 
to produce and sell separators. However it turned out that the separators which 
were produced by International Harvester Co. were greatly inferior to those 
produced by the De Laval Separator Co., and at present the position is such that 
the Harvester company dares not compel those of its agents who prefer to sell 
the De Laval Separator Co. machines to stop doing so.”
94 According to the USA’s trade statistics the net imports of butter increased by 
about 3 million pounds both from Australia and Europe in 1914.
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States 1914-1915.
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On the whole the economic trends from 1907 up to the First 
World War had been favourable, and during these seven years the 
turnover of the De Laval Separator Co. was doubled as well as 
its profits. Thus as regards finance the De Laval Separator Co. 
became of great importance to the parent company AB Separator. 
Furthermore the De Laval Separator Co. could invest its own 
profits in fixed assets which were later written off. This enabled AB 
Separator in 1910 to write up the value of its shares in the De 
Laval Separator Co. by about 11 million Swedish crowns. 
Altogether AB Separator was able to pocket almost 60 million 
Swedish crowns in profits of various kinds from the De Laval 
Separator Co. before the First World War. On the basis of the parent 
company’s investment of barely half a million Swedish crowns in 
the subsidiary this can be regarded as an excellent yield. During 
these years the De Laval Separator Co. was the goose which laid 
the golden eggs.95
Germany
On the important German market AB Separator's interests had been 
managed from the start (1879) by the general agent Bergedorfer 
Eisenwerk near Hamburg. This firm was founded by Wilhelm Berg- 
ner in 1859. From the start the production comprised agricultural 
implements, agricultural machinery and dairy utensils, and so the 
selling of separators was easily added to the company’s earlier 
activities. During the latter part of the nineteenth century dairying 
developed very rapidly in Germany. The number of co-operative 
dairies rose from 28 in 1880 to nearly 2 000 in 1900, and at the 
latter point in time dairying constituted the most important German 
branch of the economy as regards production value. Parallel with 
this development there was an expansion in the market for dairy 
and agricultural separators and Bergedorfer Eisenwerk became AB 
Separator's largest foreign dealer in Europe. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century AB Separator dominated the German market 
completely as regards dairy separators and was the largest manu­
facturer of hand separators.95 As is shown in tables 43^14 the
95 Cf. table 47.
96 According to Alfa-Laval's internal statistics, in 1898 87 9r of the dairies in the 
Rhine area were equipped with Alfa-Laval separators. The remaining percentage
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number of separators sold to Germany rose up to 1895. After that 
time there was a certain decline which was caused by the growing 
tension between AB Separator and Bergedorfer Eisenwerk, partly 
connected with the fact that Wilhelm Bergner handed over the 
management to his son Carl. His intention was to free himself 
from AB Separator when the Alfa patent expired in 1903. Through 
its position as general agent for AB Separator and as a large pro­
ducer of other dairy equipment Bergedorfer Eisenwerk had ex­
cellent prospects of building up its own separator production. The 
company had its own sales organisation and very good contacts 
with the German dairy industry as well as with the farming com­
munity. They mastered the manufacturing of all the spare parts 
for the separator, apart from the centrifugal bowls, and in 1900 
Bergedorfer Eisenwerk approached Friedrich Krupp about orders 
for centrifugal bowls. On the basis of what had occurred AB 
Separator threatened to withdraw the selling of hand separators 
from Bergedorfer Eisenwerk at the same time as a branch was 
opened in Berlin in 1901 for the selling of hand separators. How­
ever, for the time being Bergedorfer Eisenwerk was allowed to con­
tinue selling. Through the establishment of the Berlin branch there 
was another rapid increase in the sales of hand separators to Ger­
many.
In spite of everything, AB Separator’s position in the German 
separator market was comparatively secure when the Alfa patent 
expired in 1903. But German national feelings were being roused 
against the pressure of foreign competition and national propaganda 
against foreign companies became more and more aggressive at the 
turn of the century. Within the separator industry it was considered 
that the Swedish-owned AB Separator, established on the basis of 
an original German invention (the Alfa patent) was exploiting the 
German market. Consequently when the Alfa patent expired the 
company faced a two-pronged attack from new German separator 
factories on the one hand and national propaganda on the other.
was divided among five manufacturers. Conditions in other parts of Germany were 
similar. The account of AB Separator's operations in Germany is mainly based on 
Alfa-LavaPs own sales statistics, B. Steckzén’s manuscript AB Separators historia: 
Bergedorfer Eisenwerk and Alfa-Laval Berlin 1900-1914 and also AB Separator 1883— 
1908. pp. 101-107.
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As in the USA and Sweden, the inclination to invest arose in Ger­
many after the expiry of the Alfa patent, and a large number of 
new separator factories were started. For example in Germany in 
1903 there were about 20 native separator factories, but ten years 
later there were 125, most of them small and short-lived.
The relationship between AB Separator and its general agent 
Bergedorfer Eisenwerk deteriorated further in 1903. Bergedorfer 
Eisenwerk then signed a contract with the separator company Svea 
in Stockholm concerning the sales of its separators in Germany, 
which AB Separator regarded as a breach of contract. In these 
circumstances AB Separator transferred the selling of power separa­
tors from Bergedorfer Eisenwerk to its branch in Berlin. In addition 
in 1904 AB Separator began a long-drawn-out lawsuit against Berge­
dorfer Eisenwerk about a patent matter, and official contacts be­
tween the two companies were severed.97
Despite the parting from its general agent in Germany in 1904 
AB Separator through its branch in Berlin was to see German orders 
increase rapidly during the following years. Requests were made 
for an increase in the production capacity and feelers for the pur­
chase of a suitable factory were put out in 1906. It would seem 
to be profitable from several points of view for AB Separator to 
have a factory for its own production in Germany. The effect of the 
German national propaganda, which was directed against imports 
from abroad, would thereby be reduced, and the extra costs of 
duty and freight would be eliminated. Bergedorfer Eisenwerk had 
been faced with a series of problems after its parting from AB 
Separator. Among other things internal relations within the Bergner 
family had deteriorated rapidly as a result of financial difficulties. 
The company had had set-backs on the separator side, due partly to 
the dispute with AB Separator, and in 1907 Carl Bergner’s relatives 
forced him to sell the majority shareholding to AB Separator. It 
was decided when the deal took place that Carl Bergner would 
act as managing director for the time being, but alongside him there
97 The patent dispute mainly concerned an improvement of the Alfa patent, the 
central cross, which had been invented by an American called Berrigan, whose 
patent had been acquired by AB Separator. When Bergedorfer Eisenwerk began to 
produce the “Astra” model of separator in series AB Separator took the view that 
the model infringed the patent.
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would be a co-director nominated by AB Separator. John Bernström 
joined the board as chairman. Bergedorfer Eisenwerkes production 
of separators was to cease and production was to be devoted 
instead to Alfa separators. The selling was organised so that in 
principle Bergedorfer Eisenwerk would sell power separators and 
the branch in Berlin hand separators. Direct exports of separators 
to Germany were to decrease because of the acquisition of a 
factory there, as is shown in table 43. The Separator group of 
companies was more than compensated for this loss by the produc­
tion of the subsidiary in Germany (table 45). The deal attracted 
great attention in German dairying and industrial circles since it 
was unusual for foreign companies to gain control of a factory in 
a highly industrialised Germany, and in a sector of industry in 
which there had been many years of extensive domestic enterprise. 
It was also the first time that a Swedish engineering industry 
—in a Sweden which was at that period hardly expansive—had 
established itself in Germany.98
The reorganisation of the hand separator production meant that 
the Bergedorfer factory concentrated primarily on machines in the 
smaller size categories in order to meet the main German competi­
tion. The models for Bergedorfer Eisenwerk’s separators came from 
Stockholm, and royalties were paid to AB Separator for these. Cer­
tain important separator parts were subsequently imported from 
Sweden. Even after the merger in 1907 Bergedorfer Eisenwerk kept 
up its production of dairy equipment such as refrigerating 
machines, pumps and cisterns, the total value of which exceeded 
that of the separators. The separators were sold on the domestic 
market while some of the other dairy equipment was exported, 
mainly to Finland and AB Separator’s subsidiary in Russia.
A certain dualism characterised the relationship between the 
sister companies Bergedorfer Eisenwerk and AB Separator's branch 
in Berlin. The German dairies, which to a great extent bought 
Bergedorfer Eisenwerk’s power separators, complained about the 
Berlin branch’s large sales of hand separators to the farmers, 
thereby depriving the dairies of a large part of the milk produc-
98 As a result of AB Separator's purchase of Bergedorfer Eisenwerk the legal disputes 
which were going on between the two companies ceased.
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tion." According to calculations the total sales of hand separators 
in Germany in 1912 amounted to 125 000 machines. Of these the 
Alfa-Laval branch in Berlin sold almost 15000 and Svenska Centri- 
fug AB, which was owned by AB Separator, sold about 5 000. Thus 
the Separator group of companies controlled about 16 per cent of 
the German hand separator market. So its market position was not 
as strong in Germany as it was in the USA (36 per cent) but all 
the same it was considerably stronger than that of any of the 
group’s main German competitors. The German farmers were AB 
Separator’s biggest customer in Europe. As far as dairy separators 
were concerned the company was completely dominant in Ger­
many.
In comparison with the activity of the Separator group of com­
panies in the USA the company in Germany was not a financial 
success to the same extent. During the five year period from 1909 
to 1913 Bergedorfer Eisenwerk paid 1.5 million German marks to 
AB Separator in royalties and dividends and at the same time a 
further one million marks were put aside to create capital, while 
the Berlin branch’s contribution to the group’s profits during the 
years 1909-1913 amounted to 0.7 million German marks.
Russia
The exporting of separators to Russia began on a small scale in 
the 1880s. In 1888 Carl Ludvig Nobel purchased the Russian patent 
for separators from Gustaf de Laval and started his own produc­
tion in Nobels Mekaniska verkstad in St. Petersburg. The Nobel 
family had founded a works for the manufacture of arms and this 
had increased in size during the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury. An important expansion in production had occurred after 1876 
when machines for the oil industry had begun to be manufactured 
for Nobel’s recently acquired petroleum interests in Russia.
During the latter part of the 1890s development of Russia’s 
underdeveloped agriculture began in certain regions. There was 
particularly rapid expansion in the economic administration of milk
99 Only about 25 % of the German milk production went to the dairies, while the 
other 75 % was churned into butter on the farms with the aid of hand separators. 
The butter which was not consumed by the farmers themselves was sold mainly 
on the local market.
167
and dairying in Siberia, which became one of the world’s largest 
centres for butter production. For example in 1893, 7 tons were ex­
ported from there but ten years later a total of 35000 tons were 
exported, and during the three years from 1899-1901 two thousand 
new dairies were built in Siberia. Most of the Siberian butter was 
bought up by the Danish company Sibiriska Kompaniet, which in 
turn mainly sold the butter in Britain.100 The reason for the boom 
in agriculture was the colonisation of Siberia in connection with 
the building of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1891-99. Although it 
came fifty years later, the colonisation of the Russian East cor­
responded to the advance of the American frontier to the West. 
The colonisation was encouraged by the Russian government, and 
in order to assist in the modernisation of agriculture the import 
tariffs on agricultural machines (including separators) were 
abolished in 1897. The result of the colonisation was an increase 
in the demand for farming machines for two reasons. In part it was 
because agrarian techniques were sought by the colonisers in the 
large virgin territories, and partly because the crowding of the 
population and the supply of labour in the old areas decreased, 
and so there was an increased inclination to acquire machine power 
for farming there too. The result was that farming and cattle-farm­
ing were modernised in certain parts of European Russia, in 
particular southern Russia.101
100 Connolly, V., Beyond the Urals. Economic Development in Soviet Asia, pp. 
15 ff. Agriculture in Siberia in 1914 was better equipped with agricultural implements 
and machinery than that in central Russia, which reflects the difference between 
a conventional agriculture fettered by tradition and a new, pioneering agriculture. 
Agricultural machines worth 20 million roubles were imported into Siberia in 1910— 
1911. The imports of separators and refrigerators were of great importance for the 
butter production and butter exports. In 1907 Russia's butter exports amounted to 
47 million roubles and 97% came from Siberia. Treadgold, D., p. 179.
101 Treadgold, D., has given a detailed account of the colonisation of Siberia in 
The Great Siberian Migration. According to Treadgold the colonisation of Siberia 
is most like that of Canada in terms of size and geography. During the 19th 
century and up to 1914 about 8 million people emigrated to Siberia (p. 13). Most 
of the Siberian settlers emigrated from southern Russia (the black soil area) (pp. 89, 
255). The basic reason for the extensive emigration was the shortage of land for 
the large mass of Russian farmers. The Emancipation Act of 1861 did not solve 
the important economic problem of land shortage. On the other hand serfdom 
ceased, and the farmers were liberated from their feudal masters, but their freedom
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Nobel’s manufacture of separators in St. Petersburg quickly be­
came out of date as it was based on the older De-Laval models. 
When the import tariff was abolished in 1897 Nobel’s separator 
business no longer proved profitable and it gradually ceased. In­
stead, the firm under the management of Emanuel Nobel, who had 
succeeded his brother Carl Ludvig (died 1893) took over the gen­
eral agency for AB Separator in Russia. Emanuel Nobel had very 
good contacts in leading Russian circles, which was of particular 
importance in relation to Russian orders and he was among other 
things a member of the board of the Russian National Bank and 
was also appointed a member of the Russian Council of State in 
1911. Through Nobel’s agency AB Separator acquired an important 
sales channel into the Russian market. Thereafter Swedish exports 
of separators increased rapidly as a result of the agricultural 
development. In 1901 there were about 5000 dairies in Siberia and 
about 90 per cent of these had Alfa separators. The Swedish 
separators became so well-known under the name “Lavalka” that 
this became a common Russian word for a separator. The demand 
for hand separators also grew with the expansion of dairying. 
Consequently Russia, who was starting to rebuild an old-fashioned 
agriculture, appeared at the turn of the nineteenth century to have 
enormous potential as a future market for producers of agrarian 
technology.102
However, the problem posed by the Russian market was greater 
than in most other places. The distances were vast. The farmers
of action was limited by the mir. The mir, through which the more important 
questions were resolved with collective responsibility, was regarded by many farm­
ers as constricting and as a fatal obstacle to agrarian technological development. 
Therefore the colonisation of Siberia, where the institution of the mir only developed 
to a small extent, offered possibilities for industrious and independent-minded farm­
ers who felt repressed in European Russia. The institution of the mir developed 
to varying degrees in Russia, and therefore hindered in varying degrees individual 
attempts to break out. It is probably no accident that the emigration was com­
paratively greater from the rather more developed and sales-orientated farming 
districts in the South, where the mir's hold on the farmers was not as far-reaching 
as in central Russia.
102 The account of AB Separator's operations in Russia is mainly based on Alfa- 
Laval’s own sales statistics and B. Steckzén's manuscript AB Separators historia: 
Alfa-Nobel, St. Petersburg 1900-1914.
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were technically inexperienced and were always short of money. 
Therefore the salesmen had to give them much longer credit than 
in other countries. Sales in Russia bore exceptionally high costs 
due to the fact that it was a complicated and hazardous business. 
For these reasons AB Separator for three years from 1902 had its 
top expert on foreign business, travelling inspector A. Kullberg, 
attached to Nobel’s firm. Kullberg modernised the sales organisa­
tion and after travelling extensively in European Russia and Siberia 
he set up branches in Warsaw, Omsk and Odessa. In addition he 
managed to persuade Emanuel Nobel to hive off the separator 
businesses from the other branches of the firm’s extensive opera­
tions and to form the independent company Nobels Separator­
avdelning. However the various measures had no immediate effect 
on the sales since the Russian-Japanese War in 1904-05 and the great 
political unrest at home substantially repressed investment in 
Russian industrial life. After the agrarian reforms of Prime Minister 
Stolypin in 1906 which were aimed at creating a politically stable 
farm-owning class with great purchasing power—kulaks—AB Sepa­
rator’s sales figures rose considerably. From then on with one or 
two exceptions the orders were to remain on a high level until 
the end of the First World War (see table 43).103
103 Treadgold, D., op.cit., pp. 166f. and 176ff. Grossman. C.. The Industrialisation 
of Russia, pp. 15 ff.
Stolypin’s reforms must be regarded primarily as an attack on the mir. After the 
1905 revolution Stolypin proposed, partly as suitable anti-revolutionary tactics and 
reform strategy, to make it easier for the farmers to separate their farms from the 
mir and also that the village be given the opportunity to dismiss itself as land 
controller by a majority vote. But Stolypin also had far-reaching economic aims 
behind the agricultural reforms. Stolypin made the following statement in connec­
tion with a tour of inspection in Siberia in 1910: "The right of private property in 
land must serve as the chief security for the raising of the productivity of the 
peasant household and private property in land would permit industry and trade 
to develop.” The reforms in general and Stolypin’s views on the colonisation of 
Siberia in particular were probably influenced by the American Homestead Act of 
1862 which was discussed in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.
As regards Siberia. Stolypin was not completely satisfied with developments there. 
In actual fact he already became alarmed in 1910 by the dynamic power which 
Siberia showed during the first expansive decade of the 20th century, and which he 
himself had been a party to establishing and creating possibilities for. Stolypin 
feared that Siberia would outdo European Russia economically. "Siberia might crush
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The latter part of the economic development of the Tsarist Rus­
sian epoch has constituted a fascinating chapter in the country’s 
history and has interested a great number of economic historians. 
It should be borne in mind that the population (i.e. of the whole 
of Russia) increased from 74 million in 1860 to 178 million in 1913 
and that this increase in population took place almost entirely 
within the agrarian sector. From this it is possible to gauge roughly 
the slow rate of increase in Russian industry during the close of 
the Tsarist period. Nevertheless Russia through her size as a 
nation in 1914 had developed into the world’s fifth industrial 
country after the USA, Germany, Great Britain and France, while 
the per capita production in her industry was considerably lower 
than that in most of the industrialised countries. Emphasis has been 
laid on various factors as the causes of the industrial development 
in Russia. For example it is possible to see if Paul Bairoch’s theory 
as to the leading rôle of agriculture in the process of industria­
lisation is valid in the case of Russia. Bairoch contends that farm­
ing played an extremely active rôle in the industrial breakthrough 
of the nineteenth century. The increase in demand and the purchas­
ing power which the agricultural revolution created in many places 
both for consumer goods (textiles) and production goods (iron and 
steel) are seen by him as the most important factor in industriali­
sation. It is tempting to indulge in a mainly negative argument and 
declare that Bairoch is right. The institution of the Mir hampered 
the agrarian revolution in Russia and thus also the industrial revolu­
tion. The comparatively rapid industrialisation which took place at 
the start of the twentieth century could then be accounted for by 
the beginning of modernisation in agriculture. Stolypin’s agricul­
tural reforms were mainly directed towards liberating the individual 
farmer from the Mir. Even if the objective was not perhaps 
primarily an economic one but was to give the country social and 
political stability through a farming class with great purchasing 
power, the long-term economic effect was the increase in the 
productivity of agriculture and in the demand for industrial pro­
ducts. However, in certain cases the increase in demand affected
the homeland.” However, it was not Siberia but communism which seven years 
later was to crush the establishment in 'the homeland'!
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the industrialisation of other countries. For example agrarian tech­
nology was bought to a large extent from the USA, Germany, 
Britain, and Sweden. (See note 7.) It may be observed that the
Russin import of agricultural machines in 1913. Figures in per cent.
Export-countries
USA Germany Britain Sweden Others
Sowing machines 67 12 5 3 13
Self-disposing harvesters 51 4 16 5 24
Self-binding harvesters 44 16 24 7 9
Mowing machines 29 17 7 19 38
Horse hay-rakes 22 11 15 41 11
Source Linder, E., Den svenska mekaniska verkstadsindustriens utveckling intill krigs­
utbrottet, pp. 284 f.
exports of the USA were almost synonymous with those of Inter­
national Harvester. In 1909 this company had started a factory to 
produce harvesting and mowing machines in Lubertzy outside Mos­
cow which were to be specially selected for Russian agriculture. 
When it is borne in mind that the Lubertzy factory’s production 
figures are not included in the statistics of imports given above the 
dominance of International Harvester is quite plain. However, as far 
as separators were concerned total Swedish sales in Russia, with 
AB Separator leading the way, were even more dominant. They 
probably had at least 80 per cent of the whole Russian separator 
market.
Alexander Gerschenkron gives an alternative kind of explanation 
for Russian industrialisation in his book “Economic Backwardness 
in Historical Perspective". According to him Russia is an example 
of how industrialisation took place “under conditions of economic 
backwardness". Gerschenkron stresses the active rôle of the state 
in Russian agriculture during the breakthrough of the 1890s. Here 
the state acted as a substitute for the individual manufacturers and 
investment banks which played a decisive rôle in the industrialisa­
tion of more advanced countries. An increase in purchasing power 
within the agrarian economy is an important motive for indus-
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trialisation, according to Gerschenkron, but it is only one of a 
number of possible alternatives which the Russian development 
presents. In his industrialisation plan in the 1890s, the finance 
minister Witte did not follow the theory that the increased demand 
from the farmers for industrial goods constituted a condition for 
successful industrialisation. On the contrary their consumption 
potential was reduced by the considerable pressure of taxation in 
order to increase the share of the national product in investments. 
Thus government policy was aimed at securing the existing produc­
tion of the farmers rather than promoting an increase in produc­
tion. In Russia the orders of the government were a substitute for 
the defective domestic market, and what was achieved in other 
countries through the influence of a freely expanding market. The 
industrialisation was concentrated round heavy industry (the iron, 
steel and engineering sectors) while agriculture played a passive 
rôle. Loans of foreign technology promoted the rise of large com­
pany units. The substitution processes reinforced the dualism 
within the economy and brought about an economic structure of a 
heterogeneous nature. As a strategic factor in the industrial break­
through the technology created conflicts between the old and the 
new, and in an underdeveloped Russia these conflicts were partic­
ularly accentuated. The industrial boom of the 1890s ceased around 
1900. The farmers’ ability to pay taxes and their patience had been 
exhausted. After the war with Japan in 1904 came the revolution of 
1905 in which the farmers rose up to good effect. When after 
Stolypin’s reforms industrialisation started again in 1906 the sub­
stitution pattern rapidly altered, and the process of industrialisa­
tion became more conventional and more European in character.104
Bairoch and Gerschenkron adopt somewhat different approaches 
to industrialisation and they stress different factors. Bairoch lays 
stress generally on the influence of the agricultural sector on in­
dustrial development, while Gerschenkron emphasises the un­
precedented and the discrepant in the pattern of Russian industri­
alisation. As regards Gerschenkron it is important to note that the
104 Bairoch, P., Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution 1700-1914. Gerschenkron, 
A., Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Grossman, G., The Industri­
alization of Russia.
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Russian industrial breakthrough in the 1890s suddenly stopped. At 
this time it was only possible to industrialise for a short period 
against the will of the farmers and at the expense of agricultural 
interests. After Stolypin’s reforms industrialisation continued in 
Tsarist Russia following a pattern more in conformity with 
Bairoch’s theories. In consequence Bairoch’s argument seems to 
hold good even when tested against the development of Tsarist 
Russia. At the same time it is important to emphasise the inter­
dependence in agricultural and industrial development. As Gersch- 
enkron says quite rightly, the short industrial advance in Russia 
during the 1890s gave rise to market forces which among other 
things stimulated a more commercial agriculture after 1906.
During the period before 1914 Russia was a land of contrasts. 
Within the field of industrial and agrarian technology, in which 
AB Separator operated, the frontiers between old and new were 
more numerous and more clearly defined in Russia than in other 
places. However, the problems were at least as great for AB 
Separator’s competitors on the Russian market. Nobel was well 
connected with the high Russian authorities and the agricultural 
societies, and the suspiciousness usually manifested towards 
foreigners, especially salesmen, by the Russians did not unduly 
affect Alfa-Laval. Furthermore Nobel had got hold of the best 
agents. In 1908 Nobel’s Separatoravdelning had been reorganised 
into Handelshaus Alfa-Nobel, and was given greater resources in 
order to be able to meet the growing competition. At this point 
in time competition had come mainly from two sides, on the one 
hand from America and on the other from Swedish separator manu­
facturers. Next to Alfa-Nobel the largest dealer on the Russian 
market was Svenska Centrifug AB in Södertälje, Sweden, which 
opened branches in Moscow in 1901 and in Tscheljabinsk in Siberia 
in 1903. In 1905 Svenska Centrifug AB became a subsidiary of AB 
Separator. According to AB Separator’s calculations the Swedish 
separator companies (Svenska Centrifug AB, AB Pumpseparator and 
AB Baltic) sold twelve thousand separators in Russia in 1911 as 
against eighteen thousand sold by AB Separator. Through its 
agricultural machines International Harvester had built up a strong 
position in Russian agriculture which will be dealt with in greater 
detail in due course. This position was also used in selling separa-
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tors, and International Harvester was the largest non-Swedish 
separator supplier on the Russian market.
The tension between Alfa-Nobel and Svenska Centrifug AB in­
creased as competition became keener, and Alfa-Nobel contended 
that it was preposterous for AB Separator to allow its subsidiary 
in Södertälje to compete with its general agent in St. Petersburg. 
After a visit to Russia in 1909 Richard Bernstrom decided to settle 
the differences between Alfa-Nobel and Svenska Centrifug AB by 
letting them co-operate as interested parties in a newly established 
company in Riga. However, Alfa-Nobel would still retain the gen­
eral agency for Alfa separators. AB Separator, Eskilstuna Stålpress­
nings AB and AB Westeråsmaskiner would also participate in the 
newly established company as interested parties. In the same year 
AB Separator had acquired the majority share-holding in the last- 
mentioned company, which manufactured harvesters and mowing 
machines, ploughs and other agricultural machinery. Richard Bern­
ström intended to broaden the selling through this acquisition and 
thus meet International Harvester’s expansion. So the establish­
ment of the Riga company served two purposes: on the one hand 
the differences between Alfa-Nobel and Svenska Centrifug AB 
would be attenuated, and on the other hand AB Separator would 
try to apply International Harvester’s ‘full-line’ principle in Russia. 
Its own methods could be used against the American company to 
prevent it from improving its competitive position at AB Separator’s 
expense.105
The business in Riga soon turned out to be an unwise specula­
tion and it ran at an increasing loss. It proved inappropriate to
105 It was a firm principle at AB Separator not to divide the production and sales 
among various kinds of products but to concentrate on separators to a high degree. 
Thus the Riga company constituted an exception to this rule, and there was no 
lack of warnings from various leading quarters within the group. Among others 
Ossian Ström, the managing director of the subsidiary Svenska Centrifug AB, ex­
pressed reservations about the whole project by arguing that as a rule harvesters 
and separators were sold to different districts, viz. grain-cultivating and grass- 
cultivating areas respectively. Therefore the sales for the two sectors could not be 
organised jointly. However, as a subordinate Ossian Ström complied with AB Sepa­
rator’s decision.
Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia: Alfa-Nobel, St. Petersburg.
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lump together separators from Södertälje, agricultural machines 
from Västerås and enamelware from Eskilstuna, since these 
products were so often aimed at different customers and required 
different sales methods. Therefore in 1913 AB Separator carried 
out a financial reorganisation of the Rigabolaget and at the same 
time the sales of AB Westerâsmaskiner’s products were gradually 
made to taper off. AB Separator did not find it appropriate to com­
bine separators with agricultural machines even on isolated export 
markets and this is why the company sold its shareholding in AB 
Westeråsmaskiner. Through these operations the business in Riga 
was given greater stability for the future.
It became the task of the Rigabolaget above all to sell the smaller 
and cheaper separators which were particularly sought after in 
Russia. AB Separator considered that conditions in Russia made it 
necessary to sell cheap separators through the Rigabolaget in 
accordance with the needs and purchasing power of the many 
customers. This operation meant that the smaller types of machine 
were spread particularly widely in Russia. However Alfa-Nobel 
construed this selling as a revival and extension of unfair competi­
tion, while AB Separator maintained that the separators of the 
Rigabolaget were aimed at foreign competitors. The competition 
within AB Separator’s own sphere of influence was regarded as 
merely marginal, since Alfa-Nobel’s larger and superior machines 
were mainly directed towards a group of customers different from 
the Rigabolaget’s.
Relations between Alfa-Nobel and AB Separator were subjected 
to other conflicts in spite of the fact that in 1912 AB Separator 
had become a shareholder in Alfa-Nobel. As its representative in 
the Russian company AB Separator put in John Bernström’s son- 
in-law Claes Asker, who had previously held a top post in Alfa- 
Berlin. The years immediately after Asker’s appointment brought a 
boom in Alfa-Nobel’s separator sales, but nevertheless the com­
pany showed significant losses in 1912-1913. On closer examination 
of the causes of the loss it turned out that AB Separator’s and 
Nobel’s interests had diverged. Nobel wanted to extend the 
separator business, mainly into cold-storage plants and engines, and 
to hive it off from the dairying branch. The separator business’s 
share in Alfa-Nobel’s organisation had fallen from 82 per cent in
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1907 to 62 per cent in 1912. That branch of the business yielded 
continuous net profits while the non-separator business caused con­
siderable losses. In order to make the business profitable AB 
Separator thought it necessary to have greater control than part- 
ownership of Alfa-Laval. Through the conversion of Alfa-Nobel in 
the new year of 1914 into a limited company “Handels- und 
Industrie AG Alfa-NobeF ’ AB Separator acquired the majority 
shareholding in the company. This meant that AB Separator took 
over the power of decision where Alfa-Nobel was concerned, and 
the latter was transformed from a Russian trading firm into a 
Swedish subsidiary, a change which attracted attention in the Rus­
sian capital.106
The fact that AB Separator increased its influence in St. Peters­
burg aroused disapproval in many Russian circles. In spite of a 
general suspicion of foreign elements in the Russian economy Alfa- 
Nobel was able to secure its Russian separator market in various 
ways in 1914. In this context the Russian government’s agricultural 
instructors played an important rôle in continuing to recommend 
only Alfa-Laval separators even after 1914. It was a condition of 
a farmer in Russia getting a share of the grants for the purchase 
of machinery which the Ministry of Agriculture provided in sub­
stantial sums that the farmer must follow the recommendations of 
the instructor. Thanks to Nobel’s involvement in the separator 
business, the sales agreements which Alfa-Nobel had concluded 
proved of value for AB Separator even after the reduction of 
Nobel’s share in Alfa-Nobel. In particular as regards the most 
important sales area, Siberia, AB Separator had the advantage of 
Nobel’s good connections with various Russian authorities. As the 
Siberian market expanded, competition for it became keener. In 
the spring of 1914 several of AB Separator’s competitors tried to 
persuade the Danish-owned Sibiriska Kompaniet to cease trading 
with Alfa-Nobel. Certain of AB Separator’s competitors offered 
Sibiriska Kompaniet discounts of up to 55 per cent. However the 
Danish company, bearing in mind the advantage of selling a 
machine which was recommended by the Russian agricultural 
authorities, renewed its contract with Alfa-Nobel. The importance
106 Ibid.
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of the extension of the contract was plain to AB Separator, since 
the Sibiriska Kompaniet was the largest customer for separators in 
Russia. The extensive Siberian sales made possible the expansion 
of the Omsk branch in 1914.107
AB Separator’s Russian business can be summed up as large 
sales and small profits. From 1911 to 1917 the company had 
invested more than 5 million Swedish crowns in St. Petersburg 
and Riga. The avalanche-like development was completely contrary 
to John Bernström’s cautious economic policy. In fact the invest­
ment policy in Russia had also been ratified by Richard Bernström. 
Political developments in Russia during the First World War made 
AB Separator’s assets there extremely insecure. In 1918 AB Separa­
tor’s assets in Alfa-Nobel were shown as 5.2 million Swedish crowns, 
but in 1921 these were drastically reduced to 1 Swedish crown. 
In spite of the fact that separator exports were disturbed in various 
ways throughout the First World War and the Russian Revolution 
in 1917, sales to Russia were able to continue on a comparatively 
high level during the latter part of the 1910s. This was largely due 
to the fact that the large sales to Siberia were comparatively 
unaffected by the war or even by the Revolution to start with. 
However the business turned out to have made heavy losses amount­
ing to 0.9 million roubles during the years 1914-1918, mainly due to 
exchange losses resulting from the currency depreciation of the 
rouble, and extra costs connected with the war.108
The business in Russia also shows a course of events which was 
typical of that period. For a long time AB Separator delivered 
machines to a general agent against a cash payment. As sales 
increased so did the agent's credit requirements, and the agent 
turned to the producer. As the latter was interested in increased 
sales, especially on the potentially large Russian market, he did 
not refuse credit. But in order to be able to exert better control 
over the business in this situation AB Separator first acquired half 
the shareholding and later the majority shareholding in the general 
agent's company.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. Administration reports and reports of the auditors for 1918 and 1921. In 
1917 AB Separator had redeemed the NoBel family's shareholding in Alfa-Nobel 
with 1.2 million Sw. kr.
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Thus from the viewpoint of business economics the profit of the 
Russian part of AB Separator’s business during the period in ques­
tion was small. In actual fact heavy losses were incurred. How­
ever, the large deliveries to the Russian farms and dairies were 
to acquire national economic importance in Sweden from the point 
of view of employment. It was above all the commercialised part 
of Russian agriculture, especially in Siberia, which profited most 
from the separator business, as it was able to offer for sale in­
creasing quantities of butter. Moreover it is plain that it was the 
large profits on other foreign markets, especially in North America, 
which enabled AB Separator to conduct extensive business in Rus­
sia in the prevailing situation.
(d) AB Separator and competition: the situation
At the outbreak of the First World War, AB Separator, with sub­
sidiaries in Sweden and abroad, had a firm hold on the international 
separator market. As regards dairy separators it was completely 
dominant in countries with developed dairying. Comparatively large 
difficulties faced competitors seeking to establish themselves on the 
machinery side of the dairy sector, since it was financially costly 
to produce and sell such equipment. The manufacture and market­
ing of agricultural separators were simpler and less costly and 
therefore more open to fresh competition. In the latter field the 
Separator group of companies’ position on the international market 
was not as dominant as on the dairy side. Nevertheless at this 
point in time the group of companies was the largest international 
supplier of agricultural separators. The competition came mainly 
from other Swedish separator manufacturers and also to a certain 
extent from a few American and German companies. It can already 
be said by the end of the 1920s that the most prominent Swedish 
competitors had been incorporated within the Separator group of 
companies. A few examples will serve to illustrate what has been 
said. According to market research which AB Separator carried out 
in 1906, the company’s share in the whole of the Russian market 
was 54 per cent. In Germany the share of the market in agricul­
tural separators varied from 75 per cent in North Germany to 10 
per cent in Westphalia, which had its own separator production. 
In Holland the Separator group of companies produced 80 per cent
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of the dairy separators and 30 per cent of the agricultural separa­
tors. 90 per cent of the dairies in Denmark, Siberia, Argentina and 
New Zealand were equipped with Alfa separators. Of all the 
agricultural separators which were sold on the most important 
market internationally, the USA, 35 per cent came from the 
Separator group of companies.
We have already seen how in several places new separator fac­
tories were established after the expiry of the Alfa patent. This 
happened not least in Sweden. It is therefore appropriate to pause 
and consider AB Separator’s relationship with newly established 
competitors on the home market during the period following the 
turn of the nineteenth century, especially as in most cases the 
domestic competitors became AB Separator's most powerful com­
petitors on the international separator market. In all about twenty 
Swedish separator companies were formed before the First World 
War, mainly in Stockholm and in the Mälar area. Among the new­
comers to the industry AB Pumpseparator (1903) and AB Baltic 
(1904) were particularly prominent. AB Pumpseparator was able to 
introduce a technical innovation into the separator field in the form 
of its device for pumping the milk flowing to the separator. How­
ever, both AB Pumpseparator and AB Baltic were typical examples 
of companies with innovation difficulties. Above all the selling 
costs were heavy for the new companies, which were export- 
minded to a high degree. It was not until about 1910 that these 
were stabilised and had become profitable. AB Pumpseparator had 
developed a new model of separator which was smaller in size 
and had the high-sounding name of “Diabolo”, and it became a 
highly marketable machine when it was introduced onto the market 
in 1909. In 1914 AB Pumpseparator sold the same number of 
machines as AB Separator (the parent company) even if the turn­
over was considerably lower because AB Pumpseparator’s models 
of separator were smaller and cheaper. In 1912 AB Baltic was able 
to strengthen its market position in the USA by the acquisition of 
Empire Cream Separator. Gustaf Wallenberg, the person principally 
interested in Empire, had previously tried in vain to persuade AB 
Separator to buy Empire, which had an unstable financial position. 
With support from Gustafs brother Marcus Wallenberg and Stock­
holms Enskilda Bank AB Baltic was able to acquire through loans
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the financial resources to buy and reorganise Empire. At the out­
break of the First World War AB Baltic’s sales had risen to such an 
extent that in terms of the number of separators sold they were 
approaching AB Separator.109
AB Separator could see in several ways that the Swedish com­
petition was increasing. It is clear from table 50 that AB Separa­
tor’s share of production in Sweden fell from 84 per cent in 1896 
to 64 per cent in 1903. In 1910 the corresponding share had fallen 
to 50 per cent. Furthermore AB Separator’s share in the total of 
Swedish exports fell from 85 per cent in 1900 to about 40 per cent 
around 1920. On the Swedish market AB Separator’s rôle declined 
even more rapidly. At the end of the 1890s the company controlled 
80-90 per cent of the domestic separator market. However the 
company’s share of separators in Sweden had already dropped to 
30 per cent in 1903, mainly because of competition from the new 
smaller models which were exceptionally well suited to the small 
farms. As the platform which the Swedish market constituted was 
too small for a growing number of separator companies, it became 
necessary for competitors to concentrate on exports from the start, 
like AB Separator. It was a question of being able to extend the 
shop counter. In AB Separator’s market reports for 1905 one can 
read of increasing Swedish competition on the most important 
separator markets in the USA, Germany, Russia, Australia and 
Scandinavia. To mitigate the effects of competition in 1905, as has 
already been mentioned, AB Separator bought Svenska Centrifug 
AB in Södertälje. In Denmark in spite of domestic production AB 
Separator was able to dominate completely the field of dairy 
separators (98 per cent in 1905) but from 1903 Burmeister & Wain 
had control over hand separators. The production of separators at 
Burmeister & Wain constituted only a small part of the company’s 
total production. After protracted negotiations AB Separator was 
able in 1910 to come to an agreement with Burmeister & Wain 
under which the latter company would gradually close down its 
separator business in return for compensation. AB Separator aimed 
at restricting competition so that the Danish hand separator market
109 Steckzén, B., AB Separator, Stockholm 1903-1914. Manuscript. Hammarström, 
I., Stockholm i svensk ekonomi 1850-1914, pp. 348f. Svenska Industrien 1907, 1911- 
1912.
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Table 46. Sales, wages, profits and dividends at AB Separator, 1883-1907. 
Amounts in thousands of Swedish crowns
Year Sales
Number of
workers
Wages
paid
Net profits 
after de­
preciations Dividend
1883 260 61 56
1884 397 72 86
1885 400 196 91
1886 537 208 138
1887 974 211 299
1888 1 485 289 317 up to and
1889 1 546 337 337 including
1890 1 573 337 358 1891 =
1891 1 897 350 377 645
1892 2 387 363 476 559 200
1893 3 000 380 544 803 300
1894 3 356 388 635 832 400
1895 3 574 400 610 1 443 600
1896 3 927 415 674 2 034 1 400
1897 4 347 517 879 2 188 1 800
1898 5 015 644 1 065 2 379 2 000
1899 5 205 772 1 343 2 402 2 000
1900 5 748 981 1 578 2 482 2 000
1901 6 037 998 1 473 2 582 2 000
1902 6 012 1 206 1 482 2 597 2 000
1903 6 669 1 097 1 717 2 743 2 000
1904 5 378 1 077 1 597 2 655 2 000
1905 5 227 793 1 135 2 919 2 200
1906 5 854 1 194 1 624 3 016 2 200
1907 6 251 1 326 1 990 3 244 2 200
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik, styrelseberättelser; AB 
Separatorsjubileumsskrift 1883-1908.
would also be available for the company. In spite of the agreement 
with Burmeister & Wain AB Separator was not able to open up 
this market to any greater extent, since other domestic manu­
facturers took advantage of the Danish farmer’s national feelings. 
During this period AB Separator's exports to Denmark were very
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Table 47. Financial data relating to AB Separator (the parent company) in 1892- 
1921. Amounts in thousands of Sw. kr.
Year
Share
capital
Number
of
Sales workers
(the parent Co.)
The De Laval 
Company’s
Net profits contribution
after de- to the
preciation net profits Funds
Divi­
dend
1892 1 000 2 387 363 559 _ 734 200
1893 2 000 3 000 380 803 - 483 300
1894 2 000 3 356 388 832 _ 871 400
1895 2 000 3 574 400 1 443 507 1 565 600
1896 2 000 3 927 415 2 034 635 2 000 1 400
1897 4 000 4 347 517 2 188 670 2 388 1 800
1898 4 000 5 015 644 2 379 745 2 568 2 000
1899 4 000 5 205 772 2 402 1 246 3 000 2 000
1900 4 000 5 748 981 2 482 1 425 3 314 2 000
1901 4 000 6 037 998 2 582 1 781 3 382 2 000
1902 4 000 6 012 1 206 2 597 2 137 4 406 2 000
1903 4 000 6 669 1 097 2 743 2 480 3 916 2 000
1904 4 000 5 378 1 077 2 655 2 480 4 504 2 000
1905 4 400 5 227 793 2 919 2 830 5 946 2 200
1906 4 400 5 854 1 194 3 016 2 830 6 600 2 200
1907 5 000 6 251 1 326 3 244 2 830 12 700 2 200
1908 5 000 4 743 1 116 2 879 2 830 13 200 2 500
1909 5 000 5 928 877 3 164 2 830 13 750 2 500
1910 24 000 5 348 744 3 293 3 540 12 800 2 500
1911 24 000 6 890 826 4 311 3 540 12 800 3 600
1912 24 000 6 845 899 4 288 3 540 13 500 3 600
1913 24 000 7 798 925 4 707 3 740 14 000 3 840
1914 28 000 6 482 788 4 380 3 540 16 000 4 480
1915 28 000 6 562 783 6 730 4 774 4 480
1916 28 000 11 541 1 092 10 771 4 226 4 480
1917 42 000 11 297 908 8 577 2 707 6 720
1918 63 000 14 457 742 12 546 3 143 8 190
1919 63 000 14 947 821 11 699 3 206 8 190
1920 63 000 11 481 641 6 803 3 178 5 040
1921 63 000 8 887 390 988 1 331 1 890
Note The post funds relates to special reserve funds and general purpose funds. Cf. p. 199.
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik, styrelseberättelser; AB Separators 
jubileumsskrift 1883-1908; Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia.
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Table 48. Swedish separator exports in thousands of Swedish crowns 
1900-1921
Year
A= total 
exports
B = AB Separ. 
exports
C=AB Separ. +
Centrifugs
exports
D=B in
% of A
E=Cin
% of A
1900 5 862 5 041 85
1901 7 427 5 509 74
1902 7 281 5 566 77
1903 8 636 6 142 71
1904 8 652 4 956 57
1905 8 460 4 868 58
1906 10 724 5 455 51
1907 11 308 5 864 52
1908 10 178 4 378 43
1909 12 318 5 580 45
1910 11 349 5 020 44
1911 13 406 6 618 49
1912 13 374 6 584 49
1913 14 910 7 371 49
1914 14 700 6 060 41
1915 14 457 6 045 8 059 42 55
1916 26 978 10 693 15 031 40 56
1917 31 363 9 774 13 340 31 43
1918 29 100 11 885 13 988 41 48
1919 37 604 12 760 14 955 34 40
1920 25 912 9 161 10 633 35 41
1921 16 209 7 303 8 155 45 50
Source Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik, Handel; Sveriges officiella statistik. 
Handel; Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia (manuscript).
much smaller than to the other Nordic countries Norway and Fin­
land.110
110 Riksarkivet, Kommerskollegii arkiv. Primary information for the industrial statis­
tics. Steckzén, B., op. cit. An extract from a promotions publication from AB Pump- 
separator’s director Erik Hirsch to a Canadian firm in Montreal in 1914 illustrates 
the ability of the new Swedish separator companies to analyse market conditions 
and make effective use of modern sales and advertising methods which apparently 
produced results.
"We know that your district is a fine part of the world for the sale of separators 
and it could be a very good business. If we could find the right firm we would
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Table 49. Proportion of exports in the total sales of AB Separator. Amounts 
in thousands of Swedish crowns
Year
Total sales of
AB Separator Export sales
Proportion of exports 
in the total sales
1896 3 927 3 486 89
1897 4 347 3 842 88
1898 5 015 4 302 86
1899 5 205 4 434 85
1900 5 748 5 041 88
1901 6 037 5 509 91
1902 6 012 5 566 93
1903 6 669 6 142 92
1904 5 378 4 946 92
1905 5 227 4 868 93
1906 5 854 5 455 93
1907 6 251 5 864 94
1908 4 743 4 378 92
1909 5 928 5 580 94
1910 5 347 5 020 94
1911 6 890 6 618 96
1912 6 845 6 584 96
1913 7 798 7 371 95
1914 6 482 6 060 94
1915 6 562 6 045 92
1916 11 541 10 693 92
1917 11 297 9 774 86
1918 14 457 11 885 82
1919 14 947 12 760 85
1920 11 481 9 161 80
1921 8 887 7 303 82
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
be willing to support it in every possible way, and we would very much like to 
hear from you if you would be interested in this matter. We enclose a few cir­
culars about our Diabolo separator.
It is no more than five years since we brought out this machine onto the market 
but during this comparatively short period we have made the machine known and 
well-known almost all over the world. It may perhaps be of interest to you to 
learn that we are now the largest producer of milk separators in the world with 
the sole exception of AB Separator, though that company is now 35 years old. We
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Table 50. Production and exports of Swedish dairy machines in thousands 
of Swedish crowns
Year
A=total 
production
B=AB Separ. 
production
C=B as a
% of A
D=total
exports“
E=D as a
% of A
1896 4 675 3 927 84 3 694 79
1897 5 210 4 347 83 3 309 64
1898 6 557 5 015 76 3 692 56
1899 7 718 5 205 67 4 454 58
1900 8 020 5 748 72 5 862 73
1901 8 886 6 037 68 7 427 84
1902 9 445 6 012 63 7 281 77
1903 10 425 6 669 64 8 636 83
“ The export figures for the years 1896-1899 are incomplete. The figures are clearly 
too low since AB Separator’s exports alone exceeded the total volume of exports.
Source Bidrag till Sveriges officiella statistik, Handel; Steckzén, B., AB Separators 
historia. Moderbolaget (manuscript).
It is a distinctive feature of multinational companies, of which 
AB Separator was one of the first in Sweden, that their markets 
have no geographical borders to speak of. If a technically superior 
product has been developed the spread of its sales will not be 
determined by transport distances but by such factors as demand
started barely a year ago in the USA and we now ship our separators there in 
consignments of over 1000 a month. You probably know that Sweden is the birth­
place of the separator industry. More separators originating from Sweden are sold 
than from all the rest of the world put together. You probably know that firms 
such as the De Laval Separator Co., Empire and others which now manufacture 
machines in America were originally Swedish firms, and you probably know that 
AB Separator also has its home here in Sweden, and that it started its production 
in this country long before it opened its factory in the USA. We mention this 
since it may be of interest to you to know that we in Sweden sell a greater number 
of Diabolo separators a year than AB Separator sells of Alfa separators.
The hand separator should only be used by smaller farms and not in large-scale 
farming. The farmer needs a machine which he can understand and maintain and 
which is robust. In these respects the Diabolo is an ideal separator. We maintain 
that the Diabolo separator is at least equal in merit to the very best separators 
of other makes. However, we maintain further that in some respects it is superior 
to all the others, while the Diabolo separator is simpler and consequently more 
durable than any other milk separator.”
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Table 51. AB Separator’s sales of the more important groups of products 
Amounts in thousands of Swedish crowns
Year
Dairy
separators
Hand
separators Bowls Others Total
1887 440 226 31 277 974
1889 599 263 88 596 1 546
1890 450 648 84 390 1 572
1891 484 637 154 622 1 897
1893 111 1 337 497 429 3 040
1900 852 3 349 1 462 198 5 861
1906 490 3 691 521 1 152 5 854
1913 846 5 012 84 1 855 7 797
The relative importance of the groups of products in AB Separator's sales
Year
Dairy
separators
Hand
separators Bowls Others Total
1887 45 23 3 29 100
1889 39 17 6 38 100
1890 29 41 5 25 100
1891 26 34 8 32 100
1893 26 44 16 14 100
1900 15 51 25 3 100
1906 8 63 9 20 100
1913 11 64 1 24 100
Source Alfa-Lavals arkiv, Tumba: Försäljningsstatistik.
and purchasing power. In principal the spread becomes global. This 
applied to a high degree to AB Separator and to Swedish separator 
production as a whole. In neighbouring Finland Swedish agricul­
tural machines constituted 70 per cent of the country’s imports of 
agrarian technology at the outbreak of the First World War. The 
same percentage applied to the share of the separators. Thus Swe­
den was Finland’s main supplier of foreign agrarian technology. 
From the point of view of Sweden Australia may be regarded as 
antipodean to Finland in terms of distance, but nevertheless the 
Swedish separator industry played a more dominant rôle in
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Table 52. Development of prices of various separators at AB Separator
Dairy separators Hand separators
Year Type
Capacity
(litres) Price Year Type
Capacity 
(litres) Price
de Laval separators de Laval separators
1879 Al 130 550 1886 K 150 400
1881 Al 250 620 1886 L 100 350
1883 Al 280 550 1886 S 50 260
1886 Al 400 550
1885 A2 460 750 Alfa separators
1886 A2 650 750 1890 K 250 475
1890 S 125 275
Alfa separators 1893 S 150 225
1890 Al 800 850 1899 S 250 235
1893 Al 1 200 850 1890 B 250 425
1899 Al 1 400 900 1893 B 300 425
1907 Al 2 000 900 1896 B 350 425
1890 A2 1 500 I 050 1899 B 450 425
1893 A2 1 800 1 050 1897 Colibri 70 125
1899 A2 2 000 1 200 1898 Colibri 100 100
1907 A2 3 000 1 200 1899 Colibri 125 125
1910 A5 2 000 1 100 1906 Colibri 150 125
1910 A6 3 000 1 300
Source Martiny, B., Geschichte der Rahmgewinnung. Zweiter Teil. Die Schleuder­
entrahmung, Band I, pp. 326ff.
Australia than it did in Finland. For example in 1913 Swedish 
separator exports constituted 80 per cent of the total imports of 
Australia.111
(e) The rôle of the separator industry in 
the Swedish engineering industry
Immediately before the First World War the part of the Swedish 
engineering industry which manufactured agrarian technology had 
reached such a scale that a large part of the production could be
111 Kommersiella Meddelanden. Reports from consuls and commercial attachés in 
1914, pp. 301 and 578.
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Table 53. Price trend of a single Separator share in the years 1892-1911 in­
cluding effects of issue
Month Year Price (Sw. kr.) Index
June 1892 2 500 100
Jan. 1894 5 000 200
Dec. 1894 10 200 408
Oct. 1895 18 000 720
Dec. 1895 16 000 640
April 1896 24 000 960
Dec. 1896 31 000 1 240
March 1897 38 800 1 552
Dec. 1898 34 400 1 376
Feb. 1899 39 200 1 568
Dec. 1900 28 000 1 120
Dec. 1901 28 400 1 136
Average 1902 26 800 1 072
Average 1903 26 800 1 072
Average 1904 30 400 1 216
Average 1905 38 000 1 520
Average 1906 50 000 2 000
Average 1907 37 600 1 504
Average 1908 38 000 1 520
Average 1909 40 000 1 600
Average 1910 52 000 2 080
Average 1911 64 000 2 560
Source Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia.
exported. During the latter half of the nineteenth century Sweden 
was on the whole a net importer of agrarian technology, with the 
exception of separators. However, growing purchasing power from 
a commercialised domestic agriculture stimulated the Swedish en­
gineering industry to a level of production which gradually met the 
country’s needs for agricultural implements and machinery. The 
next step was for the Swedish engineering industry with the home 
market as a base to extend the production and sales series to net 
exports during the 1890s. In 1910 80 per cent of the agricultural 
implements and machines, excluding separators, which were ex­
ported were sold to the East (Finland, Russia and Asia). Agricul­
ture in Eastern Europe and Asia had not been developed to the
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same degree as that in the USA and Western Europe, but the 
difference in agrarian technology between Eastern Europe and 
Sweden was much smaller than between Eastern Europe and the 
USA. Therefore Swedish agrarian technology harmonised better 
with farming conditions in Eastern Europe and Asia, and this meant 
a favourable export situation for Swedish agricultural machinery, 
relatively speaking. As exports were increasing Sweden was im­
porting a certain number of agricultural machines, mainly from the 
USA which manufactured machines which were most advanced 
technically. In this respect, with the exception of the separator 
factories, the Swedish engineering industry borrowed American 
agrarian technology. On the other hand Swedish separators, 
especially the Alfa separators, represented agrarian technology of a 
very high quality, internationally speaking, and they could therefore 
compete successfully with separators from other countries. The 
separators, in contrast with other Swedish agricultural machines, 
were particularly widespread in countries with advanced agriculture 
and were not sold to such a great extent to countries where the 
agriculture was less advanced.112
Through the early internationalisation of the market the separator 
industry was to account for a great part of the total exports of the 
Swedish engineering industry. If the export incomes from 
separators and the rest of agrarian technology are added together 
the result is that in 1894 these incomes constituted two-thirds of 
the total value of the engineering industry’s exports. In 1913 the 
corresponding share had dropped to half in spite of the fact that 
the absolute value of the industry’s exports had almost increased 
tenfold. This was due to the fact that other branches of the in­
dustry could export at an even faster pace. However in the agricul­
tural machine sector the exports were principally net exports in
112 Bidrag till SOS Handel. Kindleberger. Ch. P., Foreign Trade and the National 
Economy, pp. 58 ff.
Kindleberger maintains that if exports are to produce results they must not be 
too different in terms of quality from the exporting country’s home market consump­
tion. For example, if the American farmers want expensive and technologically 
superior machines it is less profitable for the American machine manufacturers to 
produce cheaper and less advanced agricultural machines for export at the same 
time.
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Table 54. The value of the exports within the various sectors of the en­
gineering industry. Relative figures
Year
A=sepa­
rators“
B=Other
agricultural
machines A+B
C=Other 
eng. firms Total
1894 59 7 66 34 100
1900 57 6 63 37 100
1910 40 16 56 44 100
1913 34 17 51 49 100
“ In Swedish statistics separators are called dairy machines which is incorrect 
bearing in mind that the machines were mainly sold to the farms.
Source Linder, E., Den svenska mekaniska verkstadsindustriens utveckling intill 
krigsutbrottet, SOU: 31. SOS Handel.
character. The imports of separators into Sweden were completely 
irrelevant and imports of other agricultural machines constituted 
only a quarter of the exports in 1913. Of the separators which 
were manufactured in Sweden in 1913 more than 95 per cent were 
exported. The corresponding figure for other agricultural machines 
was 47 per cent, while in other engineering industries on average 
only 20 per cent of the production was exported. Thus the agricul­
tural side of the engineering industry was the sector which yielded 
the most substantial export incomes, due partly to the extent of 
the production and partly to the fact that production was geared 
to such a high degree to exporting. At the beginning of the twen­
tieth century butter was Sweden’s most important export next to 
wood and paper products. Thus over and above the direct export 
incomes the Swedish separator industry made a considerable in­
direct contribution to exports. As a result of the fact that the 
separator was proportionately more widespread in Sweden than 
anywhere in the world, butter productivity could be increased to 
such an extent that both a rising domestic consumption and a con­
siderable export were possible.113
113 Linder, E., Den svenska mekaniska verkstadsindustriens utveckling intill krigs­
utbrottet. SOU 1923:31, pp. 51 ff. SOS Handel. Nathorst, Hj., Om handseparatorer­
nas stora betydelse för de mindre jordbrukarna. Kuuse, J., Från redskap till
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(f) The separator and the economic situation
Since the Swedish controlled production of separators dominated 
the world market and this production was mainly marketed outside 
Sweden, the international economic conditions for the separator 
can be followed in table 45 and diagram 13. With the exception of 
1904-1905 the beginning of the twentieth century until the outbreak 
of the First World War meant stable and favourable economic con­
ditions for the separator. The First World War created an increased 
demand for agricultural products in general. With this stimulus there 
was an exceptional increase in the orders for separators. In general 
during the years 1914-1919 the farms of Europe, especially those 
in Russia, Germany, France, Austria and not least in neutral Swe­
den, bought unusually large quantities of separators. As is shown in 
table 49 AB Separator increased its share in the sales on the 
domestic market from 6 per cent in 1914 to 20 per cent in 1920. 
On the other hand the war did not seem to have had such a 
stimulating effect on American orders for separators. The peace­
time depression of 1920-1922 hit the whole of the separator industry 
hard like all other industry. During the remainder of the 1920s 
non-American agriculture rapidly regained its purchasing power, 
and this was noticeable in the orders for separators among other 
things. However in the USA agriculture became an ailing sector 
during the 1920s in contrast to other expanding sectors. The 
reason for this was that after the First World War American agri­
culture lost many of its markets overseas. American agriculture had 
previously undergone a huge mechanisation which had given rise 
to an enormous increase in productivity. The production capacity 
vastly exceeded the normal needs of domestic consumption. There­
fore when buyers could no longer be found for the surplus of
maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersialisering inom svenskt jordbruk 
1860-1910, pp. 66 and 103 ff.
The hand separator was the most “democratic” of the agricultural machines in 
large parts of Sweden. In 1910 it had, relatively speaking, spread to large and 
small farms alike, though there was a certain extra spreading to the larger farms. 
The machine separation also helped to increase the uniformity in the quality of 
butter which was of special importance in connection with exports. A factor which 
contributed particularly to the diffusion of the hand separator was that the machines 
became cheaper through increased competition. See table 52.
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American agricultural products the whole problem of over-produc­
tion with falling prices and an urge to invest made itself felt with 
full force. The difference in the economic situations of the 
separator for the De Laval Separator Co. on the one hand and 
the European separator companies on the other is clear.114
(g) AB Separator’s production conditions
Manufacturing techniques in the Swedish engineering industry in 
most cases altered comparatively slowly even after the break­
through during the 1890s. Many prominent engineering workshops 
kept to old approved working methods in manufacturing multiple 
products. AB Separator’s development was totally different. The 
whole business was built up round one idea and one special pro­
duct. In Sweden a number of special new industries were founded 
which were based on original domestic inventions or on funda­
mental technical improvements. Examples of people who laid the 
foundations for ingenious industries were Palmcrantz in armaments, 
L. M. Ericsson in telephones, Dalén in acetylene generator sets, 
Wenstrom in three-phase motors, C. G. Johansson in special tools,
114 Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia 1914-1921. Manuscript Alfa-Lavals arkiv, 
Tumba. Sales statistics.
The Siberian separator orders to the value of 7.7 million Sw. kr., equivalent to 
21% of the total Swedish separator exports, were an important factor in business 
abroad in 1919. The buyer was the Tsarist Russia emigration association, and the 
principal suppliers were AB Separator, AB Pumpseparator and AB Baltic. A certain 
number of separators were also shipped to southern Russia. The deliveries happened 
to coincide with violent civil strife in Siberia and southern Russia, and the trans­
actions which were disrupted resulted in heavy losses for the Swedish companies.
It was appreciated in the USA at the end of 1919 that the market situation for 
the agricultural machine industry was beginning to be less profitable. An investiga­
tion of the international separator market which the American Foreign Trade Bureau 
carried out at that time must be looked at against this background among other 
things. It is clear from the investigation that Swedish separators completely domi­
nated the important markets in Australia, Argentina and South Africa, and in spite 
of the confused situation, probably in Siberia too. The Swedish and German 
machines were dominant in Europe, and this dominance acted as an effective fetter 
on American separator expansion.
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Wingquist in ball-bearings and de Laval in separators. Specialisation 
in production quickly changed the structure of the Swedish en­
gineering industry before the First World War. In spite of the fact 
that the special engineering works were comparatively few, these 
companies captured or created new markets once they had survived 
the initial experimental stage which was difficult from a financial 
and commercial point of view, and in 1914 they could account for 
40 per cent of the total production of the engineering industry. To 
a great extent this development was due to improvements in 
productivity. For example AB Separator doubled the production per 
worker between 1886 and 1908. From the start the new machines 
which the newly founded special industries introduced into produc­
tion occupied a central position in this connection. The new en­
gineering techniques also influenced the rôle of the engineering 
worker. His work had previously been not unlike that of the village 
blacksmith but the modern techniques’ demand for precision made 
him resemble more the instrument maker. Because of its general 
utility as a universal implement, it was around the milling machine 
that modern techniques were built up. Torsten Gårdlund says in 
Industrialismens samhälle: “Without the milling machine it would 
be impossible to produce cog-wheels or worm-wheels for speeds 
that are attained in e.g. a separator or a steam turbine.” The fore­
runners in the use of the new milling machines in Sweden were 
the armament factories which had borrowed technology from the 
USA at the end of the 1860s. The system of production which was 
built up round the milling machine was particularly suitable for the 
mass-production of standardised products. The Swedish companies 
which were to apply the new methods consistently were therefore 
those which from the start of the 1880s had begun to manufacture 
products such as bicycles, electric motors, combustion engines, 
separators, sewing machines, telephones and machine tools.
But the new engineering workshops had not been created through 
technical development alone. New principles of organisation were 
introduced in some of the larger Swedish companies during the 
decade before the First World War. AB Separator, which played an 
important part here, introduced rational operating programmes and 
cost accounting in 1908. Innovation on the shop floor was followed 
by innovation on the office side, and the whole of the work
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process was co-ordinated in the same way as the parts of a 
machine.115
It was important that the problems on the production side should 
be solved if AB Separator was to be able to cater for the extended 
market. In this connection the importance of production techniques 
and labour have already been discussed. Raw materials were 
another important factor. In Sweden AB Separator attached great 
importance to guaranteed deliveries of cast-iron and sheet-metal. 
Because of this AB Separator integrated two steel pressing com­
panies in Olofstrom and Eskilstuna within the business of the group 
of companies, and in addition in 1901 the company established its 
own foundry in Hamra outside Stockholm, and there used Amer­
ican moulding techniques right from the start. During the period 
the foundry was able to deliver most of the castings which AB 
Separator needed. In the whole of the separator industry in Swe­
den in 1913 steel sheet-metal constituted 57 per cent of the raw 
materials consumed in terms of value while cast-iron con­
stituted 19 per cent at the same point in time. In addition the 
separator production required certain metal alloys and these con­
stituted almost a quarter of the raw materials in value. For the 
purposes of comparison it can be said that in workshops for other 
agricultural machines rolled iron and pipes constituted 46 per cent 
and cast-iron 39 per cent, thus together making up 85 per cent of 
the sector’s costs of raw materials. The agrarian technical work­
shops’ need for raw materials in most cases made it impossible to 
create vertical mergers as AB Separator did, but made it necessary 
to put orders out to a growing network of independent sub-con- 
tractors. This development was of great importance for the process 
of industrialisation. On the whole production side the main part 
of the need for raw materials was met by domestic sub-contractors. 
In this respect the traditionally strong position of the iron industry 
in Sweden played a great part. However the degree to which 
requirements were met varied a great deal. For example in 1913 
in the separator industry 68 per cent of the raw materials in terms 
of value was of domestic origin, while the corresponding share for 
the rest of the agricultural machine industry was 83 per cent.
115 Gårdlund, T.,Industrialismens samhälle, pp. 81 ff.
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Among other things the difference was due to the fact that almost 
half of the metal alloys for the separator industry had to be ob­
tained from abroad. On the other hand 73 per cent of the sheet- 
metal, which was the most important raw material in separator 
production, was supplied by Swedish companies. As far as the 
other agricultural machine sector was concerned the rolled iron and 
pipes were all ordered and produced within the country, while 
about 40 per cent of the cast-iron was imported, mainly from Brit­
ain.116
Apart from the fact that AB Separator’s production in Sweden 
was integrated vertically, the company from very early on associa­
ted factories abroad with the growing business. In most of the 
countries it was sufficient for AB Separator to have sales offices, 
but in the most important foreign market areas production was also 
established. The most prominent example of this was the subsidiary 
the De Laval Separator Co. which manufactured separators in the 
USA for the American market. The American factory was set up 
at the beginning of the 1890s, and thanks to a home market with 
extensive purchasing power combined with advanced production 
techniques, it was already able to exceed the production volume of 
the parent company around 1908. At the same time AB Separator 
was able to start its own production of separators in Germany 
through the purchase of Bergedorfer Eisenwerk. At this time it was 
unusual in Sweden to set up companies abroad. Here AB Separator 
stands out as the first instance of the country’s multinational com­
panies. Of course the fact that the company’s transfer of production 
abroad began in the world’s two technically leading industrial
116 Linder. E., Den svenska mekaniska verkstadsindustriens utveckling intill krigs­
utbrottet, pp. 14ff. and pp. 99ff.
The information is based on the industrial statistical investigation by the Tull- 
och traktatkommitté into the consumption of raw materials and semi-manufactured 
goods. As a whole the material collected was shown to be incomplete, but for the 
specialised engineering works, including the agrarian technology works, the account 
is much more reliable. There is no question of absolute accuracy, but the general 
outcome and the general impression remain intact.
As to the spreading effects within the industry resulting from the orders placed 
with agrarian technological engineering works, and the latter's orders of raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods, see note 7 for a comparison.
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nations was especially sensational. This transfer was a necessary 
condition for the company’s exercise of effective control over the 
situation on important markets. The establishments abroad were 
probably set up to a lesser degree in an endeavour to avoid the 
machine tariffs which were in force. It is true that from 1892 
Sweden imposed a tariff of 10 per cent on the import value of 
separators, but the large Swedish separator companies, thanks to 
their strong position in world markets, were not in need of tariff 
protection either at home or abroad. For their part they thought 
it best that all tariffs should be removed. Probably some employ­
ment was lost in Sweden as a result of production going abroad. 
But on the other hand the establishment abroad provided possibili­
ties for increased competitive strength on the market abroad, which 
in turn led to increased orders in Sweden as well. An excellent 
instance of this was the pressing of separator bowls, the most 
complicated manufacturing process, which for a long time was ex­
clusive to the production in Sweden. Before 1905 the De Laval 
Separator Co. in New York got its separator bowls exclusively 
from Sweden, and during the whole period AB Separator’s produc­
tion in Germany was supplemented with Swedish-made separator 
bowls. The most important thing from the point of view of Swedish 
employment was the fact that AB Separator, through its production 
abroad on strategically important markets, gained such a hold on 
the business there that it became really profitable. With these profits 
behind it the company was able to market its products more boldly 
on other extensive but more uncertain foreign markets. Because of 
this the net effect of AB Separator’s production abroad from the 
point of view of Swedish employment was probably positive.117
117 Ibid., pp. 267 ff. and pp. 318f. The tariff protection for Swedish agricultural 
machines in the years 1892-1910 amounted to 10 per cent of the import value. 
A readjustment of the rate of duty in 1911 meant somewhat more stringent tariff 
rates. In contrast to the separator industry, the engineering works producing other 
agricultural machines were not internationally pre-eminent. Therefore the tariff 
protection probably had a favourable effect on the development of this part of the 
industry. International Harvester's establishment for the production of harvesters 
and mowing-machines in Norrköping, Sweden in 1905 was justified on tariff grounds 
inter alia.
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(A) Conditions of financing and ownership
As interest in the present work is mainly focussed on the relations 
between agriculture and industry the conditions in which the 
agrarian technology was produced and marketed have been dealt 
with in detail. The financial aspects will be dealt with in a more 
summary manner and in close conjunction with the company's 
production and sales problems.
As far as the parent company AB Separator was concerned it 
can be established that the growth which occurred up to and during 
the First World War took place principally within a framework of 
self-financing. Only during the initial stage was the company 
provided with a small loan from Oscar Lamm's father for a short 
time. More occasional loans were taken from Stockholms Diskonto­
bank, which had contacts with AB Separator through Ernest Thiel, 
about which more later. In addition Svenska Handelsbanken gave 
AB Separator two bond loans in 1899 and 1901 for 1.5 million and 
2 million Swedish crowns respectively. The loans were completely 
repaid within a ten year period. The growth had taken place in­
stead through ploughing back profits, the amassing of capital and 
increases in the share capital. During the pre-war years the Ameri­
can subsidiary the De Laval Separator Co. contributed the major 
part of the total net profit, but during the war years the parent 
company accounted for a large part of the profit. The share capital 
was increased on various occasions through issues of bonus shares, 
by revaluation of shares among other methods, and by issues of 
new shares. All the new subscriptions took place without difficul­
ties. In this connection it can be stressed that it was of import­
ance that the increase in share capital which was carried out to 
compensate for the assets which were frozen in Russia and Central 
Europe took place during what was already the latter part of the 
war. If they had waited a few years a similar new subscription 
would not have been possible.
In connection with the market expansion of the company AB 
Separator formed subsidiaries for production or sales or both, and 
also for steel pressing. In certain cases the financing of these 
branches of the business required an increase in outside capital. 
In order to be able to undertake the reorganisation of the De Laval 
Separator Co. mentioned earlier, AB Separator raised a bond loan
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of half a million Swedish crowns in 1890, and this was repaid in 
1894 when the company once more became totally free from debts. 
In 1912 AB Separator took a new bond loan of 5 million Swedish 
crowns from Stockholms Diskontobank in order to get working 
capita] for the extension of the Russian business. Some of the sub­
sidiaries were in debt (bond loans) when they were incorporated 
into the Separator group of companies. AB Separator allowed some 
of these loans to remain outstanding, for example as regards 
Eskilstuna Stålpressnings AB. In order to illustrate the degree of 
self-financing there is a review in table 55 of the relationship be­
tween the group’s own and outside capital for the group’s various 
business units in 1915. The table shows the financing situation at a 
time when the group’s first period of expansion had concluded with 
Alfa-Nobel becoming a subsidiary of AB Separator in 1914. Even as 
late as 1915 outside capital clearly played an insignificant rôle ex­
cept as regards Eskilstuna Stålpressnings AB. In the case of sub­
sidiaries the short-term indebtedness consisted mainly of debts to 
AB Separator.118
A consistently good yield during the period in question made it 
possible for AB Separator to pay large dividends to the share­
holders. During the years 1892-1897 dividends of 35 per cent were 
paid on average, dividends of 50 per cent in 1898-1910, and in the 
years 1911-1919 about 15 per cent of the share capital on a yearly 
basis. A comparison between the agricultural machine industries 
in Sweden and Germany shows that the yearly dividends in 1911— 
1914 for the industries of both countries constituted on average 
9-11 per cent of the share capital. In fact the agricultural machine 
industry paid larger dividends than most of the other branches of 
engineering. The war years 1920 and 1921 resulted in lower 
dividends for AB Separator corresponding to 8 per cent and 3 per 
cent respectively of the share capital.119
During the period in question the conditions of ownership consti­
tute a comparatively complex chapter in the history of AB 
Separator. They will be dealt with briefly and only to the extent
118 Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Moderbolaget 1895-1921 (manuscript). In 
table 47 the sales figures are related only to the parent company.
119 Technik und Wirtschaft no. 6, 1921. Linder, E .,op. cit., pp. 93 ff.
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Table 55. Percentage distribution of own and outside capital in 1915 for 
companies belonging to the Separator group
Outside capital
Own capital 
Share capi­
tal, profits, 
funds
Short­
term
debts
Long­
term
debts Total
Balance-sheet
total
in millions
AB Separator 
Eskilstuna Stål-
92 - 8 100 61.8 Sw. kr.
pressnings AB 51 49 100 5.3 Sw. kr.
Svenska Stålpress-
nings AB Olofström 
Svenska Centri-
86 - 14 100 3.3 Sw. kr.
fug AB
The de Laval Sepa-
97 - 3 100 6.6 Sw. kr.
rator Company 
(Lavalco) New
York too - - 100 6.3 $
AG Alfa-Separator
Wien 65 33 2 100 5.5 Austrian k.
AG Alfa-Separator
Budapest
AG Alfa-Nobel St. Pe
48 51 1 100 2.0 Austrian k.
tersburg 65 35 - 100 3.9 roubles
Alfa-LavaI Paris
G.m.b.H. Alfa-Laval-
100 “ - 100 4.3 francs
Separator Berlin 31 63 6 100 4.0 marks
AG Bergedorfer
Eisenwerk 60 28 12 100 8.6 marks
Note The long-term debts consisted of bond- and mortgage loans, while the short­
term debts were to a great extent debts owed by contractors to the principal con­
tractor AB Separator.
Source AB Separators förvaltnings- och revisionsberättelse âr 1915.
to which they were directly connected with technical agrarian 
problems. After Oscar Lamm had left the company in 1886, Gustaf 
de Laval was able, as chairman of the board and owner of about 
30 per cent of the shares for more than a decade, to exert con­
siderable influence over AB Separator in matters which interested 
him. It was Gustaf de Laval’s ambition to unite the rôle of in-
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ventor with that of founder of a company. He wanted to see him­
self as the intermediary link in the life of Swedish industry. With 
the aid of capital his inventions would make the industrial com­
panies profitable. His economic transactions have to be viewed 
against this background. He often arranged the raising of capital 
in an impetuous and unmethodical way. but surprisingly often he 
managed to inspire and convince the owners of the capital to invest 
in his projects. De Laval was involved in starting no fewer than 
37 companies. The total share capital which was put into the com­
panies which were formed on his initiative and in direct association 
with his inventions amounted to about 50 million Swedish crowns. 
In fact most of the companies were short-lived, and only AB 
Separator, Svenska Stålpressnings AB, Olofström, and AB de 
Lavais Ångturbin were lasting businesses. Among the better-known 
companies which were short-lived there were AB de Lavais Lak- 
tator for milking machines, de Lavais glödlampfabrik, AB de Lavais 
Elektriska Smältugn and Trollhättans Elektriska Kraft AB.120
In the middle of the 1890s when Gustaf de Laval started to found 
a series of companies, he still enjoyed financial confidence. Stock- 
holms Kredit- och Diskontoförening with Ernest Thiel as the leading 
figure acted as financiers for de Laval, and had an interest in the 
milking machine company AB Laktator. To solve the problem of 
credit, in 1896 de Laval raised money on his shares in AB Separator 
to a total of 6 million Swedish crowns from Stockholms Kredit- 
och Diskontoförening and Stockholms Enskilda Bank. Gustaf de 
Laval’s involvement in the production of milking machines later 
became of importance for AB Separator’s conditions of financing 
and ownership, and since the spread of the separator produced a 
demand for milking machines as a result of investing in separators, 
it is appropriate in this context to pause and consider the devel­
opment of the milking machine. By mechanically extracting the milk 
from the cows on the one hand and separating the cream from the 
milk on the other, milk management became more completely 
mechanised. It was of course quite natural that the person who had 
succeeded in the separation of milk by machine would also try to
120 Althin, T.,op.cit., pp. 191 ff.
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solve the problem of milking by machine. The spread of separation 
by machine contributed to the creation of a growing demand for 
milk. When Gustaf de Laval applied himself to the milking machine 
industry in 1895 he was by no means a pioneer in the field. Ever 
since 1862 when the first milking machine was shown at a fair 
in the USA attempts had been made to solve the practical problems 
of machine milking technology. In spite of the fact that in the USA 
with its labour shortage there was a large market—and one with 
great purchasing power—for the milking machine, as a technical 
agrarian consequence of investment in the separator, such market 
incentives did not bring forth a machine which worked practically. 
Gustaf de Laval did not succeed in 1895 and in spite of the fact 
that in 1907 AB Separator started a company in a deliberate attempt 
to develop the milking machine, the endeavour failed here as had 
those of the other innovators in the USA and Europe. In spite of 
strong market incentives, the development of milking machine 
techniques is an instance of many technical appendices preceding 
the final practical solution of the problem. Not until after the First 
World War was the problem of machine milking solved through the 
pulsator, which allowed the milk suction to take place with frequent 
pauses, thus avoiding the damaging effect of the suction on the 
udders and teats of the cows. Earlier techniques using interrupted 
suction had caused injuries to the cattle through blood congestion 
in the udders and teats.121
121 Fussel, G. E., The Farmer's Tools, pp. 218ff. Juhlin Dannfeldt, H.. Lantbrukets 
historia, p. 60. Street, J. H., The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy. 
Mechanization and its Consequences, pp. 99 f.
J. H. Street deals with the ability of various sectors of agriculture to introduce 
and put into practice new technology. He stresses the difference in the use of 
separators and milking machines in dairying: “The milking machine, unlike the 
cream separator, failed for a long time to be put to general use even though power- 
operated models were available by the time of the First World War. The automatic 
milker came into its own, however, in response to the labor scarcity and acute 
demand for milk of World War II. There were 175 000 milking machines in use in 
the United States in 1940 and by 1950 the number had increased to 710000, an 
increase of 306 per cent for the decade.”
A comparison with Sweden shows a similar development. According to the 
Swedish census of agriculture in 1944 and 1951 at the former date every tenth 
farm had a milking machine and at the latter date every third farm. In Sweden
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When de Laval’s milking machine failed and AB Laktator had to 
go into liquidation at the beginning of 1897, de Laval was forced 
after pressure from Stockholms Kredit- och Diskontoförening to 
redeem the shares in AB Laktator at a premium, and in so doing 
he lost 1.6 million Swedish crowns. At the same time the Diskonto­
förening made it clear that Gustaf de Laval was faced with 
economic collapse. In several quarters there was an interest in 
holding the crises in check. Both the Diskontoförening and Stock- 
holms Enskilda Bank wanted to support de Laval until their loans 
were secured. AB Separator was also concerned that de Laval’s 
name should not fall into disrepute, since a large industrial fair 
was to take place in Stockholm in the summer of 1897 in which 
the company would be one of the principal participants. To save 
de Laval, AB Separator at its annual general meeting in 1897 
decided on an exceptionally high dividend of 70 per cent of the 
share capital and on a bonus issue in addition, so that the share 
capital was doubled. Thanks to a corresponding revaluation of the 
worth of the De Laval Separator Co. the bonus issue could be 
made. In 1897 the Diskontoförening acquired the right to dispose 
of the majority of de Laval’s separator shares. Thereafter his in­
fluence in AB Separator became negligible. He was, however, more 
as a matter of form, allowed to continue as chairman of the board 
for three more years. After the industrial fair Gustaf de Laval’s 
businesses were subjected to a thorough re-financing process. On 
this account a holding company was formed in 1898, Förenade 
Separatorintressenters AB, and the Diskontoförening stood behind 
the formation of the company. The object of forming the company 
was to avoid a price-cutting bargain sale of the separator shares, 
and to raise ready cash from the shares for de Laval and the
as well as in the USA the 1940s were the time of breakthrough for the milking 
machine.
See also Finansman Företagare Förhandlare. Till Jacob Wallenberg på 80 års­
dagen. The chapter on Alfa-Laval, pp. 19f., and also Jansson T., The Develop­
ment of the Milking Machine. A Historical Review.
The explanation for the later mechanisation in dairying and cattle-farming is that 
cattle require qualified individual attention. Therefore only certain stages in the 
production of that sector could be mechanised, and complete mechanisation will 
probably not be possible in the future either.
203
Diagram 16. The development of wages and profits at AB Separator, 1892- 
1907.
Thousands of 
Sw. crs.
3 500-,
-----Wages paid
Profits after deductions
3 000-
2 500-
2 000-
1 500-
1 000-
500-
96 97 98 99 1900 01 02 03 04 05 06 19071892 93 94 95
Diskontoförening to be able to satisfy de Laval’s creditors. In the 
years immediately following its formation Förenade Separatorintres­
senters AB and its securities were to feature in Ernest Thiel’s 
financial operations with Gustaf Emil Broms in Luossavaara- 
Kiirunavaara AB (LKAB).122
122 Fritz, M., Gustaf Emil Broms och Norrbottens järnmalm. En studie i finansie- 
ringsproblematiken under exploateringstiden 1891-1903, pp. 13 ff. Gasslander, O.,
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Diagram 17. Stock Exchange value of a single Separator share in 1892-1911 
(including share issues in 1893 and 1897).
Thousands of 
Sw. crs.
1892 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 1900 01 02 03 04 05
issue issue
06 07 08 09 10 1911
Source Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Cf. table 53.
The Diskontoförening, converted into Stockholms Diskontobank 
from 1899 onwards, was able to increase its influence in AB Separator 
during the course of the same year when Hugo Martin, a member 
of the board of the company, died and the Diskontobank took over 
his separator shares. At the annual general meeting in 1900 two men 
from the Diskontobank were elected as new members of the board 
of AB Separator. John Bernström took the view that these two men
Bank och industriellt genombrott. Stockholms Enskilda Bank kring sekelskiftet 1900, 
I, pp. 218ff, 243ff, II, pp. 91 ff. Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Moderbolaget 
(manuscript).
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Diagram 18. Sales and wages paid at AB Separator, 1883-1907.
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constituted a definit guarantee that no surprising action would be 
taken against AB Separator by the now powerful group of owners, 
Förenade Separatorintressenters AB and the Diskontobank. However 
John Bernström was in a perpetual state of anxiety because of the risk 
that Förenade Separatorintressenters AB, with its 30 per cent share­
holding in AB Separator, would direct AB Separator’s financial and 
dividend policy on a course other than that desired by the manage-
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ment of the company. Therefore at the annual general meeting in 
1903 he forced through AB Separator’s purchase of Förenade Separa- 
torsintressenters AB’s shares.123
From an economic point of view AB Separator’s share trans­
actions with Förenade Separatorintressenters AB were disad­
vantageous. However the course of events shows what great 
importance the company management of AB Separator attached to 
the condition that no dominant group of owners should get the 
opportunity to control development against the interests of the 
management.124 The high percentage dividends and the extensive 
bond issues made before 1911 should be regarded as a concession 
to the owner interests, but a concession which was aimed at pacify­
ing them. It has been pointed out above that the development 
of AB Separator up to and including the period of the First World 
War was essentially managed with the aid of its own capital, and 
from a formal point of view this is quite correct. In reality the 
structure of ownership was such that large parts of the company’s 
own share capital were regarded by the company management as 
a foreign element as well as ordinary foreign loan capital. Gustaf 
de Laval participated to a high degree in the formation of AB 
Separator but his financial operations led to the company he had 
created being forced to take part in an economic relief operation 
for Gustaf de Laval himself, and in consequence in a holding com­
pany which for many years caused AB Separator many problems.
(i) Summary
In his work “The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy. 
Mechanization and its consequences” J. H. Street deals with the 
ability of different sectors of agriculture to acquire new techniques.
123 Steckzén, B., AB Separators historia. Moderbolaget (manuscript).
124 Ibid. The problem of Förenade Separatorintressenters AB was to arise again in 
1910 and 1912. The purchase of yet another block of shares in Förenade Separator­
intressenters AB in 1912 caused a definitive breach in the company management of 
AB Separator. John Bernström’s son Richard refused to endorse the deal and resigned 
in protest from his newly assumed post of managing director.
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The sectors mainly referred to are grain growing, the cultivation 
of grassland, cattle-farming and cotton growing. Grain growing and 
the cultivation of grassland were the first and most highly mecha­
nised sectors of agriculture. Implements and machinery for working 
and preparing the soil were developed and improved during the first 
half of the nineteenth century especially in the USA. But it was 
more a question of further technical development to suit a growing 
commercial agriculture than of pure innovations. However the 
machines which began to be used in the USA for the protection 
of the harvest in the middle of the nineteenth century were typical 
innovations. The harvester, the mowing machine and the threshing 
machine changed the agriculture in a fundamental way, whereas 
before the time spent in harvesting and threshing had formed the 
bottleneck in production. By an enormous increase in productivity 
and more accurate harvesting and threshing stages above all, Amer­
ican agriculture was able during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century to produce a growing surplus of agricultural products. The 
next decisive step on the mechanisation side took place when the 
tractor and the combination model, the combine harvester, spread 
during the period between the wars, starting in the USA. By virtue 
of the fact that by American standards the tractor was cheap and 
easy to make, it became an example of a “democratic” agricultural 
machine there. It has been estimated that in 1946 90 percent of the 
grain of the USA was being harvested by tractor-drawn machines, 
while two-thirds was harvested by combine harvesters. On the 
other hand in Sweden in 1944 the combine harvester had not been 
introduced even on the large estates. However the tractor had been 
introduced, but only on the big estates. Of all Swedish farms, only 
6 per cent were equipped with tractors in 1944. This difference 
illustrates underlying differences in the size of farms and the 
purchasing power of the average farm in the USA and Europe.
The corresponding wave of mechanisation in cattle-farming and 
dairying came much later. The separator made its name in connec­
tion with the European agricultural crises in the 1880s and the 
transition to livestock-orientated production which followed the 
crises. Not until the period between the wars did machine milking 
begin to be used to any great extent, but the breakthrough did not 
come until the Second World War. The problem of using mechanised
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processes in conjunction with live animals had long baffled the 
innovators in this field.
However, the breakthrough of mechanisation in cotton growing 
was long in coming. In fact the first innovation in this sector came 
very early on. In 1793 Eli Whitney invented the “cotton gin", a 
machine which separated the cotton fibres from the seeds mechan­
ically. The result was that the USA was able to export cotton from 
the Southern states to England. The bottleneck in production 
moved to the working of the cotton fields and also to the harvest. 
These stages were mechanised very late, however. There were 
several reasons for this. The pattern of institutional factors in the 
South was such that it did not invite labour-saving techniques. The 
slave system was for a long time a corner-stone of the economic 
and social life of the Southern states. A large part of the capital 
was therefore tied up in the fixed assets which the possession of 
slaves represented. The victory of industrial capitalism in the North 
over the plantation economy of the South meant that after the Civil 
war the Southern states were held back economically in comparison 
with the Northern states. But problems of a technical nature also 
had an effect. In cotton growing it was difficult to standardise the 
cultivated product and the environment of cultivation generally in 
the same way as was possible in the growing of grain and the 
cultivation of grassland. Therefore for a long time the harvesting 
stage constituted a bottleneck in the cotton economy. International 
Harvester spent forty years and five million dollars on developing 
a workable harvesting machine for cotton. Individual models were 
available on the market in 1942 and there was full-scale production 
in 1947. Between the first and second technical revolutions in cotton 
growing 150 years had elapsed.125
Street’s account is very general but it showed some of the 
complex patterns and the multiplicity of the technical problems of 
agriculture. Gustaf de Laval knew something about this when he 
studied natural science at Uppsala University at the end of the 
1860s. At that time he had worked out his future and had decided 
to put his knowledge into practice and apply it in important
125 Street, J. H., pp. 93ff. Sveriges Officiella Statistik. Jordbruksräkningen i Sverige 
1944.
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economic fields. As he had grown up in and was familiar with the 
agricultural environment, and as the agricultural sector dominated 
Sweden’s economy, it was natural for de Laval to direct his tech­
nical interest towards the mechanisation of agriculture. As shown 
above and as will be dealt with in greater detail hereafter, the 
mechanisation of land cultivation in the USA had recently revolu­
tionised the methods of production in this sector of agriculture. 
On the other hand there had not been any decisive technical inno­
vations in cattle-breeding or in dairying, which was an important 
sector of the Swedish agricultural economy. With the benefit of 
hindsight it may seem obvious that de Laval with his knowledge 
and understanding of the value of a new agricultural technique 
would have been drawn straight to the technically undeveloped 
sector of cattle-breeding and dairying. Nevertheless it was more by 
accident that he introduced the separator onto the market at the 
end of the 1870s.
It is interesting to study Gustaf de Laval's development in the 
light of J. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur theory. As a young research­
er de Laval’s thoughts revolved around the economic impor­
tance of technical innovations. He says in his diary: “Sweden could 
take first place among the nations in industrial as well as general 
well-being if only the right inventions could be made.” This 
interest was combined with a pronounced nationalism, as appears 
from the phrase "Sweden for the Swedes”. His nationalism was so 
fully realised in his future sphere of activity, the separator market, 
that it is tempting to parody this as "The world for the Swedes”. 
At any rate at this time (around 1870) he appreciated and remarked 
to himself upon the need to combine the technical and commercial 
aspects of an innovation. In his diary the young de Laval had 
a discussion with himself which was apparently in complete con­
formity with Schumpeter’s model of the entrepreneur: The manu­
facturer holds the key rôle in society by creating new processes 
or new combinations of individually known processes. The practical 
application and diffusion of the innovation are of economic im­
portance. Thus the rôle of the entrepreneur becomes compara­
tively limited during the process of innovation, while the rôle 
gradually grows as regards the introduction of the innovation onto 
the market, and still more as regards its diffusion. When de Laval
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introduced his separator in 1878 there is a noticeable change in 
the direction of his interest and activity. The operation of market­
ing methodically was a limited one and instead it was the further 
development of the technical possibilities of the invention which 
occupied him more and more. In addition he was driven by a grow­
ing magical enthusiasm to the continual establishment of new com­
panies based on new ideas, but he lacked the patience to see the 
operation through. Therefore his economic importance became 
limited except in the case of AB Separator. But there it was the 
combination of de Laval and Lamm and above all of de Laval 
and Bernström which approached Schumpeter’s ideal of the entre­
preneur. De Laval himself failed to live up to this ideal.126
Thus the importance of AB Separator lay in the combination of 
technical and commercial imagination which worked because both 
the partners could meet and talk the same language well enough. 
This however was due above all to John Bernström, who showed 
that he possessed the eye of the visionary and the talent of the 
entrepreneur in his acquisition of the epoch-making Alfa patent. 
It is true that Schumpeter says that the manufacturer could fulfil 
his rôle as an entrepreneur in the introduction onto the market and 
diffusion of new products on all levels and regardless of the general 
importance of the innovation. But as Schumpeter sees the manu­
facturer and his creations as the main cause of the transformation 
of society, the social range of the innovation determines the degree 
of the transformation of society. According to this argument an 
entrepreneur who for example introduced a new lipstick onto the 
market would not be as great a transformer of society as one who 
introduced a new agricultural machine, even if the innovations were 
equally valuable from a technical point of view. An innovation 
which aims at satisfying more primary requirements of consumption
126 Schumpeter, J., ‘The Creative Response in Economic History’ (in Journal of 
Economic History, no.2 1947).
Schumpeter’s entrepreneur theory is probably most applicable to the problems of 
company formation up to the turn of the nineteenth century. The function of the 
entrepreneur was usually exercised up to that time by one or very few decision­
making men in the company. Later on during the 20th century the rôle of the 
entrepreneur was often divided up among several hands, while the company was 
becoming bureaucratic. It is therefore more difficult to apply Schumpeter's theory 
to the more complex structure of modern companies.
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and production of necessity effects a greater change than an inno­
vation which is directed more towards secondary requirements. 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century and at the turn of 
that century, not least in Sweden, a succession of industries of 
genius was created in which the entrepreneur introduced and cir­
culated newly created or newly combined products which were of 
importance for economic life and in the home. Among other things 
these included electric motors, special tools, ballbearings, 
telephones and separators, all of which circulated more or less 
internationally to a considerable extent. However, the question is 
whether the separator, as the most outstanding example of Swedish 
agricultural machines, did not out of all the new creations men­
tioned above bring about the greatest change in society by virtue 
of its range. The agricultural machines made a direct impact on the 
country’s most dominant sector, with far-reaching economic and 
social consequences for most producers in Sweden and many 
abroad. In countries which were developed at the time the 
mechanisation process divided agriculture into two parts. One part 
consisted of those farms which could be mechanised to such an 
extent that they were incorporated into commercial forms of opera­
tion with considerable sales orientation. The other part consisted 
of all the farms which for various reasons could not be mechanised 
to an extent which took them above the level of being self-support­
ing. Even if the separator was perhaps the most “democratic” 
agricultural machine it also contributed to differentiation in agricul­
ture, as the smaller and cheaper domestic separators were bought 
mainly by the smaller farmer, while the large farms, especially in 
the USA, bought larger separators for sales production.
In addition the agricultural technology became of great im­
portance for Swedish industrialisation. As H. Modig has been able 
to show, the part played by railway building in the industrialisation 
of Sweden has previously been considerably exaggerated. The rail­
way materials were mainly imported from Britain. On the other 
hand the mechanisation of agriculture played a much larger rôle 
in the industrialisation process than earlier research had acknowl­
edged. In the creation of agricultural technology the orders in the 
whole chain of production from raw materials to finished product 
were mainly executed within the country. The engineering works
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of agricultural technology, especially separator works, were 
ultimately able to export their finished products to farms abroad 
and thereby account for the main part of the whole engineering 
industry’s income from exports, thus making a further contribution 
to industrialisation. The rapidly increasing exports of butter from 
Sweden around the turn of the nineteenth century provide an ex­
cellent example of how mechanisation in the form of the mechanical 
separation of milk led to increased sales production which was 
sufficient for a rise in domestic consumption as well as in exports. 
Thus the separator contributed in a readily apparent if indirect 
way to the further income which came into the country from signif­
icant exports. The consumers of food were also affected to a 
great extent by the new agricultural technology since mechanised 
farming prevented climatic conditions from having such an unset­
tling effect on the crop yield as before, and the quality of the final 
products could also be improved and made more even. The other 
Swedish industries of genius which have been mentioned were 
based on ideas and principles which were the equal of those on 
which the separator was founded, but at the beginning of the 
twentieth century none of the other innovations had the same im­
pact or the same international diffusion as the separator. For ex­
ample at the outbreak of the Second World War the majority of 
Swedish households did not have a telephone, and the telephone 
only became common for the Swedish working classes after 1950. 
On the other hand the telephone early on played a large rôle in 
the economic life and administration of Sweden. The ballbearing is 
perhaps most like the separator as regards the power of transforma­
tion in the techniques in question, but the corresponding im­
portance of the ballbearing did not begin to make itself felt until 
that sector of industry made a breakthrough and became dominant 
during the period between the wars.
The breakthrough of the separator in the 1880s—connected with 
the change-over of European agriculture to production which was 
more orientated towards livestock when faced with non-European 
and Russian rivalry in grain—occurred in competition with a 
method of creaming which was well established in Europe, viz. 
the so-called ice method. Thus the new separator technology in 
Sweden was strengthened through facing competition which forced
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the innovators to develop methods of production which were supe­
rior to the old ones. But the ice method offered tough and pro­
longed resistance, and not until experience of the improved Alfa se­
parators had had time to spread was the machine separation of milk 
fully able to make its name in Sweden. In countries where there 
was a shortage of ice it was easier for the Swedish separator 
technology to make a breakthrough, and the trend was reinforced 
through the advantage gained by AB Separator over other separator 
manufacturers from the acquisition of the Alfa patent in 1889. When 
the period of the patent expired, newly established Swedish separa­
tor companies became AB Separator’s keenest competitors on the 
world market. However, AB Separator had the Swedish competitors 
incorporated into the expanding Separator group of companies in 
stages.
The formation of the group had begun in 1883 when AB Separa­
tor started a subsidiary in the USA. North America was the most 
important market and the one with the greatest purchasing power, 
and the profits from the American operation became decisive for 
the future development of the whole group of companies. AB 
Separator was gradually able to form a series of subsidiaries on 
the most important European markets, which had to deal first of 
all with the sales of the products of AB Separator which were 
manufactured in Sweden. In other respects the selling abroad was 
carried out through general agents. The rising demand for agricul­
tural products has already been indicated as the basic explanation 
of the increased demand for agricultural technology up to the First 
World War. However the considerable emigration from Europe 
helped greatly in stimulating the mechanisation of agriculture. In 
this case the effect of emigration was twofold. First and foremost 
there was an increase in the demand for agricultural machines in 
the farming districts cultivated by the immigrants in the USA, 
Canada, Argentina, Australia and Siberia, but there was also at the 
same time a decrease in the population of Europe which called for 
the replacement of labour by agricultural technology to a greater 
extent than would have been the case had no emigration taken 
place. The fact that AB Separator was able in the long run to 
retain its large shares of the market was due partly to the fact 
that the company moved part of its production abroad to strate-
214
gically important areas. In a longer term view the departure of the 
business had favourable effects on employment in Sweden.
By virtue of the fact that AB Separator concentrated its resources 
completely on producing, developing and marketing a special pro­
duct, the company became well acquainted with all the problems 
and possibilities of the business. From this point of view the 
specialisation was clearly an advantage, but in its struggle to spread 
its machines throughout the world AB Separator faced another 
problem. International Harvester, which was the world’s largest 
producer of agricultural machines, operated on the opposite full­
line principle. The group of companies had built up a gigantic 
sales organisation, and when it came to the acquisition of the best 
salesmen it was a definite advantage to be able to let them sell 
different kinds of agricultural technology to the farmers. However, 
in spite of the fact that International Harvester with its wide range 
of goods was able to get the most prominent agents under contract, 
AB Separator was able to see to it that International Harvester did 
not get any real hold on the separator market even in the USA. 
Apparently the selling of separators could not simply be integrated 
with the sale of machines for the cultivation of land. But by virtue 
of the high level of its resources International Harvester was 
largely able to maintain its full-line programme, which will be dealt 
with in greater detail in the section which follows.
2. McCormick-International Harvester 
Company, Chicago
The McCormick Epoch 
Introduction
When the frontier in the USA around 1860 had passed the Missis­
sippi Valley and had extended halfway into Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Iowa, Kansas and Texas, a large part of the prairies south of the 
Great Lakes had been cultivated. From an international point of 
view the largest agrarian purchasing power developed and was con­
centrated here through the many large holdings which were built
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Figure 2. The more important mergers in the North American agricultural machine
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Map 9.
up. The vast supply of land which was topographically extremely 
suitable for mechanised farming, and the shortage of labour ex­
plain why the agricultural machine industry was located and 
developed in the region of the prairies to an especially high 
degree.127 Figure 2 shows the development of the companies in the 
agricultural machine industry which around the turn of the nine­
teenth century and in the following decades merged to form seven 
different groups of companies which were then the largest in the 
business in North America. All the groups of companies through 
their predecessors had their roots in the period before 1860. The 
companies in the Middle-West completely dominated the branch of 
the industry geographically, and the Canadian Massey-Harris in 
Toronto can also be included here. In the USA the large units of 
the agricultural technology industry were entirely located in the
127 Turner, F. J., The Frontier in American History, pp. 126ff. Faulkner, H. V., 
American Economic History, pp. 186 ff.
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states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Indiana. The first wave 
of foundations in the branch of industry had ended around 1860. 
The next wave came during the 1870s and 1880s when substantial 
competition began to develop. Among other things as a result of 
this, around the turn of the nineteenth century in the agricultural 
machine industry as well as in other American industries a series 
of mergers began, the largest of which in the agricultural machine 
industry involved International Harvester. International Harvester, 
which is the largest manufacturer of agricultural technology, after 
the merger in 1902 controlled between 80 and 90 per cent of the 
production of agricultural machines in the USA. McCormick’s com­
pany, which was the largest component in International Harvester 
and its oldest and most important predecessor during the nineteenth 
century, had first started to produce harvesters before all the others 
in the 1840s. At the end of the nineteenth century McCormick was 
faced with heavy competition from the Deering Harvester Corn-
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pany, which was also integrated into International Harvester in 
1902. After the merger the production programme was gradually 
changed to the so-called full-line principle from a production which 
had mainly comprised harvesters before the merger. In the same 
way the other mergers in figure 2 changed character. After the 
mergers the groups of companies strove to operate a full-line 
system whereas the predecessors which had previously been fore­
most e.g. in Deere and Oliver had specialised in ploughs, in Case 
in steam threshers and traction engines, and in Massey-Harris in 
harvesters and mowing-machines. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century there were in the USA about 700 companies on various 
levels which produced agricultural machines. The companies in 
figure 2 were the giants in the field.128 The most important of these 
was International Harvester, and this justifies a closer study of this 
company and its predecessor. McCormick and to a certain extent 
Deering as the best known predecessors of International Harvester
128 In comparison with their Swedish counterparts, American engineering works 
had a much higher capacity. For example the J. I. Case Company which was the 
largest American producer of traction engines and steam threshers manufactured 
more than 30 000 traction engines and 70000 steam threshers between 1880 and 1914. 
Munktell in Sweden produced 7 000 traction engines and almost as many steam 
threshers in 1853-1914. Around 1910 when the sales of steam threshers and traction 
engines reached their peak both in the USA and in Sweden, Munktell’s yearly 
production was equivalent to only one-tenth of that of J. I. Case. In addition it 
should be borne in mind that Munktell completely dominated the Swedish market, 
while J. I. Case, in spite of its leading market position in the USA after the turn 
of the nineteenth century, met with much keener domestic competition. Thus before 
1898 the oldest predecessor in the Allis-Chalmers group of companies, the Gar 
Scott Company, of Richmond, Indiana, was the leading traction engine company 
in the USA.
In 1860 the John Deere Company produced about ten times as many ploughs as 
Överum. Twenty years later the Oliver Chilled Plow Company was able to sell 
60000 ploughs compared with Overum's 5 000. The above information gives an idea 
of the disparity in terms of volume which the agricultural machine industries in the 
two countries discovered.
Wik, R. M., Steam Power on the American Farm, pp. 99 ff. and p. 257. Clark, 
N. M.. John Deere. He Gave to the World the Steel Plow, pp. 39ff. Ardrey, 
R. L., American Agricultural Implements. Rogin, L., The Introduction of Farm 
Machinery and its Relations to the Productivity of Labor in the Agriculture of the 
United States during the Nineteenth Century, pp. 32ff. Holbrook, S. H., Machines 
of Plenty. Pioneering in American Agriculture.
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were also during the nineteenth century leaders of the market in 
harvesters and mowing-machines. The harvester was probably the 
most revolutionary innovation in American agricultural technology. 
Therefore the course of McCormick both before and within Interna­
tional Harvester will be followed comparatively closely, and Deer- 
ing’s course will also be traced to a certain extent. A further reason 
for choosing McCormick-International Harvester is that the sources 
for the group are both comprehensive and of good quality, in con­
trast to the material for the other groups of companies.129
(a) The background to McCormick’s harvester
The textile industry was the branch of industry which was best 
able during the eighteenth century to utilize technical innovations 
and put them into practice. During the industrial revolution in Eng­
land the textile industry led the way in the introduction of new 
techniques of production, and the demand for cotton increased 
sharply. It was probably not by chance that Eli Whitney’s cotton- 
gin became the first agricultural machine to achieve economic im­
portance. The machine, which was introduced in 1793 and affected 
the delivery capacity of American raw cotton above all, followed 
a radical mechanisation of the English cotton mills.130 Bearing in
129 The sources relating to the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company and its 
founder Cyrus Hall McCormick have been preserved in extensive records, "the 
McCormick Collection”. This collection is kept at the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin in Madison, where “the Singer Collection” is also to be found. The 
McCormick Collection contains among other things a great number of volumes in 
different series such as Reaper Sales, Reaper Orders, Deliveries, Machine Record 
(Ledger) and Twine Account for the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company 
before 1902. However, information for certain years is missing. It is possible in an 
Order book and/or a Machine Ledger to find information about the salesman's/ 
agent’s name and address, the buyer’s name and address, and also the year of the 
model of harvester sold. Thus the information is highly relevant for studies of 
diffusion of agrarian technology, since it is possible to follow the machines all the 
way to their place of operation. In addition a very comprehensive business cor­
respondence has been systematised into a special series. Finally the McCormick 
Collection contains some important sales data about International Harvester during 
the building-up period from 1902-1913.
130 The introduction of Whitney’s cotton gin had immediate and far-reaching effects. 
Cotton growing in the South developed rapidly during the first half of the 19th 
century and between 1800 and 1830 the frontier was moved westwards very much
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mind that agriculture had been of great importance in the world 
economy for thousands of years, it could have been expected that 
decisive technical changes would have taken place first in agricul­
ture. During the industrial revolution grain was the world’s leading 
staple product, but nevertheless the grain was harvested in the 
same way as in classical times. Around 1800 the sickle and the 
scythe were the only available harvesting tools. However the 
scythe had been improved during the eighteenth century by the 
attachment of a cradle consisting of a number of wooden sticks 
which ran parallel with the blade of the scythe. In the USA this 
improved implement was called the ‘cradle’, and was able to collect 
the straw with much greater efficiency, and thus make the binding 
of the sheaves easier for the farmworkers. However the economic 
effect on production resulting from this was probably marginal. 
The fact that the agricultural sector, which was economically 
dominant later than the textile industry, introduced new techniques 
was due to several circumstances. The rural population was techni-
faster and farther in the Southern states than in the Northern states. In 1830 in 
the South the cotton belt had been stretched out from the Atlantic coast to Texas, 
but in the North at the same time the reclamation of land for grain had not reached 
Lake Michigan. The yearly production and exports of American cotton were there­
fore able to increase sharply as the following series of figures shows:
Average yearly production Percentage
Year in thousands of pounds prc
1791-1795 5 200 33
1801-1805 59 600 56
1811-1815 80000 53
1821-1825 209000 73
1831-1835 398522 83
1841-1845 822 954 84
1851-1855 1294423 77
Cotton played a decisive rôle in the American economy during the first half of 
the 19th century, and in 1810 cotton accounted for 22 per cent of the country’s 
total export income. In 1860 the corresponding proportion had risen to all of 57 
per cent. In spite of falling cotton prices up to the 1840s the development men­
tioned above explains much of the sense of prosperity and confidence of the 
Southern states when faced with the prospect of the Civil War. At the outbreak 
of the Civil War the price of cotton had recovered considerably.
Faulkner, H. U .,American Economic History, p. 187 and pp. 201 f. Hutchinson, 
W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. Seed Time 1809-1856, pp. 49ff.
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cally more conservatively inclined than people in towns. The towns 
offered larger areas of contact and the influx of inventions, 
technical inventions included, was generally greater there than in 
the rural areas. To a great extent the upper class lived in the larger 
towns whence they came into contact with other people and ideas 
through their opportunities to travel. The whole way of life of the 
affluent upper class of the urban population was one of recep­
tiveness and curiosity towards innovations. Furthermore, during the 
industrial revolution the businesses of the towns were able, in spite 
of their limited importance for the national economy, almost com­
pletely to control economic policy. The national dominance of 
agriculture then resulted in frequent neglect at governmental level 
because there was the desire to promote the advance of other 
industries which were at that time still comparatively insignificant.
Another important explanation for the fact that the revolutionary 
technical innovations were first introduced in the textile industry 
and not in agriculture was probably the different production 
structure of the two industries. The leading English cotton mills 
consisted of large but comparatively few production units, for 
which the advantages of new working techniques of production 
must have been plain.131 Even if the land-parcelling movements in 
Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
brought about a certain concentration of production, agriculture 
was still divided into small units and lacked the justification for 
introducing more advanced techniques of production or the ability 
to do so. It was above all the critical and labour-consuming stage 
of harvesting which limited the volume of production in farming. 
Larger and more integrated farms were formed, above all in Eng­
land, but because of the good supply of farm labour at the be­
ginning of the nineteenth century the English landowners did not 
undertake any decisive mechanisation of farming. However there 
was no lack of technical innovations in agriculture. Between 1786 
and 1831, for example, over fifty more or less fully developed 
harvesting machines were constructed, of which 33 were of British
131 The new expanding factory-like cotton industry in England was too specialised 
to involve more than a small part of the population. Even within the English cotton 
industry it took a long time before the old forms of production disappeared.
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and 22 of American origin. In his work Cyrus Hall McCormick, 
Seed Time, W. T. Hutchinson has chronologically dated and 
schematised what were probably the sixteen most important of 
these early inventions in the harvesting machine field according to 
the inventor’s place of abode and the technical data of the inven­
tion. Thirteen of the sixteen inventions took place in England or 
Scotland, but the ground gained by these in farming technique was 
exploited first and foremost in the USA. The most important differ­
ence in the pace of progress in agricultural technology between the 
USA and Britain was that the former had an abundance of land 
but hardly of labour. In Britain, on the other hand, there was a 
shortage of land and an abundance of farm labour. H. J. Habakkuk 
explains the causal connections in the following way in his work 
American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century: “This 
work done by machinery in American agriculture is not very much 
cheaper than it could be done by hand, but the great question is 
—where are the hands to come from? In Britain, where land was 
scarce but agricultural labour abundant, farmers were principally 
concerned with raising output per acre rather than output per man. 
It is therefore not surprising that America first established an inter­
national reputation for her machines, and in this field she ultimately 
made the most striking advances. A British patent for a reaper was 
taken out in 1799 ... but the several technical difficulties, par­
ticularly the difficulty of making an efficient cutting-bar, were over- 
come first in America.”132
132 Hutchinson, W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. Seed Time. p. 59. Habakkuk, H. J., 
American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, quotation at p. 101. 
In his report The Landscape and the Machine: Technical Interrelatedness, Land 
Tenure and the Mechanization of the Corn Harvest in Victorian Britain, Paul A. 
David supports Habakkuk’s theory that Britain had a surplus of agricultural labour 
compared with the USA. Therefore in comparison with the USA the labour force 
was cheap in relation to capital. But according to David the price relation between 
labour and capital is far from explaining everything; there is in fact the third 
production factor, land. David does not so much stress the difference in the supply 
of land between the USA and Britain, instead he emphasises the difference in 
topography and suitability for mechanisation. Thus the central theory in David’s 
report is that Britain’s slow adoption of the harvester technology was mainly due 
to her agricultural land which by its nature was badly adapted to agricultural 
machines which required an even surface.
David, P. A., The Landscape and the Machine: Technical Interrelatedness. Land
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As the shortage of labour was great in the USA larger fields 
could not be harvested before the harvesting machine, even if it 
had been possible to sow them. If the harvesting time was pro­
longed there was an increase in the risk that the harvest would 
be destroyed by unfavourable weather or overripeness. Therefore 
in practice the harvesting technique dictated the size of the land 
which the farms cultivated. The average size of the two million 
American farms which existed before the harvester around 1850 
was about 25 acres. Between 1860 and 1910 there was an increase 
of four million farms, mainly through the cultivation of the prairies 
in the North and West. The total area of newly cultivated land 
during those fifty years corresponded to the total area of Western 
Europe and covered 500 million acres. The average size of the 
newly established farms was five times larger than that of the old 
ones, or 125 acres per farm. The development towards larger 
farm units stimulated the mechanisation of American agriculture 
which was gradually able during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century to make up for the shortage of labour and to facilitate 
farming on a larger scale. Research carried out by the United 
States Department of Labor (in table 56) shows the consumption 
of labour in 1830 and 1895 needed to harvest one acre of wheat 
with an unchanged yield per acre. The figures for 1830 represent 
an average for the USA and show a consumption of over 57 
working hours per acre of wheat. In 1895 in places where the 
mechanisation had gone furthest, on the large holdings in Cali­
fornia, the corresponding working time had fallen to less than four 
hours, and in Kansas, which is perhaps more representative of the 
large wheat districts, the corresponding working time then 
amounted to somewhat more than ten hours. Thus in 1895 the con­
sumption of labour in the western prairie districts had fallen to 
only 18 per cent of the number of working hours which were re­
quired in 1830. The really large saving of labour had taken place 
during the harvesting stage. Twenty working hours had been 
needed in 1830 against only one and a half hours in 1895, and so 
the labour consumption for harvesting in 1895 amounted to only 7
Tenure and the Mechanization of the Com Harvest in Victorian Britain. In Essays 
on a Mature Economy in Britain after 1840 (Ed. D. N. McCloskey).
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Table 56. Man labour time consumed in producing one acre of wheat
Implement/operation
Motive
power
Number of
hands
Man labour time
per acre
Hours Min.
Hand method 1829-30
Plow 2 oxen 1 6 40
Sow hand 1 1 15
Harrow 2 oxen 1 2 30
Total to put crop in 10 25
Reap hand 2 20 00
Haul sheaves to bam 2 oxen 2 4 00
Thresh hand 4 13 20
Winnow with sheet hand 3 10 00
Total to secure crop 47 20
Total to produce one acre of wheat 57 45
Machine method 1894-96
A=Large farming, California
Gang plow 12 horses 1 1 00
Seeder 2 horses 2 0 15
Five-section harrow 8 horses 1 0 12
Total to put crop in 1 27
Combine 26 horses 4 1 00
Wagon to granary 8 horses 1 0 52
Total to secure crop 1 52
Total to produce one acre of wheat 3 19
B=Farm in central Kansas producing 100 acres of wheat
Plow 4 horses 1 4 00
Harrow 4 horses 1 0 36
DriU 4 horses 1 1 12
Total to put crop in 5 48
Binder and shocking 4 horses 1 1 36
Stacking 4 horses 4 2 00
Threshing from stack 10 1 00
Total to secure crop 4 36
Total to produce one acre of wheat 10 24
Source United States Department of Labor, The 13th Annual Report of the Com­
missioner of Labor (1898). Hand and Machine Labor. Rogin, L., The Intro­
duction of Farm Machinery, pp. 213 ff.
Table 57. Average man labour time per acre 
parts of the United States 1925
for crop production in various
Small grain cut Small grain cut
Area with binder (hours) with combine (hours)
New England 42
New York 24
Pennsylvania 24
Virginia 23
West Virginia 23
Ohio 20
Michigan 19
Arkansas 16
Georgia 15
Missouri 15
Wisconsin 15
Indiana 15
Illinois 15
Kentucky 12
Minnesota 12
Eastern Nebraska 10
Kansas 8 5
Western Nebraska 7 5
Dakotas 7
Colorado 7 5
Source United States Department of Agriculture Bulletin 1348: 59 (1925 July).
per cent of what was required to harvest in 1830. Table 57 shows 
that according to research in 1925 the consumption of working 
hours varied greatly in different parts of the United States. The 
Eastern regions show the largest consumption of working hours 
while the Western prairie districts show the smallest. The variation 
probably reflects differences in the size of the farms as well in the 
degree of mechanisation. In 1925 mechanisation and labour-saving 
on the large farm units in the prairie districts had got just as 
far as on the most advanced large holdings in California during the 
1890s. Instead of increasing the contribution of human energy to 
any appreciable extent American agriculture increased the contri­
butions of other sources of energy in the most important grain 
districts (see diagram 19). The first wave of mechanisation, with
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Diagram 19. Amount of power available for farm purposes in United States 
1850-1930.
Millions of 
horsepower
Animal power
Steam power
Gas power
1930
Source: Courtesy US Department of Agriculture Miscellaneous Bulletin 157, April 
1933.
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the horse-drawn mechanical harvester to the fore, required a great 
increase in the number of draught-animals, and above all of 
horses. The next phase consisted of the arrival of the first non­
living source of energy on the farms, steam power, which was 
used mainly in connection with threshing. Finally at the beginning 
of the twentieth century the internal combustion engine replaced 
the draught-animals with the tractor and the steam threshing- 
machines with the motor threshing-machine. However the internal 
combustion engine did not become of real importance until the 
1920s.133
The person who first and most clearly appreciated the importance 
of these changes in the American agricultural economy of the nine­
teenth century was the Southerner Cyrus Hall McCormick. It was 
something of an irony of fate that it was the Southerner McCor­
mick who gave the Northern states their prosperity through the 
use of his harvester in the grain districts, while the economic 
growth in the Southern states was due to a large extent to the 
Northerner E. Whitney’s cotton-gin and its contribution to the cot­
ton economy. Cyrus Hall McCormick was born in 1809. He was 
of Scottish-Irish descent and the son of farmer Robert McCormick 
of Walnut Grove, Rockbridge County in Virginia. On the father’s 
farm there was also a small forge which was used for the require­
ments of the farm. Robert McCormick was interested in agricultural 
technology and as early as 1816 he is supposed to have constructed 
a simple harvesting machine which could work under favourable 
conditions. But faced with the difficulties of making it really prac­
tical he abandoned machine construction for the time being. The 
environment in which Cyrus Hall McCormick grew up no doubt 
influenced his later epoch-making work. According to his grandson, 
in his youth he was of a somewhat weak constitution and was not 
particularly suited to strenuous farmwork, which also encouraged 
him to take an active interest in his father’s experiments with 
labour-saving inventions. Cyrus Hall McCormick’s first contribu-
133 FauIimerj H. V., American Economic History, pp. 365 ff. McCormick Harvesting 
Machine Company extract from catalogue 1899: The end of the century. US Depart­
ment of Agriculture. Bulletin 1348:59 (July. 1925), Bulletin 157 (April. 1933). US 
Department of Labor. Hand and Machine Labor (1898). Rogin, L.. The Introduction 
of Farm Machinery, pp. 213 ff.
229
tion to agrarian technology was a plough he built in the 1820s 
which was especially suitable for broken ground. However the 
revolutionary improvements in the sphere of ploughing were to be 
made somewhat later by John Deere. John Deere was born in Ver­
mont in the North-East USA and he trained as a blacksmith, but in 
1837 he moved to Illinois where in the blacksmith’s workshop in 
Grand Detour he began to experiment with steel ploughs suitable 
for the sticky mould of the prairies. The cast-iron plough had been 
introduced into the Eastern states by Jethro Wood in 1817, and 
there it gradually began to drive out the wooden plough, but the 
cast-iron plough performed badly in the prairie districts. Mainly 
because of his improved and polished mould-board made of steel, 
John Deere was able to start production on a commercial scale in 
the 1840s. In 1846 the village blacksmith’s shop in Grand Detour 
had reached a capacity of a thousand ploughs a year. So that he 
could distribute the ploughs better to the prairie districts John 
Deere moved westwards in 1847 to Moline on the border between 
Iowa and Illinois, where he could expand sales and production on 
a really large scale, on the basis of improved models of plough. 
During the 1850s the steel ploughs of Deere and other newly 
established manufacturers became widespread in the prairie districts 
and they replaced the cheaper but less practical cast-iron ploughs. 
By 1860 Deere alone had reached sales of 13000 ploughs a year. 
John Deere was more than a skillful blacksmith and an inventor. 
In addition he had a definite flair for business and the same com­
bination of the entrepreneur’s characteristics as his contemporary 
McCormick, and Henry Ford later. Through the mass distribution 
of comparatively cheap products these entrepreneurs not only 
played a great part for their own large companies but became to 
an even greater degree of importance for the national economy. 
They constitute excellent illustrations of J. Schumpeter’s theory of 
the entrepreneur as social transformer. It should be mentioned that 
John Deere's contributions during the 1870s were made more com­
plete by James Oliver, whose chilled-iron plough was well adapted 
to its purpose. Oliver's ploughs spread generally, especially in the 
Eastern states, where they replaced the cast-iron plough.134
134 Hutchinson. W. T., Cyrus Hull McCormick. I. Seed Time. 1809-1856. pp. 49ff. 
McCormick, S.. The Century of the Reaper, pp. 17 ff. McCormick, C. H., Memorial
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In 1831 Robert McCormick took up his harvesting machine ex­
periments again, but they failed and he gave up the idea com­
pletely. However Cyrus was now able to make use of his father's 
experience while improving construction at the same time. 
Amongst other things he added a straw-collecting reel. When Cyrus 
had completed his construction, he had his machine tested in public 
near his home in July 1831, when the harvester did well to cut 
six or seven acres of oats. About the same time as Cyrus Hall 
McCormick two other Americans, viz. William Manning of Plain- 
field, New Jersey, and Obed Hussey of Cincinnati, Ohio, tried to 
build new models of harvesting machine. Most earlier attempts to 
produce harvesting machines had stopped short at theoretical con­
structions. The most successful of the earlier constructions was 
the Scot Patrick Bell’s award-winning harvester of 1828. It is not 
clear what influence Bell’s machine had on the American in­
ventions. Therefore the question of who originally invented the 
harvester cannot be answered unequivocally and completely. 
Several innovators improved earlier known constructions, and 
several new models of harvesting machine were built more or less 
simultaneously. Cyrus Hall McCormick’s harvester of 1831 was a 
combination of seven fundamental parts or principles, of which 
the most important were the cutting apparatus with fingers and the 
reciprocating knife with serrated edges, the reel, the collecting 
platform and also the ground drive wheel which operated the 
cutting apparatus by means of a gear device. Before 1831 the 
innovators had used one or more of these fundamental parts and 
principles, but McCormick was the first to combine them in an 
effective whole. The importance of McCormick’s contribution lay 
not in any technical originality but in the fact that he made the 
harvesting machine workable. An invention can also consist of a 
combination of processes which are already known individually, 
and this is precisely what McCormick produced.135
of Robert McCormick (reprint of a pamphlet. Chicago 1898). International Harvester 
Co., Roots in Chicago One Hundred Years Deep 1847-1947, pp. 7ff. Clark, N. M., 
John Deere. He Gave to the World the Steel Plow, pp. 39ff. Thomson, H., The 
Ageof Invention, pp. 1 !Off. (inThe New Industrialisation). Rogin. L.. op. cit.,pp. 31 ff. 
135 Fussel, G. E., op.cit., pp. 115ff. and 218ff. Hutchinson, W. T., op. at., pp. 
59 ff. International Harvester. Roots in Chicago One Hundred Years Deep, pp. 7 f. 
and pp. 15 f. Rogin, L., op. cit., pp. 72 ff.
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In spite of the fact that McCormick had tested his new machine 
successfully in 1831, he did not exploit the commercial value of 
his invention straight away. Meanwhile towards the end of 1833 
Hussey was able to obtain a patent for a harvesting machine, which 
prompted McCormick in the very next year to take out a patent 
for his harvesting machine from 1831. Hussey was a prominent 
innovator and technician and like McCormick during the rest of 
the 1830s he improved his construction through experiments. The 
comparatively long experimental period meant that the two inno­
vators did not come into any direct commercial confrontation or 
conflict of interests at that time.136 While McCormick’s model was 
adjusted for grain cutting, Hussey’s model was constructed more 
like a mowing-machine. The difference between the mechanisms 
of the harvesting machine and the mowing-machine is related to 
the difference between the problems of cutting grain and grass. 
For economic reasons grass must be cut as near the ground as 
possible, while grain can be cut at a much greater distance from the 
ground without any unfavourable economic consequences. There­
fore the unevenness of the ground makes it necessary to have a 
more serviceable and tougher cutting mechanism in the mowing- 
machine than in the harvester. For these reasons the mowing- 
machine was constructed in a more robust way than the harvester 
right from the start. Also the whole iron frame of the earlier mow­
ing-machines, for example, was often constructed as a single unit. 
There was a further difference in the way in which the cut grain 
was set down. The earlier harvester delivered the grain on the side 
of the machine opposite to the horse so that the grain would not 
be trampled down during the following swath. When grass was to 
be cut there was no need to be so careful.137
(b) The introduction of the harvester onto the market
Both Cyrus Hall McCormick and Obed Hussey had managed to 
produce the first practical working mechanical harvesters at the
136 In fact Hussey sold a total of forty machines during the 1830s. Most of the 
orders appear to have come from "gentlemen farmers" who used the machines as 
an experiment. Rogin, L., op. fit. p. 73.
137 Phillips, W. G., The Agricultural Implement Industry in Canada. A Study of 
Competition, pp. 3 ff.
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beginning of the 1830s. They had not been influenced by each 
other’s designs because their machines, as has been pointed out, 
were very different and were intended to an extent for different 
purposes. However they did not consider the innovations ready to 
be introduced onto the market as soon as the patents had been 
taken out.
A process of innovation can generally speaking be said to com­
prise five stages. The first stage is represented by the more 
theoretical basis and the shaping of the concept. The next stage 
comprises the embodiment of the ideas into an actual construction. 
Thirdly the invention must be made practical from an economic 
standpoint, and fourthly there is the introduction onto the market. 
Finally the fifth stage consists of the process of the diffusion of the 
innovation. The time consumed over these stages can vary greatly 
for different innovations. McCormick and Hussey’s particularly ex­
perimental innovatory improvements during the 1830s may be said 
to correspond to the third stage of the innovation process. As far 
as the horse-drawn mechanical harvester was concerned, the first 
two stages which preceded the work of McCormick and Hussey 
had taken place, so far as one knows, during the period from 1786 
to 1830. The fourth stage of the innovation process had started 
when McCormick and Hussey began to produce and sell harvesters 
around 1840, and the start of the fifth stage, the diffusion phase, 
can be dated for the mechanical harvester at 1847 when McCormick 
began industrial production of harvesters on a large scale in Chi­
cago. It is interesting to compare the stages of the innovation pro­
cess for the mechanical harvester with those for the milk separator 
which came about fifty years later. For the harvester the time 
which elapsed between the first and third stages was somewhat 
more than forty years (1786-1831) and between the third and the 
start of the fifth stage sixteen years (1831-1847). Up to and in­
cluding 1847 American farmers had bought about a thousand har­
vesters. Thereafter the machines spread at a much faster rate. The 
corresponding lapse of time was much shorter for the milk separa­
tor. Between the first and third stages not quite twenty years 
elapsed (1859-1877) and between the third and the beginning of the 
fifth stage five years (1877-1882). Before 1883 about a thousand 
separators had been sold, thus corresponding to the level of spread
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for the harvester up to 1847. Gustaf de Laval’s intervention in the 
innovation process from 1877 onwards was the main reason for the 
fact that the separator could be used more quickly in the agricul­
tural economy. In 1877-1878 both the third and fourth stages took 
place for the separator, when de Laval first made the separator 
workable economically and then with Oscar Lamm introduced it 
onto the market straight away. The development towards a greatly 
shortened innovation process for later innovations was not peculiar 
to the two examples mentioned above, but was a general phenome­
non during the nineteenth century, a tendency which has continued 
during the twentieth century with certain isolated exceptions.
McCormick sold his first harvesters in 1840 and sales were able 
to increase during the years which followed. Production took place 
at the blacksmith’s shop on the family farm in Virginia. Capacity 
was therefore limited. In 1844 McCormick received his first orders 
from outside Virginia. The orders came from the prairie states of 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri and Wisconsin. While the incoming 
orders were increasing McCormick realised the need to terminate 
contracts with other manufacturers for the production of his 
machines. The most important of these manufacturers was the 
Globe Works of Seymour and Morgan in Brockport, New York 
State, which was considered to be the United States’ first industrial 
manufacturer of harvesters. The contract was in force until 1848 
when McCormick’s patent expired. If McCormick found it unex­
pectedly difficult to get the farmers in Virginia to adopt his new 
agricultural technology, he found it that much easier to sell his 
innovation to the farms in the prairie states northwest of the Ohio 
river. Therefore McCormick decided to analyse the market factors 
in the new area in the West more closely. In 1844 he went to the 
prairie states to gain first-hand experience of the newly established 
market for harvesters. After his journey he summed up the situa­
tion: “If reapers were luxuries in Virginia, they were necessities 
in Illinois, Ohio and on the great plains of the West.” In hilly 
Virginia the farms were like those in most of the states in the East, 
small on average, which did not stimulate the adoption of new 
agricultural technology, and McCormick realised after his return 
that Virginia was the wrong starting-place for producing and selling 
harvesters on a large scale. It occured to him to move operations
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to a place which was more suitable from a selling point of view. 
For McCormick it was also a question of being able to centralise 
production when the various manufacturing contracts came to an 
end in 1848. In the summer of 1847 McCormick moved to Chicago, 
which at that time was a small town with barely seventeen thou­
sand inhabitants. The frontier line had passed Chicago at the end 
of the 1830s, and the town was situated on the periphery of 
America in the middle of the 1840s, and Illinois was an undevel­
oped agricultural state. At that time the centre for the grain market 
in the USA was in Buffalo in the western part of New York State. 
FIowever McCormick’s business instinct and visionary eye led him 
to Chicago, which was to be America’s new grain centre in the 
future, and the ideal starting-point for the production and distribu­
tion of agricultural technology.138
Hussey’s production of harvesters in Ohio had in fact already 
begun during the 1830s, but the annual production at that time did 
not usually exceed ten machines, and these were ordered more by 
way of experiment than from the standpoint of agricultural 
economy. Around 1840 Hussey was able to extend the production 
of harvesters and begin a more commercially orientated business. 
This meant that a conflict of interests soon arose between Hussey 
and McCormick. The first of a series of harvester wars broke out 
in 1843 when the machines of both innovators met on the same 
market for the first time. During the years immediately following 
their two machines were compared on several occasions at agri­
cultural competitions and general fairs in the Eastern states. The 
rivalry between McCormick and Hussey led to intense advertising 
campaigns on both sides, with arguments for the excellence of their 
own products coupled with derogatory verdicts on the competitor’s 
machine, something which undoubtedly gave the two rivals a great 
deal of publicity and wide advertisement. As the machines of Hus­
sey and McCormick were protected by patents until 1847-48, they 
accounted for almost all the sales of harvesters in the USA. The 
sales figures for the harvesters of Hussey and McCormick before 
1848 developed as follows:
138 Rogin L., op.cit. pp. 74ff. Roots in Chicago, pp. 8ff. Casson, H. N., Cyrus 
Hal! McCormick. His Life and Work, pp. 68 ff.
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Number of harvesters sold
Year
Of Hussey’s 
type
Of McCormick's
type
1833-39 45 _
1840 36 2
1841 22 -
1842 10 6
1843 2 39
1844 11 50
1845 33 123
1846 58 275
1847 60 500
Total up to and
including 1847 277 995
Source International Harvester Co., Roots in Chicago One Hundred Years Deep 
1847-1947, p. 8. Rogin, L., The introduction of farm machinery, pp. 73 ff. 
Rogin has based his figures mainly on material from patent disputes which 
had been 'decided by Supreme Court of the United States.
The majority of Hussey's machines were sold in the East, while 
McCormick’s went principally westwards to the prairie states.139 
It may seem obvious afterwards that the American agricultural 
machine industry when it started to take shape in the middle of the 
nineteenth century would be located in the prairie districts as with 
Deere and McCormick. This is in fact being wise after the event, 
since we have seen the result. In actual fact at that time the ques­
tion was a completely open one even for the inner circle of ini­
tiates. The prevalent opinion was rather that it was better and safer 
to aim at the market where the centre of the population was, viz. 
in the East. As we have two inventors, McCormick and Hussey, 
who developed on the whole side by side for a number of years, 
but thereafter (around the middle of the 1840s) quite divergently, 
we can compare the entrepreneur characteristics of each of them. 
Hussey’s line of development would then represent something that 
never happened and McCormick’s would represent what really did 
happen. In spite of the fact that Hussey had the advantage of
139 Rogin, L.,op.cit. pp. 74ff. Phillips, W. G.,op.cit., pp. 3 f.
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developing and introducing his innovation in the prairie state of 
Ohio with its agricultural potential, he came to the conclusion, 
which was perhaps not a completely preposterous one from the 
viewpoint of that time, that the market absorption of agricultural 
technology was greater in the densely populated Eastern regions 
with their many farms than in the West where he himself had worked. 
He therefore moved eastwards to Baltimore in Maryland, where 
he continued to manufacture and sell. A contributory cause for 
Hussey’s move was that his mowing-machine-like invention had 
had greater success in the Eastern grass-cultivating areas than in the 
grain districts in the West. However, even after his move Hussey 
did not acquire any great importance in the spreading of the har­
vester and the mowing-machine. The application of mechanised 
forms of operation was to take place first and foremost on the 
farms to the northwest of the Ohio river. At the end of the 1850s 
McCormick had sold ten times as many machines as Hussey, viz. 
23 000 for McCormick and about 2 000 for Hussey. Shortly before 
his death Hussey sold his business to a mowing-machine syndicate, 
Aultman and Co., Canton, Ohio and Cayuga Chief Co., Auburn, 
New York State. From 1860 onwards the syndicate was for a long 
time the leader on the mowing-machine market before being 
gradually incorporated into the International Harvester group.140 
The difference between Hussey and McCormick was that Hussey 
was principally an inventor and not an entrepreneur while McCor­
mick was undoubtedly an inventor but was an entrepreneur to a 
much higher degree. In the context of economic history the aspect 
of application is the essential part of the innovation process. There­
fore it is less important from this perspective to discuss who 
actually invented the harvester. It is of more importance to study 
how the innovation could be made more useful economically, how 
it could be introduced onto the market, and most important of all, 
how it could be widely adopted and spread generally. In these 
respects the entrepreneur played a great part, but he plays his real 
part when it comes to persuading people to adopt innovations and 
give them wide currency. Not until an important innovation is in 
wide circulation can it have economic consequences for both the
140 Phillips. W. G.. op. cit., pp. 4f. Rogin. L., op. lit., pp. 75 ff.
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entrepreneur and society. Thus if Hussey and McCormick did not 
differ very much as creators of the first practical working har­
vesters nor perhaps as introducers of the machines onto the market, 
they really did differ in the ways in which they analysed market 
factors after the harvester’s first introductory stage. Entrepreneur 
McCormick, with his visionary business instinct and his feeling for 
agricultural economy and agricultural psychology, aimed at the 
future while the man who was not an entrepreneur aimed at the 
present.
Several factors which were favourable for the breakthrough of 
mechanisation in agriculture had occurred in the United States in 
the decades immediately before 1850. For the first time in world 
history there was a combination of trends of development which 
were favourable for the rise of a commercial agriculture based on 
mechanised production. Factors such as good transportation, 
significant markets, an abundance of land which was well-suited for 
mechanisation, and a shortage of labour, had never previously been 
combined to the same extent as they were in the American 
economy between 1830 and 1860. Through the establishment of the 
Erie canal (completed in 1825) and the first railroads through the 
Appalachians (construction started 1843) the Western districts, the 
Ohio Valley and the area around the Great Lakes were able to be 
linked more and more closely with the East coast states. This was 
important from a marketing point of view. Before the Erie canal 
and the railroads the economy of the West had been linked with 
the little developed Southern states by river traffic. Thus the South 
could not offer any greater market for the products of the West. 
When transportation on the canal and railroads was made cheaper 
and faster in the East-West direction the new transport routes 
stimulated farming in the West by supplying markets in the more 
industrially developed states in the North-East. The non-agrarian 
population’s power of purchasing agricultural goods in the North- 
East became much greater than the corresponding purchasing 
power had been in the Southern states. The wave of immigration 
during the nineteenth century reinforced this trend. At the same 
time new transport routes developed industry in the East by supply­
ing markets in the West, but it should be observed that the agrarian 
markets in the West were able at the same time to develop a
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strongly expanding industry in the Middle-West, an industry which 
for a long time had its greatest area of contact with agriculture. 
Apart from the up-and-coming food industries, the iron and steel 
industry in the Middle-West received a significant stimulus from 
agriculture. The orders from agriculture to the iron and steel in­
dustry consisted mainly of agricultural machines but also comprised 
material for farm construction—buildings, silos, fences and so on, 
which used up iron and steel to an increasing extent. An excellent 
example of this is Chicago, with its population which was expand­
ing, particularly after the first direct railroad link with the Atlantic 
coast in 1853. For agriculture in the West the improved communi­
cations eastwards also meant greater possibilities for selling its pro­
ducts on the world market which was extremely important when 
Britain abolished grain tariffs in 1846. The effect of this action was 
to bring about an increase in grain prices in the USA, and prices 
rose further when the European demand for agricultural goods in­
creased during the Crimean War of 1854-1856. The gold rush to 
California in 1849 also resulted in raised food prices as it enticed 
labour away from American agriculture. Thus there were plenty of 
positive market signs for the American farmers to expand farming 
into large sales production, which could only take place in the 
newly cultivated areas in the West through extensive mechanisation. 
The pace of cultivation of new land therefore became rapid: 
through a constant stream of immigrants the frontier westwards 
moved forwards at a rate of thirty miles a year. Thus in the new 
areas, which consisted of the agrarian production region to the 
north-west of the Ohio river with its abundance of flat country 
and shortage of labour, mechanised farming made its first break­
through during the 1840s. Usually it was the harvesting machine 
which arrived before the railroad when the American frontier was 
moved westwards. The majority of the railroads were built on ac­
count of the wheat and it was money from the wheat trade which 
financed the building of the railroads.141
It can be said that the harvester became America’s concrete
141 Ibid., pp. 76ff. Faulkner, H. U., op.cit., pp. 205-216. Casson, H. N., The 
Romance of the Reaper, p. 43. During the latter half of the 19th century Chicago 
was the world’s fastest growing town. In 1884 Chicago had about 600000 inhabitants 
and since 1845, in 40 years, its population had multiplied sixty-fold.
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answer to Malthus’s somber prediction that man was forever 
doomed to remain on a subsistence level because the population 
would always exceed the supply of food. Malthus died in 1832, 
the year after McCormick had tested his first harvesting machine. 
McCormick was to become the great innovator in agrarian 
technology and was to bring about a development in the USA 
which completely refuted the theories of Malthus. McCormick 
learned to realise what was happening in the American economy 
and with the aid of his patented invention he took the passing 
opportunity and in 1847 laid the foundations of a harvester industry 
in the right place at the right time.
(c) The spread of the harvester before the Civil War 
against the background of orders from agriculture
When McCormick arrived in Chicago in 1847 he lacked the capital 
and credit facilities to start a factory for harvesters himself. So 
he went into partnership in Chicago with a business friend named 
Charles M. Gray. With the latter’s help a plot of land for a factory 
was bought on the north side of the Chicago River near its mouth 
in Lake Michigan. The factory was equipped with modern 
machinery including inter alia a 10 h.p. steam engine, which was 
supplemented with one of 30 h.p. in 1850. Mayor William B. Ogden, 
who took over Gray’s share, supplied McCormick with starting 
capital of 25 000 dollars, acquiring a half share in McCormick’s 
business in exchange. McCormick and Ogden both had strong wills 
and soon they had difficulties in working together. After two years 
(1849) the business had yielded about 200 000 dollars in sales. After 
various costs had been covered, half of this sum was enough 
for McCormick to buy out Ogden’s half share of 25 000 dollars. 
In addition Ogden received 25000 dollars by way of interest and 
as part of the profits. In the future the business was able on the 
whole to be financed out of profits which had been ploughed back, 
but for short-term and occasional credit McCormick was mainly 
restricted to various banks in Chicago and New York. During the 
first years of operation Cyrus Hall McCormick received help in
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the factory from his brothers Leander and William McCormick, and 
these two later became partners in the business.142
While Cyrus Hall McCormick left the management of the day- 
to-day work in the factory to his brothers, he primarily devoted 
himself to sales problems. He made a special study of the reaction 
of the farmers to the harvester at work, and he proved to have 
a great flair for farming economy and agricultural psychology. He 
entered into annual competitions between various rival harvesters 
in front of the farmers in the fields. Together with the fairs these 
competitions were popular means of advertising, and made a great 
contribution to an increase in the volume of sales. But McCormick 
did more than that. He pioneered the development of new methods 
of distribution. McCormick not only solved the problem of mass- 
producing workable harvesters, but above all he created new 
principles of marketing to spread the machines among the farmers. 
Already in the 1850s he was the first in the industry to introduce 
aggressive sales methods, systematised service for the farmers and 
the hire-purchase system. By the middle of the 1850s McCormick 
had built up a network of agents covering what was at the time 
the whole of the wheat district of the USA.143
142 Hutchinson, W. T.. Cyrus Hall McCormick. I. Seed Time 1809-1856. pp. 327ff. 
369f. Roots in Chicago One Hundred Years Deep 1847-1947. pp. 11. Casson, H. N., 
The Romance of the Reaper, pp. 30ff. Casson, H. N., Cyrus Hall McCormick. 
His Life and Work, pp. 68 ff.
Mayor William B. Ogden undoubtedly received a good yield on his capital—100 
per cent in two years, but McCormick made a profit which was many times greater 
by buying out Ogden. By 1851 McCormick’s fortune had increased to 100000 dollars, 
which proved that it was possible to make large profits rapidly in the harvester 
trade.
McCormick's short-term loans in Chicago and New York were not equal in value 
to the outstanding demands which he had from his customers.
143 Histoiy and Development of International Harvester, p. 5. McCormick, C., 
The Century of the Reaper, pp. 33 ff. Hutchinson, W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. 
I. Seed Time 1809-1856, chapters 14 and 15.
The harvesting competitions between various rivals in the harvester trade some­
times developed into real scandals with bribed judges and appeals over judgments. 
The net effect of this was that the new agricultural technology received increased 
publicity resulting in growing curiosity about the new machines.
McCormick's system of agents was an important stage in marketing and he 
organised a whole army of agents from general agents, to regional, district and local
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The first task in the sales programme was to teach and educate 
the farmers to use harvesters. It took a man like McCormick who 
was sufficiently strong and dominant to force his machines onto 
reluctant farmers and farmworkers. To do this he used hard-hitting 
advertising in vigorously designed advertising campaigns in farming 
papers. Apart from pure persuasion McCormick used new methods 
of providing information and service to break down the sales resist­
ance to the new agricultural technology. For example simple and 
detailed operating instructions for the maintenance and use of the 
machines have been preserved from 1851. On posters from 1849, 
which resemble present-day descriptions of merchandise, McCor­
mick set out among other things the comparative costs of the old 
and new methods of operation. Lists of all the retailers who car­
ried McCormick’s harvesters in the sales district usually followed 
the advertising posters. Such documents as have been preserved 
show that McCormick was a pioneer in marketing and sales or­
ganisation. As a servicing measure he laid the foundations of spare 
parts production during the 1850s. The hire-purchase system was 
an important innovation in McCormick’s sales methods. McCor­
mick knew from his own experience that the farmer usually has 
limited working capital. With a down-payment of 10-20 per cent of 
the total cost of the machine (about $120 in 1850) McCormick’s 
hire-purchase system enabled many more farmers to invest in har­
vesters than would otherwise have been unable to do so.144 A 
descriptive account of the agricultural machine industry was com­
piled in connection with the formation of Internationa] Harvester. 
The descriptive account is probably more appropriate as a sum­
ming-up of McCormick’s ‘griinder period’: “No other manufacturing 
business [than manufacturing agricultural implements and ma­
chines] carries so many risks or includes so many factors. It is the 
most comprehensive industry in the world. It is the link between
agents. The local agents often consisted of village shopkeepers and ironmongers. 
With these commercial feelers McCormick was able to have the market situation 
at his finger tips. International Harvester’s efficient network of agents was affected 
by the development of the De Laval Separator Co. and AB Separator. International 
Harvester’s sales organisation became to a large extent an extension of that of 
McCormick.
144 Hutchinson, W. T., op.cit., chapters 14 and 15. Roots in Chicago One Hundred 
Years Deep 1847-1947, p. 12.
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the city and the farm. It is both wholesale and retail, ready-made 
and made to order, local and international. It must make what the 
farmer demands, and yet teach him better methods. It is at once 
a factory, a bank and a university.”145
To those nearest to him McCormick probably did not appear 
entirely sympathetic. Looked at in a wider socio-economic perspec­
tive it must be conceded that the range of his pioneering contributions 
was enormous. When the French Academy of Science elected 
McCormick an honorary member it made the following statement, 
probably with complete accuracy: “He has done more for agricul­
ture than any other man.” To produce and sell harvesters became 
more than a business for McCormick, it became his religion. 
McCormick was characterised by his competitors as a fighter, a 
bulldog, a hunting tiger, et cetera. He plainly saw himself as a 
fanatical entrepreneur and a somewhat one-dimensional human being 
when he described his life’s ambition as follows: “I have one aim 
in life and only one—to succeed in spreading my machines every­
where. Everything else is of no importance.”146
Against this background it is easier to understand McCormick’s 
long-drawn-out lawsuit against the Patent Office to safeguard his 
patent in various connections after it had expired in 1848. The 
decades immediately after 1848 were a period of patent pooling in 
the American agricultural machine industry. In 1850 thirty different 
harvesting machine companies had already been formed, and in 
about 1880 there were two hundred of them. At the latter point 
in time there were in all about two thousand companies which 
manufactured agricultural machines, but the keen competition at 
the end of the century eliminated most of them (about 1300) before 
1900. During the latter part of the nineteenth century almost twelve 
thousand patents were granted for harvesters alone, and this led 
to the commencement of hundreds of patent lawsuits and cross­
suits during the period. Whether or not a company continued to 
exist could depend on the outcome of patent arrangements. Con­
flicts which also led to lawsuits arose when new machines were 
produced and sold under a licence which had been purchased. A
145 Casson, H. N., The Romance of the Reaper, p. 101.
146 Ibid., pp. 35 ff.
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pooling of patents meant that competing groups of companies 
within a pool tried to centralise control over the fundamentally 
important patents which covered an implement or a machine. In 
spite of the fact that the individual companies in the pool worked 
in this way, the pool was in no sense equivalent to a merger. As 
long as the market was expanding the individual element dominated 
this branch of the industry completely. Not until the turn of the 
nineteenth century when the market had been stabilised and had 
reached a certain saturation point did the first wave of mergers in 
the industry become apparent.147
McCormick kept a close watch over the emerging competition 
situation around 1850. On the home market front Hussey quickly 
became insignificant after 1850, but instead John H. Manny of 
Rockford, Illinois became McCormick’s principal competitor in the 
middle 1850s. For a few years Manny’s production exceeded 
McCormick’s. In 1854 McCormick accused Manny of patent in­
fringement. McCormick lost the lawsuit, which lasted five years, 
in the Supreme Court in 1858.148 During the 1850s McCormick was 
able to control about a third of the harvester market. In 1858 
McCormick estimated that there were more than 70000 harvesters 
in operation in the fields west of the Allegheny mountains. Of 
these he himself had sold 23 000, or almost a third. The most 
challenging competitors during the 1850s were Manny, who has 
already been mentioned, in Illinois, and Walter A. Wood of Auburn, 
New York State. Before the Civil War, Illinois was the state which 
produced the greatest number of harvesters, with Ohio in second 
place and New York State in third. However it is important to 
distinguish between the production area and the operating area. 
Many of the harvesters which had been produced in New York 
State were sold in the Western prairie district, and so the domi­
nance of the latter area was more obvious as far as the use of har­
vesters was concerned. In the Eastern parts of the country har­
vesters had apparently only been in existence to a great extent 
before 1860 in the states of New York and Pennsylvania. Before
147 Phillips, W. G.. op.cit., pp. 5f. Hendrik, B. J.. Making the World's Agricultural 
Machinery, pp. 160ff. (in The Age of Big Business).
148 US Supreme Court no. 34. McCormick vs. Manny, 1854-1858.
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Table 58. McCormick reaper sales before, during and after the Civil War
1849-
1860
Per
year
1861-
1865
Per
year
1866-
1872
Per
year
1849-1872
Total
Illinois 15 179 1 265 10 594 2 165 15 815 2 260 41 588
Iowa 2 451 205 4 204 840 15 089 2 155 21 744
Wisconsin/Minnesota 1 903 160 3 174 635 9 905 1 415 14 982
Indiana 1 858 155 1 842 370 3 406 485 7 106
Missouri 1 794 150 831 165 3 307 470 5 932
Ohio/Michigan 2 907 240 1 048 210 1 605 230 5 560
Nebraska/Kansas 3 0 426 85 2 745 390 3 174
Others 4 106 340 1 668 335 3 397 485 9 171
Total 30 198 2 515 23 787 4 760 55 269 7 895 109 256
Others as % of total 14% 1% 6%
Source The McCormick Collection: Reaper Orders and Reaper Sales.
the Civil War, mechanical harvesting was uncommon in the New 
England states and the Southern states. Apart from Virginia none 
of the Southern states cultivated a significant amount of wheat. 
As Virginia was the original area of the harvester and the principal 
wheat district of the Southern states, it was worked on with par­
ticular keenness by various harvester agents. But in spite of this 
fact Virginia also did not become a market of any significance for 
harvesters before the Civil War.149
If the pattern of distribution of the country’s total number of
149 Rogin, L., op.cit. pp. 77ff. According to McCormick’s representative in New 
York State only a small part of the production of harvesters in Brockport, New 
York was sold inside the state. The rest was sent westwards. Only half of Wood’s 
production in Auburn, New York was sold inside the state. The figures relate to 
the year 1855. Through Wood’s production reaching the same level as McCormick’s 
at the end of the 1850s, the harvester had probably become more common at that 
time even in New York State.
The harvester was in general introduced late into the Southern states (South 
Carolina 1856 and Georgia 1858) and during the Civil War no distribution of har­
vesters was achieved in the Southern states. According to the Monthly Report, 
Jan. 1867 (US Department of Agriculture) it was reported from Carolina "There 
is no machinery used in this county for harvesting wheat", from Texas “not more 
than one-tenth of our[in county] grain being harvested with machinery".
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harvesters before the Civil War is compared with the corresponding 
pattern for McCormick’s machines in tables 58-59, the result is 
that on the whole they do match up. Bearing in mind that McCor­
mick’s share of the total number of harvesters during the 1850s 
came to about a third, this is in itself plausible. In McCormick’s 
sales to ‘the other states’ Pennsylvania and New York State were 
dominant during the 1850s. The most important areas in McCor­
mick’s sales before 1861 in order of precedence were Illinois, Ohio/ 
Michigan and Pennsylvania/New York State. On the whole this pic­
ture tallies with that which L. Rogin gives for all machines. The 
fact that almost none of McCormick’s machines were sold in New 
England or in the South also corresponds well with the picture of 
the total distribution of the harvester. On the other hand an adjust­
ment upwards ought to be made in respect of the 14 per cent of 
harvesters which McCormick’s sales show for the area outside the 
prairie district, if the country’s total sales are taken into considera­
tion. Thus there was a comparative over-distribution of McCor­
mick’s machines in the prairie area, and, mainly as a result of 
Wood’s competition in the East, a comparative under-distribu­
tion in states such as New York and Pennsylvania.150
As is evident from the above, McCormick had realised that the 
technical problems of production in the business of agrarian tech­
nology were only the first stage in a wider context. The first stage 
consisted of the output of the agricultural machine industry, and 
the second stage assimilation by agriculture of the output in ques­
tion. As this process of transition did not take place by itself 
McCormick saw it as his most important task to operate as an 
intermediary link and as a force exerting pressure in the contacts 
between industry and agriculture. In a study of the mechanisation 
of harvesting in the Middle-West before the Civil War Paul A. David 
stresses the interaction between the development of American 
agriculture and industrialisation. By the adoption of mechanical har-
150 L. Rogin’s figures for the total number of harvesters delivered and for individual 
company units in the USA are based on various estimates, business correspondence 
(McCormick’s among others), reports of court rulings and information in agricul­
tural papers. Thus his estimates are often approximate, but for the picture as a 
whole they provide a valuable complement to the more reliable information from 
McCormick’s sales material.
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vesting important links were forged in the chains connecting the 
agricultural and industrial sectors in the mid-nineteenth century 
economy. In the North-Western prairie states of Ohio, Michigan, 
Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Iowa and Kansas, 
the agricultural implement and machine industry accounted for four 
per cent of the total industrial production of the area in 1860. 
In Illinois the corresponding share was eight per cent, and no other 
sector of industry contributed such a large share of the processing 
value. In 1856 the agricultural machine industry in Chicago ac­
counted for no less than eleven per cent of the town’s industrial 
processing value, while the food industries (meat-packing, mills, 
distilleries and breweries) which are usually emphasised as being 
typical sectors of industry in Chicago, together constituted only six 
per cent. The production of harvesters was the really large item 
in the agricultural machine industry. In Illinois 42 per cent of the 
production value of the branch of industry came from the harvester 
production, while the corresponding figure for Chicago was no less 
than 78 per cent. In 1856 McCormick produced 70 per cent of all 
the harvesters in Chicago. McCormick’s industries and the many 
other harvester companies which later came to the Chicago area 
contributed in the highest degree to the fantastically rapid growth 
of the town. With the aid of the harvesters the wheat wave rolled 
westwards, with mill industries and towns being established in the 
whole of the prairie area as a result: Cincinnati in Ohio, Indiana­
polis in Indiana, Chicago in Illinois, Milwaukee in Wisconsin, St. 
Louis in Missouri, Des Moines in Iowa, Minneapolis in Minnesota, 
Kansas City in Kansas and Omaha in Nebraska. By the middle of 
the 1870s the USA had become the world’s largest producer of 
food. The total value of American agricultural machines in 1880 
amounted to 900 million dollars, and the production value of the 
farming products which were produced yearly thanks to these ma­
chines was estimated at the same time at not less than 7 thousand 
million dollars.151
Thus orders from agriculture for agrarian technology generated
151 Paul A. David., The Mechanization of Reaping in the Ante-bellum Midwest. 
In Industrialization in Two Systems. Essays in Honor of Alexander Gerschenkron 
led. Henry Rosovsky), pp. 4ff. Casson, H. N., The Romance of the Reaper, 
pp. 43 ff.
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enormously vigorous growth in the American economy during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. It may therefore justly be 
asked why the harvester, as the principal manifestation of agrarian 
technology, began to spread just at the middle of the 1850s. David 
has studied this question in the essay referred to above, and has 
come up with something of interest which helps to explain the 
situation. The fundamental conditions for a transition from harvest­
ing methods involving intensive labour to those involving intensive 
use of machinery indeed became, as has been pointed out in an 
earlier context, especially favourable in the North-Western prairie 
area of the USA from the 1830s onwards. The commercialisation 
and mechanisation of prairie farming were then promoted by con­
tributory factors sush as rapidly growing markets and improved 
transport to the market centres, and also rich supplies of land 
which was well-suited to agrarian technology. According to David, 
earlier research in economic history has neglected the important 
task of analysing the specific market forces which did not attract 
the farmers to adopt the harvester technique to any great extent 
until the 1850s: “To be sure, virtually all the standard accounts of 
the development of agriculture in the United States up to 1860 
mention the introduction of the machines that Obed Hussey and 
Cyrus H. McCormick had invented in the 1830s. Yet the literature 
remains surprisingly vague about the specific technical and econom­
ic considerations touching the adoption of these devices by Amer­
ican farmers. We have called attention to the fact that although the 
twenty years prior to 1853 had witnessed a slow limited diffusion 
of the new technique, the first major wave of popular acceptance 
of the reaper was concentrated in the mid 1850s.”152 One explana­
tion for the slow pace at which the harvester was adopted after 
1830 could be that McCormick and Hussey, through their patents 
and limited production capacity up to 1848, blocked the supply 
of harvesters. But David maintains that the obstacles to the diffu­
sion of the harvester were to be found on the demand side rather 
than on the supply side in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
and he sought to explain the increase in the diffusion of the har­
vester after 1853 by stressing two factors.
152 David, P. A., ibid., quotation at p. 9.
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Figure 3
First, the cost of harvesting labour during the 1850s rose faster 
than the cost of a harvester. During the period 1849-53 the cost of 
a harvester was equivalent to about 98 working days, while the 
corresponding cost in 1854-57 was only equivalent to about 74
250
working days (this applies to Illinois, see figure 3). David has based 
his calculations here on a depreciation period for a harvester of ten 
years. In 98 working days in 1849-53 a farmer could harvest up 
to 46 acres of grain with the manual method as the most profit­
able alternative, but it was more profitable to harvest by machine 
when the grain acreage was greater than 46 acres. On the other 
hand in 1854-57 over 74 working days it had become profitable to 
harvest only up to 35 acres manually. Thus the threshold value for 
the farms in Illinois which could profitably adopt the harvester 
technique fell from 46 acres of land sown with grain in 1849-53 
to 35 acres in 1854-57, and it was more advantageous even for 
smaller farmers to mechanise the harvesting work.
Secondly, the development meant that the acreage sown with 
grain on average for the farms in Illinois rose from 25 acres at 
the beginning of the 1850s to 30 acres towards the end of the 
decade. The possibility of gathering in larger harvests mechanically 
in a faster and safer way persuaded farmers gradually to sow larger 
acreages with grain. Thus the adoption of the mechanical harvester 
before the Civil War was due both to the fact that acreages on the 
farms sown with grain increased on average and the fact that the 
lower limit of profitability for harvesting the acreages of the farms 
by machine during the 1850s was moved downwards. As the aver­
age acreage for the cultivation of grain on the farms in Illinois 
in 1849-53 was 25 acres, it proved to be profitable to mechanise 
the harvesting only on farms which were more than 20 acres larger 
than the average. Thus at the start of the 1850s the gap was wide. 
For the period 1854-57 when the average acreage had risen to 30 
acres it had become profitable to mechanise the harvesting stage 
for all farmers who had grain acreages of only five acres above 
the average, and so the gap had been sharply reduced.
The comparative development in the cost of the harvester in 
relation to work resulting in the change in the profitability limit of 
mechanisation accounts more for the spread of the harvester, ac­
cording to David, than does the increase in the average grain acre­
age (see figure 3). David further maintains that the relationship 
between the explanatory factors mentioned above probably applied 
to the whole of the Middle-West. In Illinois in fact the average 
total acreage (i.e. not just the grain acreage) of the farms increased
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much more between 1850 and 1860 than it did in the neighbouring 
states. In spite of the fact that the average acreage of the farms 
during the 1850s increased most noticeably in Illinois, only a small 
part of the harvester’s expansion in the state over the same period 
was attributable to this. The relationship between the respective 
costs of harvesting technology and manual methods in Illinois be­
came decisive for the spread of the harvester. If the comparatively 
modest increase in the acreage per farm in Illinois’ neighbouring 
states is borne in mind, it then seems plausible to David that 
the development in the comparative cost of machine and manual 
work was there too the factor which most precipitated the curve 
of the harvester’s spread.153
The comparative rise in the cost of labour in the Middle-West 
during the 1850s was not entirely due to an increase in the demand 
for farm labour to cultivate the area. The pressure of the demand 
was also caused by the labour requirements for the construction 
of the railroads and for town development which finally depended 
on a constant stream of settlers and on an anticipated growth of the 
farming capacity of the Middle-West. Since as a rule the contribu­
tions of labour gave a much higher yield proportionally in the in­
dustrial sector than in the agricultural sector, the replacement of 
manual labour in the Middle-West by the harvester meant signif­
icant profits from the transfer for the national economy.154
153 Ibid., pp. I9ff. From 1850 to 1860 the average size (total) in Illinois increased 
from 66 to 91 acres, while the corresponding increase in Indiana was from 53 to 
62 acres, in Iowa from 56 to 62 acres and in Wisconsin from 52 to 54 acres.
154 Bellerby, J. R., Agriculture und Industry Relative Income, pp. 232 ff. Zimmerman, 
L. J., Poor Lands, Rich Lands. Ihe Widening Gap, pp. 48ff. Martinius, S., Befolk- 
ningsrörlighet under industrialismens inledningsskede i Sverige, pp. 87 f.
The lower contribution by agriculture to the national income per capita was not 
exceptional for American conditions at the middle of the 19th century. There are 
corroborative reports from most countries to the effect that labour productivity in 
agriculture had been consistently lower than in other sectors. The statistical basis 
for the figures given below is such that it does not permit very far-reaching con­
clusions to be drawn as far as details are concerned. However the main trend is 
so apparent and so constant that it seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that 
agriculture made a much lower contribution to the national income than other 
sectors of industry.
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Around 1850 New York State and Pennsylvania were the lead­
ing wheat states, but during the 1850s the Middle-West began to 
take over the rôle of the granary of the USA. In 1860 Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin accounted for half of the 
country's wheat harvest.155 If the harvests from Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri and Kansas are also included in the Middle-West’s share, 
this would probably have amounted to 75 per cent at the start of 
the Civil War. By virtue of the fact that an ever increasing part 
of the wheat cultivation moved towards the Middle-West, the wheat 
could be harvested with machines which did not have to be adapted 
both to the hilly districts in the East and the prairie plains in the 
West. Attempts were made with the first harvesters to make them 
suit the needs both of the prairie states and the Atlantic states. 
The development thus implied possibilities of a simplified and more 
standardised production of harvesters on a larger scale. Something 
paradoxical happened in that the tendency towards regional special­
isation in the cultivation of grain made it possible to produce farm­
ing machines more effectively. Through this the expansion of 
mechanised farming and industrial development in the Middle-West 
were advanced.
In his explanation of the adaptation of the harvester David has 
not taken into account such reasons for the mechanisation as the 
reduction in harvest losses when the harvesting is carried out 
mechanically. Because of the harvester the harvests could be 
brought in more quickly and therefore more safely. The shorter
Ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural income per capita in United States, Britain, 
Japan and Sweden
Period USA U.K. Japan Sweden(Year)
1851-1860 37 44 33 (1860)
1861-1870 39 48 37 (1870)
1871-1880 37 43 40 (1880)
1881-1890 37 43 33 41 (1890)
1891-1900 45 42 39 40 (1900)
1901-1910 46 43 40 45 (1910)
1911-1920 42 44 42 45 (1920)
Source: Bellerby, op. cit., p. 214: Zimmerman, op . cit., p. 51.
155 Yearbook of Agriculture 1940, p. 203. Edwards, E. E., American Agriculture— 
The First 300 Years.
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the time for which the ripe grain had to remain on the fields the 
smaller the risk of wastage due to overripeness or unfavourable 
weather. The further technical development of the harvester into 
the self-binder and the combine harvester has lent further weight 
to such reasons for mechanisation. This means that, irrespective of 
other socio-economic conditions, areas which use harvesting 
methods with an intensive use of labour can already secure future 
profits in changing over to mechanical harvesting by reducing the 
wastage.
Also in practice the farmers did not react to the new harvesting 
techniques in strict accordance with a pattern of linear cost func­
tions as David assumed. With regard to the fact that farmers as 
people carrying on a trade are and have been pronounced in­
dividualists, the rapidity with which they adopt new techniques has 
been due to factors other than those in which purely economic 
considerations predominated. The farmers came to accept technical 
innovations in agriculture via the following stages of develop­
ment: information-awareness-interest-deliberation-attempt-adop­
tion, where adoption signifies the final stage in the acceptance of 
the innovation. Apart from economic deliberation by the individual 
farmer, the sum of his personal attributes has determined the speed 
with which a new technique is adopted. As appears from figure 4, 
the farmers’ inclination to adopt an innovation can be represented 
schematically by a bell-shaped curve, the pioneers being the first 
and the laggards the last to adopt the innovation, the shape of 
the curve being determined both by economic factors and factors 
of social psychology.156
The next figure shows how the most important models of the 
harvester, when it had been further developed, were distributed 
among the leading wheat states in the USA during the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. It was technically possible to develop 
the harvester in an entirely different way from the mowing- 
machine. The further development did not involve the actual cutter 
but mainly concerned labour-saving methods of safeguarding the 
cut grain. The first type of harvester (the hand-rake reaper) re-
156 Metcalf, D., The Economics of Agriculture, pp. 64 ff. Jones, G., ‘The Diffusion 
of Agricultural Innovations.' In Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 15, 1963.
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quired that one man with a rake should gather the grain together 
for the worker who bound the sheaves. The self-rake reaper 
eliminated the hand-rake. The Marsh Harvester was a forerunner of 
the self-binder and it rationalised the binding by delivering the cut 
grain to two binders which bound the sheaves on an accompany­
ing platform at the same pace as the machine cut the grain. 
Through the application of a binding machine to harvesters of the 
Marsh Harvester type, the binding process was also automated 
and the binding workers were rationalised away. The first self­
binding models used steel wire in the binding. However, the steel 
wire caused damage of various kinds, and after complaints from 
farmers and mill-owners there was soon a change from steel wire 
to twine. The combination model, the combine harvester, which 
was the most fully automated machine, already began to be used 
regularly on the large holdings in California before 1890 and be­
came comparatively widespread there during the 1890s. It is 
estimated that two-thirds of California’s wheat was harvested with 
combine harvesters in 1900. Thereafter the wheat-producing farms 
in California split their production into fruit and vegetable cultiva­
tion and also dairy production. As a result of this the production 
of wheat was reduced drastically in California, and therefore the 
demand for combine harvesters declined rapidly. Outside California 
there were hardly any combine harvesters at this time and the 
combine harvester was not again put to use until the period be-
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tween the wars, and then in the prairie states to begin 
with.157
If the pattern of adoption in figure 3 is applied to the develop­
ment in figure 5, the result is that the first type of harvesting 
machine (the hand-rake reaper) for a comparatively long time— 
from 1840 to 1855—was only adopted in the leading wheat states 
of the USA by a small group of farmers, the nearest equivalent 
to pioneers and early adopters in figure 4. Thereafter harvesting 
machine technology was disseminated at a significantly increased 
pace. When newer and more labour-saving variations were later 
introduced onto the market, they could be ordered with much less 
hesitation after the breakthrough of the hand-rake reaper. It is 
reasonable to assume that the pioneers and early adopters of the 
hand-rake reaper as a rule also became the first to buy the self­
rake reaper and the self-binder when these were introduced. How­
ever the self-rake reaper and to an even greater extent the self- 
binder were subsequently adopted by the majority of farmers much 
faster than the hand-rake reaper. In what was decidedly the wheat
157 Rogin, L., op. cit., pp. 94-125. International Harvester Co., Roots in Chicago 
One Hundred Years Deep 1847-1947, pp. 15 f.
The development of the rate of diffusion for the improved models of the har­
vester during the latter part of the 19th century has for the sake of comparison 
been dealt with at the same time as the pattern of diffusion for the first type of 
harvester before the Civil War.
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district the adoption process showed comparatively large differ­
ences as regards time. One must therefore take into account the 
fact that several of the prairie farmers who were most knowledge­
able about agrarian technology for example bought the self-rake 
reaper before the laggards had yet got the hand-rake reaper, and 
that the pioneers invested in the self-binder before the laggards 
had ordered the self-rake reaper. Furthermore it should be remem­
bered that figure 5 shows the development of adoption patterns 
for different harvesting machines in the wheat district north-west of 
the Ohio River which was the most progressive as regards agrarian 
technology. As far as the New England states are concerned, for 
example, in which farming was mechanised later and to a lesser 
degree, a time-lag of 10-15 years in the adoption curves and a gener­
ally slower rate of adoption should be taken into account. With cer­
tain simplifications one could say that the pioneers in the New Eng­
land states and the laggards in the prairie states adopted the new 
agrarian technology at about the same time.
As has been pointed out earlier, David has sought to explain the 
breakthrough in the spread of the hand-rake reaper mainly in terms 
of comparative cost development for labour and harvesting tech­
nology. Even if he has disregarded several possible reasons—men­
tioned here in part—for a transition to mechanised farming, various 
data about the sales of harvesters appear on the whole to support 
David’s argument. This of course may be due to the fact that the 
reasons for the adoption of agrarian technology which David has 
not taken into account in his explanation pointed in the same 
direction on the whole as the variables in his explanation. In any 
case David is right about the breakthrough in the spread of the 
harvester occurring around 1853-54. McCormick’s sales of har­
vesters showed a tendency to stagnate at the beginning of the 1850s 
but expanded rapidly after 1853, as is evident from table 59. In 
addition if one takes into account the fact that J. H. Manny from 
1854 onwards and W. A. Wood from 1856 onwards, together with 
many small, newly established companies contributed considerable 
and increasing quantities of harvesters during the 1850s, it is under­
standable that the total figures for harvesters began to shoot up in 
the middle of the 1850s. In the prairie district the farmers in Illi­
nois were the quickest to adopt the harvester. Before 1860 McCor-
17-742579 Kuuse 257
mick sold half of his harvesters in Illinois where the farms on 
average were larger and had more to gain from mechanisation than 
those in the neighbouring states (cf. note 153). From Illinois it 
appears that a more significant adoption of harvesters spread 
primarily to Iowa and Wisconsin/Minnesota and also thereafter to 
a somewhat lesser extent to the states of Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, 
Missouri, Kansas and Nebraska.
As various innovationary improvements of the harvester were 
gradually being introduced onto the market the farmers' inclination 
to adopt the new technology was affected. In spite of the fact that 
improved variations such as the self-rake reaper and the self-binder 
became more expensive than the original hand-rake reaper for a 
few decades, the new models nevertheless became cheaper than the 
old one by virtue of the fact that they reduced labour costs. As 
appears from figure 3, the self-rake reaper and in particular the 
self-binder could profitably be used by smaller and smaller farms. 
Even if the Homstead Law after 1862 to a certain extent laid down 
the limits for the future expansion of the farms, the average acreage 
of the farms, especially in the area north-west of the Ohio River, 
continued to expand during the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury, a tendency which had begun during the 1850s. This further 
contributed to the fact that the new types of machine, the self-rake 
reaper and the self-binder, could be adopted so quickly by the 
many prairie farmers. In the long run the new machines would be 
cheaper even in terms of their money value than the original hand- 
reaper had been in the 1850s, while in the long-term the cost of 
labour rose sharply. As a result the spread of the new machines 
was also stimulated, as will be discussed more fully below.158
158 The following prices relate to McCormick sales of various harvesters in the USA.
Type of machine 1850 1870 1880 1900 1905
Hand-rake reaper $120 - - - -
Self-rake reaper - $150 - $65 $50
Self-binder - - $200 $110 $100
The figures for 1905 include not only McCormick’s sales but the whole of Inter­
national Harvester’s. Various kinds of rebate were in operation, and in addition 
the predominant hire-purchase system exercised a modifying effect on the price 
mechanism.
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(id) The harvester and the American Civil War
The conflict between America’s Northern and Southern states in 
1861-1865 originated in the differences in their economic develop­
ment. The Southern states based their economy on agricultural 
products such as cotton, tobacco, rice and sugar, with cotton as 
the completely dominant export product. Even if the majority of the 
white farmers in the Southern states were smallholders, it was the 
plantation owners who dominated the economic, social and political 
life of the South. Before 1860 the Southern states had only been 
industrialised to a lesser extent, and the need for industrial goods 
was mainly met by imports. The Northern states on the other hand 
had developed an industry in the North-East, with New York and 
Philadelphia as the commercial centres. Through east-west canals 
and railroads the Middle-West had been more and more integrated 
with the economy in the North-East before 1860 as far as marketing 
was concerned. The areas in the North-East and North-West were 
complementary to each other. In the North-East industry was 
linked to agricultural development to a lesser extent, while industry 
in the North-West was firmly anchored to the farming sector. Grain, 
especially wheat, constituted the core of the Middle-West’s agricul­
tural economy.
The divergence in economic development led to conflicting in­
terests in the North and South. On account of the exports of cotton 
to England and the imports of manufactured goods from there, the 
Southern states supported the free trade principle. The Northern 
states, on the other hand, wanted to protect their growing domestic 
industry behind high tariff walls. The cotton and slave economy 
in the South constantly demanded newly cultivated land and needed 
space for a rapid expansion westwards. In addition there was a 
desire to see the expansion of new slave districts to the West. 
Therefore during the first half of the nineteenth century the prin­
ciple of cheap sales of land was in operation in the Southern states. 
On the other hand the manufacturers in the North, in order to safe­
guard their markets wanted to concentrate on the population in the 
East. Before 1860 there was no desire in the North to encourage 
too large an emigration westwards, and therefore higher land prices 
and what was on the whole a more restricted land selling policy 
were being advocated. As a result of this the frontier was being
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moved westwards faster in the South than in the North before the 
Civil War. It was not until California joined the group of states 
opposed to slavery in 1850 that the Northern states began to accept 
and encourage a more significant emigration westwards as a 
blockade measure against the expansionism of the South and the 
slave states. When Minnesota in 1858, Oregon in 1859 and Kansas 
in 1861 were admitted into the Union as anti-slave states, this con­
stituted a stage in the struggle of the Northern states. The aim 
of the Homestead Act in 1862, which provided that farmers could 
get up to 160 acres (quarter section) of land free of charge, was to 
meet the demands of the free farmers at the expense of the plan­
tation and slave owners. The law which was forced through by 
industrially interested parties in the North-East signified a formal 
and definitive change in attitude to the migration westwards. In­
dustry in the Northern states had thought it convenient to establish 
a union with the free farmers in the North-West in the struggle 
against the Southern states.159
The farms to the north-west of the Ohio River at the outbreak of 
the Civil War were in the process of developing into the centre of 
the nation’s agrarian economy. Around 1860 70 per cent of the 
USÄ’s wheat was grown in the Middle-West, and Rogin estimates 
that at that time 70 per cent of the wheat in the Middle-West was 
harvested by machine.160 The 1850s had been a decade of expansion 
for agriculture in the Middle-West, and at that time the harvesting 
machine was able to make its breakthrough in the most advanced 
prairie districts, above all in Illinois. Around 1850 two thousand out 
of a total of about 76000 farms in Illinois were equipped with har­
vesters. Out of about 143 000 farms which were in existence in 
1861 about 40000 had adopted the new harvesting technology.161 
This meant that the distribution of the harvester among the farms 
of Illinois had risen from about 3 per cent in 1850 to almost 30
159 Faulkner, H. U., American Economic History, pp. 306 ff.
wo Rogin, L., op. cit., pp. 78f. David, P. A., Mechanization of Reaping in the 
Ante-bellum Midwest, pp. IOf. David thinks that Rogin has somewhat overestimated 
the level of mechanisation in the Middle-West around 1860. and seeks to modify 
Rogin’s percentage figure to between 50 and 70 per cent.
161 David, P. A., op. cit.. pp. 38 f. McCormick Collection. McCormick alone had 
sold 20 000 harvesters in Illinois up to 1861.
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per cent in 1861. It was the third of the farms which gained the 
greatest acreage which had mechanised the harvesting at the out­
break of the Civil War, and this third accounted for seventy per 
cent of all the wheat harvested in that state.
In the few years of the duration of the Civil War McCormick 
sold 24 000 harvesting machines compared with a total of 35000 
before the war. However, McCormick's share of the market 
decreased significantly during the 1860s. Before the Civil War his 
share had amounted to about a third, but during the Civil War the 
demand for harvesters increased so that he could only cover a sixth 
of the market in spite of the fact that he doubled his capacity. It 
is estimated that in all 100000 harvesters were sold between 1833 
and 1860, while total sales during the four war years alone amount­
ed to 150000 harvesting machines. Furthermore there was an addi­
tion of a significant number of mowing-machines and combined har­
vesting and mowing machines.162 The harvesting machine was also
162 McCormick Collection: Reaper Sales, Reaper Orders (see table 59). Rogin, L., 
op. cit., pp. 78 f., pp. 91 ff.
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being improved in the middle of the 1850s in a way which became 
of great economic significance during the Civil War. In 1854 various 
firms started to sell self-rake reapers on a small scale. However, it 
was not until 1861 when Wood in the East and McCormick in the 
West began to produce self-rake reapers that these could circulate 
on a larger scale. The self-rake reaper brought about an important 
saving of human labour, as the hand-raker became redundant. The 
saving of labour, which was always a minor production factor in 
the North, became of special importance in time of war. The rapid 
increase in McCormick’s production of the self-rake reaper illus­
trates the development during the Civil War. In 1861 self-rake 
reapers constituted 0.2 per cent of the total harvesting machine 
production. The corresponding percentage in 1862 was 4 per cent, 
in 1863 it was 50 per cent, and in 1864 67 per cent.163
It has been estimated that at the outbreak of the Civil War 
harvesting machines of all kinds carried out work equivalent to 
that of almost a million harvest workers with hand tools. “Careful 
estimates determined that the number of reaping machines intro­
duced throughout the country up to the beginning of the great 
rebellion, performed an amount of labor while working in harvest 
nearly equal to a million of men with hand implements.” Towards 
the end of the war the harvesting machines would by analogy have 
been equivalent to two million men in harvest work.164 In com­
parison it may be mentioned that in the final stages of the war the 
Northern states employed a total of 1.5 million soldiers as against 
0.7 million for the Southern states. However, the harvesting 
machine was extremely unevenly distributed in the country around 
1860. 86 per cent of McCormick’s sales of harvesters were con­
centrated in the prairies north-west of the Ohio River, and during 
the Civil War in the area in question an even larger share or 93 
per cent of his harvesting machine production was ordered. How­
ever McCormick’s share of the market decreased during the war,
163 Rogin, L., op.cit., p. 79. Rogin refers to an expert on agricultural machines, 
ment of Agriculture in 1864 there was a large number of companies (187) which 
together produced 100000 harvesters and mowing machines.
164 Rogin, L., op.cit., p. 79. Rogin refers to an expert on agricultural machines, 
J. J. Thomas, who among other things was editor of the agricultural paper Country 
Gentleman.
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since many new agricultural machine companies had been estab­
lished beforehand. The new companies had mainly been located in 
prairie states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio, but also 
in states in the North-East, where New York State produced a 
significant number of harvesters. Even if a large part of the produc­
tion in the East was delivered to the prairie area in the West, a 
comparatively large number of harvesters remained in states like 
New York and Pennsylvania. Thus if the total number of harvesters 
is under consideration, McCormick’s figures give a somewhat ex­
aggerated picture of the importance of the prairie area as a pur­
chaser of harvesters. As regards the picture of distribution for all 
machines, a certain adjustment from north-west to north-east ought 
to be made in McCormick’s distribution pattern. But it is only a 
question of a small adjustment, and almost entirely within the 
Northern states. Before and during the Civil War the overwhelming 
majority of harvesters in the USA were ordered for the farms in the 
North, and the farms in the South accounted for 1 or 2 per cent 
at the most.
The economy of the South was based on cotton to a large extent. 
Various attempts were made to mechanise the cotton-growing in 
the South, and technological progress was not lacking after E. 
Whitney’s cotton-gin. But it was not possible to make the same 
sweeping profits from mechanisation in the South as on the farms 
in the North. This was partly due to the slave system and the 
limited possibilities of slave labour with its incapacity to take and have 
responsibility for more advanced farming machinery and organise 
mechanised farming production. Another important cause was that 
the purely technical problems connected with mechanised cotton 
growing and other farm production in the South remained unsolved 
for a long time. The harvesting operation was the bottleneck in 
cotton production, but it was so difficult to construct suitable cot­
ton-picking machines that no appropriate technical solution was 
found until well into the twentieth century. Because of the irregular 
environments for cultivation it proved difficult to construct labour- 
saving machines for other forms of farming in the South such as on 
tobacco, sugar and rice plantations. Agriculture in the Northern 
states was concentrated on grain production and the cultivation 
could be standardised technically to a far greater extent, and was
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therefore from a technical point of view more rewarding to mech­
anise.165
The growing interaction between agriculture and industry in the 
North and above all in the North-West contrasted significantly with 
the undifferentiated agricultural economy in the South. Before and 
during the Civil War the interaction between industry and agricul­
ture in the prairie area led to important profits for the national 
economy. Due to a chain of causation the rise of an agricultural 
machine industry was promoted by the great purchasing power of 
prairie farming in placing orders for agrarian technology. The same 
industry supplied a commercially expanding agriculture with 
various labour-saving machines. By these means productivity was 
increased in the farming sector, but in addition the limited labour 
force could be transferred more rapidly from farming to other sec­
tors of society which were still more productive. In this respect 
the harvester played the strategic rôle among the agricultural 
machines, but the process of mechanisation which went on at the 
same time should also be stressed. Before the Civil War the larger 
farms in the North had mechanised various stages of operations 
such as the preparation of the soil, the sowing, harvesting and 
threshing. During the Civil War the mechanisation spread rapidly 
even to small farms. Many onerous procedures in the seasonal 
rhythm of agriculture which had previously had to be carried out 
by hand were effected in the North instead by a combination of 
draught animals and machines. Therefore when necessary the re­
maining less arduous operations could be carried out to a large ex­
tent by women and children.
The start of the process of mechanisation in prairie farming 
should certainly not be regarded as a measure within the framework 
of preparation for economic defence. The mechanisation had begun 
on the basis of commercial economic estimates in a peace 
economy. But during the Civil War the mechanisation brought about 
an immediately increased state of preparedness. Thanks to the pro­
gress of mechanisation the prairie district was better able than the 
Southern states, and also better able than the North-Eastern states, 
to economise over the labour force supply in the changeover to
185 Street. J. H., op. fit., chapters 5 and 6. Cf. note 125.
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Map 12. Percentage of increase of all farm property, by states, 1860-1870.
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a war economy. Already in the years of peace immediately preced­
ing the Civil War in the prairie states there had been a commence­
ment of the reduction of the agricultural labour force and a replace­
ment of it with machines, which had resulted in a yield which 
was unchanged or increased. When in wartime it became a case 
of putting an army quickly on its feet and supplying it with 
food, this meant no real process of readjustment for the North- 
Western states, but rather the continuation of a development which 
had already begun. It was only necessary to speed up the rate of 
progress. The harvester was the principal labour-saving farm ma­
chine and the introduction of the improved self-rake reaper around 
1860 in itself meant that millions of working hours could be saved 
in the North during the Civil War by virtue of the fact that tens 
of thousands of hand-rakers no longer had to be used in harvest­
ing. During the war orders for harvesting machines increased 
rapidly, and during the war years McCormick doubled his yearly 
sales in comparison with the previous decade. Nevertheless Mc­
Cormick lost half his share of the market during the war. Compared
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with the preceding period the total annual sales were quadrupled 
during the war. Table 58 shows that McCormick's sales increase 
during the war only took place in the prairie area of the Northern 
states. In Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota the annual sales were 
quadrupled, while in Illinois and Indiana they were doubled. It is 
notable that sales to the slave state of Missouri which was neutral 
in the war fell considerably during the war. After the end of the 
war Missouri received significant supplies of harvesters from 
McCormick and the state became one of the largest customers for 
harvesters in the South-Western prairie area.
In spite of war time the spread of the harvesting machine re­
sulted in grain surpluses, above all on the farms north-west of the 
Ohio River. In 1860-1862 significant export quantities of wheat 
were shipped to Britain, whose own harvests at that time fell below 
the normal figure.166 In England there were divergent opinions 
about whether to maintain a position of neutrality towards the 
Civil War. There were sympathisers with the Southern states in 
many leading English circles, and there was a desire to see the 
collapse of the American Republic. However, Britain’s trade posi­
tion at the beginning of the Civil War was such that she stood to 
gain more from trade with the Northern than with the Southern 
states. Britain had increased her stocks of cotton through large 
purchases from the Southern states in 1860. At the same time there 
was an apparent grain shortage, and when Britain had to choose 
between cotton and wheat there was only one possible decision. 
The highly mechanised American agriculture in the North-West 
could meet England’s grain requirements, and thereby contributed 
to the neutrality of Great Britain in the American domestic conflict. 
The British balancing act between wheat and cotton during the Civil 
War has been described by E. D. Fite in the following terms: 
“It may safely be concluded that while the need of grain would 
not have prevented England from defending herself from a war of 
aggression by the United States, it was doubtless one of the fac­
tors, and an important one, in preventing aggressive demonstra-
166 Faulkner, H. U.. American Economic History, pp. 328ff. Rasmussen, W. D., 
‘The Civil War: A Catalyst of Agricultural Revolution.’ In Agricultural History, Octo­
ber 1965.
266
tions by England in favor of the Confederacy and against the 
United States.”167
The total economic power of the Northern states was superior 
to that of the Southern states during the Civil War. Various in­
dustries in the North were stimulated by the war. The wool, leather 
and armaments industries received large orders from the army and 
helped to decide the course of the war. The production of small 
arms had been rationalised, and they could be mass-produced on 
the basis of E. Whitney’s original principle of interchangeable parts. 
The outcome of the war—provided that Great Britain did not inter­
fere in the conflict—was therefore plain in the long run. The out­
come of the war has usually been accounted for by referring to 
the industrial superiority of the Northern states. It has also been 
said that the financially powerful metropolises in the North-East, 
with New York at their head, were able as middlemen to control 
the important trade between the Southern states and Europe, a 
control which the Northern states developed into an economic 
blockade of the Southern states during the war. These explanations 
are true in themselves but there is good reason for underlining a 
further important explanatory factor. The cotton in the South was 
defeated to the same great extent by the wheat and the harvest­
ing machine in the North-West as by the capital and industry in 
the North-East. The interaction between industry and agriculture 
in the North-West generated enormous forces of growth immedi­
ately before and during the Civil War by virtue of the fact that 
agriculture, the dominant sector there, was being mechanised and 
commercialised. Industry in the North-East certainly also expanded 
during the 1850s and 1860s, but at that time it was still inferior 
to English industry. When the Southern states came into conflict 
with prairie farming in the North-West during the war they had to 
fight against the world’s most efficient agriculture, which was able 
to adapt rapidly to the conditions of a war economy. The Northern 
states found it much easier to advance along the Western rather 
than the Eastern frontier, and even if troops are mobile units the 
course of the war seems to show that it was easier to meet the
167 Fite, E. D., Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil 
War, quotation at p. 21.
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new war situation in the North-West. The fact that it was possible 
to increase grain production in wartime to such an extent that 
wheat could be exported to England, who was at that time greatly 
in need of imported wheat, further underlines the economic and 
political effects of the new harvesting technology. It probably made 
an effective contribution to the fact that the conflict was limited 
to a civil war without interference from foreign powers.
(e) The spread of the harvester outside the USA before 1900
The first harvesting machines were constructed in England and 
Scotland in the years immediately before and after 1800. However, 
as has already been seen, practical application of the harvester was 
first made in American agriculture. In itself there was no lack of 
incentive for the English farmers to adopt the technical innovations 
in farming in their native land. During the nineteenth century Eng­
land’s consumption of wheat had been supplied by imports to an 
increasing extent. The proportion of imports grew from a modest 
3 per cent, during the twenty year period from 1811 to 1830, to 
13 per cent in 1831-1850 and to 30 per cent in 1851-1860. At 
the end of the nineteenth century the proportion of imports 
approached 80 per cent. In spite of the fact that the grain producers 
in England could count on good and secure sales markets, the 
work of harvesting was still carried out in the world’s leading 
industrial nation in the middle of the nineteenth century in the same 
primitive way as it had been carried out for a thousand years. At 
the world fair at London’s Crystal Palace in 1851 the harvesting 
machines of Hussey and McCormick which were exhibited took the 
English by surprise. The Times wrote lyrical articles about the 
blessings of the harvester. It was for two main reasons that Eng­
land adopted the harvester technology later, more slowly and to a 
lesser extent than the USA. First, the supply of farm labour was 
larger in England than in the USA, while the supply of land was 
much smaller in England. Secondly, England had no equivalent to 
the large, smooth plains of the Middle-West. The rapid spread of 
the harvester in American agriculture is in clear contrast to the 
slow spread in England. While only one per cent of the grain in 
the USA was mechanically harvested around 1850, the correspond-
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ing proportion in 1860 had risen to over 50 per cent for the Middle- 
West and to 80 per cent for the whole nation in 1870. It is 
estimated that in England only 6 per cent of the grain was cut by 
machine in 1863. It was not until the middle of the 1870s that the 
corresponding proportion is estimated to have risen to 40 per cent. 
It was mainly the comparatively few large English estates which 
had mechanised the work of harvesting at that time, but together 
they accounted for a considerable share of the domestic grain 
production.168 In contrast to the USA agricultural power in England 
was thus limited to a comparatively small number of farms. On the 
whole the purchasing power of the rest of European agriculture 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century was limited to a
168 Bairoch, P., Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution 1790-1914, pp. 35 f. David, 
P. A.. The Landscape and the Machine: Mechanization of the Corn Harvest in 
Victorian Britain. In Essays on a Mature Economy (ed. D. N. McCloskey), 
pp. 147 f.
"The progressive Lothians formed a British topographical counterpart to the 
American Midwest, but—unlike the latter region—carried little quantitative weight 
on the national farming scene . . . One cannot understand the divergence between 
British and American experience during the third quarter of the nineteenth century 
without observing that the landscape of Britain’s principal grain-producing districts 
was on balance inimical to the immediate successful introduction of the mechanical 
innovation that had been suddenly brought to the attention of her farmers through 
the medium of the Great Exhibition. In the United States the broad, level and 
stone-free prairies of the Midwest, where grain production was becoming in­
creasingly concentrated even before the Civil War, provided extensive regions whose 
topography was singularly well suited to the operation of horse-drawn machines 
in field work. As I have elsewhere shown [Paul A. David: The Mechanization of 
Reaping in the Ante-bellum Midwest. Cf. notes 152 and 153] so technically hospitable 
an environment in itself was not sufficient to induce the farmers of the American 
Midwest to abandon hand methods of harvesting the small grains prior to the 1850s. 
On the other hand, the favourable physical conditions did mean that during the 
1850s—when an alteration of the structure of Midwestern factor prices combined 
with a rise in average farm acreage devoted to small grain crops, providing a 
stronger inducement to substitute machinery for labour on the region’s farms—the 
mechanization of the harvest could proceed without the limitations that terrain 
problems would have imposed, and actually did impose in sections of the Northeast 
and the seabord South.” According to David small and medium-sized farming units 
dominated English agriculture around 1850. Only about 17 000 farms, equivalent to 
7.5 per cent of all the farms in England and Wales, were at that time larger than 
300 acres. During the next three decades the relative number of English large 
holdings remained constant (p. 178).
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comparatively small top stratum, and the topographical agricultural 
environment of the continent of Europe was much more like that 
of England than that of the American Middle-West. Therefore the 
American manufacturers of agricultural machines who began selling 
to Europe from the 1850s onwards were compelled to concentrate 
their exports on the comparatively narrow market constituted by 
the top stratum of agriculture. The competition from the growing 
American exports of grain to Europe subdued the inclination of the 
European farmers to invest in agricultural technology and acted for 
a long time as an additional obstacle to a more general spread 
of mechanised agriculture in Europe. During the latter half of the 
nineteenth century the USA became the world’s largest grain pro­
ducer, to a great extent on account of lower production costs than 
in Europe. In spite of the high wage situation in the USA in the 
year 1870 the production cost per bushel of grain there was more 
than 50 per cent lower than in France, who was the second largest 
producer. There was a further sharp increase in the difference in 
production costs between the countries up to 1890. The production 
costs per bushel of wheat in India, who was the world's third 
gr,.in producer, were no lower with her very cheap labour around 
the turn of the nineteenth century than in the highly mechanised 
American agriculture.169
169 Bairoch, V., Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution 1700-1914, p. 36.
The world’s wheat harvest divided among different countries and states in the USA
in the year 1880 Millions of State in Millions of
Country bushels the USA bushels
USA 459 Illinois 51
France 290 Indiana 47
India 240 Ohio 46
Russia 227 Michigan 36
Germany 121 Minnesota 35
Spain 116 Iowa 31
Italy 108 California 29
Austria-Hungary 105 Missouri 25
Great Britain 105 Wisconsin 25
Turkey 43 Pennsylvania 19
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Even though McCormick’s harvesters had great success at the 
world fairs in London in 1851, Paris in 1855, London in 1862, 
Hamburg in 1863, Paris in 1867, Vienna in 1873 and in Paris again 
in 1878, he did not achieve any large and rapid sales successes 
in Europe. European farming, in which the emphasis was on small­
holdings, still had a good supply of cheap labour. There were 
usually few incentives in the prevailing conditions to allow capital 
of a farming technology kind to replace manual labour in a decisive 
way. During the decades immediately after 1851 agricultural 
machines were only exported from the USA to a lesser extent, 
and in the beginning the harvesters and mowing-machines account­
ed for a modest proportion of the limited exports of agricultural 
machines as a whole. McCormick found that it was not profitable 
to export harvesters to Europe, and he therefore decided to let 
the English firm Burgess & Key, of Essex, produce and sell his 
machines under licence and in return for the payment of royalties 
on the sales figures. Through Burgess & Key McCormick was able 
to sell more harvesters in England in 1851-1861 than any other 
producer. After McCormick had opened up the European market 
other American producers followed suit, of whom the more 
prominent were J. H. Manny, Seymour & Morgan and W. A. Wood. 
When McCormick was ready to introduce the self-rake reaper onto 
the market in 1862 after the experimental phase of development, 
he went to Europe for the second time to have it tested in various 
countries. But Burgess & Key were unable in the long run to meet
Rumania 37 Kansas 17
Australia 37 Nebraska 14
Belgium 26 New York 12
Algeria 26
Canada 23
Source Peale’s Educator and Cyclopedia of Reference. R. S. Peale & Co. Chicago. 
Casson, H. N., Cyrus Hall McCormick. His life and work. Pp. 203ff. Mc­
Cormick Harvesting Machine Co., Chicago, Catalogue 1887.
It should be stressed that the number of farmers in France was about as large 
as the number in the USA, while the farmers in several other countries such as 
India and Russia were many times more numerous. A large part of American agricul­
ture was already producing grain for sale and for export in 1880. In Russia only 
a small proportion of the farms were able to produce grain for export at that time. 
The grain exports of France and India were negligible.
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McCormick’s capacity. McCormick therefore got involved in a 
dispute with Burgess & Key, and had to ship the machines from 
Chicago to the continental market in Europe himself with heavy 
transport costs. The events meant a decline in McCormick’s com­
petitiveness, and in 1862 he was overtaken on the European market 
by W. A. Wood. McCormick only sold 4000 harvesters to Europe 
before 1876 and the majority of those were delivered before 1866. 
In the ten year period from 1867 to 1876 McCormick sold no 
more than a thousand harvesters to Europe while over the same 
period Wood outstripped the English harvester manufacturers on the 
Continent. For the sake of comparison it may be mentioned that 
Wood exported 18 000 harvesters to Europe prior to 1870. Wood’s 
production was located in the North-East of the USA and his 
transport economic position vis-a-vis the European market was 
better than McCormick’s.170 The importance of the fact that McCor­
mick had opened the European harvester market in 1851 was not 
due to the drastic increase in the number of machines which were 
in operation on the European farms before the 1880s. If anything his 
successes among technical experts in agriculture in Europe aroused 
still further interest in the American farmers in purchasing harvesters. 
Nor were Wood’s deliveries to Europe before 1880 anything more 
than a drop in the ocean, and the value of the total exports of 
agricultural machines from the USA is shown in table 61.
During the 1880s the character of the American exports of har­
vesters changed. On the one hand they began to grow in volume
170 Hutchinson, W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. II. Harvest 1856-1884, chapter 11. 
The Rise and Fall of the Transatlantic Market 1856-1876. International Harvester 
Co. Roots in Chicago, p. 17. Wilkins, M., The Emergence of Multinational Enter­
prise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914, p. 29.
For a long time the European market played a completely subordinate rôle in 
McCormick's sales. Thus in 25 years (1851-1876) a total of 4 000 machines were 
sold to Europe, while the state of Iowa alone bought more than 4 000 machines 
in 1875 (cf. table 60).
The Walter A. Wood Mowing and Reaping Machinery Co. played an important 
rôle both on the American and the foreign harvester markets, and during the 
1860s, 1870s and 1880s was one of McCormick’s most powerful competitors. Wood 
himself was the driving force in the company, the importance of which declined 
rapidly after his death in 1892. In 1920 the company went into liquidation. Phillips, 
W. G.. op. cit., p. 169, note 4.
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Table 60. Number of McCormick harvesters and mowing-machines (includ­
ing machine parts) sold to various states and countries in 1875-1902
State/Country 1875 1891 1895 1902
Illinois 3 600 18 162 31 514 30 521
Iowa 4 623 12 831 34 275 35 211
Minnesota 3 273 35 098 37 900 35 734
Wisconsin 858 5 007 10 388 20 065
Indiana 647 9 196 14 441 24 827
Missouri 1 293 34 335 7 595 22 331
Ohio 209 15 319 19 952 17 235
Michigan 394 9 072 11 555 16 944
Kansas 614 4 915 5 600 13 157
Nebraska 1 252 12 493 4 069 6 997
North Dakota - 6 738 10 166 13 257
South Dakota - 3 784 7 941 8 480
Pennsylvania - 2 909 10 224 11 609
New York - 3 133 9 091 19 054
Oklahoma - - - 4 035
Texas 498 3 420 5 772 4 902
Tennessee - 4 599 6 279 9 356
Georgia - - - 8 201
Virginia 89 2 701 2 741 4 427
Other Southern states - - 920 6 451
Other states 555 3 424 7 599 19 120
Canada - 1 160 3 725 15 102
Denmark 6 46 556 1 606
Norway - - 271 858
Sweden - 66 430 1 888
Finland - - - 618
Russia - 1 418 2 741 16 137
Germany - 289 785 12 211
France - 189 1 396 14 646
Great Britain - 964 1 163 6 272
The rest of Europe - 29 1 122 7 214
Argentina - 371 720 3 971
The rest of Latin America - - 382 708
South Africa - - 562 621
North Africa - - 38 780
Australia/N. Zealand - 2 790 530 3 112
Total 17 911 196 175 254 172 417658
Source McCormick Collection: Machine Ledgers.
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at that time and on the other hand they began to be directed to­
wards markets other than the European one. Before 1880 the limited 
volume of exports had gone mainly to Europe. The new markets 
were composed of newly colonised areas whose land reclamation 
was made possible by the European emigrants. Between 1850 
and 1930 almost sixty million Europeans emigrated. The emigration 
was greatest between 1880 and 1914, constituting in fact 60 per 
cent of the total. During the period 1850-1880 on average a quarter 
of a million people emigrated each year, while the corresponding 
number in 1881-1900 was three quarters of a million, and in 1901— 
1914 a million and a quarter. In the years 1915-1930 emigration 
declined again to about the same level as during the period from 
1850 to 1880. Somewhat over half of the emigrants went to the 
USA, while about 35 per cent went to Canada, Argentina, Australia 
and New Zealand, Siberia and South Africa. As a rule all the new 
areas were like the USA in that there was an abundance of good 
smooth land and a comparative shortage of labour. Labour-saving 
machines in the dominant agricultural sector therefore became a 
key factor in the economic development of the new areas. The new 
areas lacked any important domestic industry of a farming tech­
nology nature. One exception was Canada who had built up her 
own agricultural machine industry by borrowing agricultural tech­
nology from the USA and through the protection of high tariff 
walls. Therefore American agricultural machine manufacturers were 
able after 1880 to extend the production series to a greater extent 
than before, for an enlarged export.171
During the latter half of the nineteenth century the domestic 
agricultural machine industry in Canada had been located south-east
171 Casson, H. N., Cyrus Hall McCormick. His Life and Work, pp. 203 ff. Carr- 
Saunders, A. N., World Population, p. 49. Phillips, W. G., op.cit., pp. 37ff. The 
number of emigrants to the following countries has been estimated at:
USA
Siberia
Argentina
Canada
Australia+New Zealand 
South Africa
Million
34
7 (before 1914 alone)
6.5 
5
3.5 
1
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Table 61. Exports of agricultural machines from the USA in 1870-1900 in 
thousands of dollars
Year
A=Reapers and
mowers
B=Other
machines C=Total
A as %
of C
1870 66 1 002 1 068 6
1880 769 1 477 2 246 34
1890 2 093 1 766 3 859 54
1900 9 943 6 370 16 313 62
Source Statistical Abstract of the United States. Department of Commerce.
of Ontario, with the Toronto district as its centre point. In Canada 
no significant agricultural innovations of a technical kind were 
made, and many Canadian producers manufactured harvesting 
machines under licence from leading firms in the USA. Most 
prominent in the Canadian industries were the two companies 
Massey Co. and Harris Co., which based their business on har­
vesters and mowing-machines and had been founded by Daniel 
Massey (1847) and John Harris (1859). Protected by virtue of the 
fact that the tariff rates on agricultural machines were raised to 
25 per cent at the end of the 1870s, and further raised to 35 per 
cent of the import value in 1883, the two firms in question could 
successfully shut out the large competitors in the USA. However, 
Massey and Harris did compete with one another for the leading 
position on the Canadian market especially during the 1880s. Thus 
in Canada the harvester war was fought out ten years before the 
equivalent conflict in the USA in the 1890s between McCormick 
and Deering. The internal struggle resulted in a merger of the 
companies in 1890 when the Massey-Harris Co. was formed.
But time was on the side of the large industries in the USA. 
As the frontier in Canada gradually, starting in the 1880s, was 
moved westwards through Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
the farmers’ dissatisfaction with the high tariffs on American 
agricultural machines in fact increased, and in 1895 the government 
was forced to reduce the tariff rates to 20 per cent. The Canadian 
agricultural machine industry had started in the East, but in con­
trast to that in the USA it had not followed the market westwards. 
The whole of the prairie area in the American Middle-West and Wes-
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tern Canada grew together into one industrial geographical unit 
based on the mechanised farming of large holdings for sales pro­
duction. The border people quite rightly felt that the border be­
tween Western Canada and the USA along the 49th parallel was a 
mere bureaucratic concept, and from a sales point of view the 
position of the agricultural machine industries in Illinois, Wisconsin 
and Minnesota vis-à-vis the market in Western Canada was a much 
more favourable one than that of the equivalent Canadian industries 
in the East. Therefore when the protective tariff was reduced, the 
domestic agricultural machine industry was unable to retain the 
expanding market in Western Canada. After twenty years absence 
McCormick returned to the Canadian market in 1887 when the com­
pany opened a branch in Winnipeg. The transporting of machines 
from Toronto in Eastern Canada to Winnipeg in Manitoba, Regina 
in Saskatchewan or Calgary/Edmonton in Alberta became too ex­
pensive to be competitive with the companies in the USA. On the 
other hand the domestic industry kept hold of the market in Eastern 
Canada. It may seem paradoxical that it was more natural from the 
point of view of transport economics for the agricultural machine 
industry in Eastern Canada to supply other migration countries 
such as Australia and Argentina with agricultural technology than 
the domestic settler farms in the West. The loss of the domestic 
market in the West was compensated for by aiming at export mar­
kets, first in Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, and later also 
in Europe. Therefore the production value of the Canadian agricul­
tural machines was able to rise from 4.5 million dollars in 1880 
to 7.5 million dollars in 1890 and 9.5 million dollars in 1900. In 
1880 the production of agricultural machines in Canada was equi­
valent to just under 7 per cent of that of the USA but in 1900 
the ratio had risen to almost 10 per cent. Canada began to export 
agricultural machines at the end of the 1880s, and in 1890 the ex­
ports amounted to 0.4 million dollars or 5 per cent of the produc­
tion value. During the 1890s exports were more than quadrupled 
and at the turn of the nineteenth century exports accounted for 
18 per cent of Canada’s total production of agricultural machines. 
At the same point in time Canada’s exports amounted to one tenth 
of those of the USA. As in the USA harvesters and mowing- 
machines accounted for the main part of the production and exports
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of the Canadian branch of the industry. After the USA Canada 
became the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of harvest­
ing machines. Outside the USA and Canada there were only a few 
smaller European companies in this field at this point in time.172
It is apparent from McCormick’s very extensive correspondence 
with his foreign agents that the exports of Canadian harvesters on 
certain foreign markets from the 1890s onwards meant noticeable 
competition for McCormick. The general agents acted among other 
things as feelers for the management of the company and inform­
ants about the competitors’ sales methods and shares of the 
market. In 1890 for example the agent Morrow, Basset & Co. of 
Christchurch, New Zealand, reported that Deering was McCor­
mick’s keenest competitor in Australia/New Zealand and that 
Wood’s share was smaller and decreasing. At that time there was 
no mention of Massey or Harris in Canada. However, ten years 
later (1900) the agent W. P. Postin in Melbourne reported that 
Massey-Harris and McCormick shared the leading position on the 
Australian harvester market, noticeably ahead of Deering. At that 
time Wood only had a modest share.173
Towards the end of Cyrus Hall McCormick’s life (he died in 
1884) Australia and New Zealand became the company’s largest 
and most profitable foreign market. At the same time the railroad 
opened up new areas for wheat-growing in Western Canada, and in 
Argentina the Pampas was being developed into Latin America’s 
principal wheat district. A decade or so later Southern Siberia was 
colonised, and new parts of South Africa. Through these new areas 
of cultivation and through continuing land reclamation in the USA 
west of the Mississippi River, the wheat-growing acreage of the 
world was doubled between 1880 and 1910. The first breakthrough 
in foreign trade with agricultural machines coincided with the first 
really important wave of emigration in the 1880s. As is shown in 
table 60, the new immigration areas of Australia and New Zealand,
172 Phillips, W. G., op.cit., pp. 37^46. pp. 54 ff., p. 179. Denison, M., Harvest 
Triumphant. The Story of Massey-Harris.
173 McCormick Collection. McCormick Company Records, letters received, series 
2 X.
McCormick's business correspondence for 1839-1904 which has been preserved is 
very extensive and consists of more than 600 boxes, of which 100 contain letters 
from foreign agents.
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Argentina and Western Canada took more than 4000 machines, or 
60 per cent of McCormick’s total exports of about 7300 machines. 
Between 1891 and 1895 the volume of exports was doubled, and at 
the latter date McCormick sold 40 per cent of the harvesters and 
mowing machines which were exported to the new areas, including 
South Africa. McCormick’s real export breakthrough occurred at 
the end of the 1890s, and between 1895 and 1902 the exports were 
multiplied sixfold. Of the total of 85000 harvesters and mowing- 
machines which were exported, about 23 000 or a quarter went to 
the new immigration areas in 1902, while at least 60000 or almost 
three quarters went to Europe including Siberia. The importance of 
emigration for the development and diffusion of mechanised farm­
ing must be underlined. The effects of the emigration became ap­
parent first and foremost in the fact that newly colonised areas 
were brought under cultivation with the aid of machines. The sett­
ler farms in the American Middle-West developed significant pur­
chasing power and became the first big customers numerically and 
individually of the agricultural technology industry. During the 
decades around the turn of the nineteenth century a new batch of 
orders for agricultural technology followed from the settler farms 
in Australia and New Zealand, Argentina, Western Canada, Siberia 
and South Africa. Through its exports of farm produce the more 
effective agriculture in the new production areas dealt a blow to 
European agriculture, which contributed further to the increase in 
emigration from Europe. However the accumulated emigration 
gradually reduced the agricultural labour surplus in Europe, which 
helped to raise labour costs in farming. Thus the emigration also 
gradually stimulated the spread of a mechanised agriculture in 
Europe.174 In research into economic history the double effect of 
the emigration in diffusing mechanisation in agriculture has hitherto 
not been sufficiently stressed.
Before the 1880s the total foreign trade in harvesters was very 
limited. The USA accounted for the exports and Europe for the 
imports. McCormick’s machines played a leading rôle in these ex­
ports during the initial stage from 1851 to 1862. After that McCor- 
mick’s significance in exports declined, and until the 1880s other 
174 Hutchinson, W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. II. Harvest 1856-1884, chapter 15. 
Casson, H. N., Cyrus Hall McCormick. His Life and Work, pp. 203-233.
278
American firms led by Wood delivered the bulk of the harvesters to 
Europe. Not until the demand on the world market increased from 
the 1880s onwards did McCormick concentrate on foreign trade and 
regain his leading rôle in exporting. After 1892 when W. A. Wood 
died the importance of Wood’s firm declined rapidly, and instead 
new competitors such as Deering and Massey-Harris began to 
assert themselves on the world market.175 When world trade in har­
vesters made its real breakthrough in the 1880s and at the be­
ginning of the 1890s, the new immigration areas succeeded Europe 
as the principal customer for agricultural technology. Not until later 
in the 1890s, when the labour force balance began to change and 
the population pressure in the agricultural sector eased on account 
of the continuous emigration, was the interest of the European farm­
ers in mechanising the work aroused. In terms of monetary value 
Europe then became once more the largest customer for North 
American agricultural machines. At the turn of the nineteenth cen­
tury 70 per cent of the USA’s harvesters and mowing-machines 
were exported to Europe including Siberia. As Siberia was a sett­
ler area which began to be colonised in earnest during the 1890s 
its imports of machines should not be included among those of 
Europe. At the beginning of the twentieth century Siberia took a 
growing proportion of the total Russian imports of machines. For 
example in 1906 half of the Russian imports of mowing-machines 
from International Harvester went to Siberia. Therefore Europe’s 
share of 70 per cent of the exports ought to be reduced some­
what in consequence, but in spite of this the absolute increase in 
imports was beyond dispute. From a comparative point of view 
however, Europe at the start of the twentieth century was still 
sparsely equipped with advanced agricultural technology of the 
harvester kind.178 In spite of the fact that the number of farms in 
the new immigration countries (excluding the USA) only consti­
tuted a small percentage of the number of European farms at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, the orders of harvesters from the settler 
farms comprised almost 50 per cent of the total orders from
175 Cf. note 170.
176 The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States. Bureau of Statistics, 
Treasury Department. McCormick Collection. International Harvester Co. Annual 
Settlement records, Foreign sales.
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Europe. Thus at that time in terms of percentages harvesters were 
more thickly spread many times over on the farms of Australia and 
New Zealand, Western Canada, Argentina, Siberia and South Africa 
than on the farms in Europe. Information available about the 
degree of the diffusion of harvesters in Sweden and in Holland 
would probably illustrate the situation in Europe at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. In Holland in 1904 not quite 4 000 out of 
approximately 200000 farms—less than 2 per cent—had acquired 
harvesters or mowing-machines or both.177 The spread of harvesters 
in Sweden is shown in the following table:
Year Percentage of spread
1890 2“
1910 16“
1944 25
“ The figures for 1890 and 1910 have been based on 1700 farms which were ex­
amined in 1890 and 1 600 in 1910 from regions in Southern and Central Sweden where 
the harvesters were more widely spread than in the North of Sweden. The percent­
age of spread for the country as a whole was therefore smaller than what is shown 
in the table above. The figure for 1944 is based on the 414 000 farms accounted for 
by the agricultural census, and shows that as late as at the end of the Second World 
War three out of four Swedish farms were without any form of harvester.
Source Kuuse, J., Från redskap till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersia­
lisering inom svenskt jordbruk 1860-1910, pp. 103 ff. Jordbruksräkningen 1944 
(SOS Jordbruk med binäringar).
As in Britain and Germany, the engineering industry for agricul­
tural technology was continuing to make rapid progress in Sweden 
around 1900 by European standards. During the first decades 
of the twentieth century there were comparatively extensive 
exports from these three countries of harvesters and mowing- 
machines among other things, mainly to Eastern Europe, since the 
dimensions of the home market in the respective countries were 
not commensurate with the production capacity of the engineering 
works. However there were probably areas in Europe around 1900
177 van der Poel, J. M. G., Honderd Jaar Landbouwmechanisatie in Nederland, 
pp. 207ff.
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where the harvester was more widely spread than in Sweden and 
Holland. Examples of such areas were the grain district of East 
Anglia and the North German Junker farms east of the Elbe. On 
the other hand at the same time harvesters were still less common 
in Southern and Eastern Europe than in Sweden and Holland.178
Before 1900 foreign trade in harvesters played a modest rôle in 
comparison with the domestic trade in the USA. This applies to 
the whole of the USA as well as to its leading company in that 
sector of the industry, McCormick’s. However the 1890s marked 
the start of a new epoch. Whereas in 1890 the exports from McCor­
mick constituted 4 per cent of the company’s total sales, in 1902 
the proportion of exports had risen to all of 20 per cent.179 Of the 
USA’s total production of agricultural machines in 1890 about 5 per 
cent were exported. In 1900 the proportion of exports had risen to 
16 per cent. The difference in the size of McCormick’s and AB 
Separator’s export shares clearly illustrates the different conditions 
of their businesses. In the USA McCormick had access to a signif­
icant home market with great purchasing power, and—with the ex­
ception of the 1890s—the foreign markets were only marginal for 
the company. On the other hand, in order to reach an equivalent 
volume of sales AB Separator from the start had to sell its products 
mainly as exports, since the Swedish farms clearly constituted an
178 Linder, E., Den svenska verkstadsindustriens utveckling intill krigsutbrottet 1914, 
pp. 284 f. McCormick Collection, Received Letters.
The firm of Andersson & Mattson, Malmö, was the sole agent for McCormick 
harvesters in Sweden during the 1890s. In a letter to McCormick in 1895 the general 
agent in Denmark, Bröderna Bendix, Copenhagen, expressed a desire for a larger 
territory for its agents. The Danish general agent specifically mentioned the Swedish 
market. According to the general agent Swedish manufacturers could sell 1400 
mowing machines a year, and because of their low-price policy Deering, Wood and 
Osborne were able to sell more machines in Sweden than McCormick could. If 
Bröderna Bendix got the general agency for the whole of Scandinavia, the agent 
predicted better sales figures, but McCormick did not comply with the Danish 
agent's wish.
179 In order to indicate the proportions of the volume of exports it may be mentioned 
that McCormick’s total exports of harvesters in 1902 were equivalent to the total 
sales in the three prairie states of Indiana. Illinois and Iowa. At the same time 
McCormick received the same quantity of orders for harvesters from Minnesota and 
the Dakotas as from the whole of Europe, while the supply to Missouri was 
equivalent to the supply to the new immigration countries.
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Values of the USA’s total exports in 1895 and 1900 divided into various ex­
port goods in order of precedence
1895 1900
Order of Million Order of Million
Export goods precedence dollars % precedence dollars %
Grain, animal
produce 1 250 32 1 447 33
Cotton (untreated) 
Iron and steel
2 205 26 2 242 18
goods
Agricultural
4 32 4 3 122 9
machines 17 5 1 13 16 1
Other goods 301 37 544 39
Total 793 100 1 371 100
Source The foreign commerce and navigation of the United States. Bureau of Sta­
tistics, Department of Commerce and Labor.
insufficient home market. Moreover in all during the years 1886— 
1921 the Separator group of companies sold more than half of its 
separators on markets outside Europe.
The composition of the USA’s exports shows that agricultural 
machines made a less significant contribution to the country’s total 
export income. The importance of the agricultural machines and 
especially the harvesters lay instead in the fact that through their 
sales, which were principally domestic trade, they contributed to 
the greatest possible extent to American farming becoming the 
world’s principal exporter of agricultural produce. It is therefore 
appropriate to trace the development of the further spread of the 
harvester in the USA after the Civil War.
if) The spread of the harvester in the USA after 
the Civil War up to about 1900
After the Civil War the mechanisation of American agriculture con­
tinued, and the agricultural machines which were in use in the 
USA more than doubled in terms of value between 1860 and 1890. 
In 1890 the agricultural machines were equivalent in value to five
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hundred million dollars. When the world demand for agricultural 
produce increased after 1890 the pace of mechanisation in farming 
quickened, and the value of the machinery was multiplied seven­
fold between 1890 and 1930. The mechanisation of agriculture re­
quired a much greater power consumption than had been the case 
earlier. Therefore alongside the spread of mechanisation the avail­
able sources of power on the farm increased both as regards liv­
ing horse-power and steam power. Around 1900 the combustion 
engine started the later phase in the development of mechanisation 
with the motorisation of agriculture. Instead the tractor became 
agriculture’s universal source of power and the importance of 
draught animals and steam power declined after 1920 (see diagram 
19).
Before the First World War the majority of machines purchased by 
agriculture were harvesters, and between 1860 and 1880 the produc­
tion of wheat was increased by more than 250 per cent. The in­
creases both in the volume of investment and in the yield of the 
harvest were partly due to the fact that new farms were established 
and new prairie land was cultivated. The frontier was moved 
further westwards through Kansas, Nebraska and the Dakotas. 
However the main reason for the increase was the fact that the 
farms’ average productivity was boosted through the use of more 
and improved machines. In fact the production per capita of wheat 
rose from 5.6 bushels in 1860 to 9.2 bushels in 1880.180 The har­
vesters were the key factor in this improvement in productivity. 
The further development of the harvester during the second half 
of the nineteenth century has been dealt with briefly in an earlier 
context. The predecessor of the self-binder was the Marsh har­
vester. Already in 1858 the brothers C. W. and W. W. Marsh, of 
Kalb County, Illinois, had patented a harvester which by means of 
a conveyor belt system delivered the cut grain to two binders, 
which bound the sheaves on an attached platform at the same pace 
as the machine cut the grain. However the Marsh harvester was of 
no economic importance for agriculture until the 1870s when it 
began to be produced on a larger scale. In fact the harvester devel-
180 Hogan, W. T., Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United 
States, vol. 1, pp. 150f. Faulkner, H. U., American Economic History, pp. 369ff. 
Rogin, L., The Introduction of Farm Machinery, pp. 94 f.
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oped rapidly and within a short time the Marsh harvester was 
replaced by the self-binder, which made the binders unnecessary. 
The first self-binders had a mechanism which bound the sheaves 
with wire. The wire-binder was adopted in agricultural circles far 
more rapidly than the Marsh harvester. This was partly due to the 
fact that several of the largest manufacturers such as Wood, McCor­
mick, Deering, D. M. Osborne and Co. and also C. Aultman and 
Co. concentrated more consciously on the production and market­
ing of the wire-binder than they had as regards the Marsh har­
vester. But the farmers’ demand for the increased supply of self- 
binders was not entirely due to the fact that the machine would 
keep down labour costs. With the self-binder the farmer could do 
the harvesting himself when necessary and in a completely different 
way he could be independent of agricultural labourers who were 
constantly attracted by the Homestead Act to move westwards in 
order to establish their own farms there. The popularity of the wire- 
binder became intensive but short-lived. In fact the wire caused 
some damage for farmers and mill-owners. Therefore when in 1878 
John Appleby of Wisconsin took out a patent for a binding-machine 
which used twine instead of wire, Deering immediately recognised 
the importance of Appleby’s patent. Deering bought the right to 
use Appleby’s binding mechanism in conjunction with a machine 
of the Marsh harvester type. Appleby says in a letter that it was 
thanks to Deering that his twine binder quickly became widespread 
and replaced the wire binder: “In William Deering, of Chicago, 
Illinois formerly of the firm of Gammon & Deering I found a man 
far-sighted enough to see the importance of my invention. To him 
belongs the credit of forcing my binder onto the market with suf­
ficient energy to convince the farmer of its practicability. His de­
monstration of the practicability of the invention soon led other 
manufacturers to adopt it.”181 The new twine binder became such 
a success that other prominent producers of harvesters hastened to 
obtain the right to use Appleby’s patent. Thus Appleby's twine 
binder began to be used by Deering in 1878, by McCormick in 
1881, by Champion in 1882 and by Osborne in 1883.182
181 William Deering presented by E. P. Korecz, Chicago 1914, after the death of 
Deering in December 1913. Rogin. L., op. cit.. pp. 107 ff.
182 Rogin, L .,op. cit., p. 115.
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Table 62. McCormick's sales of twine in 1890-1900 and the profits from 
these sales
Year
Sales
Profits
Thousand dollarsThousand pounds Thousand dollars
1890 13 586 1 728 370
1891 16 480 1 572 152
1892 23 064 2 104 340
1893 21 216 1 835 361
1894 19 662 1 353 -156
1895 18 657 1 064 195
1896 25 333 1 528 263
1897 24 001 1 408 209
1898 27 713 1 798 378
1899 24 217 2 211 724
1900 25 185 2 301 193
1901 50 000 (twine contracts)
Source McCormick Collection: Twine Accounts.
The breakthrough of the twine binder at the beginning of the 
1880s immediately led to a great increase in the demand for Manila 
hemp and sisal hemp which were used to make twine. The raw 
material was brought in part from the Philippines, and in part from 
Southern Mexico, Central America and the West Indies, and a 
significant twine industry developed in the USA. McCormick 
among others built a large twine factory as an extension to his 
other factories in Chicago. During the 1890s McCormick alone sold 
more than 200 millions pounds of twine worth a total of 19 million 
dollars. During the 1890s the profits from the sales of twine con­
stituted almost 10 per cent of the profits from McCormick's total 
sales.183
Bearing in mind the conditions of production it was natural 
enough that the attention of the inventors of agricultural technology 
was particularly directed towards methods of speeding up the har­
vesting process. In the wheat districts of the Middle-West the 
climate necessitated rapid harvesting when the grain was ripe, and
183 McCormick Collection, Twine Ledger, Twine Stock Book and Twine Account.
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the amount cultivated was directly dependent on the ability of the 
farmers to harvest before the grain was destroyed. Harold Faulk­
ner summarised the effect of the innovations in the field of har­
vesting technology in the following way: “The Marsh harvester al­
most doubled the amount of grain that could be harvested in a 
given time. Even more important was John F. Appleby’s invention 
in 1878 of a twine binder, a machine which took the place of the 
crude and unsatisfactory wire binders in use and increased eight­
fold the speed in harvesting. In other words [says Professor T. N. 
Carver] it was the twine binder more than any other single machine 
or implement that enabled the country to increase its production 
of grain, especially wheat, during this period.”184
The USA’s growing grain surplus stimulated the expansion of a 
large Hour-mill industry, which followed the wheat wave west­
wards. At the end of the nineteenth century Minneapolis took over 
Chicago’s rôle as the centre of the flour-mill industry. At the same 
time the new railroad and steamboat connections improved the 
opportunities of the surplus areas to sell to the deficit areas. The 
Wheat Exchanges in Chicago and in London/Liverpool also played 
an important part in the distribution of the wheat. The Chicago 
Exchange was the world’s big seller and the London/Liverpool the 
world’s big buyer.185 Thus more rational methods of distributing 
flour and grain contributed to the rapid expansion of the grain mar­
ket, which stimulated to a high degree American agriculture’s 
orders for harvesters from industry.
Cyrus Hall McCormick had laid the foundations of the harvester 
industry in the USA and it was the most important branch of the 
agricultural machine industry in the country before the First World 
War. Before the Civil War his company had a third of the total mar­
ket. An expansion in the formation and development of companies 
due to a growing demand for harvesters during the Civil War meant 
that McCormick’s share of the market then began to decrease in 
spite of increased production in absolute terms. Apart from the 
factor of uncertainty to which Rogin’s calculations of the nation's
184 Faulkner, H. U., op. cit., quotation at p. 369.
185 Casson. H. K., Cyrus Hall McCormick. His Life and Work, chapter 12. The 
Reaper and the World, pp. 203 ff.
286
Table 63. McCormick's sales of harvesters in relation to the country’s 
total sales in 1855-1899 (in thousands of machines)
Year A=McCormick B=USAa A as % of B
1855 2.6 10 26
1862 4.8 33 15
1863 4.0 40 10
1864 5.4 50 11
1865 3.9 90 4
1866 6.1 80 8
1869 8.7 163 5
1875 17.9 160 11
1878 18.4 150 12
1885 54.8 250 22
1899 214.0 667 32
a In many cases Rogin’s figures for the total sales of the USA in 1855-1885 are 
based on assessments and estimates, and so the column of figures for the USA 
should be approached with a certain caution. The figures for the year 1899 relate to 
harvesters as well as mowing-machines both for McCormick and the whole of the 
USA.
Source McCormick Collection: Reaper Sales McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. 
Catalogue 1899. Rogin., L., The Introduction of Farm Machinery, pp. 72 ff. 
Census of the United States 1910, Manufacturers: 1899, 1904 and 1909, 
Statistics for the agricultural implement industry, Department of Commerce.
figures are subject, the fact is that McCormick’s share of the 
market decreased during the Civil War, and remained comparatively 
modest during the rest of the 1860s and during the 1870s as well. 
Thereafter McCormick regained his lost share of the market and 
towards the end of the century he was also able to acquire a further 
share.
During the 1860s and 1870s more orders were placed for the self­
rake reaper than any other kind of harvester. At the start of the 
1860s McCormick and Wood were the leading manufacturers of the 
self-rake reaper, but after the Civil War they were overtaken by 
B. H. Warder and W. N. Whitely, who had started working together 
in the harvester industry in 1867 in Springfield, Ohio. In 1850 
Warder had founded a firm in Springfield with a variety of part­
ners to begin with. In 1879 the firm took the name of Warder,
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Bushneil, Glessner. In the middle of the 1850s Warder had launched 
a self-rake reaper which was produced under licence from Seymor 
& Morgan, but the machine could not be marketed on a larger 
scale until the 1860s. In Springfield another firm in the industry 
had been founded in 1856 by Whitely, whose firm operated as a 
partnership under the name of Whitely, Fassler, Kelly. In 1867 
the competitors Warder and Whitely started to cooperate in a ven­
ture for which Warder provided the main part of the capital.186 
The harvesters from the cooperating firms became known under the 
Champion label, and in 1879 the association between the firms 
grew closer. The Champion machines were sold in great numbers 
and during the 1870s little Springfield became known as “the 
Reaper City”. When the annual sales of the Champion machines 
were at their greatest they amounted to more then 100000 ma­
chines, and for a time put the volume of McCormick’s sales in 
the shade. After 1880 Whitely made an unsuccessful attempt to 
free himself from his partners and the sales of the Whitely group 
declined. In 1887 the Whitely group of companies was bought up by 
the Warder, Bushnell, Glessner group. Thereafter there was a de­
cline in the comparative importance of the Champion machines, but 
Warder, Bushnell, Glessner became one of the five large groups of 
companies which formed the International Harvester Company in 
1902.187
The widespread fire in Chicago in October of 1871, which 
reduced a large part of the town including McCormick's factories 
to ashes, meant that for a time there was a halt in McCormick’s 
production. Nettie Fowler McCormick, who had married McCormick 
in 1857, was the driving force behind the rebuilding of McCor­
mick's factories. McCormick is said to have wanted to retire after 
the fire. As the factories got more practical and modern equipment
iso Rogin, L., op. cit., p. 96. Casson, H. N., The Romance of the Reaper, pp. 
48ff. Phillips, W. G., op. cit., p. 168.
According to Casson, Whitely received a decisive advertising puff in 1867 when 
he became known through a reporter from the Cincinnati Commercial who covered 
a machine trial in Jamestown, Ohio. On this occasion Whitely, who had enormous 
physical strength, is supposed to have attracted a lot of attention when he pulled 
his own harvester along the field by himself. In any event. Warder, who was power­
ful financially, began to collaborate with Whitely during the same year.
187 Casson, H. N., op. cit., pp. 48ff. Phillips, W. G., op. cit., p. 168. Cf. figure 2.
288
and could also be built in such a way as allowed for future expan­
sion, the fire probably had the long-term effect of raising rather 
than lowering capacity.
As a result of the expansion after the fire McCormick’s firm was 
transformed in 1879 into a limited company, the McCormick Har­
vesting Machine Company. The share capital was set at 2.5 million 
dollars and the founder Cyrus Hall McCormick accounted for 75 
per cent of this sum and his brother for the balance. The forma­
tion of the company had more of a formal significance as far as 
the spread of ownership was concerned, since the company 
remained within the family. However, the cooperation in the com­
pany between Cyrus Hall McCormick and his brothers had not 
taken place without friction and at times had prejudiced the earlier 
business. The formation of the company strengthened the founder’s 
position in the family firm. Mrs Nettie Fowler McCormick was 
very active in the business, especially after the fire in 1871. Even 
though she had no official position in the company in reality she 
contributed greatly to the moulding of the company’s future devel­
opment. When Cyrus Hall McCormick died in 1884 he was suc­
ceeded by his son (who bore the same name) who had received 
technical training in the McCormick company and had studied busi­
ness methods in Europe. However, continuity between the found­
ing generation and the following business generation was preserved 
by the widow Nettie Fowler McCormick. She died in 1923 and sur­
vived the founder of the company by almost 40 years.188
The harvester’s potential development in terms of production 
technology meant that various manufacturers in turn could secure 
new and growing markets in the USA. When the hand-rake reaper 
had been adopted at the start of the 1860s by “the early 
majority” in the most advanced agricultural districts, the self-rake 
reaper was introduced onto the market and spread first of all to 
those who had earlier adopted the hand-rake reaper. When the 
self-rake reaper had been in circulation for a decade the Marsh 
harvester could begin to be sold in larger numbers, partly replacing 
the self-rake reaper. However the Marsh harvester did not have
188 Casson, H. N., op.cit. pp. 35ff. Hutchinson, W. T., Cyrus Hall McCormick. 
II. Harvest 1856-1884, pp. 636ff. Roots in Chicago, p. 18.
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enough time to become widespread since at the end of the 1870s 
it was in its turn replaced by the wire binder. The twine binder 
was already able to find a new market around 1880, and it rapidly 
outdistanced other types of machine. The twine binder had come to 
stay and, with the exception of the development in California, it 
faced no new competition until the combine harvester began to be 
marketed during the period between the wars. At the end of the 
1880s about 85 per cent of all the harvesters produced in the USA 
were of the self-binder type.189 As the types of machine from the 
hand-rake reaper to the self-binder gradually reduced the labour 
costs of harvesting, it became more profitable from the point of 
view of the economics of production even for farms with smaller 
grain acreages to .invest in harvesters. Therefore the new markets 
for the later types of machine became potentially larger than the 
earlier markets had been for the older types of machine. (See 
figure 5.)
During the 1860s McCormick’s market area had been con­
centrated to an even higher degree than before on the prairies 
north-west of the Ohio River. During the years 1866-1872 only 6 
per cent of McCormick’s harvesters were sold outside the prairie 
district, and the sales for the year 1875 show exactly the same 
pattern of distribution. Around 1880 when McCormick, after the 
formation of the company and the introduction of the self-binder 
onto the market, began in earnest to rebuild his lost market posi­
tion, the prairie farms were still his largest customer. However, 
during the 1890s enormous competition began to develop, mainly 
for the orders for self-binders from the prairie farmers, and at the 
end of the 1890s tendencies towards market saturation were notice­
able in the prairie states. In this situation McCormick sought new 
markets, partly abroad and partly in the USA in the South and 
also in the coastal states in the East and West. In 1891 the prairie 
farms accounted for 86 per cent of McCormick’s harvester orders, 
while deliveries to the rest of the USA and abroad together only 
constituted 14 per cent. In spite of the fact that the deliveries 
to the prairie area between 1891 and 1902 increased numerically 
in absolute terms, the area’s comparative importance for McCor-
189 Rogin, L.,op.cit., pp. 118f.
290
mick’s total sales declined. In 1895 the prairie farms took 78 per 
cent, the rest of the USA 17 per cent, and the farms abroad 5 per 
cent of McCormick’s harvesters. In 1902 domestic orders outside 
the prairie area and exports each accounted for as much as 18 per 
cent of McCormick’s supply, while the share of the prairie states 
had fallen to 64 per cent. From an international viewpoint the farm­
ers in the East and South of the USA and those in Europe and 
the countries overseas corresponded to “the laggards” and “the 
late majority” in the harvester’s adoption process.190
The volume of harvester orders is also reflected in the develop­
ment of McCormick’s profit and work force. During the 1870s the 
annual net profit varied between 300000 and 600000 dollars, as 
against 100000 dollars in the 1850s. At the beginning of the 1880s 
the yearly net profit amounted to about one million dollars, in 1890 
to 1.5 million dollars and in 1895 to 2.4 million dollars. During 
McCormick’s years of extreme expansion from 1898 to 1901 the 
net profit rose to an average of almost 5 million dollars a year. 
The expansion of McCormick’s business during the 1880s and 1890s 
was mainly financed by ploughing back the profits.
On the whole the employment capacity at McCormick’s factories 
developed in step with the size of the profits. The number of 
employees increased from 120 in 1850 to about 300 in 1860. During 
the 1860s and 1870s the number of employees varied between 400 
and 600, and rose to about 800 in 1880. McCormick’s did not be­
come a large-scale company until the 1890s, and at the turn of the 
nineteenth century it employed about 3000 workers.191
Around 1880 the production of self-binders inaugurated a new 
phase in the development of the harvester in the USA. The 
efficiency of the self-binder in relation to the cost of acquiring it 
made it remunerative even for many small farmers. Therefore 
during the 1880s and 1890s the market for harvesters in the USA 
became potentially considerably larger than it had ever been be­
tween 1850 and 1880, and the market expansion after 1880 led to 
keener competition between the manufacturers. The competition
190 McCormick Collection, Reaper Orders and Reaper Sales, Machine Ledgers. See 
table 60.
191 Ozanne, R., Wages in Practice and Theory. McCormick and International Har­
vester 1860-1960, pp. 25ff. and 116ff.
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became especially fierce during the 1890s when what was popularly 
known in agricultural technology circles as the harvester war 
took place. More than 200 harvester companies were established in 
the USA during the latter part of the nineteenth century but as a 
result of the fierce competition during the harvester war most of 
them were ruined, and in 1902 there were only 14 of the larger 
companies left. During the harvester war the fight for the market 
became mainly a contest between the two large ones in the busi­
ness, Cyrus Hall McCormick II and the new competitor William 
Deering.192
William Deering was born in the state of Maine in 1826. Unlike 
Cyrus Hall McCormick he had no agricultural background, and 
Deering entered the harvester industry direct from the textile in­
dustry. Moreover Deering made a further contribution to textiles, 
since his introduction of the twine binder brought about the break­
through of the twine industry. As a manufacturer Deering devel­
oped the same entrepreneur’s qualities as McCormick I. However 
Deering was no inventor, but simply an entrepreneur with 
extremely good business instincts. His competitors said of him 
“there is a business compass in his brain”. Deering entered the 
harvester industry relatively late and in a passive way. In 1870 
Deering put 40000 dollars into E. H. Gammon’s production. Gam­
mon was a business friend of Deering, and a former Methodist 
minister who in 1864 bought a licence to manufacture Marsh har­
vesters, which had been patented by the Marsh brothers of De 
Kalb, Illinois in 1858. As Gammon lacked capital, the capacity of 
his business had been limited. In 1870 the capacity amounted to 
not quite a thousand machines. When Gammon became very ill in 
1873 he made over part of the business to Deering who somewhat 
reluctantly was meant to take charge of production. After the 
agreement with Appleby in 1878 Deering wanted to concentrate on 
production on a larger scale, and he moved the business to Chi­
cago. When Gammon objected to this he was bought out of the 
firm by Deering, who moved to Chicago to develop Appleby’s 
twine binder.193
192 Casson, H. N.. op. cit., pp. 82ff.
193 Ibid., pp. 43 ff. McCormick, C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 73 ff.
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In the struggle for the growing self-binder market a large num­
ber of strategies were used to increase sales. As a sales argument 
to defeat competitors each and every one tried to argue that the 
producer himself had gone furthest in the continuing improvement 
of products within the industry. The catalogues of both McCormick 
and Deering show tough methods of advertising in which one’s 
own product is lauded to the skies and the competitor is vili­
fied.194 Furthermore they kept a close watch on one another when
194 The McCormick Harvesting Machine Company’s catalogue for the year 1898, 
p. 11, is one example of comparative advertising methods which consistently put 
forward the merits of the company’s own product. The following statement may 
serve as an illustration. “McCormick has 30% more durability than "Bonnie”, just 
25% more than the ‘Pony’ Deering. more than 20% more than ‘Plano’, 15% 
more than Massey-Harris and ‘Adriance’ and 10% more than ‘Osborne’. The 
McCormick is worth $20 more than any other binder.” In support of the statement 
reference is made to a brand competition which took place in 1897 at Aas Agricul­
tural School in Norway where the competing harvesters received the following 
points for working capacity and construction:
BrandlProducer Total points
1. McCormick, Chicago 34.77
2. ‘Osborne’D. M. Osborne & Co. Auburn, New York State 32.73
3. Massey-Harris, Toronto 31.96
4. ‘Adriance’ Adriance, Platt & Co.,
Poughkeepsie, New York State 31.30
5. ‘Pony’ Deering Harvester Co. Chicago 29.99
6. ‘Plano’Plano Mfg. Co., Chicago 29.11
7. ‘Bonnie’The Johnston Harvester Co., Batavia,
New York State 28.68
Furthermore, it was pointed out that expert judges “of the Mechanical College 
of the Russian Empire tested the McCormick binder in the field with seven Amer­
ican-made binders to determine which used the least twine in binding a given 
amount of grain. It was found that nineteen balls of twine from the McCormick 
bound more grain than twenty balls on any of the other machines. McCormick’s 
simple knotter saves 5 balls of twine in 100.”
“We know of more than 200 binder trials in America where McCormick binders 
met and defeated the cheap, flimsy ‘Pony’ Deering machines and replaced them.”
As appears, it was commonplace for trial and competition results favourable to the 
company’s own product to be used in advertising. At the same time it should be 
pointed out that McCormick's, and, to a certain extent, Deering’s machines 
managed de facto to gain top place in most of the domestic and international 
competitions, trials and fairs in which they participated.
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it came to patents and licences, and McCormick in particular had a 
large battery of lawyers who handled patent actions and other com­
pany disputes. At times the price mechanism was put out of action 
when the harvester war was at its peak. The hire-purchase system 
and also the granting of rebates and credits were taken to absurd 
lengths, and for many salesmen it was apparently more important 
to sell a large quantity rather than at a reasonable price.195
Deering tried yet another method to outdo McCormick on the 
market. Vertical integration became an important principle in Deer- 
ing's company organisation. By gaining control over ore fields, coal 
mines, forests, foundries and ironworks Deering secured suitable 
raw materials. Deering’s base of raw materials helped to reduce the 
cost of materials for his machines, and he became less dependent 
than McCormick on sub-contractors. Deering became superior to 
McCormick as an industrialist, while McCormick had the best sales 
contacts with the farmers and was superior in marketing.196
The price war and the inflated sales costs of the harvester com­
panies raised the question of a certain measure of cooperation and 
more uniform prices within the industry. Several of the smaller 
companies were keen on cooperation, but the large companies were 
led by individualists who were less interested in joint ventures. 
Nevertheless a half-hearted attempt at a merger was made when the 
American Harvester Company was formed in 1890. Without any 
great enthusiasm McCormick and Deering shared the leading posi­
tions in the American Harvester Company. However, when they 
failed to receive financial backing from the banks in New York 
the trust was dissolved on their own initiative after being in opera­
tion for only a few months. The trust had met with general opposi-
195 One episode during the harvester war illustrates the consequences which the 
price war between different harvester producers could have. When one of McCor­
mick’s agents passed through an isolated part of Nebraska he noticed a large 
number of unused Milwaukee self-binders. The agent knew that the farmers in the 
district did not have any grain to cut and so he inquired about the reason for 
purchasing the machines. The farmers replied that they had been in need of ham­
mers and tools, but had no money and had been refused credit in the village shop. 
On the other hand it was easy to get credit if one bought harvesters, which were 
always well equipped with toolboxes. McCormick, C., The Century of the Reaper, 
pp. 105f. Hayter. E. W., ‘Mechanical Humbuggery Among the Western Farmers 
1860-1890'. In Michigan History, March 1950.
196 McCormick, C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 111 ff.
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tion as it was considered that it violated the recently passed anti­
trust law (the Sherman Act), and even McCormick and Deering 
are supposed to have been relieved when the occasion arose for 
them to dissolve the trust. In any event, the competition between 
McCormick and Deering continued more keenly than ever after the 
dissolution of American Harvester. The reason why during the 1890s 
the larger companies such as McCormick and Deering were 
uninterested in merging, even in the future, was that they were 
established on the growing international market. They never saw 
that they were trying to sell more machines than the market could 
absorb. On the other hand the smaller manufacturers who only sold 
within the USA saw a certain saturation of the market, and were 
therefore more willing to cooperate.197
Thus in the years just before the turn of the nineteenth century 
the harvester spread in the USA at a tremendous pace. The in­
flated competition where the salesmen vied in undercutting each 
other obviously helped to increase the rate of spread. It could be 
said that the foundation of overmechanisation in the agriculture of 
the USA already began to be laid in the 1890s. The development 
towards mechanised and commercialised agriculture in the USA 
was not a purely harmonious process. To the farm workers the new 
agricultural technology must have appeared in many cases as an 
anonymous enemy which caused them anxiety and uncertainty in 
their employment, even though as a rule the demand for labour 
was heavy in the USA during the nineteenth century. On the other 
hand the agricultural machines eliminated many laborious stages in 
the work of the labour force which did remain in agriculture. 
But even within farming circles there was dissatisfaction with the 
new forms of operation which developed in modem agriculture, 
and this sometimes led to open revolt. The farmers were mainly 
dissatisfied with the middlemen who organised the trade in agricul­
tural products (the railroads) and also the food industries. Accord­
ing to many farmers the middlemen took far too large a share of 
the profits from the goods which were produced in an agriculture 
orientated more and more towards sales.198
197 Ibid., pp. 106ff.
198 Hicks, J., The Populist Revolt, pp. 80ff. Faulkner, H. U., op.cit., pp. 366ff. 
Breen, D. H., ‘The Canadian Prairie West and the ‘Harmonius’ Settlement Inter-
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It has often been asserted, not least in manufacturing circles, that 
the harvester helped to strengthen democracy in the USA, since 
the harvester reached the average American.199 The statement is 
perhaps accurate if it is considered from the perspective of the 
Middle-West at the turn of the nineteenth century, but hardly for 
farming in the rest of the USA where the farms were on the whole 
smaller and where the landscape was usually less suited geographi­
cally to mechanisation than the prairie plains. The mechanisation 
and commercialisation of agriculture tended to concentrate the pro­
fits among the larger farms whose economic base was suitable for 
mechanised operation and production for marketing.
Similar tendencies have been noted for Sweden. In research into 
the spread of mechanisation and commercialisation in Swedish 
agriculture between 1860 and 1910 it has been possible to establish 
that agriculture was more and more divided into two parts during 
the period in question. One of the parts consisted of the larger 
farms and estates where mechanised and commercialised forms 
of operation for production for marketing were introduced to an
pretation’. In Agricultural History no. 1, January 1973. Another distinction was 
drawn between farmers who on the one hand carried out cattle-farming (graziers) 
and who on the other hand carried out arable farming (farmers). To an extent in 
contrast to earlier agricultural research into settlements in Western Canada, Breen 
maintains that the same kinds of difference also applied to Western Canada, even 
though the differences did not lead to the same violence as in the USA. "The 
classic struggle between grazier and farmer so familiar in American history was, on 
a lesser scale, repeated on Canada’s southwestern plains. From the moment of his 
arrival, the cattleman, for obvious economic reasons, has attempted to stem the 
advance of the farming frontier, and by 1896 it seemed that the struggle had been 
determined in his favor. It was another decade before the farmers, growing in 
number were able to break the hegemony. The struggle was continuous through 
the entire territorial period and it was often vicious, but at no time did it break 
to open violence. In this sense the traditional homily on the peaceful settlement 
of the Canadian West must stand. But in drawing this contrast with the American 
West, Canadian writers have been negligent on two counts. Noting that armed 
violence between rancher and farmer is nowhere recorded in the Canadian experi­
ence, they have assumed that such contending groups and their related problems did 
not exist in the northern setting. Second, and more important, such fallacious 
assumptions come mainly from the inclination of many Canadian scholars to view 
the Canadian prairie west as a homogeneous unit.”
199 Casson, H. N., The Romance of the Reaper, pp. 158 ff.
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increasing extent. The total value of the actual agricultural ma­
chines on these larger farms increased tenfold between 1860 and 
1910. The other part consisted of smallholdings and smaller farms 
which certainly improved the standard of their implements between 
1860 and 1910 but did not invest to any appreciable degree in actual 
agricultural machinery, and did not produce above the level of self- 
sufficiency to any great degree. This second group of smaller 
farms which were examined in 1910 constituted about 85 per cent 
of the total number of farms which were examined. Thus in Sweden 
the profits of mechanisation accrued to the smaller part—about 15 
per cent—which consisted of the larger farms. According to the 
Swedish census of agriculture in 1927 the larger farms (of 40 acres 
and above) accounted for approximately 54 per cent of the coun­
try’s total arable land and for 75 per cent of the cereal grain har­
vest, but for only 16 per cent of the number of farms in the coun­
try. Thus the mechanisation of Swedish agriculture at the beginn­
ing of the twentieth century had taken place only on a small pro­
portion of the farms, and this minority was able among other things 
to produce the majority of the agricultural products through the 
power of its efficient machines.200
Bearing in mind the character of European agriculture with its 
emphasis on smaller farms, there are compelling reasons for assum­
ing that the mechanisation in European agriculture had not reached 
a greater percentage of farms at the start of the twentieth century 
than it had in Sweden. Certain areas of Europe were probably 
comparatively better equipped than Sweden in terms of agricultural 
technology, but in comparison with Swedish farming there were 
most probably still fewer agricultural machines on the farms of 
most of the countries in Europe.201
On the other hand the majority of the farms in the USA’s main
200 Kuuse, J., Från redskap till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersiali­
sering inom svenskt jordbruk 1860-1910, pp. 67 ff. Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Jord- 
bruksräkningen 1927.
201 In Europe agricultural machinery was mainly produced in Britain, Germany and 
Sweden. Imports of American agricultural machinery were comparatively extensive 
at the beginning of the 20th century in Russia, France, Germany. Britain and 
Scandinavia. Nevertheless, for the many Russian and. to a certain extent, French 
farms these imports of machines were only a drop in the ocean.
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farming area—the Middle-West—had been able to mechanise the 
work for several reasons which have already been mentioned. This 
applies to the harvesting work to a particularly high degree. In the 
rest of the USA where the cultivation of grain became less im­
portant—in the East and the South—the pattern of spread of the 
mechanisation of agriculture was more like that of Europe. The 
majority of farms outside the prairie area in the USA had definitely 
not mechanised the harvesting process at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The number of prairie farms at the beginning of 
the twentieth century amounted to approximately one-third of the 
total number of farms in the USA, but these accounted for two- 
thirds of the USA’s wheat harvest and, for example, for two-thirds 
of the USA’s tractors in 1920.202
Therefore the harvester, like the other agricultural machines, 
served rather to widen than bridge the gaps between farmers. How­
ever, the difference between the USA and Europe was plain. In the 
USA the harvester became more “democratic” than in Europe in 
the sense that it could be adopted by a significantly larger number 
of farmers in the USA, above all in the prairie district. The real 
importance of the harvester lay in the fact that it made an effective 
contribution to raising the level of grain production and reducing 
the earlier fluctuations in this production. In the areas to which the 
harvester had more or less spread, the cereal harvest in the years 
before the turn of the nineteenth century began, for the first time 
in world history, to reach such a capacity that the population no 
longer needed to go without bread in peacetime. This was the case 
in the USA and in other countries of immigration such as Canada 
and Australia, and in large parts of Europe too.
The International Harvester Epoch
(g) Mergers: their formation and problems
In competing with Deering, McCormick had expanded the business 
and it is estimated that McCormick had produced about one-third 
of all the self-binders in the world around 1900. McCormick’s
United States Census of Agriculture.
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efforts at expansion also included plans to establish a raw material 
base like Deering’s. In order to obtain the necessary capital to 
establish this McCormick applied to the finance house of J. P. 
Morgan in New York in 1902. George Perkins handled the negotia­
tions on Morgan’s behalf. He first wanted to test the possibilities 
of the branch of the industry before any investments were made. 
Within a month Perkins had gained an insight into the market posi­
tion of the agricultural machine industry through confidential con­
tacts with the leading companies in that industry. Perkins found 
that the aggressive price war which had taken place had led to 
supersaturation of the domestic market for the time being. The 
militant sales methods had led the farmers into buying more ma­
chines than they really needed. A machine which would work very 
well for ten years was declared obsolete and unusable after five. 
According to Perkins, conditions were basically unsound, and on 
behalf of the Morgan bank he suggested a merger which would 
bring about peaceful working conditions in that part of industry.
In comparison with the farmers in America the foreign farmers 
were remarkably under-equipped with agricultural machines. There­
fore a future merger ought to be orientated more towards the 
international market. J. P. Morgan suggested that the new amal­
gamation should be called the International Harvester Company, 
in accordance with the market expansion, and this was accepted. 
Thus the International Harvester Co. was formed in 1902 by an 
amalgamation of the two leading firms in the business, the McCor­
mick Harvester Machine Co. and the Deering Harvester Co., both 
of Chicago, and in addition the Plano Manufacturing Co. of West 
Pullman, outside Chicago, the Milwaukee Harvester Co. of Mil­
waukee, Wisconsin, and the Warder, Bushnell and Glessner Co. of 
Springfield, Ohio. In 1903 International Harvester bought yet 
another three groups of companies, viz. D. M. Osborne & Co. of 
Auburn, New York State, the Aultman-Miller Co. of Akron, Ohio, 
and the Minnie Harvester Co. of St. Paul, Minnesota. In spite of the 
fact that International Harvester through the merger in 1903 con­
trolled 90 per cent of the harvesters which were made in the USA 
during the group's first ten years of business, a few less important 
company units were bought in addition. Serious negotiations about 
an amalgamation were also started with W. A. Wood, of Hoosick
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Falls, New York State and the Massey-Harris Co., of Toronto, 
Canada, but they proved fruitless.203
By having control over the larger part of the harvester market 
it was thought possible to achieve the principal aim of the amal­
gamation, viz. to create a balance in the USA between supply and 
demand by moderating, at least temporarily, the sales volume on 
the home market in order to increase the sales abroad instead.204 
Another advantage of large-scale production was that it was better 
able than smaller companies to make use of new domains con­
quered by technology. Furthermore it was intended that Inter­
national Harvester would form an effective group by uniting 
under the same roof Deering’s well-developed production organisa­
tion and McCormick’s superior sales organisation. The Deering 
branch supplied International Harvester with a broad raw material 
base founded on the principle of vertical integration, and Deering’s 
principles continued to be developed within the group. In 1903 
International Harvester built a factory in Hamilton, south of 
Toronto, as a counterweight to Massey-Harris on the Canadian 
market. The factory was built on a plot of land which Deering 
had bought a few years before while in fierce competition with 
McCormick. Apart from factories for the actual production of 
agricultural machines, in 1907 the International Harvester group 
owned about 100000 acres of forest in Missouri, Arkansas and 
Mississippi, 20000 acres of coal country in Kentucky, orefields with 
a capacity of 40 million tons of ore in Wisconsin and the Mesabi 
Range north of Duluth in Minnesota, as well as a number of iron­
works, foundries and twine industries. The vertical integration on 
the production side was almost complete. On the distribution side 
more individualism was being practised at the beginning, and for 
several years after the amalgamation the machines were sold under
203 Hendrick, B. J., Making the World's Agricultural Machinery, pp. 167ff. In The 
Age of Big Business. McCormick. C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 111 ff. Phil­
lips, W. G., op. cit.. p. 14.
204 International Harvester, in spite of its increased control of the market, did not 
make any increase in the price of harvesters after 1902 (cf. note 158). The fact 
that price fixing did not function during the harvester war, due to discounts and 
credit facilities, was a different matter. After 1902 price fixing was able to operate 
again as a market mechanism, and so discounts and credits in the industry again 
assumed more normal proportions.
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different brand names such as McCormick, Deering, Champion and 
so forth.205
It is not completely clear whether it was the Morgan bank or 
the individual harvester companies who took the initiative in the 
International Harvester amalgamation and carried it through, even 
though this later constituted an important legal question. The 
Bureau of Corporations in Washington, which was a federal body 
controlling the operation of trusts, emphatically asserted that 
Morgan had merely carried out the wishes of the companies. For 
its part International Harvester contended that Perkins as a repre­
sentative for Morgan introduced the idea of an amalgamation, and 
conducted and concluded the negotiations for it. The various com­
panies which made up International Harvester regarded the amal­
gamation somewhat differently. Deering wanted the merger to com­
prise more company units than McCormick did. McCormick wanted 
to preserve a certain degree of competition within the business: 
“We are big enough now. It is not safe for one company to have 
a monopoly. What we want to do is to regulate competition, not 
to destroy it.” Deering was in favour of a monopoly but McCor-
205 Phillips, W. G., op.cit., p. 53, p. 62, pp. 80ff. Casson, H. N., The Romance 
of the Reaper, pp. 90 ff. The Massey-Harris merger did not achieve the same 
control of the market in Canada as International Harvester acquired in the USA. 
In contrast to International Harvester, Massey-Harris did not come formally into 
conflict with the anti-trust legislation. During the decade after the Massey-Harris 
merger in 1891 the group never controlled more than 60 per cent of the Canadian 
market, excluding imports. Since International Harvester accounted for a large part 
of Canada’s imports of agricultural machinery and for a relatively important pro­
duction within Canada at the factory in Hamilton, International Harvester became 
a serious rival to Massey-Harris in supplying machinery to Canadian agriculture. 
On the whole International Harvester and Massey-Harris each accounted for one- 
third of the agricultural machine sales in Canada during the first decades of the 
20th century. International Harvester's operations in Canada started with a capital 
of one million dollars in 1903, but the capital increased with the expansion of the 
subsidiary, and at the end of the First World War the capital amounted to 15 
million dollars (1918).
The principle of vertical integration was pursued much further in International 
Harvester than for example in the Separator group. However, AB Separator 
integrated foundries and steel-pressing factories into the business and became rela­
tively self-supporting on the semi-manufactured goods side. On the pure raw 
materials side the Separator group in fact became more dependent on sub-con­
tractors than International Harvester was.
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mick wanted to stop short at a sort of price-controlling oligopoly, 
and it was McCormick’s view which prevailed.206
The formation of International Harvester in 1902 was not a u- 
nique phenomenon in American industrial life. In spite of the in­
troduction of the anti-trust law in 1890, the largest wave of mergers 
in the history of the USA occurred between 1897 and 1904. This 
was partly due to the fact that the scope of the law was greatly 
limited in practice by the interpretation of the anti-trust law in a 
test case in 1895. Several of the mergers were amalgamations, 
that is to say mergers in their most complete form. An amalgama­
tion involves a business company, as distinct from a holding com­
pany, which owns property and all the associated companies and 
their assets are gathered into a single group, whereas the holding 
company is a company which holds the shares of the subsidiaries. 
Apart from International Harvester, among the leading amalgama­
tions which took place around the turn of the nineteenth century 
were Allis-Chalmers, American Tobacco, Bethlehem Steel, Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co., Eastman Kodak, United Fruit and the United 
Shoe Machinery Company. However, some of the really big merg-
20fi Casson, H. N., The Romance of the Reaper, pp. 90ff. Hendrick, B. J., op.cit., 
pp. 167ff. McCormick. C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 111 ff. Phillips, W. G., 
op. cit., pp. 14 f.
It has been asserted on McCormick’s part, and even in works of a company 
economic history nature, e.g. by Hendrick, that the formation of International 
Harvester was a shotgun wedding. The leading people in the individual companies 
were great individualists and entrepreneurs with a period of intensive competition 
and experience of failed co-operation behind them, and it has been stressed that 
the idea of a merger was accepted with reluctance. The final agreement is supposed 
to have been concluded in an atmosphere which betokened anything but a willing­
ness to co-operate. The four great men, McCormick, Deering, Glessner and Jones, 
could not even be persuaded to sit in the same room when the final agreement to 
the merger was going to be concluded, and instead they had to be placed in four 
different rooms. Perkins had to run between the rooms with the necessary docu­
ments in order to form a basis for the merger. The whole situation was unique 
and was more like a comic opera than a business transaction. In any event, McCor­
mick's aim was probably not to start negotiations for a merger when he first went 
to see Morgan about the question of capital. The visit was brought about by the 
competition situation with Deering. One factor which indirectly confirms that the 
Morgan bank participated in the formation of International Harvester is that the 
bank played an active and important rôle in many other important mergers in the 
USA at the turn of the century.
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ers such as the Standard Oil Company and the United States Steel 
Corporation involved holding companies.
The technological development in the USA was without a doubt 
the strongest driving force behind the process of concentration in 
economic life. It was not possible to legislate against such devel­
oping forces. The technology and its profits especially from mass- 
production made the development of the large-scale companies 
possible to a greater extent than the newly established large-scale 
companies made possible the development of technology.207
In order to avoid coming into conflict with the provisions of the 
anti-trust law, Perkins’s legal experts arranged the business transac­
tion for International Harvester in such a way that the companies’ 
corporeal assets such as mines, forests, factories, machines, sales­
rooms and stocks were pooled. International Harvester’s share 
capital was originally fixed at 120 million dollars, and in contrast 
to the United States Steel Corporation, for example, International 
Harvester did not become over-capitalised. The method of inflating 
the book value of the assets with fictitious capital unrepresented 
by actual property, “watered stock”, which was so common in 
amalgamations around the turn of the century, was not practised 
in International Harvester. The original assets of International Har­
vester were assessed at 110 million dollars by the Bureau of Cor­
porations, and since this figure did not include the goodwill value 
the Bureau did not consider that the estimate of the assets was 
too high.
In spite of the amalgamation International Harvester became a 
typical family-owned company. The McCormick family received 43 
per cent of the shares, the Deering family 34 per cent, and the 
rest hardly a quarter. During International Harvester’s first ten 
years the company’s policy was in the hands of a voting trust 
consisting of Cyrus H. McCormick II as President, Charles Deering 
as Chairman of the Board of Directors, and George Perkins from 
the Morgan group as the representative of the smaller parties. The 
object of the voting trust was to keep the control of the company 
safe “in the hands of the old harvester families”. Even though 
the voting trust in theory gave the same voting power to each of
207 Faulkner, H. U., op. cit., chapter 21, pp. 420-448.
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the three representatives, the Bureau of Corporations found in 1913 
that the McCormick interests had had a dominant influence on the 
development of the company.208
In spite of all the legal measures taken to avoid it, International 
Harvester did not escape conflict with the anti-trust legislation. 
In actual fact the first twenty-five years of the company’s history 
were characterised by a more or less intensive battle against 
various authorities over the interpretation of the anti-trust law. The 
state authorities in Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky and 
Texas accused International Harvester in 1906 and 1907 of violating 
the anti-trust law. For a number of years the company was for­
bidden to trade in certain states. The actions of governments of 
individual federal states in fact had limited effects even in the state 
in question. In 1912 the battle was removed to a higher level. 
By a resolution of the Senate the Bureau of Corporations was given 
the task of investigating the case of International Harvester and the 
trade in agricultural machines. On the basis of its investigation the 
Bureau found that International Harvester in restricting competi­
tion was acting contrary to the spirit of the anti-trust law, and the 
Bureau found that International Harvester had forced its agents 
under threat of dismissal to sell the machines which were newly 
introduced by the group. “There is no doubt that the principal 
motive for the formation of the International Harvester Company 
was to eliminate competition and to secure a dominant position in 
the trade.”209 In the same year, 1912, the federal government con­
sidered that on the basis of the Bureau’s investigation it had 
enough material to start legal proceedings against International 
Harvester for violating the anti-trust law, and very extensive 
proceedings then began. According to the judgment of the court 
which followed in 1914 and completely endorsed the government’s 
view, International Harvester was ordered to divide the group into 
three equal, separate and independent units. International Harvester 
appealed to the Supreme Court, where the case had not been 
decided in 1918.
208 McCormick, C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 111 ff. Phillips, W. G., op.cit., 
pp. 15 f. Report of the Commissioner of Corporations, 9 (1913).
209 McCormick, C., op.cit., pp. 166 ff. Phillips, W. G., op.cit. p. 171. Report of the 
Commissioner of Corporations, 20, 66 (1913).
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Pending the decision of the Supreme Court, International Har­
vester suggested a provisional compromise solution in front of the 
Attorney-General. The compromise proposal was accepted and 
meant that International Harvester would part with the three units 
Osborne, Champion and Milwaukee. On the other hand the two 
big McCormick and Deering branches would remain intact. The 
compromise, which nullified the decision of 1914, was a setback 
for the government, who had aimed above all at having the McCor­
mick and Deering branches separated. During the 1920s the govern­
ment continued the proceedings against International Harvester 
through the Department of Justice. However, in 1926 a lower court 
decided the case in favour of International Harvester, and gave as 
its reasons inter alia the facts that International Harvester’s sale 
of the Osborne, Champion and Milwaukee branches had reduced 
International Harvester’s share of the market, and that other groups 
in the industry had expanded more rapidly than International Har­
vester. According to the court, as a result of this International Har­
vester’s share of the harvester market had fallen from 85 per cent 
in 1902 to 64 per cent in 1926. The government appealed against 
the decision to the Superme Court which, however, finally upheld 
the judgment of the lower court in 1927.210
An important aim in the amalgamation and formation of Inter­
national Harvester was to slow down at least temporarily the sales 
of agricultural machines. As table 64 shows, the companies which 
together formed International Harvester also reduced their domestic 
sales of harvesters by 35 per cent and mowing-machines by 16 per 
cent during the first four years after the merger, as compared with 
the four-year period immediately before the amalgamation. The
210 Phillips, W. G.. op. cit., pp. 19ff.
The lower court’s reference to increasing competition for International Harvester 
applied mainly to the John Deere Company. At the turn of the 19th century the 
John Deere Co. was the largest producer of ploughs in the USA, and when in 1903 
International Harvester extended its business to include the production of imple­
ments, the Deere Company retaliated by developing a full-line system which was 
fully-fledged in 1915. Deere expanded not least on the harvester side, and became 
the largest producer next to International Harvester in the whole of the agricultural 
machine industry in the USA. Therefore, according to the lower court, International 
Harvester was not able to dictate or control price development on the harvester 
market.
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Table 64. Number of machines sold (thousands) before and after the merger 
of the company units which formed International Harvester
Year
Self-
binders
Other
harvesting
machines
Mowing-
machines
Horse
hay-rakes
1899 159 22 215 64
1900 127 35 198 78
1901 146 55 236 113
1902 168 42 245 149
merger
1903 106 25 208 155
1904 87 21 187 114
1905 98 20 181 123
1906 103 24 176 119
Note Sales means total domestic sales, i.e. the USA + Canada.
Source McCormick Collection: International Harvester Co. Annual Settlement Re­
cord.
reduced profitability which affected parts of the amalgamation dur­
ing the initial years of operation, according to table 64, shows that 
International Harvester on top of general teething troubles had 
certain difficulties in effectively coordinating the different parts of 
the business.
Table 65. Amount of sales in millions of dollars of the company units 
forming International Harvester in 1904-1906
Company unit 1904 (in %) 1905 (in %) 1906 (in %)
Champion 3.2 (9) 2.4 (6) 2.3 (5)
Deering 13.4 (40) 15.0 (38) 17.5 (38)
McCormick 13.0 (39) 15.2 (38) 18.3 (39)
Milwaukee 2.0 (6) 1.7 (4) 1.9 (4)
Osborne 3.3 (8) 3.4 (7)
Plano 2.0 (6) 2.4 (6) 3.3 (7)
l.H. total 33.6 (100) 40.0 (100) 46.7 (100)
Note Sales means total domestic sales, i.e. the USA+Canada.
Source McCormick Collection: IH Co. Annual Settlement Record.
306
Table 66. International Harvester's sales in millions of dollars divided into 
various sales areas in the years 1904-1912
Year USA Canada
Domestic 
USA +
Canada
Foreign
excl.
Canada
Total sales
Domestic + 
Foreign
1904 30.7 2.9 33.6
1905 36.2 3.8 40.0 13.2 53.2
1906 41.9 4.8 46.7 15.7 62.4
1907 46.2 5.7 51.9 19.0 70.9
1908 42.0 5.6 47.6 19.0 66.6
1909 49.1 7.1 56.2 20.6 76.8
1910 55.2 10.0 65.2 24.2 89.4
1911 55.5 13.8 69.3 28.5 97.8
1912 62.8 14.7 77.5 36.2 113.7
Source McCormick Collection; International Harvester Co. Annual Settlement Re­
cord; Annual Reports.
In spite of the fact that the acreage under cultivation and the 
grain production continued to increase in the USA at the beginn­
ing of the twentieth century, International Harvester’s domestic 
sales of the original production (old-lines) of parts of the company 
stagnated, above all as regards harvesters. On tne other hand 
after a few years of consolidation International Harvester was able 
to compensate for this stagnation on the home market by expanding 
internationally, and the group’s foreign sales of old-line products 
increased 2.3 times from 1905 to 1912. However the factor which 
in the long run gave International Harvester growing sales markets 
was the new agricultural technology, mainly in the form of tractors, 
trucks and combine harvesters.
(A) International Harvester and the new 
agricultural technology
The driving power of the tractor, which was a by-product of the 
motor-car industry, was, like that of the car, ultimately based on 
the gas engine constructed by the German Nikolaus Otto in 1876, 
which was shown for the first time at the world fair in Paris in 
1878. The first petrol-powered tractors were manufactured at the
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beginning of the 1890s, and when they began to be manufactured 
industrially from 1902 onwards they gradually replaced the steam- 
powered “tractors” which had been in use since the latter part of 
the nineteenth century. It was above all the intricate problems 
surrounding carburation and ignition which held up the practical 
application of the petrol engine during the last quarter of the nine­
teenth century. R. Wik divides the development of the petrol- 
powered tractor in the USA into three stages:
1876-1902 Experimental state of tractor development 
1902-1913 Manufacture of large gasoline and kerosene tractors 
1913-1924 Development of the small gasoline tractor to the advent 
of the all-purpose sow-crop tractor in 1924.
When the Hart-Parr tractor was introduced onto the American 
market in 1902 the last phase in the development of mechanised 
agriculture began. Charles W. Hart of Iowa and Charles H. Parr 
of Wisconsin had studied technology at the same time during the 
1890s at Madison in the University of Wisconsin, and they had been 
especially interested in the combustion engine. In 1900 they moved 
to Charles City, Iowa, where in 1902 they started the first petrol 
powered tractor industry in the USA. During the next five years 
a total of about 600 tractors were produced of which Hart-Parr 
accounted for one-third. In order to distinguish the petrol powered 
machines from their steam powered rivals, Hart-Parr adopted the 
name “Tractor”, a name which was gradually accepted by the 
public. When in 1906 International Harvester included tractor manu­
facturing in its production programme there were about ten com­
panies in the business. However, with Internationa] Harvester’s 
entry the capacity of that part of the industry increased consider­
ably. In 1912 International Harvester produced more than 3 000 
out of a total of approximately 10000 tractors manufactured in the 
USA.211
The construction of the first tractors was robust, but heavy and 
clumsy, and the shape was very much like that of the gigantic
211 McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record. Inter­
national Harvester Annual Reports. Wik, R. M., Steam Power on the American 
Farm, pp. 200 ff.
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steam powered machines. To begin with the producers tried to 
create efficient tractors by making them as large and giving them 
as great a horse-power as possible. During the tractor’s introduc­
tory stage the farms in Western Canada became the most important 
customer of the tractor industry. The early big, heavy and compara­
tively expensive tractors could most easily be adopted by the really 
large Canadian prairie farms in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta, and to the same extent in the USA in the Dakotas and 
Minnesota. At the end of the nineteenth century and the begin­
ning of the twentieth century the large plains in the USA’s North- 
Western prairie area and in Western Canada had permitted steam 
ploughing on a comparatively large scale. Tractor ploughing, which 
replaced steam ploughing in these districts after 1910, became just 
as important as mechanical harvesting had been on the prairies 
west of Chicago, and a series of tractor ploughing demonstrations 
started, the first of which took place in Winnipeg in 1908. In the 
same year International Harvester was able to export the first 
tractors to Europe, Argentina and Australia.
Economic trends during the First World War prompted the Amer­
ican farmers to invest in tractors and during the war an increas­
ing number of tractor models were shown at national tractor de­
monstrations in Minneapolis, Madison, Indianapolis, St. Louis, 
Dallas and so on. In 1917 the production of tractors in the USA 
had risen to 62000, of which a quarter were exported, especially 
to countries at war in Europe such as Britain, France and Italy. 
During the war International Harvester was still the leader on the 
tractor market. Even though tractor orders in the USA increased 
rapidly under the influence of wartime conditions, only about 1 
per cent of the USA’s farms had tractors in 1917. The limited 
spread of the tractor up to the end of the First World War was 
mainly due to the fact that it was too heavy and too expensive 
for most of the farms.212
212 McCormick, C., The Century of the Reaper, pp. 145 ff.
One of International Harvester's tours de force at various demonstrations around 
1910 was to synchronise three tractors which together pulled 54 ploughs, which 
ploughed furrows in a band of more then 20 metres in width. The display was of 
course an advertising stunt, but it demonstrated the manufacturers' view that the 
new agricultural technology worked best on the massive level. Hart-Parr's first
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As a result of Henry Ford’s decision to supplement car produc­
tion with the production of tractors in 1917, the character of the 
tractor industry changed immediately. Ford’s object was to produce 
simpler and lighter tractors which could be adopted by the 
majority of farmers. Through this tractors could be mass-produced 
in the same way as cars, the production costs per tractor could 
be reduced and the tractor would become considerably cheaper. In 
1917 Ford received his first big order, consisting of 6000 tractors, 
from the British government, and in the following year Ford 
introduced his tractor (Fordson) onto the American market. 
The USA more than doubled its production of tractors in 1918 
when approximately 200 manufacturers produced 133 000 tractors. 
In one year Ford exceeded the sales volume of International Har­
vester, and Ford's sales totalled 34000 tractors in 1918 and 54000 
in 1919. Ford’s share of the American tractor market rose from 
25 per cent in 1918 to 33 per cent in 1920, and went up to a total 
of 70 per cent at the beginning of the 1920s. The explanation for 
the great popularity of Ford’s tractors was largely that he trans­
ferred the new production and sales methods of the car industry 
to the production and selling of tractors. Ford could also apply the 
principle of standardisation, combined with mass-production which 
had developed in the car industry, to the tractor industry, and this 
resulted in smaller and more adaptable tractors, reduced production 
costs and substantially lower prices. Ford reduced the price of trac­
tors in various stages from about 900 dollars in 1919 to 400 dollars 
in 1922, at the same time transferring advertising and publicity cam­
paigns from car selling to tractor selling, and having the tractors 
sold by his car salesmen. As an entrepreneur Ford helped to give 
a fresh lease of life to the agricultural technology industry through 
the motor-car industry.213
tractor was a gigantic machine which weighed over 10 tons and International Har­
vester’s first 45 horse-power tractors of the 1910 model weighed 11 tons. When the 
Oliver Farm Equipment Company extended its business to include the produc­
tion of tractors, the group bought up the Hart-Parr Co. Phillips, W. G., op.cit., 
pp. 25 ff.
213 Phillips, W. G., op.cit., pp. 27ff. Sorensen, Ch. E., My Forty Years with Ford, 
pp. 217ff. The Yearbook of Agriculture, i960. Power to Produce, pp. 36f.,
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Ford’s successes on the tractor market were a challenge for In­
ternational Harvester, the largest manufacturer of agricultural 
machines in the USA. In reply to Ford’s price reduction, Inter­
national Harvester lowered the price of its Titan tractor from 930 
dollars to 700 dollars in 1922 and in 1923 International Harvester 
brought out two new lighter models, the McCormick-Deering 10-20 
and 15-30. International Harvester’s new tractor models embodied 
technology borrowed in part from the Fordson tractor and the 
group now began to integrate its implements with the tractor to 
a higher degree. Thereafter a tractor sales war broke out between 
International Harvester and Ford which resembled the harvester 
war between McCormick and Deering in the 1890s. In 1924 
International Harvester was again able to increase its tractor supply 
and in 1927 was able to exceed Ford’s tractor sales for the first 
time since 1918. Ford stopped producing tractors in the following 
year and International Harvester regained its leading position on 
the tractor market as well.
The fact that International Harvester was able to win the tractor 
war in the 1920s was probably due to a great extent to Ford’s 
inadequate insight into agricultural economy and agricultural 
psychology. For a short time Ford was able to sell a large number 
of tractors through his car salesmen. The Fordson tractors were 
certainly advanced products technically, but in the long run Ford’s 
car salesmen could not maintain the same sales and service contact 
with the farmers as International Harvester’s dealers who were 
more experienced in agriculture. In addition tractor production was 
not as vital for Ford as for International Harvester. Therefore when
pp. 42f. Wik, R. M., ‘Henry Ford’s Tractors and American Agriculture.’ In Agricul­
tural History, April 1964. Fraser, C., Harry Ferguson, Inventor and Pioneer.
An important improvement in agrarian technology resulting from the tractor were 
the implements and machines which were made to be fitted directly to the tractor. 
The best-known was the Irishman Harry Ferguson's tractor plough which was 
specially constructed for the Fordson tractor at the beginning of the 1920s, and his 
tractor plough became a completely integrated part of the tractor. At the end of 
the 1920s Ferguson further developed a hydraulic system for the tractor, which 
enabled the implements to be operated and controlled in a revolutionary way. 
In 1953 Harry Ferguson Inc. merged with Massey-Harris when Massey-Harris-Fer- 
guson was formed. In 1958 the group changed its name to Massey-Ferguson and 
the name ‘Harris’ was dropped.
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Diagram 20. Tractors manufactured in the United States 1910-1930 and 
Fordson tractor production 1917-1928.
Thousand
tractors Total tractor production in United States 
Fordson tractor production
150-
100-
1910
Source The Yearbook of Agriculture 1960, p. 38, Phillips, W. G., The agricultural 
Implement Industry in Canada, p. 175.
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Ford during the 1920s noticed increased competition from Inter­
national Harvester and other full-line groups with long experience 
of agricultural technology, he preferred to quit and concentrate on 
the car industry. Before the First World War the producers of 
various kinds of agricultural technology such as implements, 
sowing machines, harvesters and threshers had as a rule formed 
four separate branches of industry which were not in direct compe­
tition with one another. After the First World War full-line groups 
of companies of the International Harvester type, the J. Deere Co., 
the J. I. Case Co., Oliver Farm Equipment and Massey-Harris be­
came typical company units in the agricultural machine industry, 
an industry which was to consist of a small number of multi- 
producing groups all in direct competition with each other.214
Ford thus made a concrete and decisive contribution to the 
spread, over a decade, of tractors to the pioneers and early adopt­
ers in the USA, but his most lasting contribution to the mechani­
sation of modern agriculture was to show the way to other tractor 
manufacturers. It was natural for the experienced agricultural 
machine firms to try and approach the tractor problem by providing 
the tractor with the same strong, rugged, robust and heavy features 
which had previously been given to ploughs, harvesters and 
threshers. With the earlier agricultural machines there was not the 
demand for flexibility that there was with the tractor. Technolog­
ically the tractor resembled the car more than other agricultural 
machines and it was because of this that the established companies 
in the agricultural machine industry had difficulties in developing a 
suitable tractor construction. Ideas from outside were needed. In 
comparison with the production of cars the manufacture of har­
vesters had called for a relatively simple production technique, and 
therefore companies such as International Harvester in fact had no 
advantages in the development work on the tractor.215
In spite of Ford’s efforts in 1918-1928 to persuade the smaller 
farmer to adopt the tractor, it was very unevenly distributed 
within the USA. On the large holdings in the Great Plains the
214 McCormick, C.. The Century of the Reaper, pp. 190ff. Phillips, W. G., op.cit., 
pp. 29ff. Gray. R. B., Development of the Agricultural Tractor in the United States. 
part II, pp. 18 ff.
215 McCormick, C., op. cit., pp. 155 ff.
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tractor in 1930 was ten times as common than on the farms in the 
Southern states, and three to four times commoner than on the 
farms in the North-Eastern coastal states with the exception of 
New Jersey. With an interval of fifty years the pattern of spread 
in the distribution of the harvester was roughly repeated. The 
tractor pioneers, like the harvester pioneers in their time, were to 
be found in the most recently cultivated areas in the extreme 
North-West. The extreme North-West had in fact been moved from 
Illinois to the Dakotas and Montana in the USA and also to Mani­
toba, Saskatchewan and Alberta in Canada.
In North America the tractor was adopted by the pioneers and 
early adopters approximately twenty years earlier than in Sweden. 
According to the census of agriculture in Sweden, 6 per cent of the 
farms had tractors in 1944 as against 18 per cent in 1951. These 
figures correspond most closely to the figures from the official 
statistics for the USA in 1925 and 1930 respectively, when 8 per 
cent and 15 per cent respectively of the farmers had adopted the 
tractor. The domestic regional differences behind the official figures 
are also comparable. In the USA 20-22 per cent had adopted the 
tractor in the most advanced districts in 1925, and in Sweden in 
1944 25 and 17 per cent respectively of the farms in prominent 
arable counties such as Uppsala and Malmöhus län had tractors. 
In 1925 the tractor had only spread to 1-2 per cent of the farms 
in the American South, which was equivalent in Sweden in 1944 
to a county such as Kronobergs län, which was rich in forests 
and where the farms tended to be small, where only one per cent 
of the farms had adopted the tractor at that time. In 1930 the 
tractor had spread to 40-48 per cent on the Great Plains as against 
54 per cent and 35 per cent respectively in Uppsala and Malmö­
hus län in Sweden in 1951. In the South in 1930 the tractor was 
to be found on 4 per cent of the farms on average, as compared 
with 5 per cent for Kronobergs län in Sweden in 1951. The differ­
ence in time between the breakthrough of the tractor in North 
America and in Sweden is probably a reflection of the difference 
in time as between North America and the continent of Europe 
generally .21fi
216 See table 71. Sveriges Officiella Statistik (SOS). Jordbruksräkningarna 1944 and 
1951.
314
The farmers’ inclination to adopt the tractor was dependent to 
an even higher degree than the decision to adopt the harvester on 
the economic basis of the individual farmer. Economic factors such 
as the cost of the tractor in comparison with the cost of horses 
and labour and also the size of the arable area and the volume of 
production played a decisive rôle in this respect, even though 
different acquisition motives of social psychology could modify the 
pattern. At the outbreak of the Second World War almost two- 
thirds of the farms in the USA were so-called low-producing farms 
with a yearly production below 1 000 dollars. On the whole these 
low-producing units did not rise above the self-sufficiency level, 
and in 1939 they only accounted for 20 per cent of the total 
production value of the agricultural sector. Only 9 per cent of 
these two-thirds of the farms in the USA had a tractor in 1939. 
In the group of farms which produced between 1000 and 2000 
dollars worth, constituting 19 per cent of the nation’s farms, 37 
per cent had tractors, and for the farms with a production of a 
value greater than 2 000 dollars, constituting the remaining one- 
sixth of the farms, the equivalent figure was 66 per cent. Even 
though most American farms were not highly mechanised in 1939, 
the minority which were highly mechanised in the USA proved to 
be very large in an international comparison.217
International Harvester’s new-line products increased much more 
rapidly in terms of volume than the company’s old-line production. 
According to table 67 the domestic sales of new-line products in­
creased sevenfold between 1905 and 1912, while the corresponding 
foreign sales increased 25-fold over the same period. Tractors, 
trucks and lorries for transporting farm produce accounted for the 
main part of the new-line production. In 1914 International Har­
vester extended the new-lines programme with the production of 
combine harvesters. The combine harvester had already been 
developed during the 1880s, and for a short time during the 1890s 
had achieved a certain distribution, which had however been 
limited to the large holdings in California. Due to the changed 
character of farming in California after 1900 the combine harvester
217 United States Department of Agriculture Mise. Publication no. 630, October 1947. 
Progress of Farm Mechanization, pp. 48 ff.
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Table 67. International Harvester’s sales of old-line products and new-line 
products in millions of dollars in 1905-1912
Year
Old-lines New-Iines
Total
New-Iines 
as % of 
totalUSA Foreign USA Foreign
1905 33.3 15.6 2.9 0.6 52.4 7
1906 34.5 17.9 7.4 1.2 61.0 14
1907 35.4 21.3 10.8 2.0 69.5 18
1908 30.9 21.2 10.6 2.5 65.2 20
1909 34.6 22.9 15.5 5.2 78.2 26
1910 37.7 25.2 18.8 9.0 90.7 31
1911 37.5 29.0 19.3 13.3 99.1 33
1912 42.0 35.7 21.9 15.1 114.7 32
Old-line=harvesting machines, implements etc. 
New-line= tractors, motorwagons etc.
Source International Harvester Annual Reports.
disappeared. In spite of the fact that the combine harvester was 
no innovation in agricultural technology, during the period between 
the wars it was not adopted to the same extent as the tractor. 
In 1940 only about 3 per cent of the farms in the USA were 
equipped with combine harvesters, whereas at that time every 
fourth farm had a tractor. The reason for this was that the tractor 
was more versatile than the combine harvester. The self-binders 
and threshers were alternatives to the combine harvester and for a 
long time formed a barrier to its rapid spread.
Tractors and lorries were the forms of agricultural technology 
which increased most rapidly, comparatively speaking, during the 
period between the wars in American agriculture. This kind of 
agricultural technology replaced the draught animals and steam 
power. The rôle of the horse declined comparatively quickly as 
regards transport work but comparatively slowly as regards work 
in the fields. In spite of the fact that in 1945 there were almost 
2.5 million tractors on the farms in the USA, it is estimated that 
only about 400 self-binders or sowing machines were drawn by 
tractors. It is estimated that about 75 per cent of the sowing 
machines and self-binders were drawn by horses at that time. On
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Table 68. Number of machines in use on farms in the USA in 1910-1946 
(in thousands)
Year
Farm
tractors
Farm
motor-trucks
Farm
automobiles
Grain
combines
1910 1 0 50 1
1920 246 139 2 146 4
1930 920 900 4 135 61
1940 1 545 1 047 4 144 190
1946 2 585 1 550 4 100 415
Source Miscellaneous Publication No. 630, United States Department of Agricul­
ture, October 1947, p. 32.
the other hand advanced machines such as grain combines and 
corn pickers were to be developed to a greater extent side by 
side with the tractor, and they were practically all tractor-driven 
at the outbreak of the Second World War.218
Table 69. The value of the agricultural machines and draught animals on 
the farms in the USA, 1910-1946. Amounts given in millions of dollars in 
prices for the years 1935-1939
The figures in parentheses indicate the values as percentages
Year Tractors
Motor­
trucks
Farm
auto­
mobiles
Other
farm
machinery
Horses
and mules Total
1910 1 (0) 0(0) 13 (0) 1 876 (42) 2 564 (58) 4 454 (100)
1915 12 (0) 7(0) 123 (3) 2 025 (41) 2 813 (56) 4 980(100)
1920 123 (2) 40(1) 558 (10) 2 055(37) 2 748 (50) 5 524 (100)
1925 274 (5) 133 (3) 854(16) 1 647(31) 2 386 (45) 5 294(100)
1930 460 (8) 261 (5) 1 075 (20) 1 634 (30) 2 019 (37) 5 449(100)
1935 524(12) 258 (6) 947 (21) 1 043 (23) 1 728 (38) 4 500 (100)
1940 772 (16) 304(6) 1 077 (21) 1 364 (27) 1 503 (30) 5 020 (100)
1946 1 292 (20) 450 (7) 1 066 07) 2 296 (37) 1 168(19) 6 272 (100)
Source Miscellaneous Publication No. 630, 
ture, October 1947, p. 84.
United States Department of Agricul-
218 Ibid. 
mick, C
, pp. 32, 36 f. 
op. cit., pp.
, p. 84. 
145 ff.
International Harvester AnnuaI Report 1912. McCor-
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Table 70. The development of sales, profits, wages and number of em­
ployees at International Harvester in 1902-1921. Amounts in millions of 
dollars
Year Sales
Net profits 
after tax
Wages
paid
Number
employed
Wage as % 
of sales
1902 9.6“
1903 0.8
1904 5.7
1905 55.7 7.5 16.9 22 980 30
1906 67.6 19.7 26 560 29
1907 78.2 21.8 28 680 28
1908 72.5 19.7 25 679 27
1909 86.6 22.9 28 493 26
1910 101.1 17.2 29.2 35 743 29
1911 108.0 41 690
1912 125.4 16.4 42 979
1913 118.4" 39 650
1919 212.7 15.0 63.0 40 483 30
1920 225.0 16.7 89.9 48 280 39
1921 121.2 4.2
“ Net profits 1902 covers the total profits from the five company units which were 
later to form International Harvester.
6 In 1913 International Harvester was divided into one domestic and one foreign 
part. International Harvester Company of New Jersey was formed on half of the 
share capital—70 million dollars (the share capital was increased in 1910 to 140 mil­
lion dollars)—and took over the production in the USA. All production and sales 
abroad together with certain production of new-line products in the USA were taken 
over by International Harvester Corporation which was founded on the other half of 
the share capital. Of the total sales in 1913 of 118.4 million dollars I.H.C. of New 
Jersey accounted for 66.7 million and I.H. Corporation for 51.7 millions. In 1918 the 
two parts of the group were reunited.
Note The sales amounts above show somewhat larger values than equivalent 
amounts do in the other tables. The reason for this is that an outstanding item 
"other sales" has been included here.
Source International Harvester Annual Reports. Ozanne, R.. Wages in Practice 
and Theory. McCormick and International Harvester 1860-1960.
International Harvester’s new-line production was developed in 
an attempt to achieve a full-line system. In 1903 the new-line 
production constituted 5 per cent of the whole of the business, in 
1908 20 per cent, in 1912 32 per cent, and in 1916 the new-lines
318
Table 71. The spread of tractors to the farms in various states of the USA in 1920- 
1930. Numbers of farms and tractors in thousands
A=Number of farms
State 1920 1925 1930
1 North Dakota 78 76 80
2 South Dakota 75 80 83
3 Montana 58 46 47
4 California 118 136 136
5 Kansas 165 166 166
6 Illinois 237 226 214
7 Iowa 213 213 215
8 Nebraska 124 128 129
9 Minnesota 178 188 185
10 Arizona 10 11 14
11 Colorado 60 58' 60
12 Wyoming 16 16 16
13 Nevada 3 4 3
14 Oregon 50 56 55
15 Wisconsin 189 193 182
16 Ohio 257 245 219
17 Indiana 205 1% 182
18 New York 193 189 160
19 Washington 66 73 73
20 Idaho 42 41 42
21 Michigan 196 192 169
22 Pennsylvania 202 200 172
23 Missouri 263 260 256
24 Oklahoma 192 197 204
25 New Jersey 30 30 25
26 Maryland 48 49 43
27 Texas 436 466 495
28 Louisiana 135 132 161
29 Massachusetts 32 33 26
30 Connecticut 23 23 17
31 Vermont 29 28 25
32 Delaware 10 10 10
33 Rhode Island 4 4 3
34 New Mexico 30 32 31
35 Utah 26 26 27
36 North Carolina 270 283 280
37 South Carolina 193 173 158
B=Numberoftractors C=B as % of A
1920 1925 1930 1920 1925 1930
13 17 38 17 22 48
13 17 34 17 21 41
8 7 19 14 14 40
14 30 44 12 22 32
17 31 66 10 19 40
23 43 70 10 19 33
20 37 66 9 17 31
11 19 41 9 15 32
16 27 48 9 14 26
1 1 3 9 11 18
5 7 13 8 12 22
1 1 4 7 9 26
0 0 0 7 8 10
3 6 10 6 11 18
9 30 50 5 16 27
10 31 53 4 13 24
9 24 42 4 12 23
7 26 40 4 14 25
3 4 8 4 6 12
2 2 5 4 5 11
6 19 34 3 10 20
6 20 34 3 10 19
8 13 25 3 5 10
6 11 26 3 6 13
1 4 8 3 15 32
2 4 7 3 8 17
9 17 37 2 4 7
3 3 5 2 3 3
1 2 4 2 7 15
0 1 3 2 6 16
0 2 2 2 6 10
0 1 2 2 7 16
0 0 1 2 8 18
0 1 2 2 3 8
1 1 1 2 3 5
2 8 11 1 3 4
1 3 3 1 2 2
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A=Numberoffarms B=Numberoftractors C=B as % of A
State 1920 1925 1930 1920 1925 1930 1920 1925 1930
38 Virginia 186 194 171 3 7 10 1 3 6
39 Kentucky 271 259 246 2 5 7 1 2 3
40 Tennessee 253 253 246 2 5 7 1 2 3
41 Georgia 311 249 256 2 4 6 1 2 2
42 Arkansas 233 222 242 2 3 6 1 2 2
43 Florida 54 59 59 1 3 6 1 5 10
44 West Virginia 87 90 83 1 2 3 1 2 3
45 Maine 48 50 39 1 2 3 1 4 9
46 New Hampshire 21 21 15 O 1 1 1 3 7
47 Mississippi 272 257 313 1 2 6 O 1 2
48 Alabama 256 238 257 1 2 5 0 1 2
USA 6 448 6 372 6 289 245 505 920 4 8 15
Source United States Census of Agriculture. United States Census Bureau, Census of Tractors 
on Farms 1920, 1925, 1930.
accounted for half the production value. Around 1930 the new­
lines accounted for 90 per cent of the total business. When in 1918 
International Harvester acquired the third largest plough factory in 
the country through the purchase of the Parlin and Orendorff Com­
pany, the last step towards the full-line principle had been taken, 
and as a result International Harvester was able to produce any 
implement or machine which a farmer required. The full-line system 
carried various advantages for the producer of agricultural 
machines. On the one hand it was easier to persuade the agents 
to sell a full-line range than more specialised machines, and on the 
other hand the full-line principle meant that the earlier seasonal 
demands could be replaced by a more even distribution of the 
orders during the year, which gave a more even annual rhythm 
to the production.219
International Harvester’s company policy differed in this respect 
from that of AB Separator. The Separator group concentrated its 
production and limited it to cream separators and other dairying
218 McCormick. C., op. cit., pp. 185ff.
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machines. At the end of the 1870s milk production had been less 
mechanised than other processes in farming, and this had given AB 
Separator an opportunity to develop a new domain in agricultural 
technology in which it later became the international market leader. 
It may seem remarkable that the Swedish AB Separator was able 
through its subsidiary in the USA, the De Laval Separator Co., 
to control a large part of the American separator market. The USA 
was in fact the world’s leading industrial nation and she had ‘know­
how’ of long standing as regards agricultural machines which was 
quite overwhelming, and as far as tractors were concerned not even 
a powerful company such as Ford was able in the long run to 
stand its ground against the domestically established companies in 
the agricultural machine industry. The Separator group’s ability 
to maintain its position on the American separator market seems 
to have been due in part to the fact that it concentrated on a type 
of agricultural technology of which it acquired supreme mastery, on 
the production side as well as on the distribution side. It should 
be borne in mind that the separator production was not as vital 
as the tractor production within the framework of International 
Harvester’s full-line system. The sales of separators in 1909, for 
example, in terms of value constituted only 4 per cent of the total 
sales of machines in the USA and Canada. At the same time the 
sales figures for International Harvester’s old-line products such as 
harvesters and mowing-machines were thirteen times as great as 
those for separators. Twine alone had a sales value for Interna­
tional Harvester which was five times greater than that of separa­
tors. It was obvious to International Harvester early on that the 
tractor as an exponent of the new agricultural technology would 
represent very large sales values in the future, and so it was more 
profitable for the company to fight for the tractor market rather 
than, for example, the separator market. Thus the fact that AB 
Separator succeeded with separators when Ford failed with tractors 
was due to a great extent to the fact that International Harvester 
deliberately offered much tougher resistance to Ford than it had 
done to AB Separator. In fact International Harvester tried to in­
crease its separator business in various ways, but was forced to 
acknowledge that the Separator group’s hold on the market was 
generally such as to foil the attempts. From the point of view of
21-742579 Kuuse 321
International Harvester, it was doubtful whether it was profitable 
to make great efforts in order to begin to compete with the 
limited but efficient Separator group for a part of the market which 
was less vital for the former company. In International Harvester’s 
overall view of competition the business of the Separator group 
could hardly have ranked as a serious threat. At the outbreak of 
the First World War the value represented by International Har­
vester’s total sales figures was about 25 times greater than that 
of the whole Separator group.220
Since AB Separator had a small domestic market basis it was 
reasonable for it to specialise in and limit itself to a particular 
agricultural technology. It may be said that the Separator group 
reached its position of world pre-eminence within the mechanisation 
of milk production at the expense of having to forgo competing 
in other market sectors of the agricultural machine industry. Cer­
tain of these other sectors were more important as far as quantity 
was concerned, but for this reason they were also exposed to 
keener competition. International Harvester, on the other hand, had 
access to a large domestic market with great purchasing power, 
which made it easier to build up in a profitable way really long 
production series of various kinds of agricultural technology. By 
virtue of the amalgamation International Harvester was supplied 
with significant financial resources and resources of production 
technology which enabled the company to meet the main part of 
the domestic market’s demand for all the more important kinds of 
agricultural technology and at the same supply a not insignificant 
part of the foreign market with various kinds of agricultural 
machine.
(i) International Harvester and the domestic market
During the nineteenth century the orders from domestic agriculture 
had given the decisive potential resources to International Har­
vester’s predecessors, the McCormick and Deering companies. In 
the decade before the merger in 1902, as has already been pointed
220 McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record. Alfa- 
Laval's Records, Sales statistics. Steckzén, B., The De Laval Separator Company, 
AB Separators historia (manuscript).
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Table 72. Sales of the more important types of machines by the companies which 
merged to form International Harvester. Applies to domestic sales (USA+ Canada) 
in units of a thousand in 1904-1912
Year
McCormick Deering Others Int.
Harv.
TotalB M R Total B M R Total B M R Total
1904 38 80 49 167 38 61 38 137 25 46 27 98 402
1905 43 81 52 176 45 60 39 144 21 40 32 93 413
1906 47 81 52 180 50 59 38 147 21 36 28 85 412
1907 48 92 60 200 49 68 43 160 20 37 29 86 446
1908 37 81 51 169 38 61 36 135 10 27 24 61 365
1909 51 88 53 192 50 65 38 153 14 24 23 61 406
1910 58 89 56 203 57 69 42 168 17 24 21 62 433
1911 67 76 47 190 69 62 37 168 18 21 18 57 415
1912 71 84 50 205 72 72 39 183 20 23 19 62 450
B=binders, M=mowers, R=rakes.
Note Ofthe self-binders about 17 per cent were corn-binders.
Source McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record.
out, foreign orders for agricultural technology began to play an 
ever increasing part for the leading American agricultural machine 
producers. McCormick, which was also the leading firm on the ex­
port market, sold for example approximately 20 per cent of its 
machines abroad in 1902 as against 4 per cent in 1890. During the 
years after the merger in 1902 and up to the First World War the 
foreign market’s importance for International Harvester continued 
to increase. In 1909 sales abroad represented about 36 per cent 
and in 1912 as much as 45 per cent of the value of International 
Harvester’s total sales. Even though the home market immediately 
before the First World War accounted for somewhat more than half 
of International Harvester’s output, its comparative importance for 
the development of the company had been significantly reduced. 
The tendencies towards supersaturation after the harvester war in 
the 1890s, which were mentioned above, continued to make them­
selves felt in the USA and slowed down the market expansion of 
agricultural technology before the First World War.
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The prairie states were the most important sales areas for Inter­
national Harvester. The relative change in the home market from 
the prairie farms to the other farms in the USA which had taken 
place in McCormick’s sales before 1902 also continued during the 
International Harvester epoch. Nevertheless the prairie farms in 
proportion to their numbers continued to order much larger quan­
tities of agricultural technology than the farms in the South and 
East did. This applied particularly to the newly introduced agricul­
tural technology represented by the tractor. Since the middle of 
the nineteenth century the localisation of the agricultural machine 
industry had been concentrated in the prairie district. The estab­
lishment of International Harvester rather strengthened the pre­
vailing localisation pattern of the industry. In 1909 65 per cent of 
the production of harvesters in the USA took place in Illinois, and 
as far as the whole of agricultural technology was concerned the 
production value was divided between the leading states as follows:
Per cent
Illinois 47
Indiana 9
Ohio 9
Wisconsin 6
Michigan 4
Prairie states, total 75
New York State 11
Other states 14
Source Census of the United States 1910. Department of Commerce. Manufac­
turers 1909, Statistics for the Agricultural Implement Industry.
The two families of McCormick and Deering proved to be com­
pletely dominant within the International Harvester group, both as 
far as the home and the foreign markets were concerned. Together 
McCormick and Deering accounted for between 80 and 85 per cent 
of International Harvester’s total sales before the First World 
War.221
221 McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record. See 
tables 65 and 77-78.
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The market situation altered on account of the First World War. 
Domestic orders for agricultural technology increased in the condi­
tions of wartime, while foreign sales, apart from exports to Canada, 
declined.222 In the wartime conditions which were favourable to 
agriculture the tractor was definitively adopted by the farmers in 
the USA and Canada, but Ford’s efforts as a product developer 
also played a great part in this connection. The economic situa­
tion was favourable to agriculture up to 1920, during which time 
significant domestic and Canadian orders were placed. In 1920 
domestic sales of agricultural machines which were entirely 
produced in the USA amounted to 470 million dollars. Altogether 
583 companies contributed to this production, but International 
Harvester alone accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the 
sales within the USA and the other 582 companies for the remain­
ing 60 per cent. The sales value of various kinds of agricultural 
technology for the whole industry was distributed in the following 
way in terms of percentages in 1920:
Per cent
Tractors 35
Harvesting= threshing machines 18
Ploughs, harrows and others 12
Farm trucks 9
Planting=Cultivating machines 8
Others 18
Total =471.4 million dollars 100
Source US Department of Agriculture, Department circular 212 Washington D.C. 
1922. The manufacture and sale of farm equipment in 1920.
222 During the First World War the regular orders placed by agriculture with Inter­
national Harvester were supplemented to a certain extent by government war orders. 
The government orders for war materials played an important part for International 
Harvester during the Second World War. The production of agricultural machinery 
was drastically curtailed on instructions from the government, and several of Inter­
national Harvester’s factories had to change over to the production of war materials. 
During the Second World War International Harvester produced significant quantities 
of military lorries, tractors, trucks and jeeps, and also torpedoes and arms. So that 
the existing agricultural machine park might continue to function, International 
Harvester kept up a certain production of spare parts for agricultural machines at 
the same time.
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International Harvester’s share of the home market varied accord­
ing to the type of agricultural technology. In 1920 the biggest share 
of the market was for harvesters, but it was considerably lower for 
tractors, where Ford was leading on the market.
After 1920 the American economy was hit by a post-war depres­
sion which became especially troublesome for the farming sector. 
Several expanding new industries in the United States such as the 
car industry, the electrical engineering industry and the building 
industry experienced a boom period for the whole of the 1920s 
after the depression year of 1921. This was not the case with 
agriculture. The exports of farm produce to Europe had been 
significant during the First World War and the years immediately 
after it, but after 1920 American agriculture lost a large part of 
her overseas export markets. The reason for this was that competi­
tion for the European market in farm produce stiffened from coun­
tries such as Canada, Argentina and Australia after 1920. During 
the 1890s and at the beginning of the twentieth century these new 
competition areas had mechanised their farms in connection with 
the immigration after the majority of the American prairie farmers 
had mechanised the farm work. In addition, as regards the in­
creased tariff rates in the USA after the war and the surplus of 
industrial and farm products resulting from the country’s economic 
superiority, Europe found it easier to trade with countries which 
were economically inferior such as Canada, Argentina and 
Australia. Besides, European agriculture had already started to be 
mechanised before the turn of the nineteenth century because of the 
reduction in the agricultural labour force surplus through emigra­
tion. Mechanisation had continued on the larger farms at the be­
ginning of the twentieth century and had accelerated during the 
First World War. Therefore Europe, once it had overcome the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War, became more self- 
sufficient as regards farm produce after 1920 than it had been 
around 1900, and this particularly affected the American farmers 
who had got used to Europe absorbing the surplus production 
of the highly mechanised American farming. In spite of the fact 
that the number of farmers in the USA decreased after 1920 in 
response to the decline in the total demand for farm produce, the 
production volume of American farming did not decrease. The
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mechanisation which was in progress in agriculture led to increased 
efficiency, and the result was overproduction and reduced prices. 
The farmers in the USA were hit hard by this, and land values 
fell during the 1920s.223
The development in American agriculture was naturally enough 
reflected in agriculture’s orders for agricultural technology. In 
terms of results the depression year of 1921 became the worst in 
International Harvester’s history up to that time. The company’s 
volume of the sales in 1921 amounted to only 54 per cent of that 
of the year 1920 and the net profits fell by 75 per cent from 1920 
to 1921. The total tractor production in the USA declined by 75 
per cent in all between 1920 and 1921. Thus the diminishing orders 
from agriculture had immediate consequences for the employment 
potential in the agricultural machine industry. In 1920 International 
Harvester had laid off 48000 employees, of whom about 8 000 had 
just been taken on in the previous year. The production labour 
force had to be drastically reduced in 1921. The sales organisation 
was also affected, and almost 40 per cent of the distributors were 
dismissed in 1921.224
On the whole the situation of the 1920s was a novel one for the 
agricultural machine industry. Earlier tendencies towards super­
saturation of agricultural technology within farming had in fact 
been noticed, but the problem after 1920 was that American 
agriculture was not so plainly able as before to find foreign cus­
tomers for farm produce. With the new limitations of the market, 
farming in the USA was utterly over-mechanised and too efficient. 
A state of chronic overproduction had been reached. An article 
from the National Association of Farm Equipment Manufacturers 
demonstrated and commented on the decline in the production of 
agricultural implements and machines in the USA from 1914 to 1922 
(in actual fact from 1920 to 1922), see table p. 330.
At the same time a comparison was made with the expanding car 
industry and the result was that the production of cars had increased 
by 340 per cent over the corresponding period. In the magazine 
the producers’ association appealed to the farmers to utilise the
223 Faulkner, H. U., op. cit. pp. 625ff. McCormick, S., op. cit. pp. 175 ff.
224 Cf. tables 70-71 and diagram 20.
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full capacity of the land and not to let it lie fallow, as had been 
happening lately. As an argument in favour of continued invest­
ment in farming machinery the association relied on lower produc­
tion costs and higher production within agriculture.225
Implementslmachines produced, in thousands
1914 1922
Percentage
decrease
Ploughs 1 335 431 68
Harrows 765 254 67
Corn-cultivators 379 90 76
One horse cultivators 254 59 77
Grain drills 89 17 81
Corn planters 115 21 82
Cotton planters 101 18 82
Mowers 275 80 71
Grain binders 215 41 81
According to the article the figures are based on US government figures.
The agricultural technology which, according to the producers’ 
association was hit by sharply reduced orders in the 1920s was the 
older variety of agricultural technology which had been developed 
and adopted in the nineteenth century. In this respect the pessi­
mism in producer circles was well founded. Against a background of 
prevailing overproduction in agriculture the producers’ associa­
tion could hardly count on getting a hearing for its proposals. 
On the other hand the new heavy agricultural technology repre­
sented by the tractor, the lorry and to a certain extent the com­
bine harvester, became a great success in the USA during the 
period between the wars. The depression year of 1921 constituted 
an important but in fact short-lived exception. The curious thing 
was that the new agricultural technology was adopted to a high 
degree during a period in which the economic trends in the agricul­
tural sector of the USA were weaker than ever and made the 
problems of the overproduction which already prevailed even
225 The Harvester World, Jan. 1924. Article composed by the National Association 
of Farm Equipment Manufacturers, Chicago.
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worse. In any case the connection between the inclination to adopt 
the new agricultural technology and positive market signs, which 
had been so apparent during the spread of the harvester in the nine­
teenth century, was in any event very slight during the spread of 
the tractor in the USA between the wars. What actually happened 
during the period between the wars shows instead how technology 
which had developed within one sector of the economy “spilled 
over” into other sectors, even though the market conditions within 
the sector receiving the technology had not directly indicated à 
need for the technology in question. In the present case the modern 
tractor was developed rather as a by-product of the moior-car 
industry than as a product of established companies in the agricul­
tural machine industry. As the production of the new heavy agricul­
tural technology required greater resources and access to an ad­
vanced production technology, it was above all the big company 
mergers in the agricultural machine industry which were able dur­
ing the period between the wars to compensate for the loss in 
production of the older types of agricultural technology. However, 
for the many smaller and medium-sized producers of agricultural 
machines who were restricted to the production of the older types 
of agricultural technology the period between the wars was a time 
in which the foundations of the market shook.226
(j) International Harvester and the foreign market
Before the First World War International Harvester’s foreign markets 
were expanding more than its home markets. While the sales on the
226 Gray, R. B., Development of the Agricultural Tractor in the United States. 
Part II, pp. 27 ff.
In 1933 90 per cent of the USA's tractors were produced by nine companies 
in the following order of precedence: (1) International Harvester, Chicago. Illinois, 
(2) the J. Deere Co., Moline, Illinois, (3) the J. I. Case Co., Racine, Wisconsin, 
(4) Massey-Harris, Toronto, Canada, (5) Oliver Farm Equipment, Chicago, Illinois, 
(6) the Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., Minneapolis, Minnesota, (7) the 
Allis-Chalmers Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, (8) the Cleveland Tractor Co., Cleve­
land, Ohio, (9) the Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois. As far as all kinds of 
agricultural technology were concerned, during the period between the wars Inter­
national Harvester was completely dominant on the home market as well as the 
international market. On the home market Deere took second place, while Massey- 
Harris held the corresponding position on the foreign markets.
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Map 13. The spread of International Harvester’s agent network in 1912.
Source International Harvester Annual Report 1912.
home market doubled in terms of value between 1904 and 1912, 
the sales to Canada over the corresponding period increased five­
fold, and threefold to the other countries abroad. The most im­
portant foreign markets remained the same as they had been during 
the McCormick era. In 1906 Russia, Canada, France, Britain, Ar­
gentina and Australia accounted for more than 80 per cent of Inter­
national Harvester's total sales abroad. A certain change in the 
foreign sales areas occurred by virtue of the fact that Russia and 
Canada ordered agricultural technology from International Har­
vester to an especially great extent. Almost half of International 
Harvester’s total sales abroad in 1906 went to Russia and Canada.
The Canadian farming in the West was younger than the Amer­
ican, but otherwise showed great similarities with the prairie farm­
ing in the USA from which it was an offshoot. Therefore it was 
particularly natural for Internationa] Harvester in Canada to extend 
the shop counter once a large part of the domestic prairie farming 
had been supplied with agricultural technology. In order to avoid 
customs duty on agricultural machines International Harvester
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founded its first factory abroad in 1903 in Hamilton, Canada, which 
expanded rapidly and in 1912 employed 2 500 workers. International 
Harvester’s operation in Canada should also be regarded as a 
counterweight to the Canadian Massey-Harris group.227
Agriculture in Russia as compared with the rest of Europe was 
under-equipped with agricultural machinery, but in the years after 
the turn of the nineteenth century Russian orders for farming 
machinery rose rapidly. In this connection the colonisation of 
Siberia and the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway played 
a great part. The topography of the land in Southern Siberia 
resembled that of the prairies in the USA and Canada, and the 
shortage of labour in the newly colonised Russian East stimulated 
the adoption of agricultural technology there. Apart from the cul­
tivation of grain, milk production and the dairy industry were 
developed in Siberia, as was shown earlier when discussing AB 
Separator. Siberia was a very important sales area for AB Separa­
tor’s cream separators, and as is shown in table 75, both har­
vesters and mowing-machines and also horse hay-rakes played a 
great part in International Harvester’s Russian sales in 1905 and 
1906. Half the number of mowing-machines which were ordered 
in 1906 were sent to Siberia. In fact the orders for agricultural 
technology were considerably reduced in 1904-1905 on account of 
the disturbances of the war between Russia and Japan and domestic 
political unrest, but after Stolypin’s agricultural reforms in 1906 
the development altered. In one year from 1905 to 1906 Interna­
tional Harvester increased the number of mowing-machines sold to 
Russia by 70 per cent, and the number of horse hay-rakes by 50 
per cent. It was Siberia which accounted for the main part of this 
increase, which shows that the expansion of grass cultivation and 
cattle-farming developed there side by side with investments in 
agricultural technology.228
227 Cf. notes 202 and 205.
The operations in Canada occupied an exceptional position among International 
Harvester’s business abroad. The Canadian market was regarded more as an exten­
sion of the domestic market than as a foreign market, and in International Har­
vester’s accounts the sales in Canada were referred to as ‘Domestic sales'.
228 McCormick Collection, Annual Settlement Record. Casson, H. N., The Romance 
of the Reaper, pp. 130 ff.
One episode during the Russian-Japanese War illustrates the importance which was
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century Odessa on the 
Black Sea was the most important port of entry for American 
agricultural technology. The smaller quantities which were ex­
ported to Russia before 1900 were mainly used on the farms in 
the black earth area in Southern Russia. In connection with the 
development of Siberian agriculture, Odessa’s relative importance 
as a Russian port of entry for American agrarian technology de­
clined, which was shipped in an increasing volume during the twen­
tieth century, partly to the Baltic ports of St. Petersburg and 
Riga, and partly, from 1908 onwards, to Vladivostock via the 
Trans-Siberian railway to the plains of Southern Siberia. Thus the 
Siberian market was supplied with American technology both from 
the West and the East, and American agricultural technology was 
largely synonymous with agricultural machines from International 
Harvester.229
International Harvester’s expansion on the Russian and European 
markets raised the question of establishing companies on these 
markets in the same way as in Canada. In 1905 International Har­
vester took the first step in Europe, when a Swedish factory in 
Norrköping primarily producing mowing-machines was purchased, 
and the subsidiary Aktiebolaget International Harvester, Norr­
köping, was formed. In connection with International Harvester’s 
plan to form further companies in Europe, an American envoy, R. 
Dennis, was sent on behalf of the Department of Commerce and 
Labor in 1908 on a trip to Europe, Asia and Africa in order to get to 
know the basis for the USA’s market for the agricultural machine in­
dustry. On his return home Dennis handed in a written report, 
“American agricultural implements in Europe, Asia and Africa”, 
which gives a good picture of the market situation in the years
attached to the new agricultural technology in government quarters. Several trains 
carrying Russian troops on their way eastwards were directed onto a siding on 
government instructions, to await a goods train carrying American harvesters which 
was also travelling eastwards. The generals were displeased and sent a telegram to 
Witte in St. Petersburg, but he replied: “The goods trains must pass. They are 
carrying American harvesters. That means bread."
229 The direct trade in harvesters between the West coast of the USA to Vladivo- 
stock was mainly bound for Eastern Siberia. However, some of the harvesters were 
sold in Nikolayevsk and in Blagoveschensk in the Amur province, and also in 
Harbin in Manchuria.
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before the First World War, and so it is worth while pausing to 
consider the report.230
As far as the Russian market was concerned Dennis particularly 
stressed the importance of the Trans-Siberian railway in spreading 
agricultural machines to an area which was underdeveloped as 
regards agricultural technology and therefore offered potential 
markets: “It is generally admitted by all who are conversant with 
the conditions now controlling the agricultural implement trade of 
the world that Russian Siberia presents today the finest virtually 
underdeveloped field that exists. The completion of the Trans- 
Siberian Railroad has made hundreds of thousands of acres of till­
able land accessible to the would-be settler, and also provides him 
a means of getting the products of his labor to a market.”231
In order to make the emigration to Siberia easier the Russian 
government opened about forty depots in various parts of Siberia 
to sell agricultural implements and machines to the settlers with 
generous credit facilities. The government’s purchasing depots 
handled significant quantities of agricultural technology and so sub­
stantial deals were made over American reapers, binders and 
mowers, German ploughs and Swedish cream separators. In the 
report Dennis urged American manufacturers who, apart from 
International Harvester, had been inactive in getting a hold on the 
Russian-Siberian market, to do so before the activity of the Ger­
mans in the area precluded future possibilities. In addition Dennis 
stressed the double effect of the Siberian migration on the demand
230 Dennis, R. R., American Agricultural Implements in Europe, Asia and Africa. 
Department of Commerce and Labor. Statistics for the Agricultural Implement 
Industry. Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, 1909.
231 Ibid., quotation at pp. 71 ff.
The centre of activity in Siberia was Omsk, and Dennis saw in this town a 
parallel with Kansas City. “Omsk is the best point of the whole line of the Trans- 
Siberian road. It may well be called the Kansas City of Siberia. For 150 miles 
north of the line of the railroad and hundreds of miles to the south and southeast, 
stretching away down to the Chinese frontier, are millions of acres which only 
need a modicum of working to produce wonderful crops. Following Kansas City’s 
example, Omsk is becoming a distributing point for this immense territory and it 
sounds almost like a fairy tale when one is told the money values of the implements 
already being sold from there. When one considers the possibilities for the future, 
it is amazing.” Quotation at p. 78.
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for agricultural technology. Apart from increased demand in 
Siberia, the new producer area, the migration of labour from Euro­
pean Russia also stimulated new investments in agricultural tech­
nology there.232
In the rest of Europe France, Germany, Britain and Scandinavia 
constituted the most important sales areas for American agricul­
tural technology. In 1907 the French farms ordered about 80000 
harvesters and mowing-machines, more than 70 per cent of which 
were imported from the USA. Since Canada as a most-favoured 
nation had special customs tariffs with France, Massey-Harris was 
the most powerful rival to the American manufacturers on the
232 Ibid., pp. 71 ff. Volin, L., A Century of Russian Agriculture: From Alexander II 
to Krusehev, quotation at pp. 108 ff.
Through Stolypin’s agricultural reforms among other things the migration from 
the more densely populated areas in European Russia to the thinly populated areas 
of Siberia was stimulated. Between 1896 and 1913 about 5 million Russians moved 
to Siberia. As a result the population pressure in the agricultural sector was reduced 
in European Russia. "The rôle of migration in draining off surplus population will 
be best appreciated when it is remembered that it most affected precisely those most 
densely populated areas and those strata of the rural pupulation which experienced 
the shortage of land most acutely. The average land holding of families migrating 
to Asiatic Russia was only ten acres before migration, as against an average of 
thirty acres for all peasant holdings in European Russia, according to the census 
of 1905.
A correlative aspect of the resettlement movement was its tremendous influence 
on the agricultural development of the great open spaces of Asiatic Russia. Thus 
the crop area of western and central Siberia and northern Kazakhstan, for which 
continuous statistical data are available, more than doubled between 1905 and 1914, 
increasing from 11.5 million acres to 24 million acres. Moreover, the productivity 
of peasant labor was higher in the new regions, with a consequent favorable effect 
on the whole national economy.” The reason for the greater efficiency of Siberian 
agriculture was mainly that conditions for a mechanised agriculture were more 
favourable there than in the rest of Russia.
One factor which further stimulated investments in agricultural technology in 
Russia was the unusually quick seasonal changes, especially in Siberia and southern 
Russia. In Siberia the sudden autumn cold causes great problems with the harvest 
for the farmers, and in southern Russia the sudden summer heat can destroy the 
crops if they are too frail. Thus the agricultural machines for harvesting and sowing 
could play a particularly large part in Russia during the most critical stages of the 
seasonal rhythm of agriculture. These processes could be carried out in a much 
shorter time through mechanisation, and important quantities of crops could thus 
be saved from destruction.
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Table 75. International Harvester’s sales abroad of the various types of 
harvesting machines in units of a hundred and divided into the various 
company units within International Harvester.
Binders Mowers Reapers Rakes
Company unit 1905 1906 1905 1906 1905 1906 1905 1906
/. Canada
Deering 47 61 72 71 0 0 45 46
McCormick 38 48 65 66 0 0 47 50
Others 4 1 3 3 0 0 3 3
I.H. total 89 110 140 140 0 0 95 99
2. Russia
Deering 15 19 31 45 71 79 36 48
McCormick 29 32 32 58 71 88 44 77
Others 17 17 23 42 54 60 49 70
I.H. total 61 68 86 145 196 227 129 195
3. Germany
Deering - - - - - - - -
McCormick 5 7 52 74 20 26 5 5
Others 2 3 17 23 3 4 2 2
I.H. total 7 10 69 97 23 30 7 7
4. France
Deering - - - - - - - -
McCormick - - - - - - - -
Others 10 13 32 39 4 5 8 9
I.H. total 10 13 32 39 4 5 8 9
5. Great Britain
Deering 4 6 15 15 0 0 6 6
McCormick 6 9 12 13 1 1 6 6
Others 4 6 12 9 0 0 7 7
I.H. total 14 21 39 37 1 1 19 19
6. South America
Deering 28 18 38 43 2 4 28 29
McCormick 16 22 23 33 4 5 15 19
Others 11 5 14 22 1 1 7 16
I.H. total
22-742579 Kuuse
55 45 75 98 7 10 50 64
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Table 75. (Cont.)
Binders Mowers Reapers Rakes
Company unit 1905 1906 1905 1906 1905 1906 1905 1906
7. Australia with New Zealand 
Deering 3 5 2 4 0 0 2 3
McCormick 4 4 2 1 0 0 1 1
Others 4 5 3 2 0 0 2 2
I.H. total 11 14 7 7 0 0 5 6
8=the total of 1-7
1 Deering 97 109 158 178 73 83 117 132
2 McCormick 98 122 186 245 96 120 118 158
3 Others 52 50 104 140 62 70 78 109
4 I.H. total 247 281 448 563 231 273 313 399
5=1 as % of 4 39 39 35 32 32 30 37 33
6=2 as % of 4 40 43 42 44 42 44 38 40
Source McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record.
French market. Canadian harvesters and mowing-machines accoun­
ted for fifteen per cent of the total market, while France’s own 
production amounted to about thirteen per cent of her total require­
ments. The situation was similar in Germany and Britain, where 
the USA accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the countries’ 
total imports of agricultural machines, but the British and German 
domestic production was more significant than the French equiva­
lent. Germany’s imports of agricultural machines were dominated 
by harvesters and to a certain extent cream separators. Of the 
52 000 harvesters imported by Germany in 1907, 83 per cent came 
from the USA, 12 per cent from Canada and 4 per cent from Brit­
ain. According to Dennis the Germans had been the best in 
Europe at adopting American technology, and he predicted that 
Germany would become the USA’s new competitor on the produc­
tion side. In several European countries at the beginning of the 
twentieth century active campaigns were started against all foreign 
sales, against a background of strong waves of nationalism. Such 
tendencies were apparent not least in Russia and Germany, and in 
order to avoid high tariffs and also a confrontation with such moods
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of industrial nationalism, International Harvester decided to go the 
whole hog as far as the establishment of companies in Europe’s 
most important market areas was concerned. In fact in 1909 Inter­
national Harvester opened a factory in Neuss near Düsseldorf in 
Germany, another in Croix near Lille in Northern France, and a 
third in Lubertzy outside Moscow.233 Thus International Harvester 
created new opportunities of employment in Europe but the com­
panies were able to negotiate in their own favour tariff exemptions 
for their American-made machine parts. So the establishment by 
International Harvester of companies in Europe also meant a con­
tinuing stimulus for production and employment in the USA. In 
actual fact International Harvester’s direct exports of agricultural 
machines to Europe continued to expand side by side with the 
group’s production in the European factories.234
233 Dennis, R. R., op.cit., pp. 23 ff. McCormick Collection, Diaries of Cyrus Hall 
McCormick (II) Nov. 24, 1909; Oct. 19, 1911 ; Jan. 29, 1912.
Cyrus Hall McCormick II personally started the negotiations which preceded 
International Harvester’s establishment of a company in Europe, and through 
several visits to Europe he became familiar with market conditions. In spite of the 
fact that the Russian market held out the greatest temptation for International Har­
vester, McCormick explained at a discussion with the Russian finance, trade and 
agriculture ministers in St. Petersburg in 1909 that he was particularly hesitant over 
company investments in Russia since the market conditions there seemed more 
uncertain than on other European markets. The ministers there gave him every 
assurance, and promised full support for the company’s operations in Russia.
To supplement his initiative and his contacts abroad McCormick also maintained 
close contacts with leading foreign diplomats in the USA. McCormick appears to 
have become particularly close to the Russian Ambassador Boris Bakhmetev and the 
French Ambassador Jules Jusserand, who were often McCormick's guests at dinner. 
International Harvester's largest European markets were in Russia and France.
In the USA McCormick, as President of International Harvester, was one of 
the country’s most influential men. In his circle of friends there were several people 
who were perhaps more widely known such as W. Wilson, J. P. Morgan and J. D. 
Rockefeller. Cyrus's brother Harold F. McCormick, who succeeded Cyrus as 
President of International Harvester in 1918, had married J. D. Rockefeller's 
daughter in 1899. International Harvester’s close relationship with two such im­
portant finance houses as Morgan and Rockefeller provided the group with specially 
large financial resources, through favourable loans, so that it could extend its 
business both on the domestic and foreign markets. Cf. Farm Implement News, 
Jan. 18, 1912.
234 Dennis, R. R., op. cit., pp. 50 ff.
However, Dennis expressed certain fears that International Harvester’s produc-
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In 1890 the exports of agricultural machines from the United 
States had begun to reach a certain volume, and from then until 
the First World War they expanded much more rapidly than before 
1890. As is shown in diagram 21, harvesting machines played a 
significant rôle in the total exports. International Harvester was 
responsible for most of the USA’s exports. In fact the columns in 
diagram 21 indicate International Harvester’s total foreign sales, 
and thus include both the company’s direct exports and sales from 
the business abroad. The sales from the American subsidiaries’ 
production abroad have not been included in the export statistics 
for the USA, which explains why International Harvester’s columns 
show higher figures than the graph of the country’s total exports 
of agricultural machines. Before 1906 International Harvester’s pro­
duction abroad was limited to Canada. If the Canadian market in 
1905 is excluded International Harvester’s foreign production is elim­
inated. The result then is that the group’s direct exports con­
stitute 65 per cent of the total exports of agricultural machines 
from the whole of the USA. In 1909 International Harvester’s share 
of the country’s total exports of agricultural machines (excluding 
Canada) had risen to 80 per cent, and as regards harvesters the
tion of agricultural machinery in Europe would have negative consequences for the 
USA’s exports of agricultural technology. As an example Dennis cited the develop­
ment in Sweden, where the USA had been hit by export losses after International 
Harvester had opened the factory in Norrköping in 1905. According to Dennis it was 
unwise to establish an American-owned factory for agricultural technology in Swe­
den, as Sweden and Germany were the European countries who were most eager 
to adopt new technology for the production of agricultural machinery. Moreover, 
Sweden like Germany had started active campaigns against foreign sales of agricul­
tural machines, and Dennis pointed out that three Swedish factories were producing 
imitations of American mowing machines and reapers for the 1908 season. At 
that time the largest Swedish factory had a yearly capacity of 7 000 machines.
Dennis's fears were exaggerated, but they proved to be not entirely without 
foundation. The German and Swedish engineering industries which concentrated on 
agricultural machinery became the largest borrowers of American agricultural 
technology at the beginning of the 20th century, and these loans of agricultural 
technology in the long run undoubtedly brought about a certain reduction in the 
need for imports. Earlier Canada had been the large borrower, and later, in connec­
tion with the collectivisation of agriculture during the first five-year plan, the Soviet 
Union became the large borrower of American agricultural technology, especially 
as regards tractors.
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iagram 21. Exports of agricultural machines from the USA in 1870-1913 
ympared with International Harvester’s sales abroad in 1905-1912. 
mounts in millions of dollars.
U.S.A.'s exports of
------------ Agricultural machines total
------------ Harvesting machines
The columns indicate International Harvester's sales 
abroad in millions of dollars.
The hatched part of the column for year 1 909 indicate 
the sales value of harvesting machines.
/0 80 90 1900 10 1913
mrce The foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, Bureau of 
Statistics, Treasury Department.
McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record. 
International Harvester Annual Reports.
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Table 76. Exports of harvesting machines (binders, reapers, mowers) and 
other types of agricultural machines from the USA in 1900-1913 in millions 
of dollars
Land/Area 1905 1909 1913
Russia 2.6 4.4 6.9
Germany 1.0 1.4 3.1
Sweden 0.2 0.2 0.3
Holland 0.2 0.6 0.4
France 2.6 3.0 3.0
Great Britain 0.4 0.6 0.8
The rest of Europe 0.8 1.7 2.9
The whole of Europe+Siberia 7.8 11.9 17.4
Canada" 0.5 0.2 0.5
Argentina 1.5 1.2 1.7
The rest of America 0.1 0.1 0.2
The whole of America 2.1 1.5 2.4
Australia 0.5 0.3 0.4
Africa 0.1 0.2 0.3
Asia excluding Siberia 0.0 0.0 0.0
Harvesting machines total 10.6 14.1 20.6
Ploughs+harrows total 2.9 3.8 7.7
Other agricultural machines total 7.3 7.8 12.3
Total 20.8 25.7 40.6
Harvesting machines as % of total (51) (55) (51)
" In Canada International Harvester started a factory for the production of agri­
cultural machines in 1903. The sales from these operations are not included in the 
export statistics. In 1909 for example International Harvester’s sales of harvesting 
machines in Canada amounted to 2.1 million dollars. International Harvester first 
started its own production of agricultural machines in Europe in 1905 in Sweden, 
then in 1909 in Russia, Germany and France and the sales from this production are 
not shown as exports either. One of the most important motives for setting up com­
panies abroad was that in so doing it was possible to avoid the high import tariffs 
on agricultural machines.
Source The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, Bureau of 
Statistics, Treasury Department.
company accounted for 84 per cent of the total number exported 
(excluding Canada) from the USA. Furthermore diagram 21 shows 
clearly the result of the extensive establishment by International 
Harvester of companies in Europe in 1909. At the same time as
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Table 77. International Harvester’s sales abroad divided into various coun­
tries and areas in 1905-1906. Amounts in millions of dollars
Land/Area 1905 1906
Russia 3.7 5.0
Hungary 0.2 0.4
The rest of Europe including an unknown 
amount to Russia 1.1 1.7
The whole of East Europe+Siberia 5.0 7.1
Germany 0.8 1.0
Sctmdinavia and the rest of Central Europe 0.2 0.5“
The whole of Central Europe 1.0 1.5
Western Europe 2.9 3.1
The whole of Europe+Siberia 8.9 11.7
Canada 3.8 4.8
Mexico 0.1 0.1
South America (mainly Argentina+Uruguay) 2.7 2.2
South Africa 0.1 0.1
Australia with New Zealand 1.4 1.7
Total 17.0 20.5
“ The sales by International Harvester’s factory in Norrköping, Sweden, which 
was started in 1905 are not included in the figure of 0.5 million dollars. The value of 
the factory’s production in 1906 only amounted, however, to a few tens of thousands 
of dollars.
Source McCormick Collection, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record.
sales from the factories abroad were increasing after 1909, Interna­
tional Harvester’s exports, especially of spare machine parts, were 
growing. Thus through International Harvester’s establishment of 
companies abroad, the spread of American agricultural technology 
was still greater than directly appears from the export statistics of the 
United States.235
The organisation of International Harvester’s production at home 
and abroad during the years preceding the First World War is 
illustrated by the list of the group’s factories in 1912.
235 The Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States. McCormick Collec­
tion, International Harvester Annual Settlement Record. International Harvester, 
Annual Reports.
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International Harvester manufacturing plants 1912.
Employes Annual capacity
A. Domestic plants (in thousands)
International Harvester Co.
McCormick Works, Chicago, 111. 8 500 375 harvesting 
machines
Deering Works, Chicago, 111. 7 000 300 harvesting 
machines
Plano Works, West Pullman, 111. 1 300 80 manure spreaders, 
wagons, etc.
Champion Works, Springfield, Ohio 1 800 85 harvesting and 
seeding machinery, 
hay presses, etc.
Milwaukee Works, Milwaukee, Wise. 5 000 75 gasoline engines, 
cream separators,
tractors
Osborne Works, Auburn, New York 3 000 275 tillage imple­
ments, harvesting 
machines
Akron Works, Akron, Ohio 1 250 5 auto-wagons, 
commercial cars
Keystone Works, Rock Falls, 111. 500 100 harrows, 
rakes, etc.
Newark Valley Works, New York 170 7 manure spreaders
Tractor Works, Chicago, 111. 1 500 5 tractors, engines
Weber Works, Auburn Park, 111. 700 45 wagons
McCormick, Deering, and Osborne
Works together 96 tons twine
International Flax Twine Co.
St. Paul Works, St. Paul, Minn. 300 5 tons twine
B. Foreign plants
International Harvester Co. of Canada, limited
Hamilton Works, Hamilton, Canada 2 500 175 harvesting and 
seeding machines, 
tillage implem.
Chatham Works, Chatham, Canada 300 18 wagons
Paris Works, Paris, Canada 250 20 tillage implem., 
manure spreaders
Compagnie Internationale des Machines Agricole
Croix Works, Croix, France 700 47 mowers, rakes
3 tons twine
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OCont.)
Employes Annual capacity
International Harvester Co. m.b.H.
Neuss Works, Neuss, Germany 700
International Harvester Co. in Russia 
Lubertzy Works, Moscow, Russia 2 500
Aktiebolaget International Harvester Co. 
Norrköping Works, Sweden 300
45 reapers, mowers, 
rakes
4 tons twine
50 lobogreikas, 
harvesting mach.
35 mowers, rakes
The production volume in all seven of International Harvester’s 
factories in Canada and Europe in 1912 did not quite reach the 
same level as the group's largest factory in the USA, McCormick 
Works, Chicago.236 In fact International Harvester’s production of 
agricultural machines abroad was an important contribution to the 
more small-scale agricultural technology engineering industry in 
Canada and especially in the European countries mentioned above. 
International Harvester developed the largest factories abroad in
236 International Harvester, Annual Reports. Casson, H. M., The Romance of the 
Reaper, pp. 150ff.
At the same time the group was divided commercially into eight world regions around 
1910:
Commercial 
head office
1. Domestic department USA and Canada Chicago
2. Central Europe, Scandinavia, Russia+Siberia Hamburg
3. Western Europe and North Africa Paris
4. Great Britain London
5. South America Buenos Aires
6. Mexico Mexico City
7. Australia Melbourne
8. New Zealand Christchurch
Cf. the map of the spread of the agent network in 1912.
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Canada and Russia. Most of the foreign-owned factories in Russia 
were English or German, and were located in Southern Russia 
where the demand for agricultural machinery had been greatest. 
Examples of such factories were John Grieves in Berdjansk and A. J. 
Kopp in Alexandrovsk for harvesters, R. T. Elworthy in Elisavet- 
grad for sowing and harvesting machines, and Höhn in Odessa for 
ploughs.237
By virtue of the very fact that International Harvester started its 
own production in Russia on a large scale, the relative importance 
of the English and German harvesters in Southern Russia declined. 
In addition International Harvester’s Moscow factory benefited 
more from a sales point of view than the factories in Southern 
Russia from the expansion of Siberian farming and the resultant 
increase in the orders for agricultural technology. At the factory in 
Lubertzy the aim at first was to produce self-binders and other 
varieties of the late models of harvester. However, the demand for 
lobogreikas—a simpler Russian form of non-self-rake harvester— 
was so great that the production came to consist mainly of lobo­
greikas. The lobogreika required a special hand-raker to follow 
the machine and rake the grain off the machine platform, but 
nevertheless this cheap machine was popular in Russia.238 Such
237 Essay on the development of the Russian agricultural machine industry during 
the years 1843-1913 (in Kommersiella Meddelanden. Konsulers och handels- 
attachéers berättelser år 1915, pp. 325 ff.). Volin, L., op. cit. pp. IlOf.
The period 1905-1913 was one of expansion in the development of Russian 
agriculture and both the production and the exports of agricultural products in­
creased. The growth in the agricultural sector also led to a rise in the real standard 
of the agricultural proletariat. In 1913 the daily wage for farmworkers was between 
23 and 64 per cent higher than during the period 1901-1905, and over the same 
period food prices only rose by 10-16 per cent. According to Volin the invest­
ments in agricultural technology which took place during this time played a decisive 
rôle in economic growth in the agricultural sector. In terms of value, orders of 
agricultural machines from Russian agriculture increased 3.4 times over from 1900 
to 1913. During the same period imports of agricultural machines increased 2.6 
times, while domestic production increased 4.7 times. Around 1900 imports account­
ed for 62 per cent of the consumption, whereas by 1913 the proportion of imports 
had shrunk to 47 per cent. Thus the domestic agricultural technology industry 
received an ever increasing share of the order for agricultural machines from Russian 
agriculture, but a large part of the more important industries were foreign-owned.
238 Konsulers och handelsattachéers berättelser 1915, pp. 330 ff.
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a simple form of agricultural technology was well suited to Russian 
farming which usually had a good supply of labour. It is note­
worthy that the hand-rake reaper, which had its breakthrough on 
the prairie farms in the USA in the 1850s and was beginning to 
be replaced there by other more efficient harvesters before 1870, 
had its boom period in Russian agriculture about fifty years 
later.239
International Harvester’s big investment in the Russian market 
should be looked at against the background of the hopes, which 
were not completely without foundation, which the group enter­
tained at the time about the millions of Russian farms which were 
under-equipped with agricultural technology as a substantial future 
market. At the start of the twentieth century many manufacturers 
of agricultural machinery in Europe concentrated their foreign trade 
on Eastern Europe to a particularly high degree. In the years be­
fore the First World War the potentially extensive Russian market 
appeared especially desirable to International Harvester, since 
American farming showed signs of supersaturation in agricultural 
technology. A certain modernisation of Russian agriculture did in 
fact take place, and after Stolypin’s agrarian reforms it is notice­
able that the orders from Russia for agricultural technology in­
creased, and Siberia in particular developed into a significant 
surplus area for agricultural produce.
International Harvester ploughed back the profits from its sales 
in Russia into factory buildings and new sales offices for future 
expansion. But the political administration in Russia was weak, and 
because of the revolution in 1917 in practice the company’s Russian 
investments were lost. The course of events during the First World 
War also meant serious disruptions of International Harvester’s 
sales and production in the rest of Eastern Europe and in Central 
Europe. However, the growing demand in the USA and Canada, 
where farming went through a boom period during the war, more 
than compensated for the market loss in Europe during the First 
WorldWarup to 1920.240
After 1920 International Harvester and the whole of the American
239 Cf. figure 5.
240 McCormick, C., op. cit. pp. 170ff.
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agricultural machine industry were hit by the heavy reduction in 
the domestic demand for agricultural technology. After the peace­
time depression during the inter-war period the big groups of com­
panies in the industry were partly able to make up for the loss by 
orders from American agriculture for the new heavy agricultural 
technology, but the final loss of the Russian-Siberian market caused 
serious damage to International Harvester.241 During the period be­
tween the wars the American producers and exporters of agricul­
tural machines regained a large proportion of their former European 
customers, apart from the Russian farmers. After the peace treaty 
France became the biggest customer in Europe, and when the 
German economy had recovered from the after-effects of the war 
and the hyper-inflation of the early 1920s, Germany also started to 
order considerable quantities of American agricultural machinery. 
Furthermore, during the period between the wars Canada con­
stituted International Harvester’s large foreign market. On the im­
portant Canadian, French and German markets International Har­
vester was able to sell its agricultural machines partly through 
direct exports, and partly through its own production in the market 
areas in question. Argentina and, to a certain extent, Australia were 
other significant export areas for the group. During the period be­
tween the wars International Harvester tried to find replacement 
markets abroad to make up for the loss of the Russian market. In 
fact a study of the group’s internal monthly reports on foreign 
market conditions during the 1920s shows that International Har-
241 However, there were significant imports by the Soviet Union from the United 
States, in which International Harvester played an important rôle, under the NEP 
policy and in connection with the collectivisation of Soviet agriculture during the 
first five-year plan. Towards the end of the first five-year plan the agricultural 
machine industry in the Soviet Union had developed its own tractor production on 
the basis of the agricultural technology represented by the imported American 
tractors. In 1931 the largest tractor factory in Stalingrad was completed, and after 
that the Soviet Union no longer needed to import any more tractors. Somewhat 
later large tractor factories were established in Kharkov and Chelyabinsk. The 
question of the importance of the American tractors for Soviet agriculture has been 
discussed in more detail in some articles by D. Dalrymple: ‘The American Tractor 
Comes to Soviet Agriculture: The Triumph of Technology’ (in Technology and 
Culture, April 1964), ‘American Technology and Soviet Agricultural Development, 
1924-1933’ (in Agricultural History, July 1966). Cf. note 2.
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vester did not pin any great hopes on this. There were two market 
areas in which the company showed a certain interest. The first 
was Mexico, and the second was Manchuria and the Japanese 
Hokkaido in the Far East, but it was quite clear to International 
Harvester that these markets could not replace the Russian-Siberian 
market to any great extent.242
242 International Harvester, Department Managers Conferences No. 76, Oct. 10, 
1922; No. 99, Oct. 2, 1923; No. 160, April 20, 1926; No. 189, July 26, 1927. 
Market reports from E. A. Brittenham, Foreign Sales Department on Mexico 1922, 
the Far East 1923, Europe 1927, and also from H. F. Perkins, First Vice-President, 
on South America 1926. According to Brittenham's report an increase could be ex­
pected in the exports of American agricultural machinery to Mexico, which was 
otherwise a large customer for US products. In order to give the management of 
the group an idea of the dimensions of the Mexican market, Brittenham pointed out 
that Mexico’s cultivated acreage. 38 000 square miles, was equivalent to the area 
under cultivation in an average state in the Middle-West. In Mexico an area just 
as large was waiting to be reclaimed or recultivated, but this reclamation or recul­
tivation was partly dependent on how the problems of irrigation could be solved. 
In 1921 Mexico came directly after Australia and was sixth in order of quantity 
among the countries importing American agricultural machinery.
As to the market situation in the Far East, Brittenham pointed out that at the 
beginning of the 1920s there was no market for agricultural machinery. However, 
agriculture in Manchuria was in the process of being developed, and for several 
reasons offered the best conditions as a sales area for the agricultural technology 
industry. The transport system was comparatively well-developed, and this would 
favour the establishment of new markets for agricultural products and investment 
in agricultural machinery. The River Amur in the north, and the southern branch 
of the Trans-Siberian railway in the east, from Chita in Siberia through Harbin in 
Manchuria to Vladivostock on the Pacific Ocean, and the railway from Harbin to 
Dairen on the Yellow Sea constituted the most important transport systems. “There 
is no existing market in the Orient for modern agricultural machinery, so my 
[Brittenham] remarks will deal principally with the peculiarities and possibilities of 
the market in the countries and places visited on my Oriental journey. Our greatest 
present hope for a market lies in the Plains of Manchuria, where we now have 
an office located at Harbin, and are making one supreme effort to break down the 
old customs and traditions of the Chinese Nation and choke agricultural implements 
down their throats whether they want them or not.
Manchuria consists of a fertile plain approximately 360000 square miles. In area 
this matches well our five lake states with the addition of Iowa and Missouri.
When regarding the Orient as a possible market for our agricultural machines, we 
are inclined to overlook the fact that, by far the largest per cent of farm labor 
is man power. There are vast areas under cultivation where animal power does not 
exist, and, as far as China is concerned, we can regard the standard as excellent
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(k) Summary
Agricultural technology had admittedly developed from the agricul­
ture of the old river cultures and classical times up to the agricul­
ture of the industrial revolution, but the technological changes had
where animal power is used. Our efforts to introduce modem machinery in Man­
churia are aided materially by the fact that horse and mule power are in common 
use, and the farmer in that section knows how to handle animals and make use 
of them. This can no doubt be explained by a better economic condition among 
the farmers, which permits them to own and use animal power. The section is 
sparsely settled, permitting of larger individual holdings, and with it the necessity 
for some power other than man. A home-made plow is the main tool for the 
Manchurian farmer. Crops are harvested and threshed mostly by hand, and very 
little thought has been given to the use of machinery in this connection.”
In order to break down the resistance to the adoption of agricultural technology 
which various traditions in Eastern community life constituted, the agricultural 
machine salesman in the Far East also had to act as a kind of agricultural mis­
sionary. In addition, it was the custom in foreign trade to engage a comprodore 
as a middleman between the Chinese state and the foreign firm. “Into this much 
talked of potential market for agricultural machinery we have entered, and with 
sufficient courage to open a sales office in Harbin and the staff in charge was 
recruited from our former office at Vladivostock. Most of their time is devoted to 
field demonstrations and educational work. The process is slow when trying to 
convince the Chinese farmer. Each sale is an individual sale, resulting usually from 
a demonstration of the machine combined with the persuasive influence of a Chinese 
Comprodore. We have adopted the comprodore system at Harbin, which is one of 
the old established customs peculiar to the country, but is an entirely new phase 
in our sales operations.”
In Japan the farms which were on average very small did not constitute any 
potential market for modern agricultural machinery. Intensive campaigns by the 
Japanese government to persuade the farmers to adopt modem agricultural tech­
nology have met with no response except from the farmers on Hokkaido.
“Before Japan can become an interesting market for our modern farm machinery, 
it will be necessary to change her entire system of land holdings and create an 
economic condition among her farmers which will make individual purchases 
possible ... The north island of Hokkaido has an area of approximately 23 000 
square miles, and, contrary to the condition in the balance of the Empire, most 
of this area is open and permits of cultivation by machinery. The government has 
offered every inducement to aid the settlement of this land. Holdings are com­
paratively large, and the cultivation is conducted very similar to the methods in 
the United States. Unless the surplus population eventually overruns this Island, 
then it is likely that cultivation will be conducted, in the main, by machinery; 
but the market for us will be very restricted, due to the small area and strong 
tendency in Japan to manufacture their own requirements.”
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been comparatively marginal from the point of view of the econom­
ics of production. The standard of implements had improved 
throughout the centuries, but the critical stages in the harvest and 
sowing of arable farming which constituted the bottlenecks in 
production had hardly been affected by the development in agricul­
tural technology, and these critical stages were decisive for the 
volume of production. A series of decisive innovations in agrarian 
technology for sowing and harvesting had already appeared in 
England and Scotland during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen­
turies, but these innovations had not been adopted by the farmers. 
Instead it was on the prairies of the USA that the decisive innova­
tions in agrarian technology began to be put into practice in the 
middle of the nineteenth century for the first time in world history, 
and thus the mechanisation there had consequences of a completely 
different magnitude than previously for productivity and the volume 
of production. The fact that the mechanisation of farming originally 
spread in the USA was due to a series of concurrent factors. On 
the prairies there were large resources of level land on which it 
was easy to operate machines, and as the density of the popula­
tion was low, the farms as a rule were able to consist of large 
acreages. The agricultural sector in the USA had to compete with 
industry for labour of which there was a comparative shortage, and 
the development during the latter part of the nineteenth century 
meant that the cost of agricultural technology became lower and 
lower in comparison with the cost of labour. Around 1850 canals 
and railroads finally linked the prairie district around the Great 
Lakes with the industrial area in the North-East of the USA, which 
on account of the immigration which was current after 1850 con­
stituted a continually expanding sales market for prairie farming.
Through favourable conditions prairie farming in the USA devel­
oped significant purchasing power, and as a natural consequence 
of this an extensive agricultural machine industry was located in 
the Middle-West. The interaction between agriculture and industry 
in the Middle-West gave great vigour to the economy. Through the 
mechanisation of farming the labour force could be transferred 
to other branches of the economy with higher economic produc­
tivity. The pace of industrialisation and urbanisation grew rapid in
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the Middle-West after 1850, and Chicago was the world’s fastest 
growing town during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Like 
several other industries in the USA, because of technological 
development inter alia, the agricultural machine industry was con­
centrated among a comparatively small number of large company 
units. At the turn of the nineteenth century the largest and best- 
known industries were to be found in the area around the Great 
Lakes: Deere and Oliver for ploughs, and J. I. Case for threshers, 
as well as McCormick, Deering and Massey-Harris for harvesters.
The harvester represented the most important agricultural tech­
nology during the nineteenth century. The harvesting stage con­
stituted the biggest bottleneck in production, and the spread of the 
harvester after 1850 was the most important factor in the develop­
ment of productivity in American agriculture. The foremost name 
in the harvester industry was that of Cyrus Hall McCormick. Be­
tween 1840 and 1860 he was the supreme manufacturer of har­
vesters. During the Civil War the demand for harvesters increased, 
and a lot of producers then entered into competition with McCor­
mick, whose share of the market was considerably reduced during 
the years 1860-1880. The harvester was improved in several im­
portant details during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and 
when the self-binder was introduced onto the market around 1880, 
McCormick was able to regain his prominent market position in 
competition with Deering. The really big company merger in the 
agricultural technology industry of the USA took place in 1902 
when International Harvester was formed, and the McCormick and 
Deering companies became the two dominant companies in the 
group.
McCormick was probably the most important example in the 
nineteenth century of the confirmation of Schumpeter’s entrepre­
neur theory of the manufacturer as the most prominent transformer 
of society. McCormick embodied in one and the same man the 
innovator as well as the inventor on the market. McCormick’s 
entrepreneur characteristics stand out with perfect clarity in com­
parison with those of Hussey. In AB Separator it was the combina­
tion of Gustaf de Laval and John Bernström which represented 
something of Schumpeter’s ideal of the entrepreneur. McCormick
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introduced and marketed an agricultural technology which had an 
even wider range and greater importance for the economics of 
agriculture than that of de Laval and Bernström in combination. 
The agricultural technology which McCormick offered for sale was 
to have technological, economic and social consequences for the 
formation of society and was to affect more people than any other 
form of technology at that time. The following McCormick genera­
tions extended the founder's achievements, and because of the 
continuity the giant International Harvester became to a large ex­
tent a McCormick company.
The technique of receiving the cut grain was improved on the 
harvester on several occasions during the latter part of the nine­
teenth century. When investment in labour was reduced with the 
new models, the American farmers became more and more inclined 
to adopt the harvester or replace an older model. For the producers 
of agricultural technology this meant that they faced a demand 
which grew like a wave. However, when the self-binder was in­
troduced onto the market around 1880 the technique of harvesting 
had been developed to such a point that no further development 
of the harvester was possible for the time being. Not until the com­
bine harvester started to spread during the period between the wars 
could the self-binder be replaced by more modern agricultural tech­
nology. Since the self-binder, as a result of intensive sales cam­
paigns, was sold to American agriculture in large quantities at the 
end of the nineteenth century and no definitively new models could 
be marketed, certain tendencies towards supersaturation began to 
appear on the harvester market in the USA around 1900.
From the 1890s onwards American agricultural technology also 
became of interest to other immigration countries, above all 
Canada, Argentina, Australia and Siberia. The conditions in these 
new farm production areas were in many cases the same as they 
had been in the USA in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
More rapid transport and the development of refrigeration tech­
niques had since then permitted farm produce to be carried longer 
and longer distances to the large sales areas. The emigration from 
Europe which was taking place reduced the labour force surplus 
and so increased the inclination to invest in agricultural machines. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Europe became the big-
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gest customer of American agricultural technology in terms of 
monetary value. In fact in relation to the number of farmers the 
new agricultural technology became far more widespread in the 
new immigration countries than in Europe. Thus the emigration 
from Europe stimulated the spread of new agricultural technology 
in two senses. It was important for International Harvester and 
other American manufacturers of agricultural machinery to find 
new markets when the important home market began to show tend­
encies towards supersaturation. An important stage in Inter­
national Harvester’s market expansion was the group’s establish­
ment of companies in Canada and Europe. This facilitated the 
diffusion of advanced agricultural technology to existing agricul­
tural machine industries in Canada and Europe.
Tendencies towards supersaturation of agricultural technology 
which had already appeared in American agriculture around 1900 
became quite plain when the farmers of the USA lost significant 
sales markets after the First World War. In spite of the lack of 
positive market signs, a new form of heavy agricultural technology 
became a success in the agriculture of the USA during the period 
between the wars. The car industry lent technology to the 
established agricultural machine industry in the development of the 
new agricultural technology. Thus the tractor as the most pro­
minent exponent of the new agricultural technology was an ex­
ample of the transfer of technology from one sector of industry to 
another. Even though market conditions in the sector receiving the 
technology did not show a direct need for the technology in ques­
tion, its spread could not be prevented. For the agricultural tech­
nology industry in the USA which did not have the resources for 
the production of the new agricultural technology the period be­
tween the wars was a time of receding trade. International Har­
vester and other big groups in the industry which were able to 
concentrate on the new agricultural technology and extend the 
business in conformity with the full-line principle, were able to 
some extent on the home market to make up for the reduced de­
mand for the older agricultural technology.
Through the revolution in 1917 International Harvester lost its 
important Russian-Siberian market, and during the foreign sales 
resistance of the 1920s the group tried to find new markets to
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replace it in Mexico and also in Manchuria and Northern Japan. 
International Harvester sought the new substitute markets amongst 
the most advanced of the underdeveloped countries, and they could 
be regarded as offshoots from the markets in the USA and Eastern 
Siberia.
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III. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The expanse of time from the old river cultures six or seven 
thousand years ago to the beginning of the industrial revolution 
two hundred years ago was certainly not a period of technological 
standstill. A series of significant inventions took place especially 
at certain times such as the Hellenic period and the Renaissance. 
Nevertheless production techniques in the completely dominant 
agricultural sector were on the whole the same at the beginning of 
the industrial revolution as during classical times. Agricultural 
implements had certainly been improved before 1800, but these 
improvements had mostly had only marginal economic effects. No 
decisive new technology had been introduced into the bottlenecks 
in agricultural production such as harvesting, threshing and sowing. 
More advanced innovations in agricultural technology, such as sow­
ing and harvesting machines, had in fact emerged during the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries, but they had not been adopted by 
the farmers at that time.
During the first stage of the industrial revolution the new tech­
nology was making the production process more efficient, above 
all in the textile and iron industries. For a long time the new 
technology of industrial production had comparatively little effect 
on the national economy because of the limited capacity of the 
industrial sector. In fact agriculture still remained the important 
sector of the economy during the whole of the industrialisation 
process of the nineteenth century, except in England, and agricul­
ture accounted for the greatest total purchasing power. Therefore 
industrialisation became dependent on progress in agriculture, even 
though a smaller but growing industrial sector helped to re-shape 
farming to an ever increasing extent. Therefore it is important to 
stress this interdependence in development in this context.
Before 1850 the production volume in arable farming had been
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able to expand above all through land reclamation and increased 
manual labour. As the bringing in of the harvest required the largest 
supply of labour, this stage was a bottleneck in the work of the 
farm. It was not profitable to cultivate or sow larger acreages 
than could with certainty be harvested. Therefore production 
technology in harvesting work was in reality to limit the extent 
of the production volume and a large part of the productivity in 
arable farming. Through a series of interacting factors a mecha­
nised agriculture developed for the first time in the middle of the 
nineteenth century in the American Middle-West. There was a great 
abundance of even land which suited the agricultural machines very 
well, while the supply of labour was less good. In addition the 
farmers in the Middle-West had access to large and growing domes­
tic markets, and through the revolution in the transport service 
they were also able to sell their products on foreign markets. Thus 
favourable market forces developed an agriculture with particularly 
great purchasing power in the Middle-West, and it made additional 
profits by ordering agricultural technology which became relatively 
cheap in comparison with manpower. As a result of this an agricul­
tural technology industry developed in the Middle-West. Contacts 
between agriculture and industry took several forms, partly through 
agriculture’s orders from industry, especially the engineering in­
dustry, partly through agriculture’s supplies to industry, above all 
the food industries. Chicago became the centre of this interaction 
between agriculture and industry, and was the world’s fastest grow­
ing town during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Produc­
tivity in American farming increased many times over during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, and in grain cultivation 
mechanisation alone—particularly as regards harvesters—accounted 
for more than half of the profits from productivity.
The emigration from Europe was an important factor in the 
economy during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 
immigrants contributed to the move westwards and created a new 
agrarian production area which through its efficiency and sales 
direction became a competitor of European agriculture. On the 
whole the same factors which had favoured the establishment of a 
mechanised and commercialised agriculture in the Middle-West after 
1850 existed a few decades later in the new immigration areas of
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Canada, Argentina, Australia and Siberia. Here too a mechanised 
and commercialised agriculture of the Middle-Western type 
developed, starting around 1890. The supply of arable land was 
good in relation to the sparsely populated areas, and there was a 
shortage of labour. In addition there was access to growing 
domestic markets and markets abroad. The domestic market was 
in fact considerably smaller than that in the USA, and so the 
mechanisation of agriculture in the new immigration areas did not 
become as extensive as that in the USA in terms of monetary 
value. In Canada a domestic agricultural machine industry 
developed on the basis of American agricultural technology, but 
Argentina, Australia and Siberia were dependent on imports of 
American agricultural technology. Gradually, as the emigration 
from Europe reduced the surplus of manpower, the inclination of 
the European farmers to mechanise farming also increased. Thus 
the extensive migration during the latter part of the nineteenth cen­
tury and at the beginning of the twentieth century played an ex­
tremely important rôle in creating and spreading a mechanised and 
commercialised agriculture. The migration had a double effect on the 
diffusion of mechanisation in agriculture, first in the immigration 
areas and later also in the emigration areas.
Agriculture in Europe at the start of the process of mechanisa­
tion was dependent on imported American agricultural machines. 
After borrowing American agricultural technology, countries such 
as Germany, Britain and Sweden freed themselves gradually from 
dependence on the USA, and developed significant domestic en­
gineering industries for agricultural machines. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century the Russian agricultural machine industry 
also expanded, and reached a not insignificant capacity, but the 
industry was mainly developed by foreign companies which had 
established themselves in Russia. It was above all leading American 
companies in the agricultural machine industry which tried to face 
the growing European agricultural technology industry by estab­
lishing subsidiaries in strategic countries such as Germany, France, 
Sweden and Russia.
What has been said above relates first and foremost to the mech­
anisation of arable farming. Furthermore it should be remem­
bered that it was a comparatively small number of farmers in coun-
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tries with advanced agricultural technology who mechanised farm­
ing in a decisive way before the First World War. In Europe prob­
ably only 10-15 per cent of the farms had introduced advanced 
agricultural machines into their production at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, while the corresponding proportion in the USA 
was perhaps 30 per cent. On the other hand this minority accounted 
for a significant sales production of farm produce. Cattle-farming 
was mechanised later and to a lesser extent than arable farming. 
Mechanisation took place first in milk production, and for a long 
time the machine separation of milk on the farms was the only 
form of mechanisation in operation in cattle-farming. The machine 
separator was first introduced in Scandinavia at the end of the 
1870s, and it played an important rôle in European agriculture’s 
partial changeover to livestock production which began in the 1880s 
under pressure of competition from foreign grain. The development 
of refrigeration technology during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century also extended the transport possibilities and the markets for 
overseas livestock production. Dairy production made its greatest 
progress at the beginning of the twentieth century in Scandinavia, 
Central Europe, Siberia, Australia and New Zealand and North 
America, the principal surplus areas being Scandinavia, Siberia and 
New Zealand. In spite of the fact that the demand for milking 
machines as a natural investment following on from the separator 
was large, for a long time it proved difficult to adapt it to agricul­
ture on account of technological circumstances. Only when the pul- 
sator was connected to the milking machines could the suction 
take place jvith frequent pauses, so that the damaging effect of 
the suction on the udders and nipples was avoided. The electri­
fication of the rural areas during the period between the wars 
definitely contributed to a certain extent to the solution of the 
problem of machine milking and brought about a certain spreading 
of the milking machines, but it was not until the demand for milk 
products; increased on account of the Second World War that the 
milking machine made its breakthrough, starting in the USA.
In the present research the reaction of agriculture to the in­
creased demand for agricultural products after 1850 has been 
studied by analysing the degree of mechanisation and commerciali­
sation of agriculture. The mechanisation and commercialisation of
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agriculture have directly contributed to industrialisation, and a 
special analysis of these processes in the pattern of interaction be­
tween agriculture and industry has been made. Of course each 
factor has not acted in isolation but several factors have acted 
together in some form in larger fields of force. The growth of the 
agricultural sector was not achieved simply by the mechanisation 
of arable farming and cattle-farming but could also be brought 
about by improved farming methods, the introduction of more 
rational rotation of crops, and more intensive methods of cultiva­
tion with larger harvests, resulting in an increased number of har­
vests. New forms of soil improvement such as drainage and the 
systematic introduction of fertilizers began to be practised when 
the land reclamation expansion was drawing to an end. From the 
nineteenth century onwards scientific discoveries regarding cultiva­
tion and improvement by breeding became of ever increasing 
practical importance for the production capacity of agriculture. 
After the land reclamation expansion it was of greater importance 
to invest in forms of soil improvement, mechanisation and more 
intensive cultivation rather than to make any striking attempts to 
extend the existing acreage with new marginal land. Furthermore, 
the extended education in the nineteenth century in the forms 
both of general mass education and of more practically orientated 
teaching in agronomy contributed to the growth of the agricultural 
sector in Europe and the new immigration areas. The processes 
in agriculture mentioned above mostly developed side by side with 
the process of mechanisation, and their importance is stressed 
mainly in order to give a certain balance to the large field of force 
which caused the expansion of the agricultural sector. In fact a 
large proportion of the inventions which were engendered by the 
new situation were closely linked with the mechanisation of agricul­
ture, and as the mechanisation aspect is considered fundamental 
its rôle has been deliberate subjected to intensive study.243
When society has been studied in sectors the agricultural sector’s 
various contributions to the growth of the economy have usually
243 Gould, J. D., Economic Growth in History, pp. 95 ff. Kudse, J., Från redskap 
till maskiner. Mekaniseringsspridning och kommersialisering inom svenskt jordbruk 
1860-1910, pp. 17 ff. and also pp. 31 ff.
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been pointed out. First, an increased productivity in agriculture has 
led to a greater volume of agricultural production and has brought 
about a direct increase in national production. Secondly, emphasis 
has been placed on the importance of the agricultural sector as a 
customer for capital goods and consumer goods, the farmers thus 
constituting an important and growing market for other sectors of 
society, especially in times of agricultural expansion. Thirdly, an 
increase in agricultural production has been able to provide transfer 
profits for the national economy when the possibilities of trans­
ferring labour to other sectors of the economy with greater produc­
tivity were facilitated and speeded up. The first and third contri­
butions mentioned above seem quite plain, but as regards the 
aspect of agriculture’s contribution to development via the market, 
it would probably be more appropriate to link it with the concept 
of balanced growth. According to this concept development is con­
sidered more from an intersectoral point of view, and parallel 
growth in agriculture and industry is advocated as the best strategy 
for development. The market for industrial products must in the 
main be sought in domestic agriculture, as the agricultural sector 
is large, but if farming is to be stimulated to higher productivity, 
industry and the urban population must buy agricultural produce 
and offer consumer goods to the farmer in exchange, as an in­
centive for further agricultural expansion. The best-known attempt 
at industrialisation contrary to the principle of balanced growth was 
made by the Russian state during the 1890s, when industrialisation 
was forced forwards at the expense of the farmers, who constituted 
about 80 per cent of the population. However, the attempt at 
industrialisation was halted on account of Stolypin’s agricultural 
reforms after the revolution in 1905, and economic development 
was linked more closely to the principle of balanced growth. In 
contrast to the Russian experiment countries with a more even 
industrialisation such as North America, large parts of Europe and 
Japan, experienced a plain expansion during the course of early indu­
strialisation, even though the paths taken by the individual countries 
to attain this expansion varied according to the economic conditions.244
244 Gould, J. D., op. cit., pp. IOOff. Higgins, B., Economic Development. Principles, 
Problems and Policies, pp. 327 ff.
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Mechanised agriculture’s orders from industry were thus a key 
factor in the early industrialisation in several countries. Agricul­
tural technology orders became of particular importance to the en­
gineering industries in countries such as the USA, Canada, Ger­
many and Sweden. Furthermore, the mechanisation and commer­
cialisation of agriculture led to the development of a lot of food 
industries, as agriculture was able to improve and distribute its 
produce in a more rational way through the food industry. Flour­
mills, bakeries, dairies, slaughterhouses, sugar refineries and 
breweries became on the whole machine-intensive sectors of in­
dustry. The extensive orders for machinery by the food industry 
from the engineering industry were therefore significant chain reac­
tions from the commercialisation process in agriculture.
Most of the engineering works which supplied farming with 
agricultural technology were comparatively small company units 
whose business was based mainly on a local market. They are 
represented by Lilia Harrie and Skurup in Scania among the work­
shops studied in the present work. The sales contacts between the 
many small workshops and the farms became more direct than such 
contacts as the larger companies, which aimed at covering regional 
and national markets, were able to develop. For many of the 
smaller farmers, who hesitated about making an investment, the 
opportunity of direct contact with the supplier was a valuable 
psychological asset. The larger engineering works, with middle­
men as special distributors, concentrated perhaps primarily on farm­
ers who were more aware of agricultural technology, and a 
hesitant buyer might regard them as anonymous sellers of agricul­
tural implements and machinery. Therefore many smaller engineer­
ing works found the local market a suitable base, affording them 
sufficient ‘IebensraunT in which to work and develop. With their 
special aim of sales and service, the smaller engineering works 
were complementary to the larger ones in agricultural technology. 
Most of the smaller engineering works which produced farming 
implements and machinery were to be found in rural areas. In­
dustrialisation in Sweden was for a long time a rural phenomenon, 
and agricultural orders placed with the small workshops contributed 
to a high degree to the industrialisation of the rural areas in Swe­
den. The same tendencies were not as pronounced in the USA,
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where the concentration of companies at the beginning of the twen­
tieth century was carried much further than in Sweden. Some of 
the largest American manufacturers of agricultural technology 
developed into giants in the industry, with far-reaching vertical and 
horizontal company integration. These multinational companies, of 
which International Harvester was the most prominent, achieved an 
enormous market range. AB Separator was the only multinational 
company in the agricultural technology industry in Sweden before 
the First World War, and it achieved its position by concentrating 
on the foreign market and limiting its production to separators to 
a great extent. Through far-reaching integration the large groups 
were able to act comparatively independently of the sub-contractors 
of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials. However, medium­
sized and smaller producers of agricultural implements and 
machinery usually became dependent on a network of sub-contrac­
tors. The establishment of these sub-contractors constituted another 
example of an industrial chain reaction through the mechanisation 
of agriculture.
The fact that the expansion of agriculture during the nineteenth 
century was not just caused by mechanisation has already been 
pointed out. In several modern industrial countries mechanisation 
did in fact play a significant part and stimulated the establishment 
of a domestic engineering industry. The clearest case is that of the 
USA. Britain, and Japan are examples of countries in which orders 
for agricultural technology played a somewhat smaller part in the 
development of the domestic industry. Britain’s progress in agricul­
ture was due more to organisational changes, soil improvement 
and more intensive cultivation. Furthermore, the industrial revolu­
tion had been in existence in England for more than a hundred 
years before orders of a more significant size from farming for 
agricultural technology could affect the English engineering in­
dustry.
In Japan the production capacity of agriculture was increased 
at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries mainly through intensive farming methods, and the system 
of double harvests in each year spread northwards in Japan. The 
conditions for the establishment of a mechanised agriculture were 
few in Japan as compared with the USA. In Japan there was a
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shortage of arable land and the population density led to an 
abundance of cheap labour. Nevertheless the technology was adop­
ted in Japanese agriculture, but it was a question of small-scale 
technology which could be suitably combined with a plentiful 
supply of labour. In Japan first the American and then the European 
technology was borrowed, but it only proved suitable in a small 
number of cases, and in this situation the Japanese, with technolog­
ical assistance from Americans and Europeans, created a small- 
scale agricultural technology which could raise the productivity on 
the many small farms. At the same time Japanese agriculture made 
use of European and American experience of soil improvement, 
plant breeding, planting seed selection and animal breeding which 
opened the way to more intensive farming. Industrialisation in 
Japan took place through good contact with agriculture. Agricul­
ture’s orders for less advanced agricultural technology certainly 
favoured the establishment of small engineering works, but as the 
demand for more advanced agricultural machinery was limited, 
these effects were less extensive from the point of view of in­
dustrialisation than they were in many other places. Instead the 
most outstanding example of contact between agriculture and in­
dustry in Japan was the expansive development of silk culture and 
the silk industry. A large part of the silk could be sold abroad. 
To a high degree it was the export income from the silk which 
enabled the Japanese to import goods which were important for the 
industrialisation of the country. Gradually Japanese industry was 
also able to diversify.245 Otherwise the export income from agricul­
ture usually played a great part for a long time in the industrial 
development of the countries which are now industrialised. For 
example, goods from the primary sector constituted almost 75 per 
cent in value of the USA’s exports as late as the 1890s, when the 
country had become the world’s leading industrial nation.24'*
The trade in agricultural implements and machinery which devel­
oped at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twen­
tieth centuries took place almost exclusively between the countries 
which are now industrialised. This is particularly apparent when one
245 Higgins, B., op. cit., pp. 617ff. 
248 Gould, J. D., op. cit., p. 108.
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compares the sales areas of the large groups International Har­
vester and AB Separator with one another. They show remarkable 
similarities, and the complete absence of the underdeveloped coun­
tries from the market is striking. It was the effects of the exten­
sive population transfer which to a high degree created at that time 
conditions for a mechanised agriculture in the industrialised coun­
tries of today. It is hardly possible for similar effects to arise today, 
and for mechanisation to solve the problem of agricultural produc­
tivity for today’s underdeveloped countries.
The continuation of mechanisation in Western capitalist agricul­
ture has gradually increased the productivity of the agricultural 
sector. In many cases high efficiency has now created more or less 
chronic surplus problems. Agriculture in the Soviet Union and 
China and to an even higher degree in the underdeveloped coun­
tries is forced to live with deficiency problems, and to appear to 
be more sensitive than agriculture in the Western world. Industrial 
technology does not vary much in the industrial countries and 
in the underdeveloped countries, whose industry insofar as they 
have one is based to a great extent on foreign investment, or in 
capitalist and socialist countries. The comparative difference in 
productivity between industrialised and underdeveloped countries 
therefore seems to be somewhat smaller in the industrial than in 
the agricultural sector. Thus the difference is great between the 
agricultural productivity of the industrial countries and that of the 
underdeveloped countries, and apparently also between that of the 
industrialised capitalist countries and socialist countries, and it is 
the agricultural sector which, in terms of employment, is still 
dominant in the underdeveloped countries and still fairly large in 
the socialist countries.247
An increase in the productivity of agriculture in the under­
developed countries therefore stands out as the only realistic solu­
tion to the world’s hunger problem. However, the underdeveloped 
countries are faced with a conflict between problems of economic 
efficiency and social problems of employment. By the introduction 
of a small-scale agricultural technology it would be possible to 
achieve a significant increase in productivity without at the same
247 Higgins, B., op.cit., pp. 202 ff. and also pp. 303 ff. Gould, J. D., op.cit., pp. 71 f.
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time making the employment situation worse, and to make profits 
by reducing the wastage which arises mainly in connection with 
harvesting and the stocking of harvests. Japan, who built up some­
thing of an early mobilisation economy during the Meji period, 
has shown one way to agricultural expansion by combining work­
intensive farming methods with a small-scale agricultural technol­
ogy, thereby creating a significant growth in the agricultural sector 
in spite of the fact that the conditions were not the most favour­
able. The adoption of work-intensive farming in combination with 
small-scale agricultural technology appears to constitute a reason­
able way to economic development in the underdeveloped countries 
under existing conditions. The success of this development will 
depend on the possibilities of devising an agricultural technology 
which in great measure is no longer relevant for the more advanced 
agriculture in the industrialised countries. In this respect the under­
developed countries have to bear the main responsibility, and com­
bine in a realistic way work-intensiveness and borrowed technology.
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